The Nation (8 February 2010) has an editorial on human rights that is about as muddled as one can get. Entitled “Thailand in the world spotlight on human rights” the editorial writer has this tortured logic (pun intended):

The current Thai government is somehow remiss for “allowing” Thailand’s human rights record to be scrutinized by outsiders, viz: “Thailand is either very smart or the silliest country in the world for allowing the international community, especially human rights organisations, to scrutinise its human rights record,” and “One wonders how many countries in the world, especially within Asean, would allow these organisations to dissect the government’s legislation and practices to the tee.”

This is dumb, misinformed or both. The organizations mentioned are Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Commission for Jurists (ICJ), both of which regularly report on a large range of countries, including many that actively try to prevent scrutiny.

At another level these statements are deeply troubling for suggesting that perhaps Thailand should join those countries that try to prevent scrutiny or define human rights in terms that allow abuses.

Yet the author agrees that the “verdict is quite clear: Thailand can do better than it has recently.” Then it is stated: “Thailand genuinely believes in democracy and human rights. This government has a policy to promote and protect human rights inside the country and within the Asean region.” Then, this preposterous statement: “Luckily, Thailand is improving in its human rights record by the day.”

The point of the HRW report was to point to a list of abuses. This is not saying that things are getting better. The author says the HRW report is a “good example of how a well-respected human rights advocacy group would like to see greater improvement of rights practices in Thailand. So, HRW came out with harsh criticism and lists of recommendations.” The issue is partly that the Abhisit Vejjajiva government has made a song and dance of saying it protects human rights but does something else.

Then, like a number of government supporters who have been sent out to work on the blogs, the editor states: “HRW overdid it in the press release attacking Thailand’s human rights record, especially the government’s response to political turmoil due to the polarisation of various political pressure groups.”

This is a fallacy. The press release shows little substantive difference from the full report. It is just much shorter and uses some synonyms that lazy readers, including government ministers, chose to interpret as having a deep and dangerous meaning. The government’s chief of censorship and propaganda, Sathit Wongnongtoey – described in the editorial as making “immature comments” – actually accused HRW of getting red shirt information and publishing it. As PPT pointed out at the time, the press release sections on “political turmoil” matched the government’s own statements at the time of the Songkhran Uprising.

The editorial then goes off on a “I love Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva” tangent, claiming that Abhisit welcomed the HRW report as “a noble objective.” It is added that “Abhisit was not perturbed by the report, which he pledged to investigate further on alleged human rights violations here. It was only Abhisit’s own ethics and belief in human rights that let such a hard personal attack on him pass. If previous governments had been involved, representatives of the HRW would have been expelled without doubt.”

Readers of PPT knows that we have repeatedly pointed out that Abhisit has a penchant for PR statements that are then shown to be untrue, so we have no illusions that would suggest that we should love Abhisit as the only noble amongst a bunch of nasty, horrible politicians. Our comments on Abhisit’s odd initial comments on the HRW report are here.

The comment on human rights representatives being expelled seems odd. As far as PPT can recall (correct us if we are wrong) no representative of an international human rights organization has been expelled in the past decade and more. We think the last person expelled who was involved with human rights was back in mid-2000. Of course, Thaksin Shinawatra wasn’t too fond of international scrutiny on human rights and was wont to overreact.

Remarkably, the editorial admits the gap between Abhisit’s promises and what happens on the ground. This is the explanation: “the biggest problem so far has been whenever there are clear policies emanating from Abhisit and concerned authorities on rights issues, officials on the ground have failed to implement them in effective ways, especially in the troubled South. So, there are great discrepancies between pronounced policies and implementation; encouraging the stereotype belief that the Abhisit government has double standards and is hypocritical.”

Stereotype? Rohinga, Hmong, Karen stereotypes? Lese majeste stereotypes? And so on. Actually, this is a chorus now emanating from the Democrat Party. Its tripe, but the more ludicrous expansions of this involve an evil plot by pro-Thaksin Shinawatra groups to destabilize the government. PPT thinks the polite terminology for this is grasping at straws.

