Just to make everyone realize that absolutely nothing has changed for the royalists, the Thai Patriotic Front or Network has dredged up a ploy that was the strategy that marked the People’s Alliance for Democracy as a royalist instrument.

Yes, in a throwback move, the so-called Patriots have:

filed a petition seeking the Royal appointment of a new prime minister, citing what it described as failures by the current government on such issues as amnesty legislation, the rice-pledging policy and the Bt2-trillion infrastructure loans.

Chaiwat Sinsuwong and his small band anti-elected government ultra-royalists have submitted a “petition to the Royal Household Bureau seeking the Royal appointment of a new prime minister.”

We can only assume that this throwback action is a reference to Article 7 of the constitution. It states: “Whenever no provision under this Constitution is applicable to any case, it shall be decided in accordance with the constitutional convention in the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State.”

Readers may recall that Article 7 of the then 1997 charter was also used by anti-Thaksin Shinawatra protesters in 2005 and 2006. PAD pushed the use of this article very strongly. As Michael Connors explained it in his well-known Journal of Contemporary Asia article, the call for royal intervention was persistent and became a plea for the king to sack Thaksin [Shinawatra], supported by PAD and the Democrat Party. He also notes that the Democrat Party was prepared to use Article 7 in other circumstances in 2006 (p. 158). They made another call for its use in 2012.

Article 7 was introduced to the 1997 constitution by conservative royalists just before it was promulgated, and after public hearing were completed (p. 150). Connors argues that “the effect of Article 7 was to limit the reach of all … new [democratic] claims by empowering a traditionalistic and royalist interpretation should one be so required” (pp. 150-1).

While the 2005 plea was rejected by the palace, it led to the king’s call on the judiciary to intervene following the abortive 2006 election, which eventually led to the 2006 military coup and the political struggles that have continued to this day as the royalists prefer the intervention of unelected and unrepresentative powers against elected and popular political regimes. Article 7 pits the elite against the people.

The Bangkok Post, Post Today and The Nation, amongst others, carried stories like this, with the implication that a volatile group of red shirts had gone on a bit of a rampage. And that police did nothing. Yet, when Khaosod reports it, a somewhat different picture emerges. In addition, the same newspaper reports violent white masks-yellow shirts chasing down red shirts, aimed with metal bars.

We begin to think that the process that the royalist groups are engaged in is exactly the same as seen in previous years, where violence and rumors of violence are used to provoke, curry support and destabilize.

The Bangkok Post reports small and coordinated white mask rallies in several places, in Bangkok but most notably in red shirt strongholds in the Northeast and North, where the Democrat Party has also sought to hold rallies in recent months, although with little support. These rallies mirror provocative actions in earlier years when the People’s Alliance for Democracy took supporters to rallies in places like Udorn, and managed to provoke violence from pro-Thaksin Shinawatra groups and gained much from the resulting publicity.

It is in this context that yellow shirt stalwart and “Green Politics coordinator” Suriyasai Katasila shouts his demand that “the Yingluck government rein in the red shirts…”. Readers may recall that earlier Puea Thai Party statements deriding the white shirts as provocateurs were greeted with howls of derision from the white-mask supporting and backing Democrat Party.

But Suriyasai goes a step further. Whereas most of the yellow shirt media and spokespersons think their groups are engaged in a destabilizing, coup-promoting exercise, Suriyasai has a different vision. He believes that the Yingluck Shinawatra government is seeking violence, indeed, “anarchy so that it can stage a coup against its own government.”

Yes, really, that is his reported claim.

In addition, he claims that violence and clashes is a government strategy “to divert public attention or overshadow reports of rice pledging losses. The government’s failure in its major policies and its failed administration could trigger a repeat of ‘dark power’ taking control of the country as happened in 2006…”.

Yes, really, that is his reported claim. In this, Suriyasai is rewriting history, changing his own character from a coup-supporting ideologue for “dark powers.”

