Never, ever, not now, not ever….

The Nitirat group of Thammasat University law lecturers is again making proposals related to constitutional change. In an article at the Bangkok Post: attention is given to Nitirat’s proposal that political amnesty be a part of constitutional reform.

Because the Yingluck Shinawatra government has faltered on “an amnesty process for rank-and-file red shirts accused of violence during the political unrest in April-May 2010,” Nitirat “wants to put the amnesty as a chapter in the amended charter…”. Nitirat’s Worachet Pakeerut explained:

Why is it to be in the constitution? That’s because an amnesty bill or decree will provide a blanket amnesty, but the proposed amnesty as a constitutional chapter will not cover authorities involved in crackdowns on protests after the Sept 19 coup in 2006 until the last election in 2011…. This [proposal] is unprecedented as it aims to teach a lesson to the authorities. It will be a concrete platform to dismantle the impunity in our society….

This is an important and necessary innovation.

On the proposed amnesty chapter, “a five-member conflict resolution committee would be established and it would have the final say on the amnesty process.”

Predictably, an anonymous “member of the Law Reform Commission (LRC) said introducing national reconciliation laws or amending the constitution to bring about reconciliation could only be achieved when political sentiments were conducive _ and now is not the right time.”

Essentially, the royalist elite will say “not now, not ever” on such a necessary innovation as they reject any proposal that seeks to make Thailand more democratic.

Also in the “not now, not ever” category is a House sub-committee on constitutional change reported at the Bangkok Post. The idea that the principal legal tools of the royalist elite in the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court’s Criminal Section for Holders of Political Positions should be dissolved is anathema to all royalists.

These two judicial bodies have been shown to be politically-biased and corrupt. In particular, the Constitutional Court has demonstrated a role as the proud defender of the indefensible royalist power structure.  Replacing them with new bodies that are independent would be a remarkable innovation.

Further suggestions by the sub-committee to do away with other politicized bodies such as the Office of the Ombudsman are sure to bring cries of derision. The idea of  only having elected senators also strikes at the heart of the conservative changes wrought by the military-royalist coalition following the 2006 coup.

However, as with all that is associated with the military junta’s constitution, these courts and unelected bodies are on the wrong side of the line in the sand drawn by the royalist elite that continues to see itself as the rightful ruling class.

The fear is that the royalist rulers will lose power. Their cry will continue to be “Never, ever, not now, not ever.”

Thaksin-Yingluck strategy has failed II

Several times PPT has posted skeptically about the political strategy adopted by Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra in dealing with their opposition. Essentially, their strategy is to stay in the government’s seats for four years, no matter what.  To do that, the Puea Thai government has appeased the military, monarchy, royalists and others. Whenever the government has proposed anything that has resulted in rising opposition or criticism, it has withdrawn.

We see this strategy at work on the issue of constitutional amendment. While the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship strategy for 2013 lists constitutional reform as a priority -  “The UDD is unwavering in its conviction that the government must proceed with a third reading of the charter amendment bill” – it seems the government is in full retreat. Yingluck reportedly says: “We will need to take a step back and talk it out to find the causes [of the problems], but not to create more divisiveness. Otherwise [the problems] will never come to an end…”.

All it seems to take is a few determined royalists ranting about a government policy and the government is seen reversing, seeking a safe parking place. So when a royalist bully with palace connections like coup plotter Prasong Soonsiri claims that “wholesale charter amendment is prohibited and a referendum to decide if it should proceed is probably unconstitutional” his views are sufficient for the Thaksin-Yingluck retreat strategy to be implemented. (The current undemocratic constitution, born of the 2006 military coup, is largely Prasong’s work as he was the chair of the drafting committee and repeatedly called the document an anti-Thaksin charter and demanded military action against those opposed to it and the sham referendum.)

The flaw in the Thaksin-Yingluck strategy is that opponents – yellow shirts, military brass, ultra-royalists, palace figures and the Democrat Party – now know that they can use it to get what they want. So it is that the People’s Alliance for Democracy is opposing the authority of the International Court of Justice on Preah Vihear. This in itself is not triggering another retreat, but as this position is reinforced by other xenophobes and ultra-royalists, the risk is government capitulation.

Hence it is no surprise that the “so-called Group of 40 Senators said the Pheu Thai government would have to inform the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that it had no authority to make a ruling over the dispute — and Thailand would not accept a ruling or order of the court that would affect sovereignty over the disputed plot.” This is the usual group of mostly unelected senators that oppose everything the government does. They know that a bit of agitation can get them their way when all the government desires is longevity.