The editorial writer describes the ICJ report on the use of the Internal Security Act as an “excellent report [that] urged the Thai government to improve on this frequently used legislation to ensure that Thai human rights are properly protected in times of political crisis.” The ICJ states: “While welcoming significant improvements to previous draft versions of the bill, the report warns that the ISA risks undermining the rule of law by conferring broad and vaguely defined preventative powers to the military-dominated Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC).” Its report expresses three main concerns:

· That many definitions and provisions are vague and overbroad, thus potentially criminalising a wide range of behaviours that pose no security threat;

· That fundamental rights – particularly those relating to liberty and security of the person, fair trial and due process, freedom of movement, association and expression – are at risk of being violated; and

· That sweeping powers granted to security forces risk undermining the principles of civilian authority and democratic governance.

This is trenchant criticism from an organization that is often reasonably conservative in the language it chooses.

The editorial then talks of the “key role” that the government played “in establishing the Asean Intergovernmental Commissioner for Human Rights.” The writer doesn’t point out that almost every sensible human rights agency thinks this mechanism is toothless if not useless.

In the end, is seeking to blame anyone but the very nice Mr. Abhisit, the editorial writer rounds on the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). The writer argues that the “current NHRC team has been a big disappointment for its failure to probe key human rights issues.” That’s an understatement.

But the editorial writer wants the NHRC to release more annual reports about the state of human rights in the country to educate Thai people. Well, yes, but the current NHRC is a toothless and largely unqualified panel that is really meant to be benign for the government.

It is clear that the writer wants better human rights in Thailand but the response is so muddled by the political debates of recent years that the writer can’t do much more than come up with a mish-mash of contradictions while knowing only that Abhisit has to be supported. The writer must know that letting the military and police get back huge and unchecked powers is a major reason for human rights abuses in Thailand under all governments. Abhisit owes his position to the military. That’s an unlikely foundation for improved human rights in Thailand.

What the writer forgets is that there is a human rights NGO in Thailand with a long history. And it happens that they have just released a report on 2009. We refer to the Union of Civil Liberty. UCL has had a long history of taking on difficult issues, but it too was and remains caught up in the remarkable political side-taking and censorship and self-censorship regarding the monarchy that has been heightened in recent years, so what is noticeably missing from their attempt at evenhandedness is any mention of political arrests under lese majeste (in the past, UCL was once a brave defender of those charged) and under the Computer Crimes Act. Even so, their assessment is an antidote to the Nation’s muddleheadedness.

Readers may find a new piece at Asia Sentinel (8 February 2010) of some interest. The report begins with the continuing buzz about a coup – and PPT has to confirm that this is the main topic of conversation in political circles – and then discusses the Thaksin Shinawatra asset case.

The article states: “Getting rid of Thaksin’s influence completely would presumably be the rationale for another coup. The military would take over and obliterate him once and for all.” Later it says: “The biggest beneficiaries of the coup talk are the pro-Thaksin group that needs to build momentum before a court rules Feb. 26 whether to seize about $2 billion in proceeds from his family’s 2006 sale of telecommunications firm Shin Corp. to Singapore’s Temasek Holdings.”

PPT is not sure how to reconcile these seemingly disparate statements. In fact, red shirts seem intent on preventing a coup – taxi drivers are on alert to surround tanks and armored personnel carriers if they come onto the streets. The government appears to think the coup talk is a red shirt attempt to destabilize the government. Some red shirts believe that the coup would be to stabilize and strengthen the government, with the military continuing to stand behind the Democrat Party but maybe not Abhisit Vejjajiva. The Asia Sentinel writer seems to think that Abhisit remains the military’s “best bet for the moment.”

On the Thaksin assets case, the article has this to say as background: “Like most of the court cases brought against Thaksin after the coup, the assets seizure case is more about politics than law. It’s anyone’s guess how it will turn out. Ever since head of state King Bhumibol Adulyadej instructed judges to solve the country’s political problems in 2006, nearly every legal decision has gone against Thaksin. Courts have nullified an election that he won, dissolved two parties linked to him, banned him and some 200 lawmakers associated with him from politics for five years, and slapped a 2-year prison sentence on him for abuse of power, should he actually ever reappear in Thailand. Prosecutors have at least three more criminal cases against him that they are keeping in the bag.”