He concludes this rant with this: “The government is creating the conditions for a coup because not only should it have prevented the clashes, it has actually been pulling the strings behind them.”

Yes, really, that is his reported claim.

The idea that the government is seeking a coup is bizarre, but diverts attention from the real coup lovers. Meanwhile, the destabilization by the coalition of PAD, Democrat Party, white masks, no colors, multi colors and aged royalists will continue.

The charges will be that “Abhisit and Suthep would be charged in connection with the deaths of Phan Khamkong and Kunakorn Srisuwan, as well as with severe injuries sustained by Samorn Maithong.”

This decision will see Abhisit and Suthep summoned by DSI investigators, scheduled for 26 June, “so that they can be handed over to public prosecutors for arraignment.”

While DSI continues to say that “troops involved will not be charged, as they were carrying out orders,” the military brass remains as culpable as Abhisit and Suthep.

Its all-inclusive account begins with the murder of Akeyuth Anchanbutr, a former ponzi scheme operator, self-promoting and personally arrogant crook  and self-styled Thaksin critic, who was fond of creating political scandals, both real and fabricated. The yellow lot are all convinced that a man with hundreds of enemies must have been killed by the Thaksin side, who hated him. It is possible that this was a political murder, but there’s simply no evidence for this yet and no one amongst the yellow shirts is prepared to let the investigation get too far, but that seems to matter little as the yellow shirts try to create a political crisis.

2Bangkok.com then goes on to explain the movement towards a military or judicial coup (that would require the backing of the military’s guns).

It begins with “academics and the heightened rhetoric of the ‘white mask’ anti-government demonstrations…”.  In fact, the “academics” are seldom deserving of this title for they are self-styled “public intellectuals,” attached to the royalist elite, who never do any research but pass judgements and peddle opinion, often for a fee or position. The editorial observes:

In Thai culture in general, it is expected that the elite and educated pass judgment on others [PPT: this is wrong. It is the elite that decide they have this position; the cultural bit is that years of military terror means that it is grudgingly accepted by the populace]. The city dweller (assumed to be the elite and educated) passes judgment on the hoards of country people who bring regional tycoons to power. In politics these elite are one of the unelected and informal checks that are expected to temper the activities of the elected [PPT: again, this is a result of the great wealth and power of the elite who abhor electoral politics and self-allocate this position. In any case, the era of the regional political and economic tycoons ended in 2000, only to be brought back to political life by the 2007 military-tutored constitution]. The elected are held with some suspicion, as it assumed that they will inevitably seek to benefit themselves and their status by harnessing the supposedly uneducated voter [as Thongchai Winichakul has shown, this is a royalist construction. For the royalist genesis of this line of argument, His useful academic piece can be located with bit of searching that will link a reader to the original article at several sites].

But here’s the point for 2Bangkok.com:

When seminars begin again that include academics passing judgment on a sitting government, it means the classic Thai cycle in the lead up to a coup is starting. It will later include the “Chula doctor’s letter” where, again, elite physicians from Thailand’s most prestigious university present a letter to the government saying it has engaged in overreach. This trend includes expressions of disapproval and concern from military figures, those in the state bureaucracy, and elder statesmen (like Anand Panyarachun who this week spoke out against the government).

This is combined with a “a ramping up of media scrutiny (this time being conducted on the internet as the mainstream Thai papers are considered, rightly or wrongly, to be already co-opted by the Pheu Thai) and regular ongoing protests.”

Of course, the “ramping up” is of  a more politicized reporting and editorializing that is often little more than the repeating of concoctions found on social media. In fact, the media is divided, and there has never been a “ramping down” of anti-Thaksin, anti-red shirt, anti-Puea Thai editorializing.

But the social media stuff is said to have “significance” in the “sudden regular white mask protests” – a handful of yellow activists and Democrat Party supporters trying to “create either a genuine groundswell of public opinion or at least the appearance of it.” Not sure how the word “genuine” got into this sentence, but the idea of creating an appearance of public protest is certainly important for the coup makers.

