There’s an interesting and revealing report at the Bangkok Post. Interesting and significant for the admissions made and revealing of the admission on the limits of human rights. The report draws on a U.N. Human Rights Council report (clicking downloads a large PDF) and the associated Thai government response.
The UN special rapporteur on freedom of expression report is here. (PPT will spend some time on this document over the next few days as it includes information on nearly 60 lese majeste/computer crimes cases, including cases against 11 foreign nationals.)
Thailand has conceded to issues raised by a UN special rapporteur as alleged malpractice regarding freedom of expression and migrant labour, and to the fatal harassment of human rights defenders.
The admission is in a document included in 108 pages of communications involving special rapporteurs of the United Nations recently made available ahead of the 23rd session of the UN Human Rights Council.
This admission appears to PPT to be a significant advance as an admission could, with the right political will, lead to some policy changes.
The limits:
On page 24, there is a short reply dated Dec 26, 2012 from the Thai government to UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression Frank La Rue to questions about cases in Thailand.
Thailand replied that the 2007 Constitution of Thailand contains the clause: The King shall be enthroned in a position of revered worship and shall not be violated.
No person shall expose the King to any sort of accusation or action, the official reply from Thailand said.
It is the reply that sets out the “reasons” for limiting freedom of speech related to the monarchy that draws a line in the sand.
While admitting that Article 112 was:
largely applied in a manner and with a frequency which raises some concerns. The severity of the punishments received, the absence of exemptions on constitutional or legal grounds, and the force it exerts over the judicial system adds to the chilling effect on free speech…,
the state defends all of this in the name of protecting a”special” monarchy. It is done with a quasi-religious zeal and rhetoric.
As many readers will know, the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) is a non-governmental organization with general consultative status at the U.N.’s Human Rights Council. It makes regular reports to the HRC on Thailand. Find PPT’s earlier posts on these reports here.
Below,we reproduce the latest report by the ALRC:
A written statement submitted by
THAILAND: The regularization of the crisis of freedom of expression
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 22, 2013
ALRC-CWS-23-05-2013
Language(s): English only
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Twenty-third session, Agenda Item 3, General Debate
1. The Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) wishes to bring the regularization of the crisis of freedom of expression in Thailand to the attention of the Human Rights Council. This statement is the sixth on this topic that the ALRC has submitted to the Council since May 2011. During the seventeenth session of the Council in May 2011, the ALRC highlighted the rise in the legal and unofficial use of Article 112 of the Criminal Code and the 2007 Computer Crimes Act (CCA) to constrict freedom of expression and intimidate citizens critical of the monarchy (A/HRC/17/NGO/27). During the nineteenth session in February 2012, the ALRC detailed some of the threats faced both by those who have expressed critical views of the monarchy, both legal and extralegal, as well as those who have expressed concern about these threats (A/HRC/19/NGO/55). During the twentieth session in June 2012, the ALRC raised concerns about the weak evidentiary basis of convictions made under Article 112 and the CCA (A/HRC/20/NGO/37) and the concerning conditions surrounding the death in prison custody of Amphon Tangnoppakul on 8 May 2012, then serving a 20-year sentence for four alleged violations of Article 112 and the CCA (A/HRC/20/NGO/38). During the twenty-second session in March 2013, the ALRC highlighted the January 2013 conviction under Article 112 of human rights defender and labour rights activist Somyot Prueksakasemsuk (A/HRC/22/NGO/44).
2. In the prior five statements, the ALRC has been concerned with the urgency of the threats posed by the constriction of freedom of expression. Particularly in the context of the 19 September 2006 coup and the violent clashes between state security forces and citizens in April-May 2010, the protection of fundamental human rights is necessary to foster the rule of law and democratization. The ALRC is again raising the issue of freedom of expression with the Council because the constriction of speech in the name of protecting the monarchy and national security has now become regularized. This is no longer an unusual breach of human rights, but one that has become constitutive of political and social life in Thailand. The entrenchment of the violation of freedom of expression threatens to normalize an additional series of human rights violations, such as the routine denial of bail to individuals awaiting trial and appeal, the provision of substandard medical care in prisons, and the use of secrecy to restrict the openness of trials and public information about ongoing cases.
3. Article 112 criminalizes criticism of the monarchy and mandates that, “Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen years.” The 2007 CCA, which was promulgated as part of Thailand’s compliance as a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, has been used to target web editors and websites identified as critical of the monarchy or dissident in other ways. The CCA provides for penalties of up to five years per count in cases which are judged to have involved the dissemination or hosting of information deemed threatening to national security, of which the institution of the monarchy is identified as a key part. While Article 112 law has been part of the Criminal Code since the last major revision in 1957, available statistics suggest that there has been a dramatic increase in the number of complaints filed since the 19 September 2006 coup; how often these complaints become formal charges and lead to prosecutions is information that the Government of Thailand has failed to provide up to this point. The CCA has often been used in combination with Article 112 in the four years since its promulgation; similar to the use of Article 112, complete usage information has not been made available by the Government of Thailand. This failure to provide information itself raises many unanswered questions about the use of both laws to diminish space for freedom of expression through the use of secrecy and creation of uncertainty.