If more opposition weight is added to this co-ordinated PAD-military junta demon seed senators – the same lot who, with Prasong were championing Pitak Siam – then expect the government to be looking for a retreat.

“Journalism” in the parallel universe or reporting for The Nation

Sometimes it is as if the journalists at The Nation live in a parallel universe. As an example, read the latest year-end assessment by three journalists - Somroutai Sapsomboon,
Kittipong Thavevong and Samudcha Hoonsara. Their view seems to be that Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra is lucky to have retained her position. Their headline is: “Yingluck enters 2013 a survivor.”

They are writing about a premier who won a landslide election in July 2011 and retains a popularity in surveys that is well above that of opposition leader Abhisit Vejjajiva. So how is it that these journalists can begin their report with: “Thanks to powerful supporters, the PM has made it [survived] despite the brickbats”? They obviously don’t mean the electorate is considered amongst those “powerful supporters.” The norm in an electoral democracy is for a premier to maintain the broad support of the electorate and the confidence of parliament. Yingluck has both.

They go on to tell readers that Yingluck “has survived more than 15 months in office despite repeated attacks from critics and opposition politicians on her alleged ignorance, lack of political experience, and tendency to stay adrift of key issues.”

The point seems to be that there hasn’t been a military or judicial coup to oust yet another elected government. They seem to think that the real forces in politics, in the elite, the military and the palace would have or even should have chucked her out by now.

But these “journalists” refuse to give Yingluck any credit for her political “longevity”: she can only survive “thanks to support from many experienced and influential politicians behind her,” including “her brother Thaksin.” This statement is not one that expresses another norm of electoral politics – leaders have teams of advisers and have to deal with fractious issues. The Nation team seems to think that one-man politics (and “man” is probably the right term) is somehow better than working as a government and through parliament, for Yingluck is criticized as “invisible politically” and for insisting that “hot issues” are “matters for Parliament…”.

Worse, according to this set of “reporters,” Yingluck “needs much support and assistance … from experienced politicians and advisers in order to survive.” Her “political crime” seems to be that she has “trusted aides” and has advisers who “prepare her statements and often updates her on current affairs.” The idea of a Thai premier being advised and updated by experts and experienced politicians seems somehow anathema.

Of course, this is sour grapes journalism. The idea that Abhisit had no advisers is ludicrous when, say, Chuan Leekpai taking a significant role in dealing with major challenges for the Democrat Party and Abhisit. Thaksin relied on trusted advisers including Pansak Vinyaratn. And, we can hardly refer to earlier premiers like Chatichai Choonhavan without mentioning his group of advisers at Ban Phitsanulok.

When the report mentions Abhisit, it is a to make excuses for him and to criticize Yingluck for not (yet) having to face determined street politics. Abhisit “faced open shows of hatred … [and] was harassed often by small groups of red-shirt protesters in public.” And, of course, “Abhisit’s government was severely interrupted by the red shirts’ street protests in 2009 and the unrest and riots in 2010, which paralysed Bangkok for more than two months and led to more than 90 deaths under a government crackdown to end the stand-off.”

All of that excuses Abhisit’s politicized rule and the military- and palace-backed repression that caused a huge electoral backlash for an illegitimate government. Yingluck is seen to have only faced “a protest in November by the Pitak Siam group, which lasted less than one day. The protest was easily subdued, thanks to an efficient and swift crowd-control operation by the police…”. The reporters conclude: “She will need to try harder and be more hands-on in government affairs to silence the critics and reassure the dubious public.”

The parallel universe near The Nation building

This is nonsensical stuff. Rather than being praised for avoiding huge street politics and heading a popular and elected government that doesn’t kill and maim street demonstrators and locks up few political opponents, it is as if the journalists are saying her “cooler” approach to politics is somehow unfair when compared with the hapless Abhisit and his authoritarian approach to politics! The “public” is not dubious about Yingluck and she remains ahead of Abhisit in all polls of leaders.

The Nation and several of its journalists operate in a parallel universe that has a deep yellow tinge to it. Yingluck has done more than simply “survived.” As academic Kevin Hewison recently explained, the political cooling has been a successful political strategy: “The underlying rationale for all this has been a determination that the Yingluck administration should remain in place for a full term and gain re-election.” Another academic, Duncan McCargo, notes that: “Yingluck has gradually gained in stature, [and]… an extended term of office for Yingluck Shinawatra now looks increasingly probable.” For once the “ivory tower” seems fairer, more realistic and rational.