It is noteworthy that 2Bangkok.com specifically mentions that the “English-language press has joined in as the government is referred to as a ‘regime’ and even the Nation has decided to begin referring to Thaksin as the ‘defacto leader’ of the government.” Of course, neither the Bangkok Post nor The Nation have ever hidden their yellow, royalist, Democrat Party credentials, so the change is simply these media “ramping up” their anti-government activism to give the appearance of an anti-government groundswell.

The significance of this is explained:

It is important to note that the military cannot take open action without feeling confident that there will not be widespread protest or dissent. They must be able to claim that they have support for any action. The pro-Thaksin camp can rest assured that they can make things sufficiently painful for the military. The military has always been inept at governing and their humiliating outing after the coup in 2006 means there is little real stomach to act against Thaksin amnesty [sic.] with tanks on the street–even if it were assured a Red Shirt siege threatening Bangkok would not happen again.

If the military needs convincing, there is an alternative:

The courts are a much better weapon to use against the government. Warnings about a “judicial coup” have not aroused the same alarm as when there are actual tanks on the streets. Government and Red Shirt calls for the court to be abolished or judges resign to make way for those friendly to Thaksin simply do not play the same way to the public as when the military is abrogating a constitution.

The editorial reckons that the trouble now is all to do with “amnesty bills,” the desire by some to “bring Thaksin home” and “constitutional reform.” PPT thinks this is all a beat-up and that if one looks at the period since the 2011 election, that the yellow shirts have been seeking and testing openings from day 1, and this is simply a more coordinated effort by them, probably because the funders of yellow shirt action, with their coffers recharged by a strong economy under the Yingluck Shinawatra government, are feeling that they are able to maintain an anti-government activism for a longer period.
As the editorial has it:

Now Thaksin foes think they have the government significantly weakened. PM Yingluck was drawn into the fray in April with her speech praising the Red Shirts and Thaksin and the courts successfully weathered attempts at intimidation while wracking up an impressive list of cases that can be used to shake up the government if necessary.

It adds, perhaps hopefully, that the red shirt movement is seen as weakened. Yet the editorial says that more time is needed as the red shirts and government need to be further weakened and the elite more convinced that the military or judiciary needs to act.

The rejection of an elected government – seen as no democracy at all by the yellow lot, who anyway prefer elite rule by hierarchical institutions – is part and parcel of the anti-Thaksin agenda, but it is a stance that requires considerable undermining of the government before the stamp of the military boot can be accepted. After all, the undermining of electoral politics has been tried and it was rejected, repeatedly, so the digging out of the foundations of “electoralism” will take considerable time and money before the tanks can roll:

The opposition, having experienced the Thai Rak Thai years when the media and business became political pawns of one-man and one-family rule [sic.], fears this future. It works against it by again starting the cycle of academic disapproval, weekly protests, and the threat of judicial sanctions to bring the elected government to its knees.

That’s how the military coup can be put back on the agenda.

No prizes for guessing that the petitions are dripping yellow: “the petitions filed by Chamlong Srimuang and five other members of the People’s Alliance for Democracy and by Democrat Party MP Wirat Kalayasiri.”

But the court didn’t issue an injunction to prevent further consideration of amendments to Article 68, it ordered the petitioners to “make 312 copies of their petitions to send to 312 MPs and senators, whom were complained against in the petitions.”

Meanwhile, it is reported that the same court “delayed its deliberation on Pheu Thai MP’s petition for the court to consider the MP status of Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva.” The petition relates to “the defence minister issued an order to fire him retroactively as a lecturer of a military cadet school.” The judges wanted more time to consider Abhisit’s submission on the petition.

The court of double standards continues its “work” as the chief defender of the military junta’s rules for the royalist state.