4. At present, there are 6 persons known to be serving prison terms for alleged violations of Article 112 and/or the CCA and 1 person behind bars while awaiting trial.
a. Daranee Charnchoengsilpakul was convicted of violations of Article 112 related to 55 minutes of speech and sentenced to 18 years in prison on 28 August 2009. Following examination of her case by the Constitutional Court, her sentenced was reduced to 15 years in December 2011.
b. Wanchai Sae Tan was convicted of violations of Article 112 related to leaflets he made and distributed and sentenced to 15 years in prison on 26 February 2010.
c. Thanthawut Taweewarodomkul was convicted of violations of Article 112 and the CCA related to his work maintaining the NorPorChorUSA website and sentenced to 13 years in prison on 15 March 2011.
d. Surachai Sae Dan (Danwattananusorn) was convicted of a series of violations of Article 112 related to political speeches he made and sentenced to a total of 12.5 years in prison in a series of cases in 2012.
e. Somyot Prueksakasemsuk was convicted of violations of Article 112 related to his work in editing and publishing Voice of Taksin magazine, which was deemed to include two anti-monarchy articles (written by someone else) and sentenced to a total of 11 years in prison on 23 January 2013 (10 years on Article 112-related charges and 1 year related to a prior case).
f. Ekachai Hongkangwan was convicted of violations of Article 112 related to selling VCDs of an ABC Australia documentary and copies of WikiLeaks material and sentenced to 3 years and 4 months in prison on 28 March 2013.
g. Yutthapoom (last name withheld) has been held in the Bangkok Remand Prison since 19 September 2012 on charges of violating Article 112.
5. While there have been several other convictions in recent years, these 7 cases stand out because the individuals involved have repeatedly been denied bail, always on the grounds that their crimes are too grave a threat to national security to permit even temporary release. Although some individuals were granted bail while awaiting trial, upon conviction they were all denied bail, despite ongoing processes of appeal. This is in contravention to Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Thailand is a state party, which specifies: “Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment.” Bail is routinely granted during trials and after conviction while awaiting appeal in cases of committing violent crimes in Thailand, but routinely denied for cases involving freedom of speech.
6. As highlighted by the May 2012 death in custody of Amphon Tangnoppakul, who was then serving a 20-year sentence for allegedly sending 4 anti-monarchy SMS messages, which the ALRC commented on in a June 2012 submission to the Council (A/HRC/20/NGO/38), the prison healthcare system in Thailand falls well beneath the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. As part of the testimony provided during the April 2013 postmortem inquest hearings into Amphon’s death in custody, as reported by Prachatai, Amphon reported to fellow prisoners that when he went to seek treatment at the prison hospital, physicians made contemptuous comments about his alleged defamation of the monarchy. This goes far beyond institutional failure to meet minimum standards and indicates that physicians have become partial and may not provide an equal level of care to all prisoners.
7. Prosecutions under Article 112 and the CCA are surrounded by several different kinds of secrecy. The first is that the total number of charges and prosecutions under these two measures has not been made public by the Government of Thailand. The reason that the ALRC noted above in the list of current prisoners above that these are the known cases of individuals currently serving prison sentences or under detention while awaiting trial is that in the annual U.S. State Department Human Rights Report on Thailand, released in late April 2013, they reported that the number of persons detained or imprisoned under laws related to lèse majesté was between 7 and 18. Those 7 individuals listed above are those who are known to be behind bars, but the U.S. State Department report indicates there may be an additional 11 individuals being held. The failure of the Government of Thailand to provide precise information to the public itself raises many unanswered questions about the use of the laws to diminish space for freedom of expression through the use of secrecy. In addition, in at least two cases, those of Daranee Charnchoengsilpakul and Wanchai Sae Tan, the trials were held in camera and were closed to the public on the basis that the dissemination of the testimony may constitute a threat to national security. In a 2011 comment, the Constitutional Court argued that there was no contradiction between a secret trial and the protection of rights and liberties as provided for in the 2007 Constitution. Taken together, these two forms of secrecy create uncertainty about what consequences citizens may face for the basic exercise of human rights and makes political participation filled with possible danger.
