Updated: Yale and censorship

Readers will likely know Michael Montesano as a historian and frequent commentator on Thailand’s politics. PPT’s attention was recently drawn to another debate Montesano is engaged in, related to the establishment of a Yale University campus in partnership with the National University of Singapore.

The debate taking place seems long and convoluted for outsiders, but in making the point that Yale’s management has been compromised and in pointing to censorship and self-censorship on Singapore’s politics and how Yale will slot into that, what caught PPT’s eye was that a part of Montesano’s argument drew attention to the Yale administration’s role in the publication of The King Never Smiles. This is what he says:

… chillingly, in early 2006 Yale’s current president caved in to pressure from the government of Thailand to allow representatives of the Thai monarchy, whose supporters would just months later mount a coup d’état in Bangkok, pre-publication review (just “for accuracy,” but they always say that, don’t they?) of a biography of the Thai king already in the process of publication by Yale University Press… [by Paul Handley]. While the late Yale law professor Alexander Bickel turned over in his grave, publication of the book was thus delayed long enough so that the world’s media had no access to it as they reported on the gala celebrations marking sixty years of the king’s reign in June 2006. This episode leaves little doubt about the impact, on Yale itself, of the current Yale president’s weak commitment to academic freedom where Southeast Asia is concerned. Its implications for Yale scholarship relating to Singapore are clear and ominous. After all, Yale was not even employed by the government of Thailand when the episode occurred.

That this Thai episode elicited so little protest from Yale faculty was hard to understand. Nonetheless, it was in itself a one-time event. Should such episodes, or even the suspicion of them, become routine in matters concerning Singapore, however, the resultant regime of self-censorship in New Haven would surely prove unsustainable. It would poison both the relations of many of Yale’s humanists and social scientists with Yale’s leadership and the intellectual climate at the university. It would thus also undercut the ability of Yale, especially under the leadership of future Yale presidents, to serve as an effective partner of the PAP government and NUS.

For those who have forgotten the details of the pre-publication efforts by the Thaksin Shinawatra government and the palace to stop the book, and the U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce’s role, there is a useful summary in the first few pages of this article (a PDF).

Update: A reader tells us that Montesano’s claim that it was “a one-time event” is not accurate. Yale has a longer record of freedom of speech challenges than indicated just by the events over The King Never Smiles. The reader points to cases here, here, here and here.

Updated: Politicizing a national disaster II

In addition to the comments in PPT’s earlier post, there are a couple of stories that reflect on the way that the attacks on Yingluck Shinawatra reflect on the broader political conflict in Thailand.

Michael Montesano has a story at the Jakarta Globe that reflects on how the “floods have triggered a political and ideological contest concerning the role of the Thai monarchy.” He adds that “Thais unreconciled to the victory of Yingluck’s Red-Shirt-supported Pheu Thai Party in July’s polls have in recent weeks tried to turn her government’s current struggle to partisan political advantage. ” He notes how they have used fake and dated photos to convince themselves that the palace is hard at work on floods.

Related, it is interesting that Army boss Prayuth Chan-ocha seems to have become official spokesperson for the monarchy. We noted his earlier comments here. Now, at The Nation, it is he that tells the media that “Their Majesties the King and Queen have been concerned about the plight of flood victims…”, noting that the king is monitoring the floods. Why wouldn’t he be?

Prayuth then goes on to say that he is “pledging full military efforts on rescue and recovery.” What were they doing before this? Half-hearted efforts? Prayuth adds that “Their Majesties told the soldiers to take good care of the people…”. In Bangkok, yellow-shirt speak, that is saying (again) that Prayuth and the military’s loyalty is not to the government, but to the monarchy. Prayuth seems back on political course, posing the monarchy-army alliance against Puea Thai. The watery coup idea holds water, so to speak.

Andrew Spooner has a cheeky post that asks a relevant question of the HRW staffer in Thailand who seems to have a political concern about portable toilets….

For those saying that the government has been partisan in its efforts, this story is a kind of mild antidote.

Update: A reader draws our attention to a story in The Nation:

The military will deploy another 50,000 troops, 1,000 vehicles and 1,000 boats to fight off floodwaters from Bangkok, the Defence Ministry said yesterday.

