Amidst the huffing and puffing about Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s forthcoming visit to Chiang Mai, The Nation (22 November 2009: “Heavy security in North keeps protesters from PM”) reports on his recent official visit to Phitsanulok, Sukhothai and Phichit, all provinces where there is reasonably strong government support.
The Nation reports that the visits “went smoothly with no violence or disruption, thanks to heavy security that prevented anti-government protesters from getting close to him.” It says that his visit was protected by “[h]undreds of anti-riot police and four helicopters” in one district in Phitsanulok, with human barricade and metal barriers used to block the road.
It is said that “hundreds of red shirts gathered” to protest his visit, but police kept them a kilometer away from the prime minister.
Abhisit only came close to the thousands of organized supporters “including local villagers, politicians and officials” were arranged to greet the premier. Abhisit asked villagers if they were happy with the Democrat Party-led government’s projects “aimed at helping farmers” including subsidies. His organized followers provided the unsurprising response that “they were pleased.”
On these forays into rural areas, usually accompanied by thousands of police, military and officials, Abhisit records his weekly television address, attempting to give the impression that while he is seen as rooted in Bangkok, he is a man of the rural people.
Abhisit has made it clear that the Thai khemkaeng projects will be used to curry favor and, he hopes, win votes. He announced that Phitsanulok “would receive up to Bt3.8 billion from the Thai Khemkhaeng stimulus scheme next year, the highest budget for lower northern provinces.” Phitsanulok has 3 Democrat Party members of parliament.
On of those members described villagers giving Abhisit a “warm welcome” and “knew that Abhisit had come to help them.” He said the “government received a great response to its policies.” Indeed, he said, “Abhisit is very hot here.”
He’ll be hot in Chiang Mai also, but not because he’ll be surrounded by supporters. Red shirts in Chiang Mai are planning huge demonstrations against his visit. Red shirts have often over-estimated their numbers before, but Chiang Mai is a stronghold, so PPT would expect thousands of red shirts and thousands of security personnel. However, we would also expect the government to implement the Internal Security Act to limit and restrict protests.
When in opposition the Democrat Party seemed less concerned about protests against government leaders, and was also alleged to have been organizing protests in the south, with PAD, to “chase government ministers out of the south.” At the time, now Deputy Prime Minister in charge of security matters, Suthep Taugsuban, considered such protests an expression of public sentiment (see the Bangkok Post and Nation for July 2008).
Meanwhile, as often happens in these periods of increasing political activity, conservatives come out to support their political party. The Nation (22 November 2009: “Fierce political battles brewing”) reports that Pummarat Thaksadipong, a former director of the National Intelligence Agency, has come out to warn of likely red shirt violence. He says he has “intelligence” that violence would be used.
He predicts “[s]erious political confrontation – and possibly violence – could erupt during the upcoming months when Thaksin [Shinawatra] and his allies inside Parliament and on the streets employ an arsenal of tactics in a bid to effect a change in government.” The claim is that the Puea Thai Party “would disrupt the work of Parliament, and those who are protest leaders would instigate hatred against the government and possibly incite violence…”. This is all claimed to be motivated by Thaksin’s fear that his frozen Bt76 billion will be lost when the courts again rule against him and confiscate this “unusual wealth.”
Pro-government, pro-military senators joined this chorus, with Senator Paiboon Nititawan claiming that the red shirts want “to cause violence and deaths.” He claims they failed at this in April, and now want blood and deaths.
PPT agrees that the political heat has been significantly turned up, with all sides looking less restrained. The April Songkhran Uprising might indeed be something to think about again. However, if that anger and frustration were to boil over again, we have the impression that more brutal repression cannot be ruled out.
We say this because the government and its backers are also increasingly frustrated. PAD supporters are calling for blood. Other supporters – like Senator Paiboon – are stirring the flames of conflict. It also seems that the government and its powerful backers are convinced that decisive action is required. The government has become more repressive and more reliant on the security apparatus. With better control of the police now established, harsher repression is increasingly likely.
We hope we have this wrong.
Update: The Nation’s Political Desk has joined the frenzy of claims and counter-claims on pending violence (23 November 2009: “Desperate Thaksin may go for broke”). Misleadingly claiming that its story is “analysis,” the report claims that that the assets declaration case against Thaksin makes him desperate: “During the Songkran mayhem, the premier almost lost his life when his car was attacked by red-shirted people at the Interior Ministry. Some fear that Thaksin’s new battle may repeat history.” The Nation doesn’t say who, but PPT covered that above. It adds: “It would be no surprise if Thaksin sets off on a ‘kamikaze’ mission and takes the country hostage as he has always done – putting his personal interest before the country’s.”
It wouldn’t surprise the Nation’s reporters because they have been predicting violence for months. But like others supporting the government, they see this as a one-sided argument and ignore the repressive measures used against red shirts and other opponents of the Abhisit government. They also happily parrot the claims made by provocative figures in the government’s ranks and those behind the government.