8. The ALRC is very concerned about the effects of the regularization of the constriction of freedom of expression on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Thailand. The danger of this regularization is that it naturalizes violations of rights and causes them to appear normal and justified. The ALRC would like to remind the Government of Thailand that under Article 19 of the ICCPR, restrictions on the right to freedom of expression are only permissible under two circumstances: “for respect of the rights or reputations of others” and “for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.” While measure 112 is classified as a crime against national security within the Criminal Code of Thailand, and this is frequently cited by the Government of Thailand when faced with the criticism that the measure is in tension with the ICCPR, to date a clear explanation of the precise logic for categorizing the measure as such has not been provided. Without an adequate explanation being provided, the constriction of freedom of expression is arbitrary.
9. In view of the above, the Asian Legal Resource Center calls on the UN Human Rights Council to:
a. Call on the Government of Thailand to release all those convicted or facing charges under Article 112 and the 2007 Computer Crimes Act.
b. Demand that the Government of Thailand revoke Article 112 of the Criminal Code and the 2007 Computer Crimes Act.
c. Demand that the Government of Thailand provide an accounting of how they will improve the provisions for healthcare in prison and ensure that all prisoners receive the same treatment, without regard for the alleged crimes that they have committed.
d. Urge the Government of Thailand to allow and support the full exercise of freedom of expression and political freedom, consistent with the terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which it is a signatory, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which it is a state party.
e. Request the Special Rapporteur on the freedom of opinion and expression to continue ongoing monitoring and research about the brought situation of constriction of rights and individual cases in Thailand; and, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to continue to monitor and report on those cases of persons arbitrarily detained under Article 112.
At Prachatai, academic Tyrell Haberkorn has translated a remarkable document by now-imprisoned lese majeste activist Akechai Hongkangwarn.
Sentenced at the end of March , Akechai has requested bail while he appealed the conviction, but bail has been denied and he remains in the overcrowded Bangkok Remand Prison.
Prior to his conviction, Akechai wrote an analysis of the history of the lese majeste law over more than 100 years, the Computer Crimes Act, and the recent efforts to changes these laws and implement political amnesties. This tract is long and deserving of study. Here, PPT mentions just a few highlights.
In noting the first lese majeste law on 1 June 1908, Akechai notes that the law applied to king, queen, crown prince and regent but also applied to historical royalty and could apply to “anyone who violated either of these two laws in a foreign country would be punished in Siam.”
The revised Criminal Code promulgated on 13 November 1956 “reduced the number of people protected to only include the present-day King, Queen, Heir-apparent, and Regent, eliminated fines and kept a maximum 7 year sentence, but set no minimum. Akechai says: “This was tantamount to repealing Article 100 of the Penal Code of R.S. 127 [1908].” The application to those overseas remained.
It was following the massacre and coup of 6 October 1976 and under the present king’s selected prime minister, Thanin Kraivixien, that Article 112 was strengthened, setting a minimum sentence of 3 years and a maximum of 15 years.
The only other times that even harsher measures were proposed was following the 2006 coup. First, when yet another king’s favorite, Surayud Chulanot, was prime minister. As Akechai notes, only heavy local and international criticism saw the proposed changes dropped. Second, under pro-Thaksin Shinawatra premier Samak Sundaravej, who was also involved in the regressions of 1976. This amendment was also withdrawn.
The 2007 Computer Crimes Act, first proposed during Thaksin’s government and made law under Surayud’s appointed regime, is “an attempt by the rulers to promulgate a new law in order to control lèse majesté from spreading on the internet, because it could not be addressed by Article 112.” Like laws of old, “anyone who violated this law in a foreign country would be punished in Thailand…”.
On amnesty, Akechai “found 3 amnesty laws which constituted an amnesty for Articles 98 and 100 of the Penal Code of R.S. 127 [lese majeste] and Article 112 [lese majeste] of the Criminal Code.” He notes that there “have not been any laws which provide an amnesty for the Computer Crimes Act.”
The first granted amnesty to the 1932 People’s Party. The second was under Kriangsak Chomanan, in 1978, when he “passed the Amnesty for those who committed offences in the demonstrations at Thammasat University between 4 and 6 October 1976′.” It covered a lese majeste case. The third was in 1989, under the “government of General Chartchai Choonhavan [that] issued an amnesty for those whose actions were a violation of national security of the state in the kingdom following the Criminal Code and offences under the Anti-Communist Activities Act of 1989.” It also applied indirectly to at least one lese majeste case involving Veera Musigapong.
When he examines drafts of amnesty laws in the current period, Akechai states:
Among all 8 of the draft amnesty laws proposed by various sectors during the past 2 years, there is not even one that mentions amnesty for lèse majesté or Article 112 of the Criminal Code/Computer Crimes Act at all. Yet it may be incorrect to conclude that these amnesty laws do not provide an amnesty for lèse majesté.