The First Army Area will defend Bangkok, and the Navy Siriraj Hospital, where His Majesty the King is receiving treatment, and Thawee Watthana district….

The Air Force will be in charge of Don Mueang airport compound and the government Flood Relief Operations Centre, said ministry spokesman Colonel Thanathip Sawangsaeng.

There are around 10,000 troops already deployed throughout the country, he said. Military reservists may be mobilised as extra helpers to assist regular troops when needed.

It does seem seem odd that the report only has 10,000 troops in places other than Bangkok. Given that almost all deaths and injuries have been beyond Bangkok and that the flood in Bangkok will, in all likelihood, be less than further north, the question of priorities needs to be raised.

Jory and Montesano on lese majeste

Australian academic Patrick Jory and his Singapore-based colleague Michael Montesano have an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that warrants careful consideration. The article is entitled “End the Gag on Thailand’s Citizens.”

They note that the “Electoral Commission recently warned that discussion of the monarchy will not be tolerated in the lead up to the July 3 general election.” They add that this is just the “latest in a series of warnings by government authorities designed to shut down debate about the role of the Thai monarch.” Before this, the Abhisit Vejjajiva Government had “blocked more than 100,000 websites,” imprisoned “numerous Red Shirt leaders and sympathizers” on lese majeste charges and has locked up critics and popular red shirt and leading opposition politician Jatuporn Promphan.

The latter is “as a result of a speech that he made at a rally on the anniversary of the April-May 2010 violence, in which he accused military units attached to the palace of firing on and killing Red Shirt demonstrators.”

The authors note that every attempt to close discussion leads to a growing debate. Why? They say, and PPT agrees:

This is mainly a result of the belief among large sections of the public that the ties between Privy Council Chairman Prem Tinsulanonda and the soldiers who carried out the coup of 2006, along with the subsequent appointment of a privy councilor as prime minister, mean that the palace was directly involved in the coup. Further, in the political turmoil of the past five years, the palace has on numerous occasions appeared to side with the royalist Yellow Shirt protestors, the military and the Democrat Party.

They also note the growing chorus calling for reform of the monarchy “to make it more democratic. The proposals include reforming or abolishing the lèse-majesté law and ending the constitutional prohibition on criticism of the king and the royal family.”

Some of the proposals they mention include:

abolishing the Privy Council, which is appointed by the king and widely believed to intervene in the country’s politics, military promotions and judicial decisions; ending the relentless promotion of the monarchy in the Thai mass media and education system; bringing the monarchy’s extensive assets and business interests under the direction of the government, … ending the practice by which the king makes speeches on politically sensitive subjects, military affairs and judicial decisions without the approval of the elected government of the day; and abolishing the custom whereby commoners are obliged to prostrate themselves before members of the royal family in Thailand—the only place in the world where this custom still exists.

They also note that the specter of republicanism lurks. The authors reckon that “royalists ought to welcome open discussion of the monarchy and its place in national life” as the monarchy’s role needs to modified to meet modern-day realities. They note that “continued suppression of discussion makes impossible” any rational discussion of the monarchy’s future.

The authors conclude that “Thais have a right to debate freely and openly the reform of the monarchy to suit a more modern and democratic future.” PPT agrees but it seems pretty clear that the royalists so not acknowledge any such right.

Academic freedom challenged

Simon Montlake comments on declining academic freedom in the Christian Science Monitor. Of course, this relates to the lese majeste case brought by the Army chief against history professor Somsak Jeamteerasakul at Thammasat University.

The report begins: “An outspoken historian is facing the threat of a criminal trial for his writings on the Thai monarchy, spurring an international appeal by scholars for the protection of academic freedoms in Thailand.”

Some useful quotes from the story:

“Watchdog groups say Thailand’s widespread use of repressive laws such as lèse-majesté to silence critics has undermined its democratic rights. US-based Freedom House recently ranked Thailand with dictatorships like China and Cuba for its ‘substantial censorship’ of political debate. Thai authorities continue to shut down media outlets allied to the opposition red-shirt movement. Armed police raided several red-shirt radio stations on April 26 for airing anti-royal speeches.” PPT thinks there should be an “allegedly” associated with “anti-royal speeches.”

“Somsak is among a group of intellectuals who have called for root-and-branch reform of the monarchy to diminish its political influence.”