It was the so-called People’s Alliance for Democracy and its supporters who originally brought media attention to her speech at an anti-coup rally, baying for Darunee’s incarceration on lese majeste charges. Repeatedly refused bail and dragged through secret trials and a series of appeals, the royalist courts have repeatedly made it clear that Darunee is to be punished. Readers can see the details of royal and royalist retribution here.

It is worth noting that the charges were laid – under huge political pressure – by the pro-Thaksin Shinawatra government led by the late Samak Sundaravej.

The Appeals Court ruled that her conviction and long sentence on three counts of lese majeste and agreed with prosecutors that her speech “expressed her malicious intent against Their Majesties the King and the Queen.” The prosecutors say that the speeches “led to misunderstanding and caused DAAD [UDD] demonstrators to hate Their Majesties…”. YouTube has four excerpts from one of her offending speeches, in Thai, with limited English titling. Search for “Da Torpedo” at YouTube and the speeches come up.

The Appeals Court judges reportedly “saw that Daranee’s behaviour had caused damage to the reputation of Their Majesties and she deserved to be punished to warn others not to follow her example.”

PPT has made this point several times in the past – Darunee’s case is important for the royals and royalists as an example. Of course, the things that she said are widely known and, today, are all over social media. Yet she was one of the first to use these items as parts of political speeches in the post-coup era and is thus punished many times over in sham trials and repeated violations of her constitutional and other legal rights.

Darunee is a political martyr for free expression and in establishing a debate on the political role of the monarchy. Her case was one of the first to gain media attention – albeit tepid – in the massive increase of lese majeste charges hurled at political opponents following the coup.

PPT has only mentioned Shetty in two previous posts, when we were highly critical of AI’s stance on lese majeste. In fact, it was the lack of any stand and its capitulation to the Abhisit Vejjajiva royalist regime’s vigorous use of the lese majeste and computer crimes laws that was the issue. AI in Thailand was under the influence and control of royalists and its then Southeast Asia representative Benjamin Zawacki repeatedly made comments supportive of arguments about lese majeste being about “protection of the monarchy” and argued publicly that the king was a defender of human rights.

AI’s stance on lese majeste remains somewhat less than crystal clear, so whenever it makes a statement, we try to highlight it. This is from the interview:

Q: How many people are in jail or have been charged under lese-majeste in Thailand? Are they categorized as political prisoners or prisoners of conscience if they are detained under lese-majeste or associated aspects of Thailand’s computer crimes law?

IA: Amnesty International has expressed a number of concerns with lese-majeste laws—they don’t meet international human rights standards. Some of them are prisoners of conscience, such as Somyot Prueksakasemsuk [a magazine editor and labor activist who was sentenced to 11 years jail for lese-majeste in January], and we have been campaigning actively for their immediate and unconditional release. Another aspect we are concerned about is the denial of bail to those charged under lese-majeste. It is very important that all those facing charges are free pending investigation and trial. It is very hard to say the exact number detained under the lese-majeste laws, I believe it is tens of people. We are not able to say at the moment how many of those are prisoners of conscience. There are other laws such as the Computer Crime Act that we are concerned about and recently the use of criminal defamation suits as well.

SS: We will be meeting the Thai prime minister and will raise several of these issues and also issues of rights violations in the conflict in the south of Thailand. And just to go back to the region [ASEAN], it’s not overall a pretty picture, there are violations in most countries. For the region, freedom of expression, reform of the criminal justice systems and accountability for past violations are the three key issues for us. There are land issues, issues of women’s rights are other important issues as well that come up across the region in terms of human rights.

To be honest, we don’t think AI has been active enough on lese majeste, political prisoners and accountability in Thailand. But as we have said before, at least AI is no longer expressing support for laws that made political prisoners of regime opponents.

Pokpong begins by noting:

NHRC head Amara Pongsapich and friend: opposing human rights

During the administration of the then-Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, was dubbed the most helpful and most relevant independent agency in the eyes of ordinary Thais. That is no longer true.