I have examined the 8 draft amnesty laws and found 2 drafts of interest. These are the Draft Constitution for Amnesty and Eliminating the Conflict (proposed by the Khana Nitirat in 2013, timeframe of 19 September 2006 — 9 May 2011) and the Draft Act for Amnesty for People Imprisoned and Undergoing Prosecution Resulting from Political Conflict from 1 January 2007 until 31 December 2011 (proposed by the UDD in 2013, timeframe of 1 January 2007 – 31 December 2011).
… Upon examination of these two drafts, I am certain that these are amnesties for lèse majesté, but not that every case of lèse majesté can be covered by the amnesty from these two draft laws.
The Red Shirts blog reports that after “intense lobbying by the UDD and Red Shirt activists fighting on behalf of political prisoners, the Ministry of Justice has recently agreed to transfer 4 convicted Red Shirt political prisoners from Bangkok Remand Prison to Laksi Prison.”
UDD chairwoman Thida Tawornsate Tojirakarn says the “decision to transfer political prisoners already convicted of violating the Abhisit government’s Emergency Decree of April-May 2010 brings Laksi one step closer to becoming a prison for all political prisoners…”.
Thida also noted with concern that the “Ministry did not approve the transfer of lèse majesté (112) prisoners that were included in the UDD’s request.” She noted that lese majeste prisoners caused the Ministry to proceed “with caution, for fear of retaliation from the other side.”
The report adds:
Human rights activists are growing increasingly frustrated at the lack of political will to work on behalf of all political prisoners, including those charged under Article 112.
Meanwhile, at the Bangkok Post, it is reported that “[r]elatives of those convicted and jailed for lese majeste are pinning their hopes on royal pardons so they can be reunited with their loved ones.”
Having to rely on a royal pardon – paper work for seeking a royal pardon reportedly up to two years – may be less than satisfying but the fact that the only hope is feudal fickleness is damning of the law and those who do nothing about it.
Amidst great social media attention, Kong Rithdee has an account of a PBS program that has interviewed several commentators on Article 112 or lese majeste. PPT hasn’t watched all of the shows from beginning to end, but the couple we did were very good and pushed public debate further than we have previously seen in the mainstream media.Unfortunately, it seems PBS has decided that four shows debating lese majeste and the monarchy are enough and have pulled the show. More on this below.
Kong says of the show:
It was as close to an ideological thriller as we’ve ever had on Thai television, and I hope, my hand on my heart, that it will go down in history as the beginning of the time we finally realised the necessity of open, sane, civilised, televised, above-ground discussion as a way to scrutinise the great knots of our conflicts. Heavy flak has already flown and vilifying contempt has been heard at work, which is not unexpected, but I believe the first hurdle has been crossed.
The program is Torb Chote: The Monarchy Under the Constitution/ตอบโจทย์ สถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ ภายใต้รัฐธรรมนูญ. The first, from 11 March, is the not particularly interesting but provides a background. One of the reasons it lacks interest for us it that it focuses on the relentless self-promoter Surakiat Sathirathai, looking like he just popped out from a meeting of the conservative Chinese Politburo. He has strong connections to the palace but his comments are all a bit drab and seem to us to merely reproduce “liberal royalist” nonsense that’s been around for years.Maybe we missed something as we got bored and moved to the more interesting interviews.
All of the clips are only in Thai.
Hosted by Pinyo Traisuriyathamma, the series moved onto historian and academic Somsak Jeamteerasakul, who speaks machine-gun fast, cramming in lots of information and views.
The third is with the ultra-conservative royalist Vasit Dejkunjorn. PPT has posted on this former royal policeman and royalist activist several times as a royalist racist, a royal spy, part of the cabal of palace intriguists, as propagandist for the monarchy, and anti-Thaksin warrior. We had some biographical details in our Old Men post. In the clip that follows, Vasit does all of these things over again, talking about a plot or plots to bring down the monarchy and sounding fearful that his era is ending.
In the fourth show, critical monarchist Sulak Sivaraksa and Somsak are put together. Kong describes them as:
sharp, outspoken intellectual firebrands with huge followers and nitpicker critics; they share a broad idea on the need to update the monarchical institution and the lese majeste law, though their lines of argument and rallying calls are different (sometimes starkly).
He goes on to describe this program:
Clearly the programme is pushing the envelope. And envelope-pushing is what we need when the same old blabbering inside our old, cobwebbed envelope isn’t taking us anywhere. The highlights of the five-night series were on Thursday and Friday, when Mr Sulak and Mr Somsak sat next to each other debating, eyeing up and staring down, hands moving in a complex telegraphy of their thought. First they exchanged pleasantries and then [verbal] punches, verbally wrangling, sometimes heated, sometimes cool, and altogether energising. What’s most important, however, is the fact that they said many things we never thought we’d hear on television. Names – Chuan Leekpai, Thaksin Shinawatra, MR Sukhumbhand Paribatra and his ancestors, and privy councillors – were dropped and dissected, sometimes in volleys of criticism, and the mentions of the monarchy were as frank, or as evasive, as the law allows. Of course they both wish the law would allow more, that’s the gist of it all.