David Streckfuss: “If charges are brought against him, it would really put a dent in Thailand’s image as a place where general freedoms are observed…”.

“For academics, this creates a ‘black hole’ in the study of Thailand’s modern history, says Michael Montesano, a fellow at the Institute for Southeast Asia Studies in Singapore. While some studies have simply echoed official hagiographies of the current ruler, others have resorted to coded language or bitten their tongues…”.

Montesano: “In recent years, this caution has ebbed a bit. But Somsak has really pushed the envelope…”.

Prime Minister “Mr. Abhisit [Vejjajiva], who was educated at Oxford University, has said that non-partisan scholarship on the monarchy is permissible.”

Kevin Hewison: “said Somsak’s case was a test for Abhisit. ‘He has stated several times that academic comment on the monarchy is acceptable. If it now isn’t, [his] reputation will be in tatters for scholars who follow Thailand’…”.

PPT thinks it worth noting that there are now reformist and abolitionist perspectives on lese majeste. Somsak’s case is a clear over-step by an enraged Army boss. Arguably, this is also the case for Somyos Pruksakasemsuk, who continues to be held without bail.

General Prayuth Chan-ocha has shown that he is unable to comprehend Thailand’s current political climate and the changes that have taken place in recent years. So while the action against Somsak is an act of repression, it has thrown open a door that the royalists can’t shut. The more “liberal” amongst them must press for reform of the lese majeste law. If they don’t do this, as Sulak Sivaraksa says, time and again, they risk the monarchy itself.

Election talk

As readers will have noted, PPT has been watching election speculation and while agreeing that there is probably an elite strategy on the royalist government an electoral mandate that will (it hopes) silence critics, we have also noted the intense debate that has gone on within the elite on whether this was the “right” strategy at this time. This caused us to comment on the conflict with and in the People’s Alliance for Democracy as well as the unbridled use of lese majeste against the government’s opponents while demanding silence on the monarchy during an election campaign.

As the Bhum Jai Thai Party-Ministry of Interior-Internal Security Operations Command organized a large rally of the so-called Monarchy Protection Volunteers Group in Rangsit (go here and choose 6 May to see a front-page picture) and as the Army displayed on Channel 5 its nationwide activities supporting the monarchy and opposing those “threatening” the monarchy, and as the Cabinet approved huge budgets (see below and here) in an unusual, long and generous meeting, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said late Friday that he had submitted a decree for the king’s signature that would dissolve parliament and lead to an election.

The Economist, writing before Abhisit’s announcement, has a piece that includes some interesting issues.

It begins with Abhisit’s “spendthrift cabinet” approving “102 spending proposals, totalling billions of dollars.” (A Bangkok Post account says 137 billion baht.) It concludes: “Plainly, an election is in the offing.” The Economist believes “the contest will be bitter…. And whatever the result, some will not accept it.”

PPT hasn’t mentioned what the Economist calls “the centre of the show”: Thaksin Shinawatra. It observes:

Deposed in a coup in 2006 and banned from politics in Thailand, he is now in exile in Dubai. But his devoted followers, the red shirts, have kept the flame glowing, often in the face of extreme government hostility. Scores of their number were gunned down during a prolonged protest in central Bangkok a year ago. They see this election as possibly their last chance to right the wrong of that coup.”

PPT would add that the supporters of Thaksin have seen their votes count for nothing in the three most recent elections. Many of them will wonder if that will be the case again should the Puea Thai Party do well. It is unclear if people will remain connected to the electoral process if their votes are thrown out time and again.

Thaksin remains critical. As this report notes, many “hoped that Pheu Thai would evolve into an issues-based party rather than remain a Thaksin fan-club. Fat chance. As the election nears, the opposite is happening…”. One reason for this continuing “Thaksinisation” of the party is because “the party does not have a lot of choice, because of government crackdowns… [and bannings]. With so many leaders sidelined, Pheu Thai’s remaining talent pool is shallow.”

Abhisit sees an opportunity to “ opportunity “win his own mandate.”

The Economist raises one important question: will “the campaign will be a proper contest of people and ideas…”, adding that censorship, jailings and so on make “some red shirts argue that it will be almost impossible to hold a free and fair election.” Not just red shirts. PPT has argued a “fixing” has been going on.