While Pokpong notes that, under Yingluck Shinawatra, the NHRC has become irrelevant, the process of de-fanging the NHRC has been a post-2006 coup phenomenon. This is because the military junta and the Abhisit Vejjajiva regime that gave the NHRC extra powers, they used it as a political tool and stacked it with political flunkies:

This explains why the former civil servants from the Royal Thai Police, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, Drink Don’t Drive Foundation campaigner, and a businessman were selected instead of veteran human rights activists….

While the Constitution stresses explicitly that the commissioners need to have knowledge and experience in the field of human rights, the current batch do not know what are and what are not human rights….

The NHRC has repeatedly delayed the “publication of its fact-finding report on the April–May 2010 crackdown after 37 months have passed,” although no one expects such a report to be sincere or comprehensive.

Pokpong calls for “the Pheu Thai Party … to seriously consider the need to reform the NHRC.”

If the government did consider reform for the NHRC, it would need to demonstrate a serious concern for human rights. While Abhisit and the military royalists might have neutered it, a useless the Commission may well suit the current government.

The Bangkok Post reports on the white masks as “faceless men and women” who “are making a bold showing on social media and trying to rally support on the streets.” Some political pundits – almost all of them from the royalist/anti-Thaksin Shinawatra coalition, reckon this is a “new style of political activism.”

For example, veteran People’s Alliance for Democracy activist Suriyasai Katasila, now coordinator of the Green Politics group “predicted it [the white mask group] would be a more powerful social movement than the multi-coloured group formed in 2010 to counter the red shirt supporters of Thaksin.” That isn’t too difficult as the multicolors were a fringe group of ultra-royalists. Suriyasai is then reported to have had this tautological “insight”: “if the movement gained popularity the government would not be able to remain in power.”

The claims for white masks being “new” or using “new” political technologies are simply wrong and mostly intent on propagandizing for the anti-Thaksin cause. In fact, both red shirts and yellow shirts have used social media for some time, and various political events have been organized via social media. Even the use of the white masks isn’t new. Think of flash mobs, the facelessness masks of some months ago in support of free expression or the flash dancing of February:

The more that is published about the “new” group, the more they appear to be recycled yellow shirts and support, in the words of the Post, “has been modest.” Those who speak as members of the group sound very PAD-like. For example, one says they aim to ”encourage the silent majority to rise up and be aware how evil the Thaksin system is.” That core member acknowledged the membership “came from previous and current incarnations of anti-Thaksin groups such as the multi-coloured shirt group, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and supporters of the Democrat Party.” Another member “said he was also a member of the multi-coloured shirt group that opposed Thaksin in 2010.”

And the reason for trying a new political gimmick is crustily old: “We love our nation and we love our royal institution.”

Fuller adds that income from the CPB [Crown Property Bureau] “is separate from the approximately $350 million in taxpayer money allocated for the royal household, royal-led development projects and other expenses related to the royal family.”

PPT added:

In fact, PPT thinks $350 million of taxpayer money is an under-estimate. For example, in the Abhisit Vejjajiva government’s last budget the first three lines of the Ministry of Finance’s allocation was for royal things and amounted to about $100 million. Line after line in the budget allocates funds to the royals. This is public information, but as far as PPT knows, going through the Budget Bureau’s allocations has not been a task yet completed.

Now doing the rounds of the social media is this estimate for 2013, and drawn from the Budget Bureau. Our version is sent to us by a reader who says it is a Facebook translation provided via Andrew MacGregor Marshall. PPT edited some of this but didn’t change the data:

… according to the Fiscal Year 2013 budget Act:

- Expenses related to Royal Development Projects – 2,300,000,000 Baht (US $76.67 Million)

- Expenses related to traveling and welcoming foreign Heads of States – 700,000,000 Baht (US $ 23.34 million)

- Layout of plans for cherishing, safeguarding and protecting the monarchy institution to these government organizations:

