In case readers missed it, the Bangkok Post (25 November 2009: “DSI to investigate Thaksin interview”) reports that “the committee on special cases” has agreed that the “Department of Special Investigation (DSI) should investigate comments made by former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in an interview with a reporter from The Times newspaper.”

What is “the committee  on special cases”? It is explained by DSI deputy chief Police Colonel Narat Savetnant. He says it is “the committee, known as the DSI board and chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban…”. He says that the committee has “decided to take it [the Times interview] as a special case since Thaksin’s comments, published … on Nov 9, could constitute lese majeste and might be deemed a threat to national security under the Criminal Code.”

Any fair reading of the said interview would not reveal lese majeste or threats to national security. But this is Thailand, the monarchy and Thaksin so fairness is not a consideration. Should the DSI find lese majeste or a national security threat in this, then any commentary on the monarchy is going to be under threat. The depths being plunged are murky indeed and the precedents being set under the Democrat Party are for repression and authoritarianism.

Samak Sundaravej passed away and the obituaries are dissecting his past and noting that he was a complex political figure. PPT doesn’t plan to add too much to those discussions. Samak was one of Thailand’s old guard who was able to stay on the scene and politically relevent because many basic features of Thai politics remained unchanged. In other words, because the political environment changed relatively slowly, the political dinosaurs have been able to adapt and even thrive.

Samak was an anti-communist rightist who spared little time for human rights. That’s pretty much true. His period as Minister of the Interior under the palace’s prime minister Tanin Kraivixien (still a member of the king’s Privy Council) in 1976-77 was one of the most repressive in the modern era. Samak had hundreds of alleged leftists arrested and his tactics led to many fleeing Thailand or joining the CPT in the jungle.

Earlier, he had a critical role in the events that resulted in the massacre of students at Thammasat University on 6 October 1976. Samak is seen to have encouraged ousted dictator Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn to return to Thailand, setting off demonstrations that led to the Thammasat massacre. At the time, Samak was a close associate of Queen Sirikit and Samak claimed that the king wanted Thanom to return. When the royal family showed up to welcome Thanom on his return, Samak’s claims were vindicated.

More than this, Samak organized anti-government rightists to bring down the government and contributed to the extremist actions that led to horrendous events. Samak continued to deny the Thammasat massacre until the end.

Another rogue of this period, Chamlong Srimuang, whose role in the 1976 events is far murkier, has commented on Samak’s passing. In the Nation (25 November 2009: “Samak never knew I voted for him : Chamlong”), Chamlong says that things that show another side of Samak.

Chamlong says he used to vote for Samak when he was a “young-blood politician…”. In other words, when Samak was a hard-core rightist anti-communist. They became enemies as time went on. Chamlong explains that Samak “didn’t like the Santi Asoke Buddhist sect that much and I happened to be one of its members.” They also clashed over abortion rights when Chamlong was secretary-general to then Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda. Samak want a “liberalisation of abortion” whereas the fundamentalist Chamlong mobilized to kill the bill. And, Chamlong explains that Samak was not prepared to be at Prem’s beck and call. So not all bad.

That animosity between Prem and Samak was reinvigorated when Thaksin Shinawatra nominated Samak to lead the People’s Power Party following the 2006 military-palace coup and the dissolution of the Thai Rak Thai Party and banning of its leading members. That bitter rivalry eventually saw Samak ousted on very minor charges essentially trumped up by courts that sort every means to defeat the “Thaksin regime.”

Like so many of the dinosaurs that continue to stride the political stage, Samak’s longevity had much to do with the conservatism fostered by the weight of authoritarian and undemocratic institutions like the monarchy, bureaucracy and military. Until that hold is broken, human rights in Thailand are doomed to more dark days.

Update: Ji Ungpakorn has a comment here.

In the least surprising of announcements from the Democrat Party-led government, Cabinet has decided to enforce the Internal Security Act over the whole of Bangkok from 28 November to 14 December (Bangkok Post, 24 November 2009: “ISA to be enforced throughout Bangkok”).