In one startling stretch, Mr Sulak went on about Queen Victoria of England and how she really had no power to govern though she thought otherwise, then he described how the monarchical protocol is all “theatre”. Mr Somsak, meanwhile, homed in on a crucial point: slapping the wild-card charge of lom jao, “overthrowing the monarchy,” against anyone on the opposite side or anyone who wants to discuss the monarchy – as being an utter disgrace to the democratic system.
Kong points to the fierce debate that the program unleashed in social media and says that the debate, still ongoing, is significant:
We as the citizens, and we as journalists, who can now take comfort in the fact that some of the “sensitive” issues often talked about in murmurs, with hand covering mouth, or online, or totally underground, have made their way to national TV, in HD to boot. Television is known for accommodating emotion (think drama series) but in the right setting, it also encourages reason as a condition of being persuasive. It’s official: this five-day talk has raised the bar on possible discussion about the monarchy.
And that seems to be the point that has scared the royalists witless. Kong observes that:
Royalists are annoyed and irate, to varying degrees, and some have put forth the weirdest logic I’ve ever heard: Why on earth has Thai PBS, a public station funded by public money, brought above-ground and legitimises the figures and topics they believe should remain underground (or buried in an unmarked grave, especially Mr Somsak)? As if the job of public television was to keep feeding propaganda. As if the job of public television is to fawn and flatter and let us hear only what conforms to what we think. Switch to commercial channels then. To raise questions in good faith and in the service of society is precisely what public television must do, and not refrain from doing. It’s fine to disagree with – even to despise – Mr Sulak and Mr Somsak, but to try to stop them from speaking reasonably and intelligently is the mark of a backward and uncivilised society.
It does seem, however, that figures in PBS and the government have been frightened or had the frighteners put on them. Just a few hours after Kong’s story came out, he had to add this:
The article … was written on Friday, just hours before Thai PBS banned the broadcast of the last episode of the five-part series “Thai Monarchy Under the Constitution”, a talk programme hosted by Pinyo Traisuriyathamma.
While parts of the content in the commentary remain valid, a large chunk of it now sounds wrong and naive, especially my assertion of faith, now proved false, in the future of our public television. The censorship was a great disappointment, a heartbreak even.
It invalidates the contribution that the show had made during its first four episodes, because by banning it, the station has sent out clear signals that sane, reasonable and open discussion on “sensitive” subjects cannot be allowed.
It discourages any further attempt by journalists and writers to continue in the direction that the show has already started. After all, there’s no light at the end of any tunnel, proverbial or real, because once again, we’re kept like sewer rats in perpetual darkness.
Pinyo has also spoken out, writing that there are ludicrous claims that the program somehow infringed the sections of the constitution that protect the monarchy and pointing out that the same constitution is meant to protect freedom of expression. While he claims that the longevity of the monarchy can only be protected through a real constitutional monarchy, it seems to PPT that it is impossible for freedom of expression to exist while the monarchy is protected by royalist-military constitutions, feudal laws like Article 112 and a ruling class that owes its power and wealth to the primacy of the monarchy. Pinyo calls on the management of PBS to explain what has gone on and who has intervened. The last word in this post, also in Thai, belongs to Pinyo:
Update 1: At the Bangkok Post, there is a story that reports “Thai PBS executives have defended their decision to cancel the final episode of a debate on the constitutional monarchy.” It seems that because a handful of complaining royalists showed up at the station (the report says 20), the executives “feared broadcasting the discussions could spark social conflict.” Yes, the monarchy has moved so prominently into the political fulcrum following the palace-military coup in 2006 that just talking about the it ignites fear.Or at least that is their excuse. PPT thinks they got an order from someone, either in the government, in the military or in the palace. Of course, we have no evidence, but we can’t believe that the possibility of “conflict” was not considered even before the programs were made.
The seemingly spineless lot managing PBS decided that a “debate on proposed amendments to Section 112 of the Criminal Code, or the lese majeste law, was also [too ] sensitive,” and could not be aired.
As noted above, “Pinyo called on station executives to clearly explain their decision to cancel his programme. He insisted the decision to stop producing the show was not caused by any interference from the government or anyone connected to the royal institution.”
Update 2: Prachatai has a post with English-language details of the debate between Sulak and Somsak.