1. Office of the Permanent Secretary to the Office of the Prime Minister – 635,066,000 Baht (US $ 21.2 Million)

2.  Office of the Secretariat of the Prime Minister – 2,104,446,500 Baht – (US $ 70.15 Million)

3.  Minister of Defense (22,760,700 Baht – (US $ 0.76 Million)

4.  Royal Thai Aide-De-Camp Department – 580,426,700 Baht (US $ 19.35 Million)

5.  Royal Thai Armed Force Headquarters = 260,000,000 Baht (US $8.67 Million)

6.  Royal Thai Army – 320,000,000 Baht (US $ 10.67 Million)

7.  Royal Thai Navy – 12,246,100 Baht (US $ 0.41 Million)

8.  Royal Thai Air Forces – 23,500,000 Baht (US $ 0.78 Million)

Grand Total: 6,958,446,000 Baht (approximately US $232 Million) per year

The version sent to us adds this, which confirms our earlier comment above on needing to drill down on the budget:

In an addition, several individuals provided the comments that most governmental branches are required to use their own annual budget to allocate for “cherishing, safeguarding and protecting the monarchy institution” on the top of the Official Annual Budget for Fiscal Year 2013.

The Thai of the translation  above is:

… ตาม พ.ร.บ.งบประมาณรายจ่ายประจำปีงบประมาณ พ.ศ.2556 ต่อไนี้หน่อยครับ (เพื่อนลิงค์มาให้ตามโพสต์ด้านล่าง)

 - ค่าใช้จ่ายตามโครงการอันเนื่องมาจากพระราชดำริ 2,300,000,000 บาท

- ค่าใช้จ่ายเกี่ยวกับการเสด็จพระราชดำเนินและต้อนรับประมุขต่างประเทศ 700,000,000 บาท

- แผนงานเทิดทูน พิทักษ์ และรักษาสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ จัดให้หน่วยงานหลักดังนี้

(1) สนง.ปลัด สำนักนายกรัฐมนตรี 635,066,000 บาท

(2) สำนักเลขาธิการนายกรัฐมนตรี 2,104,446,500 บาท

(3) กระทรงกลาโหม 22,760,700 บาท

(4) กรมราชองครักษ์ 580,426,700 บาท

(5) กองบัญชาการกองทัพไทย 260,000,000 บาท

(6) กองทัพบก 320,000.000 บาท

(7) กองทัพเรือ 12,246,100 บาท

(8) กองทัพอากาศ 23,500,000 บาท

If readers go back to the 2012 budget (clicking downloads a very large PDF in English), the centrality of the expenditures on and for the monarchy indicates how debased ideas about “national security” have become. In fact, these allocations are evidence of the extent of the warping of public public policy required by monarchism:

The FY 2012 budget allocation consists of 8 strategies and a list of expenditures on general administration under 49 programmes. Important aspects of the strategy can be summarized as follows:

Strategy 1 : Building of foundation for a balanced development towards the society….

Strategy 2 : National Security

The government has allocated the budget for protecting national security, upholding and preserving the monarchy and maintaining domestic order by strengthening and developing readiness and potential for the national defence system….

The amount of 190,300.9 million baht, equivalent to 8 per cent of the total budget, is allocated for this strategy and can be classified by the following programmes.

2.1 Programme on upholding, protecting and preserving the monarchy

The amount of 11,208.8 million baht will be allocated to uphold, protect and preserve the monarchy from any offenses by providing a security system and organizing events on upholding the monarchy at appropriate occasions. In addition, His Majesty’s suggestions will be implemented along with the promotion and promulgation of the Royal Projects to make people aware of his kindness and maintain their loyalty to the monarchy and the fact that the Thai society is the society of unity and sufficiency living.

2.2 Programme on national defence

The amount of 164,615.4 million baht will be allocated to strengthen and develop the national defence system to be prepared with potentials to protect independence, sovereignty, security and national interests from internal and external threats….

2.3  Programme on maintaining domestic order

The amount of 14,476.7 million baht will be allocated to preserve national interests and maintain domestic order….