The government’s tame Federation of Thai Industries again supported the imposition of the ISA.

The government says it fears a repeat of the April Songkhran Uprising. It also states that it believes that Thaksin Shinawatra supporters are mounting a go-for-broke campaign because of the assets case against the former premier. They might also add that it is now the anniversary of the PAD airport occupation and the hastily decided court case against government parties that gave the Democrat Party its current position as the protectors of the monarchy.

Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva fully supported the imposition of the “ISA across the capital [as] necessary to ensure law and order…”. Abhisit joined his deputy Suthep Thaugsuban in claiming that he saw as credible “reports that people, including foreign workers, have been gathered from different regions to join the demonstration…”.

As PPT pointed out yesterday, such claims are reprehensible for several reasons.

Prachatai (23 November 2009: “Computer Crimes Act too ambiguous”; 9 November 2009: สัมภาษณ์ ‘สาวตรี สุขศรี’: ชำแหละ พ.ร.บ.คอมพิวเตอร์ อาวุธใหม่สั่นสะเทือนโลกไซเบอร์) has a useful story on the Computer Crimes Act. The report is based on an interview with Ajan Sawatree Suksri, a lecturer of the Faculty of Law, Thammasat University.

Sawatree has studied computer-related law in Germany. Her conclusion is that Thailand’s 2007 Computer Crimes Act is too ambiguous, especially on “national security,” allowing for “arbitrary interpretations by the authorities.”

She also points out some of the absurdities associated with the recent arrest of the royal health rumors 4.

Also available as ยุให้แยง ตะแคงให้รั่วหรือไง

For some time PPT has been concerned that the political strategy adopted by the Democrat Party and the government that it leads has been increasingly repressive. A party that has come to government by the combined actions of the military and royalists is inevitably underpinned by the forces that have backed authoritarian regimes for several decades.

We have pointed to the government’s use of lese majeste and computer crimes laws to limit freedom of expression in the media and more broadly. These laws have also been used to intimidate and lock up opponents of the royalist regime. PPT has repeatedly pointed out that the Democrat Party-led government has used the Internal Security Act to limit the right to legal protest.

Several times we have pointed out that the government has glaring double standards, selectively applying laws when it acts against perceived opponents while supporting allies.

PPT has also been concerned about the language that has been used in recent days to attack opponents, in particular noting the increased tendency to label political opponents as traitors. We have observed that the government and its allies, most especially rightists and the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), have been using ultra-nationalist discourses to attack opponents and to ramp up anger and xenophobia against “traitors” who do not support “Nation, Religion and Monarchy.”

PPT has pointed out that these calls have, in previous years, resulted in violence, and we pointed to events in the 1973-76 period, which ended with a massacre of students at Thammasat University, led by extreme rightists imbued with royalist, anti-communist and nationalist propaganda that revolved around concocted and exaggerated “stories” sometimes peddled by the mainstream media (on 1976, go here for a PDF).

PPT is therefore disturbed to see similar trends developing in 2009. In an earlier post, we discussed the alleged car bomb threat to Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. We pointed out that back on 15 July 2006, when there were reports of an assassination plot against Thaksin Shinawatra, a spokesperson for the Democrat Party was dismissive. And in August 2006, when the government claimed a  failed car bomb assassination attempt against Thaksin, with arrests made and a bomb displayed, there was widespread skepticism, including from the Bangkok Post and other mainstream media. Academics urged the government to resist using the “plot” as a pretense for repression.

We asked: where is that skepticism now? Where are the academic protectors of human rights?

By the way, it is reported that the “Chiang Mai Provincial Court Monday rejected police’s request for an arrest warrant against a local red-shirt on ground that police’s evidence is too weak.”

Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Taugsuban has added to the choking feeling of deja vu that is enveloping Thailand. In the Bangkok Post (23 September 2009: “Govt: Aliens banned from protests”) he is reported to have stated that the “government believes the red-shirt United Front for Democracy against Democracy (UDD) is planning to use foreign workers to swell the numbers at its planned anti-government rallies…”.

The government has set about warning “employers that foreign labourers would not be allowed to take part in the series of protests planned to begin on Nov 29 …”. Suthep warned that the “government will take legal action if they fail to comply, because only Thai people have the right to voice their political opinions…”. PPT emphasizes this last point because we do not believe that we have seen this point stated previously. All of those foreign commentators in Thai newspapers had better be on guard from now on.

More seriously, this statement by Suthep is reprehensible for two other reasons. First, it targets migrant workers, arguably the most marginalized and exploited group in Thailand, and does so in a way that could engender hatred against them. Second, as a correspondent to Bangkok Pundit notes, this move has scary resonances with 1976 massacre, when it was rumored that the Thammasat students had been infiltrated by Vietnamese communists.

As the Democrat Party and the government moves once again to invoke the Internal Security Act, PPT is coming to the conclusion that the government is provoking conflict. We are yet to be convinced that this is a deliberate strategy. It may be that the government is simply piling up repression and provocation and is unaware of the cumulative impact. More seriously, it could also be that the strategy is, as PAD speakers urged, a strategy aimed at “traitors” that means finally and “quickly finish[ing] them off for the sake of our beloved King and ancestors, so that Thais stop quarrelling with one another because of these scoundrels.”

The Democrat Party’s Prime Minister’s Office Minister and chief of double standards Sathit Wongnongtoey uses every opportunity to use the power of the state to repress his party’s opponents. Allegations against a community radio host in Chiang Mai are now allowing him to go after at least 20 broadcasters (Bangkok Post, 23 November 2009: “Evidence sought to arrest radio host for threatening premier”).

As PPT has already pointed out, pursuing one red shirt announcer who may have made a threat against Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva reeks of double standards when just days before the PAD called for the beheading of the government’s opponents and this brought no condemnation from Sathit and his fellow minsters.

Playing on the story from Chiang Mai, Sathit has ordered the “National Telecommunication Commission to examine the licences of community radio stations that incited listeners to kill the prime minister.” For Sathit, there are apparently several radio stations now involved. The NTC can close stations that are unlicensed.

The Post report states that about “20 community radio stations were inciting protest action against his government. They were located in areas of red shirt support, in Bangkok and elsewhere.” There’s a considerable difference between calling for protests and calling for assassination.

Meanwhile, even without the Internal Security Act yet implemented, authorities are attempting to limit red shirt and anti-government protests in Chiang Mai: “Protesters would be allowed to rally on a ground at the Tha Phae gate when the prime minister arrives…. Any protesters who demonstrate elsewhere in an unlawful manner would face legal action.”

Amidst the huffing and puffing about Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s forthcoming visit to Chiang Mai, The Nation (22 November 2009: “Heavy security in North keeps protesters from PM”) reports on his recent official visit to Phitsanulok, Sukhothai and Phichit, all provinces where there is reasonably strong government support.

The Nation reports that the visits “went smoothly with no violence or disruption, thanks to heavy security that prevented anti-government protesters from getting close to him.” It says that his visit was protected by “[h]undreds of anti-riot police and four helicopters” in one district in Phitsanulok, with human barricade and metal barriers used to block the road.

It is said that “hundreds of red shirts gathered” to protest his visit, but police kept them a kilometer away from the prime minister.

Abhisit only came close to the thousands of organized supporters “including local villagers, politicians and officials” were arranged to greet the premier. Abhisit asked villagers if they were happy with the Democrat Party-led government’s projects “aimed at helping farmers” including subsidies. His organized followers provided the unsurprising response that “they were pleased.”

On these forays into rural areas, usually accompanied by thousands of police, military and officials, Abhisit records his weekly television address, attempting to give the impression that  while he is seen as rooted in Bangkok, he is a man of the rural people.