Accent of Women is a program from a satellite, community radio station in Australia. It has posted a podcast that looks at the use of Article 112 used “to suppress and prevent opposition and political action.” It states that “Somyos Prueksakasemsuk is the best known prisoner charged under this law, and he was sentenced on 23 January 23 to 11 years imprisonment.” In examining the issue, Accent of Women interviews Sukunya Prueksakasemsuk and Thai activist-in-exile in Finland, Junya Yimprasert. Sukunya speaks first, about her husband’s case and the campaign for his release. Junya speaks initially about her exile and contact with Somyos and then more broadly about lese majeste law and its operations. Both speak in English.
Together with an interested reader, PPT has been trying to understand this video clip from the recent Thammasat-Chulalongkorn soccer game there were several anti-112 protests, many of which were reported in the media. Yet we think there is room for interpreting that there was something more going on that engaged the crowd.
We haven’t been able to work it all out, although a reader has tried to explain it all to us. So let’s see what other readers think.
The first point to note, as expressed by our correspondent, is that while politics is often parodied in these events, the annual game back in 1983 was special. During that game, students put up a banner as shown on the left of the photo here. The Free Somyot photo is from the recent game.
The images on the left are about “Father.” Now everyone knows who “Father” is, yet these students say their “father” is Pridi [Phanomyong], a good man that “Thailand” didn’t want.
The video itself has a bunch of political and university plays on events and words, with the theme being who is “north” or above others. So Chalerm [Yubamrung] has Somjit above him [we think this is a reference to Somjit Nawakruasunthorn]. Abhisit [Vejjajiva] has his draft dodging case above him, and so on until “Above the cabinet” and the response is: There’s someone looking over it [probably meaning Thaksin Shinawatra].
A little later there is a reference to the banned/withdrawn Channel 3 soap opera Nua Mek. In this stream it means: “above the clouds?” The response is: “above the clouds there isn’t anything,” followed by the question: “Why is that?” The answer is: “There is nothing above the clouds…. Because no one is brave enough to speak the truth.”
It seems a critical comment to us, but maybe PPT is guilty of “anti-royal fundamentalism,” and so we ask readers for other interpretations.
Thanks to the reader who went to considerable effort to link all of this.
Mong Palatino at Global Voices has a useful post that summarizes some of the anti-112 actions and debates sparked by the cruel sentencing of Somyos Prueksakasemsuk.
There is a related story at the Bangkok Post about a new group that is challenging the lese majeste law. The report says they are “calling themselves the Alliance for People’s Democracy [กลุ่มแนวร่วมประชาธิปไตยภาคประชาชน (นปป)] – all wearing red shirts – gathered on Monday to challenge the judiciary’s interpretation of the lese majeste law.” It adds that “The gathering began with a few dozen participants and then swelled to at least 150…”. The group included former lese majeste convict Suchart Nakbangsai, who spoke to the crowd.
The group expressed concern regarding a warning by the Criminal Court chief judge that the court “has the right to prosecute and sentence those who comment on the court’s verdict on Somyot (such as controversial monarchy commentator Somsak Jeamteerasakul and others posting on the Internet) for contempt of court…. Their statement said these remarks by the chief justice undermined people’s confidence in the fairness of the courts.”
PPT thought that that “confidence” was already shot to pieces and that the courts are seen as unfair and politically partisan.
Are we being crazy optimistic or has this latest sentencing unleashed forces that cannot be contained?
The cruel 11-year sentence meted out to Somyos Prueksakasemsuk – 10 years for lese majeste and an extra years for insulting a autolatric, coup-making general – has caused plenty of reaction. Some of that has been the usual yellow-shirted and monarchist gloating that the monarchy has been “saved” once more by locking up a red shirt. Most of the reaction has been shock and outrage. In this post PPT looks at some of the reaction.
Some have asked if this case means that the monarchy is an impediment to democratisation in Thailand (a question asked 17-18 years ago in one academic article, well before there was any red shirt movement and when lese majeste was not used so eagerly). Others have used words like “chilling” and “detrimental” when talking of freedom of expression.
When the EU condemned the verdict, the required ultra-royalist reaction was to protest, with a group of 50 or so royalist xenophobes calling themselves the Monarchy Protection Network or Volunteers ranting that Europeans with constitutional monarchies might better understand “the importance of the monarchy to Thailand.” They grumbled about the king being some kind of military leader and about him having “done a lot for the country” and demanded that anyone being nasty towards their idol be punished. They also drew comparisons with Europe and lese majeste laws there. Of course, their observations on Europe are uninformed, as even a quick look at Wikipedia shows that even the rare uses of the laws usually result in small fines, whereas Thailand’s use of these laws is more in line with feudal Europe.