A second important question relates to acceptance of a hypothetical Puea Thai victory. PPT thinks that such a victory would be a remarkable outcome with so much aligned against the party. Hence the generals say they will accept a Puea Thai government. We think this is little different from their claims back in 2007 when they said the junta’s constitution could be changed following an election that they thought the Democrat Party would win. When they didn’t, and People’s Power Party sought constitutional amendment, PAD mobilized, chaos resulted and the judicial coup took place in December 2008.

Writing after the Abhisit statement, the Wall Street Journal has another take on the election. Despite all of the obstacles and fixing, the Journal thinks calling an election is “a risky strategy” against a “well-funded opposition backed by former premier Thaksin Shinawatra, the man the army kicked out of power nearly five years ago.” In fact, the Democrat Party doesn’t seem short of campaign funds, and has used the state coffers extensively to promote its position (see above).

The Journal has more on opposition to the election amongst the elite, saying “conservative royalists argue that Thailand isn’t ready to hold peaceful elections.” It cites Michael Montesano who says “that even among Thailand’s anti-Thaksin establishment, there are doubts that elections are the best way to stabilize the country.”

As we noted above, the military has actively campaigned for the royalist government and hopes that its work will be more successful than it was in 2007. Meanwhile, Abhisit, who was put in place and maintained there by the military says: “I think we see the military is now playing its role according to the constitution, and supports an elected government and the policies we adopt.”

More doublespeak by Abhisit, obscuring his enduring debt to the military and their weapons. Expect much more of this and also expect the military to be heavily involved as they provide bodyguards for Abhisit and other Democrat Party politicians as they campaign. Also expect the already huge promises made by both sides to get even bigger. And, don’t forget the monarchy. We assume the king will sign off on the dissolution of parliament, despite his operation. Even if the major parties agreed that it is unmentionable, state television and the military will continue to harp on “the institution,” implying that the opposition is disloyal.

Unrest is the norm

Getting a slot in one of the big U.S. news weeklies has always been taken in Thailand as problematic. This has been more so since the current regime came to power with various accusations against the international media for “failing to understand” or, worse, being in the pay of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This week Thailand got a slot in Newsweek as it talked with some international scholars on the problems in the south.

The take-off point is the observation that  “Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva appears eager to show that Thailand is on the mend. In late December, the government lifted the state of emergency that had been in place in the capital for more than eight months, and Abhisit then gave an optimistic end-of-year speech promising stability. As one indication, the cabinet also lifted a much older state of emergency in three districts of Thailand’s troubled Deep South—where successive administrations have been unable to quell an insurgency that since 2004 has claimed more than 4,400 lives.”

Abhisit claimed: “It shows that the government is making progress…” on the south.

Newsweek seems to refute this, citing the analysis of three scholars familiar with the region. Zachary Abuza, a professor at the U.S.’s National War College says: “The violence isn’t down…”. He adds that : “there’s no end to the conflict in sight…”. One of the reasons for this is that: “Harsh military and police tactics, meanwhile, such as detaining suspected insurgents without charge and allegedly using torture, seem only to make things worse.” And, as for lifting the state of emergency, this means little when the Internal Security Act remains in place.

Professor Duncan McCargo from Leeds University hits the nail firmly on the head when he says: “What you see in the Deep South is just an extreme version of the national problem in Thailand, which is that power is overly concentrated in Bangkok, where “the military and monarchy sit.”

Michael Montesano, a researcher at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies responds that the solution is “[d]evolution of power … both in the Deep South and countrywide…”. Yet he knows this is deeply challenging for the elite who are “reluctant to cede real power, while Abhisit’s government is backed by Thailand’s most centralized powers—the military and the crown.”

PPT agrees when the article concludes: “Until the country’s leaders are willing to address the longstanding grievances held by Thais outside the traditional power structure, unrest, both in the South and in Bangkok, will likely continue to be the norm.”

Red shirt resentment and action

There’s a useful report on red shirts outside Bangkok in a U.N.-based newsletter that warrants consideration. It does considerable summarizing of already well-known information, and continues the theme of lack of reconciliation by the government as it hunts and arrests red shirts. As the report states, “though many of its leaders have been detained, the Red movement is, in fact, far from over, as community grassroots groups … continue to collect money for the cause and as Reds convene more rallies…”. See some clips of recent events below.