Abhisit has made it clear that the Thai khemkaeng projects will be used to curry favor and, he hopes, win votes. He announced that Phitsanulok “would receive up to Bt3.8 billion from the Thai Khemkhaeng stimulus scheme next year, the highest budget for lower northern provinces.” Phitsanulok has 3 Democrat Party members of parliament.

On of those members described villagers giving Abhisit a “warm welcome” and “knew that Abhisit had come to help them.” He said the “government received a great response to its policies.” Indeed, he said, “Abhisit is very hot here.”

He’ll be hot in Chiang Mai also, but not because he’ll be surrounded by supporters. Red shirts in Chiang Mai are planning huge demonstrations against his visit. Red shirts have often over-estimated their numbers before, but Chiang Mai is a stronghold, so PPT would expect thousands of red shirts and thousands of security personnel. However, we would also expect the government to implement the Internal Security Act to limit and restrict protests.

When in opposition the Democrat Party seemed less concerned about protests against government leaders, and was also alleged to have been organizing protests in the south, with PAD, to “chase government ministers out of the south.” At the time, now Deputy Prime Minister in charge of security matters, Suthep Taugsuban, considered such protests an expression of public sentiment (see the Bangkok Post and Nation for July 2008).

Meanwhile, as often happens in these periods of increasing political activity, conservatives come out to support their political party. The Nation (22 November 2009: “Fierce political battles brewing”) reports that Pummarat Thaksadipong, a former director of the National Intelligence Agency, has come out to warn of likely red shirt violence. He says he has “intelligence” that violence would be used.

He predicts “[s]erious political confrontation – and possibly violence – could erupt during the upcoming months when Thaksin [Shinawatra] and his allies inside Parliament and on the streets employ an arsenal of tactics in a bid to effect a change in government.” The claim is that the Puea Thai Party “would disrupt the work of Parliament, and those who are protest leaders would instigate hatred against the government and possibly incite violence…”. This is all claimed to be motivated by Thaksin’s fear that his frozen Bt76 billion will be lost when the courts again rule against him and confiscate this “unusual wealth.”

Pro-government, pro-military senators joined this chorus, with Senator Paiboon Nititawan claiming that the red shirts want “to cause violence and deaths.” He claims they failed at this in April, and now want blood and deaths.

PPT agrees that the political heat has been significantly turned up, with all sides looking less restrained. The April Songkhran Uprising might indeed be something to think about again. However, if that anger and frustration were to boil over again, we have the impression that more brutal repression cannot be ruled out.

We say this because the government and its backers are also increasingly frustrated. PAD supporters are calling for blood. Other supporters – like Senator Paiboon – are stirring the flames of conflict. It also seems that the government and its powerful backers are convinced that decisive action is required. The government has become more repressive and more reliant on the security apparatus. With better control of the police now established, harsher repression is increasingly likely.

We hope we have this wrong.

Update: The Nation’s Political Desk has joined the frenzy of claims and counter-claims on pending violence (23 November 2009: “Desperate Thaksin may go for broke”). Misleadingly claiming that its story is “analysis,” the report claims that that the assets declaration case against Thaksin makes him desperate: “During the Songkran mayhem, the premier almost lost his life when his car was attacked by red-shirted people at the Interior Ministry. Some fear that Thaksin’s new battle may repeat history.” The Nation doesn’t say who, but PPT covered that above. It adds: “It would be no surprise if Thaksin sets off on a ‘kamikaze’ mission and takes the country hostage as he has always done – putting his personal interest before the country’s.”

It wouldn’t surprise the Nation’s reporters because they have been predicting violence for months. But like others supporting the government, they see this as a one-sided argument and ignore the repressive measures used against red shirts and other opponents of the Abhisit government. They also happily parrot the claims made by provocative figures in the government’s ranks and those behind the government.