The more positive reaction has been for the mobilization of protests demanding amnesty and for Article 112 to be abolished or reformed. Even some usually critical of anything considered to have a whiff of Thaksin Shinawatra like ” consumer protection rights advocates and FTA Watch activists are behind the letters to be sent Friday to Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Parliament Speaker Somsak Kiatsuranand, and Supreme Court president Phairoj Vayuparb, as well as the chair of the National Human Rights Commission, to seek basic rights for Somyot who has been denied bail 12 times…”.
“The reactions to the ruling reflect the strength of feeling against the court’s decision which has the potential to damage severely the country’s standing,” said IFJ president Jim Boumelha. “The sentence handed down by the court speaks more to curtailing critical reporting in Thailand than to protecting the monarch.”
The Nation says that the amnesty calls “started with the proposal of the Nitirat group … who called for a charter amendment to make a new provision on amnesty.”
Nitirat proposed that only the demonstrators should be absolved. Their leaders would also benefit from the amnesty if they proved they led the protests because of political conflict, not because they were hired. Of course, those who were jailed under the lese majeste law would also receive the benefit.
But under Nitirat’s proposal, no government officials would be absolved irrespective of whether they were officials carrying out the crackdown orders or they were the officials who gave the orders….
… Nitirat also linked the amnesty to the campaign for amendment of Article 112 on lese majeste, so the government could not comply with it.
Therein lies the rub for the timid Yingluck Shinawatra government that has refused to touch lese majeste, fearful of the wrath of the palace and its supporters. The more official red shirts want an amnesty via an executive decree, believing that this would not tread so heavily on any royalist or palace toes.
One way or another, the Yingluck government is now seemingly being cornered by its supporters.
Meanwhile, the Bangkok Post’s Voranai Vanijaka decides that all of this tells us there are real red shirts and fake red shirts. PPT isn’t sure how he would know apart from the fact that he recently spoke with a taxi driver who claimed to be a red shirt. As with most royalists, his focus is Thaksin. He also makes a point about the government’s timidity on lese majeste:
should the government be cowed by the fear of possibly losing power into sacrificing promises of justice, democracy and human rights; or – at the very least – should it have the courage to take some sort of a public stand, starting with the lese majeste law, to simply say something.
Readers might scoff at Voranai, an opponent of red shirts when they have been on the streets and a booster for the Democrat Party, suggesting that his question is a kind of yellow shirt provocation, hoping that the government will do something on amnesty and lese majeste in order that the “tanks and protesters on the streets and judges on the Constitution Court bench” can get into action again. Yet the question for the government is apt: “But to take some sort of a stance, to say a word or two against the abuse and exploitation of the lese majeste law should not be beyond the courage and conviction of the Pheu Thai government.”
Of course, Voranai doesn’t make any comparisons. It cannot be denied that this government’s track record on lese majeste charges is far superior to that of the Abhisit Vejjajiva government, when lese majeste was just one of its tools in filling jails with opponents and censoring opposition media. So at least Voranai can ask about “promises of justice, democracy and human rights” for this government; under Abhisit such questions simply didn’t arise.
Update 1: Asia Provocateur posts on questions raised in the UK parliament regarding the lese majeste sentencing of Somyos. We found the answers interesting, where it was twice stated that the “Government frequently raises human rights concerns with Thailand, both at ministerial and official level.” In addition, the British say:
Following the verdict, the European Union issued a statement expressing deep concern at the decision to sentence Somyot to 10 years imprisonment. The statement noted that the verdict seriously undermined the right to freedom of expression and press freedom. Our ambassador has also raised the issue with the Thai authorities.
Update 2: With respect to the European experience, The Nation has a useful report from an EU-sponsored workshop in Bangkok.
Former Dutch Ambassador to Thailand Tjaco Van Den Hout declared that “diversity, tolerance and broadmindedness are fundamental aspects of human rights in Europe. He stressed that high tolerance for criticism of public figures, including that of politicians and head of state and monarchy, is necessary for a democratic society.”
Lese majeste scholar David Streckfuss pointed out that the “minimum mandatory punishment under Thai lese majeste law, which is three years imprisonment term, is as high as the maximum sentences stipulated in Jordan, Morocco and Belgium.” He added that Thailand, “is unique in the world when it comes to the severity of the law and the frequency of its use.”
Peter Mork Thomsen, a judge from Denmark who handled lese majeste cases said “Danish lese majeste law had no mandatory minimum punishment…”.
The Bangkok Post is a conservative newspaper. It has been the preferred newspaper of the English-reading Thai elite and tends to reflect their interests. In recent years it has demonstrated the royalism of that elite, hoping that the relatives and friends in military- and palace-backed governments (under on-again-off-again Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont and elite scion of the royalist elite, Abhisit Vejjajiva) could get royalist rule back on track.