The political chatter is about how much he will lose: all, some or none. On the latter, it is said that: “If the court were to exonerate Thaksin and give him the money back, it would undermine the whole rationale for ousting him in the first place and instantly boost his war chest for the next big election fight.”

The author thinks the court won’t take it all because that would cause political chaos and favors an outcome that sees Thaksin keeping half of the money. The author thinks this was the king’s message: “the king urged judges last month to stay in the middle’.” PPT guesses that Thaksin will lose the lot. There are stories of a deal being negotiated between Thaksin and the palace, but the rumor is that these talks were ineffective. The palace seldom forgives its enemies.

The article concludes this way: “With the military and coalition partners unlikely to abandon him, Abhisit looks like he can ride out any protests over the next month.” Further: “Abhisit will likely be able to muddle through 2010 without any major disasters before he’s forced to call an election next year.” That seems a reasonable guess but Thailand’s politics remains exceptionally volatile and bitter.

Meanwhile, the Abhisit government is preparing for red shirts not a coup. The Washington Post has an AP report (8 February 2010) that reports on the deployment of “about 20,000 security forces to brace for protests ahead of a widely anticipated court ruling on the … Thaksin [assets case]…”.

The remarkably supercilious acting spokesman Panitan Wattanayagorn said “more than 13,000 army, police and civilian security officers will be deployed across Thailand’s 38 provinces. About 6,000 additional security will be deployed in the capital, where 200 checkpoints will be set up at ‘every entrance into Bangkok’…”. PPT recalls that the military used this roadblock tactic after the coup to prevent the free movement of citizens.

This deployment has begun and will expand next week. As PPT stated previously, we think the movement of 22 armored personnel carriers was part of these preparations.

Panitan explained: “We don’t want a repeat of what happened last April when the troops came out a little late…”. He added that would invoke his baby, the Internal Security Act, if required.

PPT has kind of thought that the royalists would be pretty happy with the Democrat Party-led coalition they maneuvered into power with the help of the military a year ago. While the government hasn’t dealt a death blow to Thaksin Shinawatra and the red shirts, in terms of being royalist, the Abhisit Vejjajiva government would seem to have done the right things.

The government has jailed critics on lese majeste and Computer Crimes charges, blocked tens of thousands of critical website, had millions brought out to demonstrate “loyalty” and “love” in various ways, and it has spent millions if not billions on royal propaganda and other royal things.

But it seems this may not be sufficient. The Bangkok Post (7 February 2010) reports that Privy councilor Air Chief Marshal Kamthon Sindhavananda has said that the Abhisit government appeared to be “on the defensive” when it came to preventing insults against the monarchy. Kamthon complained that the government was way to slow in responding to attacks and insults aimed at the monarchy.

PPT foolishly imagined that the palace might have been grateful that the government seems to have shifted the bad press regarding lese majeste off the front pages of newspapers. Apparently not. It seems the old guys at the privy council want even more people locked up.

When asked about Kamthon’s comment yesterday, Abhisit looked uncomfortable, but said he would listen to the honorable one’s advice and he “pledged to improve mechanisms to safeguard the royal institution…”. The premier reaffirmed that “protecting the monarchy is the government’s top priority…”.

It seems that the privy councilor may not be happy with Abhisit’s new “committee charged with providing advice on lese majeste cases to make sure the monarchy is not embroiled in politics.”

In the same report, there is a photo of gleeful banned politician Newin Chidchob displaying his great love for the monarchy by launching the Bhum Jai Thai Party’s king lover’s website. Newin said the “website will give Thais another channel to express their love and allegiance to the King.” One of hundreds. Expecting challenges, Newin said that his “website staff will continually monitor and filter out messages posted on the website that are deemed inappropriate.”

The site is actually a mess, so maybe he should have had someone update the website before “launching” it. But that isn’t really the point as Newin simply wants to be seen as a staunch royalist.