It cites Jim Della-Giacoma, South East Asia project director for the International Crisis Group: “Genuine reconciliation can only happen when the government stops suppressing the Red Shirts and allows them to voice their aspirations and grievances through peaceful political channels.” The report continues: “That means restoring electoral democracy and respecting the vote, even if those in power lose.”

One of the surprising aspects of the report is the claim by [m]any Reds” that there was “a utopia completely void of corruption during the Thaksin [Shinawatra] years…”. That may be a rural villager’s perspective on the changes that have taken place post-Thaksin as the military and civil bureaucracies have reinforced their control, and this allows for increased demands on the public for “support.”

As PPT has also pointed out, “there is little awareness on the part of the ruling elites as to how deep-seated change needs to be.” Michael Montesano is quoted: “There are people who get it and are virulently opposed to change, and there are even more people who don’t get it…. I don’t think there’s an understanding in the top rungs of the government that the old tricks just won’t work any more.”

The report also comments on “Red Sundays” partly organized by Sombat Boonngamanong. Some of these are seen in the clips below. Sombat says: “The government can now see that the Red Shirts will not be defeated…”.

PPT is pretty sure that Thai E-News remains pretty much blocked in Thailand. Our recent scan of their posts revealed some recent video gems, which we wish to post here for those interested in current red shirt activism:

The site also includes links to Picassa pages of photos.

On the government’s part, repression and startling claims regarding “terrorism” remain the order of the day. The government’s leading supporter, banned politician and former Thaksin supporter Newin Chidchob has claimed that a former “boss” has put out an assassination contract on him. Newin says the”former boss” – PPT and everyone else assumes he means Thaksin – has put up 20 million baht for the assassination. The claim seems odd given that Newin is often in highly public situations, not least at football games, so he would be a relatively easy target if a professional assassin had really been hired. Maybe he’s been watching Bangkok Dangerous.

PPT notes that claims of assassination plots are legion in recent years, but that the only ones that had any basis appear to be that against Thaksin when he was premier, and another against yellow-shirt leader Sondhi Limthongkul. Neither seems to have seen any effort to get the masterminds brought to justice.

This claim by Newin follows hard on the heels of a government report that it has busted a ring of 11 “red shirt” assassins-in-training “at a resort in Chiang Mai in preparation to launch violent acts and political assassinations.” That is convenient given Newin’s accusation. The Post states that the police “acknowledged the arrest but refused to provide details.”

Red shirt leader and parliamentarian Jatuporn Promphan, in the story on Newin, called the the arrest “a birthday gift for Mr Newin.” He added that the arrests and confessions “seemed to be scripted.” He denied all knowledge of the men and suggested that they weren’t red shirts.

At the very least, the claims of terrorists need to be substantiated and more information supplied; usually, it is at this stage that the claims seem to melt into history…. Let’s see if anything happens this time.

Montesano on tolerance

Michael Montesano, a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, has an article entitled “The Death of Tolerance in Thailand” in the Wall Street Journal (31 May 2010). It is prompted in part by the arrest of Chulalongkorn University professor Suthachai Yimprasert, now released from his arbitary detention.

The article remain relevant even following Suthachai’s release. This is because his arrest was under the draconian 2005 emergency decree that pretty much allow the military-backed regime to do whatever it wants.

Montesano is also correct to observe Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s empty words about reconciliation: “The Abhisit government says it wants reconciliation. But Mr. Suthachai’s detention, along with aggressive measures to censor the Internet and other media, suggest that it has embarked on a post-crackdown course likely to deepen Thailand’s ugly divisions.” He sets out some of the actions taken by the government, using its emergency powers, to conduct a repressive witch hunt. These include:

• freezing the bank accounts of more than 100 individuals that the government thinks have helped fund the red shirt protests;
• surveillance  of ordinary citizens in northern and northeastern Thailand;
• internet censorship on a grand scale.

Montesano argues that the current regime and their backers are ignoring “the most hopeful lessons of modern Thai political history. Instead they have embarked on a path to destroy what is best about their country.”