So it is significant that the recent lese majeste conviction of Somyos Prueksakasemsuk has caused the Bangkok Post to issue a call for “reform” of this draconian, medieval law. We assume that this call represents one thread of discussion within the higher echelons of the royalist elite who now see lese majeste as a problem for royalist rule.
We make this assumption because the Post editorial begins by observing that the “trial and conviction of Somyot Prueksakasemsuk has once again put Thailand in an uncomfortable spotlight.” We can imagine that the fact that “Thailand is increasingly criticised as a nation where authorities trample on the media and on freedom of expression” bothers the elite. We guess that some of them are tired of having to defend Thailand and its “protection” of a fabulously wealthy and privileged monarchy as somehow “culturally unique.” They probably get prickly at having to defend the sentencing of chained and caged journalists, aged men and political activists as being “culturally appropriate.” The idea that two men are sentenced for things they didn’t say and articles they didn’t write is probably causing them to squirm in their bespoke suits and Thai silk designer dresses.
Hence, the editorial demands action be taken to address the discomfort felt by some of the royalist upper crust about the lese majeste law (the editorial also briefly mentions the Computer Crimes Act). To be sure, Article 112 is defined by the Post as “a special law about the most special high institution,” and it makes no political or class mistake by demanding that the law is required, necessary and foundational:
The purpose of a lese majeste law must be to protect the monarchy and the royal family. They are otherwise defenceless against libel, slander, defamation, and against attacks on the system of democracy under a constitutional monarchy.
So the Post’s argument is that the lese majeste law might be reformed in ways that maintain the status quo and continue to “protect” the monarchy and the system of elite rule that it underpins. [Of course, "defenceless" is a bizarre term when referring to a body that wields huge political and economic power, but the monarchy continues to fear a situation where normal law might be applied to it and its privileges.]
The Post appears to be calling for a thinking person’s royalist “reform” of lese majeste as the “ultra-nationalists” are too hardline [read this as meaning: ultra-royalists are a nasty lot only good for street demonstration at needed times to protect our ruling class] and “advocates of legal change too often play into the hands…” of the yellow-shirted “knee-jerk” protection-of-the-monarchy lot. Hence, the “key to any reasonable amendment of the Criminal Code cannot proceed rationally from simple opposition to a law. The question is what the country needs, and what best serves the nation and all its institutions.”
In other words, how do “we” keep the law, “protect” the monarchy which “we” maintain as foundational to our class rule and not have to be “uncomfortable” and seen as knuckle-draggers locally and internationally.
Reflecting this ruling elite position, the editorial then claims to speak for all Thais:
… there is no disagreement among Thais. All citizens want to protect the national institutions. Protection of the monarchy, in particular His Majesty the King, is the aim of all citizens. No rational person or group has called for abolishing laws which protect His Majesty and the royal family. So any discussion of legal change can start on level ground:
This is pompous upper class nonsense. Of course there is disagreement! Clearly, there are rational Thais who do wish to abolish the law. Others, for reasons of political limitations, powerful threats and extant fears of attack, demand thoroughgoing reform rather than going the extra step.
The Post is right to observe that “[r]easonable people also can agree that Section 112 of the Criminal Code is out of date and deserves careful and factual study.” It observes that “it is obvious that the law is sometimes used by unscrupulous people in a political manner to harass those with whom they disagree.” This charge must include Abhisit, Suthep Thaugsuban and a gaggle of Democrat Party politicians, pretty much everyone in the leadership of the People’s Alliance for Democracy, Tul Sitthisomwong, Army boss General Prayuth Chan-ocha, several high officials in the Interior ministry, a number of politicians associated with pro-Thaksin Shinawatra political parties, amongst many others.
Tacitly acknowledging that many of the charges currently going through the courts were politicized charges brought by the Abhisit regime, the Post calls for an “amended Section 112 [that] would cause lese majeste charges to be brought only in cases where legal experts were certain that the offence was indeed against the monarchy _ not against a political ideology.” The editorial advocates “… change to make it relevant to the current situation.”
Without acknowledging that lese majeste charges have declined very significantly under the the Yingluck Shinawatra government, the Post blames politicians for being tardy on lese majeste reform and its abuse. Yingluck’s timidity on lese majeste is based on a fear that “an amendment to Section 112 could be political suicide.” To then compare her political reticence with “silence” by her predecessors is disingenuous. Surayud and Abhsit weren’t “silent” on lese majeste; they used it again and again to repress political opponents and to demonstrate loyalty and their royalist credentials. They were deafening in their use of this political weapon. They spawned hundreds of other knuckle-draggers on monarchy and lese majeste through their collaboration with those who considered the monarchy and monarchy’s state under threat from republicans.
The ruling class is trying to save the royalist state it has constructed.