In a related Bangkok Post (7 February 2010) story Privy Council president General Prem Tinsulanonda is reported to have made a speech at Rangsit University (where there are strong royal, yellow shirt and Democrat Party connections) calling for “good” leaders.

Taking a leaf out of Jakrapob Penkair’s 29 August 2007 speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand (FCCT), Prem claims that “nepotism, cronyism and the patronage system are key factors in making Thai leaders ignore justice and the rule of law…”.

Jakkrapob said essentially the same thing, and got charged with lese majeste because he linked the system to the current monarch and his flunkies, including Prem.

The Post states: “Without identifying any leader, Gen Prem said that forms of relationships in Thai society – relatives, friends, and those who do someone favours – are key factors in shaping the mindset of Thai leaders.” Of course, a monarchy is a prime example of nepotism and everyone knows that an “in” with the palace is exceptionally powerful, so maybe Prem is living in a very large and well-appointed glass house.

Prem’s solution is to look to the military – what a thing to say when coup rumors are everywhere! The old general disparages politicians when he says: “many people have volunteered to be leaders but they lacked the charisma needed to lead people.” Prem urges a search for “charismatic [barami] leaders to work for the good of the country…”.

Prem seems to support Abhisit when he states: that “good leaders [must] be able to differentiate between the good and the bad and uphold justice. They must have moral integrity and must make sure their colleagues also maintain those standards.” That’s exactly the image Abhisit tries to portray.

And, of course, leaders “must be loyal to His Majesty the King and act in the best interests of the country.” Good old-fashioned Thai-style democracy, repacked from the late 1950s.

Regular readers may remember that about a week ago PPT said that, as the political heat rose we could expect more noise from the palace. It seems to have begun in earnest.

When the People’s Alliance for Democracy was cranking up in 2005 there was an ever so brief brief moment when a broad coalition of anti-Thaksin Shinawatra groups seemed like a movement for democracy. PAD was soon taken over by the ego-driven Sondhi Limthongkul, a failed but resurrected media tycoon. His ethnic Chinese slogans, hyper-nationalism and wild black magic beliefs were soon on display as he linked with military, palace and security figures on the right.

The red shirts, so long lampooned by their opponents as little more than Thaksin acolytes, appear to have hit upon strategies with some broad traction – anti-coup, highlighting double standards. They also have a couple of recent victories against the military leadership and Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont. Their smaller demonstrations have been highly effective. But for a while this week they seemed in danger of being shanghaied by the strange ideas of a couple of dangerous men.

The more democratic strategists amongst the red shirts have long cringed at being associated with General Panlop Pinmanee and Khattiya Sawasdipol (Seh Daeng). The unreformed right-wing military men are associated with some of the most evil elements of the post-Cold War Thai army. Vicious, manipulative and seemingly unprincipled nak leng, their antics of the past couple of days risk having the red shirt movement seen in the same light. (For readers unaware of the background of Panlop and Seh Daeng, just Google about a bit and prepare to be startled by their claims of political murder and so on.)

The Nation (5 February 2010) reports that both men recently met with Thaksin. On Wednesday, Panlop is reported to have said that an “armed offshoot” of the red shirts would be formed and that General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh “would lead the red shirts to victory.” Seh Daeng reportedly added that “the organisational structure of the opposition movement was now complete with Pheu Thai as the party, the red shirts as its front and the armed units.”

Other reports don’t refer to “arms” but to a “people’s army for democracy” or, as The Nation has it, bizarrely, a “People’s Army for Democracy under His Majesty the King.” PPT suspects that some of the mainstream media are beating the story up. Certainly, the yellow-shirt media has been strong in seeing a “people’s army” communism at work. As examples, see the remarkable bleating of Thanong Khanthong in The Nation (February 5, 2010) and of Boonlert Changyai in Matichon, summarized here.

As a footnote, Boonlert states that the real political competition is “between the Thaksin-backed Puea Thai Party and his red-shirt supporters on one side and Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda and the Abhisit Vejjajiva government on the other…”.