In the absolutely most predictable move in Thai politics, a “meeting of the political situation assessment committee of Democrat Party has passed a resolution to recommend the government that the Internal Security Act (ISA) in Bangkok and Chiang Mai next weekend…” (Bangkok Post, 21 November 2009: “Democrats back imposition of ISA”).

Party spokesperson Buranaj Smutharaks, who works in tandem with Sathit Wongnongtoey as chief spokesmen for repression and censorship, said that the Democrat Party wanted to prevent “anti-government demonstrators from provoking unrest which would damage the country’s economy…”.

Well, at least they didn’t claim to be acting in the interests of “national security” or the monarchy. But now the Democrat Party is using repression and authoritarian tactics to protect the economy.

Buranaj did add that “red-shirts in Chiang Mai had threatened to kill prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva” and that they planned a rally to bring down the government, claiming that “this means they will resort to the use of all violent means to achieve the goal.” There have also been claims by Democrat Party members that Thaksin Shinawatra will march across the border to lead an armed uprising.

The Democrat Party seems seriously rattled, and when they are rattled, those of an authoritarian nature, like Abhisit, Sathit and Buranaj, gains strength and get opportunities to create fear in the middle class and implement more repression.

PPT readers may find a current debate in Britain of some interest. The Financial Times (18 November 2009: “Crown dethroned in Whitehall”) discusses changes proposed that even provokes the use of the term “lese majeste” and cites conservative royalists spluttering and fuming over change. The Daily Express (19 November 2009: “Labour Dethrone Queen in Bill”) has a shorter article although the comments by readers are worth perusal.

Could such a debate be considered in Thailand?

Update: Readers will also be interested in an article at the Malaysian blog The Nut Graph (23 November 2009: “Questioning the monarchy”) raising questions about transparency and lese majeste.

Also available as สงสัยในสองมาตรฐานขององค์กรนิรโทษกรรมสากล

Yesterday PPT posted on the Asian Human Rights Commission statement on the use of the Computer Crimes Act as a substitute for the lese majeste law and Reporters Without Borders released a report the day before criticizing the use of this other laws that limit expression.

PPT assumes that because these “crimes” are political and related to the monarchy in Thailand, that Amnesty International will say nothing. That has been its “policy.”

But what are they doing elsewhere? On 16 November 2009, there was this:

Urgent Action 308/09 – Prisoners of conscience – Bloggers Jailed in Azerbaijan: URGENT ACTION APPEAL – From Amnesty International USA

Two “activists and bloggers” are said by AI to “have been sentenced to two and a half years and two years respectively in an unfair trial. Amnesty International believes the charges against them were fabricated and they have been imprisoned solely for exercising their right to freedom of expression.” One of the men posted “a satirical video … criticizing the Azerbaijani government … on the video-sharing website YouTube.”

Interestingly, in this case, the men are jailed on charges that don’t relate to their postings. However, AI considers them prisoners of conscience because the government has targeted them for their political views.

So can anyone at Amnesty International explain why Thailand is different for the organization? How is the jailing of people in Thailand different? PPT sees that the details are different. In fact, the use of the law is harsher in Thailand (jailing for 20 years, reduced to 10 – Suwicha Thakor) and being held for long periods without bail (Suwicha and Nat Sattayapornpisut), but political “crimes” are very similar. Indeed, in Thailand a special law has been created to facilitate intimidation and to allow for people to be “imprisoned solely for exercising their right to freedom of expression.” That law was put in place by an illegitimate, military-backed government. The trials of these Thais could never be considered fair.

We wonder how it is that Amnesty International feels comfortable operating with such double standards.

Readers may want to ask AI, but be aware that emailing AI produces, in PPT’s experience, no response at all: Amnesty International USA, 600 Pennsylvania Ave SE 5th fl, Washington DC 20003, Email: uan@aiusa.org, http://www.amnestyusa.org/, Phone: 202.544.0200, Fax: 202.675.8566