PPT agrees that the current regime is on a path that has not been seen in Thailand since the dark days of the Thanin Kraivixien government. However, we would quibble with Montesano’s history of the reconciliation that followed on the heels of a draconian government, put in place by the palace in 1976, and headed by a still-serving privy councilor.

Montesano argues that on 6 October 1976, “Soldiers, police and right-wing vigilantes attacked Bangkok’s Thammasat University. They killed tens of student protestors, detained many others and drove still others into the jungle to join the armed insurgency of the ‘terrorists’ of the Communist Party of Thailand.”

That’s more or less right, but the death toll in that event is disputed (as the death toll in recent events is). The government officially claims just 46 killed. Others at the time claimed many more deaths.

Montesano then states that “Thailand entered a very bleak period.” It did indeed. The Thanin government was, not unlike the current Abhisit regime, rabidly ultra-royalist and attacked even royalist liberals as “communists.” Again, we see signs of that today.

Montesano then sees a period of reconciliation, presided over by General Prem Tinsulannda after he replaced another general who was despised by the palace for throwing out their favorite in Thanin. Those who fled to the jungles or overseas following the October 1976 events began to come back. He argues that one outcome was the return of talent and a new “academic freedom” that made “Thailand’s best universities sites for rigorous examination of the country’s past and present, its society, economy, and history.” He calls on the Democrat Party – the victim of the 1976 coup and a party seen then as too liberal – to remember the lessons of the past and to see true reconciliation rather than resorting to the dead wood of repression and authoritarianism

Again, PPT agrees in part but points to the contexts. Recall that the period of reconciliation of the 1980s came after a thorough “cleansing” by ultra-royalists and a significant turning back of the political clock. Indeed, elections didn’t really matter again until Prem was pushed out of his army-palace appointed premiership in 1988, 12 years after the 1976 events.

PPT suggests that this scenario is not dissimilar to the Abhisit regime’s approach today. They are engaging in a period of cleansing, making the world “safe” for the palace and its conservative backers, and they will only look at elections when they feel they can safely control the outcome.

Updated: Release of Dr. Suthachai Yimprasert

PPT was very pleased to hear about the release late on Monday, 31 May 2010, of Dr. Suthachai Yimprasert, the assistant professor at Chulalongkorn University who was arbitrarily detained by the CRES last Monday. PPT has previously blogged about Suthachai here, here, here, and here. You can also read about his case on the blog of Siam Democracy Cooperative, a new, emergent organization here.

Update: The Bangkok Post covers his release here.  Matichon covers his release here.

Violence, monarchy, people

At channelnewsasia.com (25 April 2010) there is a report of an academic discussion on Thailand in Singapore. Some interesting elements include the observation that violence is deep-rooted in Thai society: “In terms of the carnival atmosphere turning into violence, this comes from very deep in Thai society…. This is the whole Thai society that we are seeing here. There is a lot of violence under the surface.” This has often included deadly confrontations between security forces and demonstrators (Michael Montesano, a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).

Paul Chambers, who is said to be “a Thailand expert at Germany’s Heidelberg University” makes doubtful comments about the monarchy. PPT thinks this one is simply silly: “Given the country’s cultural affinity for obedience to monarchy, Thailand’s palace can facilitate moves toward consensus…. Absent such intervention, polarisation and violence may well continue.” We wonder what Mr. Chambers has been doing over the past few years. The idea of a “cultural affinity for obedience to the monarchy” is something that royalists sprout in their propaganda, but is hardly academic thinking.

The report refers to a “sense of resentment has now spread to the working poor in urban areas.” We at PPT would suggest that this is something that is also deep-rooted and that we are seeing it again.

Montesano makes an excellent point about the current situation: “The hatred of Thaksin is much more dangerous to Thailand than Thaksin [himself]…”. Talk to members of the Democrat Party and to the various yellow-shirted intellectuals and this personal hatred of Thaksin is the fundamental basis of their political position. Montesano adds: “Because the government believes Thaksin is behind all this, there is no compromise.”

Jacques Ivanoff, said to be from the Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia, is reported as saying: “When citizens take matters into their own hands, the outcome is never very good.” Not quite sure what this refers to. People in the Philippines and Indonesia might disagree as might many Thais when they think of their country’s long history of uprisings against authoritarianism.