But back to Panlop and Khattiya. They demanded that the government “negotiate a settlement with Thaksin or risk facing an eruption of violence in which even Thaksin would not be able to control what the red shirts would do.”

That doesn’t sound like a “people’s army.” In fact, in a later story, Panlop “insisted that the ‘people’s army’ would not be armed. However, it would be an effective people’s army which had clear policies and adhered to peaceful struggle. It should be able to draw more people to join it in a larger number than sympathisers of the red shirts…” (Bangkok Post, 6 February 2010). Perhaps, but the damage to the image of the red shirts has been significant.

Chavalit was forced to deny the claims, saying in The Nation, “I resumed my political activities because I aspire to bring about social unity, and peace by peaceful means…”. He added that “he was in complete agreement with ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra, who he believes is an advocate for peaceful means,” considering himself a “part of the movement to advance justice and democracy but not in a violent way.”

Red-shirt leader Jatuporn Promphan also “said his movement would not resort to violence and insisted its members would fight through peaceful means” (The Nation, 5 February 2010) for whom the civil war has begun.

Despite the backtracking Panlop and Seh Daeng have allowed the government and the military to engage in scare tactics, recall the Songkhran Uprising and to make preparations for violence, with (Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban saying that the “people’s army” statement is a “threat to national security.”

Panlop has now said that he has left the red shirts (Bangkok Post, 6 February 2010). Claiming that Jatuporn said he “did not represent the views of the red shirts,” Panlop explained that he “would end his participation in the UDD. If any serious incidents took place in February, it should be clear that he had anything to do with them…”.

Here’s the issue for the red shirt movement. Panlop and Seh Daeng might have their uses, but allowing them to have a high profile risks allowing the far right to take over the movement. That happened to PAD as the democratic and anti-royal groups were sidelined by a right wing led by Sonthi, Chamlong Srimuang and Prasong Soonsiri, in cahoots with the palace. A rightist takeover of the red shirts would doom it to a clash between rightist forces or worse, a deal amongst rightists. That’s bad for democracy and bad for human rights.

Update: Update: The Bangkok Post (7 February 2010) has a story on Newin’s Buriram PEA footbal team.

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A few days ago PPT had a short comment on “Privileges of wealth and position”. In that post we mentioned the demise of PB Air and its estimated 2 billion baht in liabilities. The airline was associated with Piya Bhirombhakdi, who is now off doing his new luxurious hospitality venture, the 3-billion-baht Ritz-Carlton Reserve in Krabi. We mentioned the Bhirombhakdi family’s royal connections.

In this post, PPT wants to add more on royal and political connections.

We begin with a column by former Thai Rak Thai Party man Suranand Vejjajiva (Bangkok Post, 5 February 2010) where he writes of the Ministry of Interior’s plan to “set up a satellite television channel, TV Mahadthai to create a better understanding of the ministry’s policies and activities, with special emphasis on ‘protecting the institution [of the monarchy]’.” When combined with appearances by “the interior minister, his deputies, the directors-general of various departments and the provincial governors” one could hardly imagine anything more boring, and in the minister’s case, would probably be barely intelligible.

This is yet another way to waste of taxpayer’s money for the benefit of particular interests. But here’s the interesting bit: the press has noticed that this is a Phum Jai Thai Party exercise, with the backing of Newin Chidchob and his family: so they call it “Blue TV.” It isn’t as if Thailand needs more pro-government and pro-monarchy television. The country is full of this propaganda and it is currently becoming more dense.

Newin has promoted his Phum Jai Thai as a monarchy-loving and monarchy-protecting party promising a Thaksin Shinawatra-like return to the good economic times. Newin appears regularly on television at royal-related events, promoting clumsy and obvious kinds of royal propaganda. But it is blue for his party and for the royal he seems to be most keen to support.

Related, it is widely reported that Newin has bought one of Thailand’s major league football teams. Newin is the new chairman of Buri Rum-Provincial Electricity Authority FC. Of course, its kit is blue. What was most interesting for PPT in the extensive television coverage was the sponsors: Chang Beer and King Power.

Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi is the owner of Chang. He is well known as one of Thailand’s wealthiest men but has been reasonably publicity shy. Lycos Retriever has some details. There’s also a chapter on him in Pasuk and Baker’s Thai Capital published in 2008. Family details are available here. He has good bureaucratic contacts through his liquor and beer businesses. Charoen has been a generous donor to royal activities. He is remarkably powerful and has huge cash flow, which makes him a valuable political ally.

The King Power link to Newin has been known for several years. Vichai Raksriaksorn has been one of Newin’s strongest supporters and he is wealthy, politically active and a big supporter of things royal. He is the one credited with having “plagiarized” the Lance Armstrong plastic bracelets in Thailand and made them Long live the king bracelets and raised a fortune that he handed over to the palace.

Vichai’s background is not very clear. In 2007 he was ranked by Forbes as Thailand’s 21st wealthiest, worth about US$200 million. He’s much richer than that now. The best available account of King Power and its economic and political power is by Chang Noi. The airport monopoly also provides the huge cash flow that are a political asset.

Vichai almost single-handedly established and developed the rich person’s sport of polo in Thailand. You’d think this was little more than a hobby, but through his Thailand Polo Association, Vichai has been able to link to royals worldwide – they all seem to play this ostentatious sport – and this has added greatly to his credibility in Thailand’s high society. The Association is also populated by “advisers” who are generals in the police and military.

To bring the connections back to where we began, PPT suggests looking at the Thai-language edition of the U.K.’s Hello magazine often highlights royals, the rich (Charoen’s son’s engagement and wedding was covered) and polo. In the print version of the latest issue, pictured at the website, but with no detail, has an advertisement for a 20 February fund-raising polo game that is called the Queen’s Cup, for “ladies” on page 97. They also have a King’s Cup for the gentlemen players. This advertisement features M.L. Piyapas Bhirombhakdi, lady-in-waiting to the queen.

Being back with a Bhirombhakdi means we are now full circle on the connections, with Newin and the queen featuring.

Update: The repatriation, forcible, has apparently begun (The Irrawaddy, 5 February 2010)

Further Updated: The Bangkok Post (6 February 2010) claims that the military said the repatriations yesterday were “voluntary” and have now ceased following domestic and international pressure.

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Following up on PPT’s earlier report , a report in The Irrawaddy (4 February 2010) suggests that the forced repatriation of up to 3,000 Karen to Burma will begin today (Friday).

The report states: “The refugees fled fighting in Burma between the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the Karen National Union (KNU) in June 2009, and now fear for their safety if they return to their homes in a heavily mined area still occupied by the DKBA. The DKBA is an ally of the Burmese army.”

The UNHCR says that it met Thai government authorities on 28 January, and “reached an agreement with them that no forced repatriation would take place.” UNCHR continues to hope that the “Thai authorities to honour that agreement.”

A letter from more than 70 NGOs has urged the Thai government to “suspend any action to push the refugees back, pending genuine participatory and open investigation led by authorities and the UNHCR.” According to the UNHCR: “In our interviews with the refugees, none expressed any desire to return home.”

According to one of the NGO leaders: “this issue is more to do with the army than the government.” He said, “In principle, the government can decide what to do with this case, but in reality, it seems the army has more power.”

On Thursday, police raided the homes and offices of Karen Nation Union leaders and Karen journalists in Mae Sot (The Irrawaddy, 4 February 2010).

Meanwhile, a police officer at the Phop Phra district police station near Mae Sot “who admitted to being involved in the killing of nine Karen job-seekers, committed suicide on Jan. 30, a police official said at a press conference in Tak Province…”. The story (The Irrawaddy, 4 February 2010) claims that he committed suicide after admitting his involvement.

All of these events suggest the Thai authorities in the area, led by the army, are seeking to assert total control in the border area, reinstitute a climate of fear, and strengthen their ties to the Burmese regime. All of this at the expense of the limited human rights gains made over the past few years in the Mae Sot area. It is probably no coincidence that businessmen in Mae Sot are expecting increasing investment and trade with Burma at a time when the military reasserts its authority in the area.

The military can do this because it lacks any civilian oversight from a government that is beholden to it.