Updated: Wikileaks, Pansak and Surin

As mentioned in an earlier post, PPT has finally found the time to get back to Wikileaks cables and is looking through the 6,000 or so cables to see what we missed in our past viewings. We are doing this in a systematic way, trying to ensure that we don’t double-up and re-post something we’d commented on previously.  We are now working our way through the 2006 cables.

Two cables get our attention in this post. The first is from a meeting with Thaksin Shinawatra’s close adviser Pansak Vinyaratn and the second from a talk with the Democrat Party’s Surin Pitsuwan. Both cables revolve around politics and monarchy.

PPT has previously posted on comments made by Pansak. In an earlier cable, this one dated 9 March 2006, Pansak meets with Ambassador Ralph Boyce and then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Southeast Asia Eric John (who later became ambassador to Thailand). PPT thought we had covered this one previously, so if we are doubling up, we apologize.

At a time when People’s Alliance for Democracy rallies were expanding, Pansak is said to have “brimmed with fatigued confidence.” He even felt a “military coup improbable.” According to Pansak, denouncing “the ‘arrogance’ of the political opposition”,

the current political crisis is the “last hurrah of the old wealthy class,” according to Pansak. This cabal of political and economic elite who have dominated modern Thai society are “absolutely, deeply resentful” of Thaksin, who Pansak suggests is a new type of businessman and politician. Pansak said he told Thaksin, “all of these people who have lost their role in society, who have lost their shirts because of arrogance, want to come back (and defeat Thaksin.)” This “unholy alliance” of big business, the Democrat Party and “some people close to the palace” remain feckless. They have no specific programs or platforms and lack even the leadership to defeat Thaksin….

Thaksin, Pansak claimed, “has strengthened democracy…”. By this he seems to mean that “Thaksin’s power base ‘is the people’,” with Thai Rak Thai Party “took only five years to capture the hearts and minds of the people.”Again, Pansak pans the “immature” established “elite who have dominated the country for so long have focused too much on a form of representative democracy that meets their needs and minimizes the voices of the masses.”

Boyce decides that Pansak claims are a “humorous efforts to paint Thaksin as a man of the people…”. In all of the cables we have seen, apart from being an ardent admirer of everyone in the palace, Boyce shows a congruence with the elite in usually being unable to understand Thaksin’s popular appeal.

At the same time Pansak reveals the Achilles heel of the aggressive Thaksin and an arrogant TRT: “In the past, journalists were thrown in jail…. Now, we sue them, because we believe in the custom of democracy.”

Of course, the monarchy wasn’t missing from the discussion. Pansak refers to “the King’s personal private secretary Arsa Sarasin had called Democrat Party Chief Abhisit Vejjahiva [sic.] to ask him if he would like to meet Thaksin at the palace to discuss the current crisis. Abhisit refused, saying that if the palace would like him to meet with the PM, they would have to submit a list of subjects for discussion first.” This invitation is confirmed by the ambassador and by Abhisit to the media.

Pansak made “a cryptic sentence or two that seemed to suggest a preference for a respected but politically uninvolved monarch.” He is quoted as saying:

“To revere the King in the correct manner is to allow him to be in the palace with happiness and his eunuchs only come out of the palace to go to the supermarket. So always fund beautiful roads for eunuchs to go back to the palace…the situation now is, build beautiful roads for eunuchs to go back to the palace.”

The second cable is also dated 9 March and begins with a comment on the monarchy, with the Democrat Party Deputy Leader and former Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan is headlined as having “voiced his hope that the Palace would convince Prime Minister Thaksin to step down.” As the cable has it:

When DAS John asked where he thought the situation was going, Surin said that he hoped that someone such as Privy Council Chairman General Prem Tinsulanonda would be able to weigh in with the Palace’s authority to persuade Thaksin to go for the sake of the country’s stability. He opined that otherwise Thaksin will not likely go without being pushed. If Article 7 comes into play, Surin said, the King could appoint a new Prime Minister and “fair and transparent” elections be scheduled…. The Ambassador asked if the DP had lines through to the Palace towards this eventuality. Surin said he thought not, but that the DP was “hopeful” that the Palace would decide “enough is enough” and tell Thaksin to go.

Surin’s next claim was that Thaksin and TRT were engaged in vote-buying for the 2006 election, which his party was boycotting.

Nothing much ever seems to change in the (un)Democrat(ic) Party. In a kind of bizarre failure to recognize that Thaksin and TRT had been weakened by the Shin Corp sale, Surin seems blinded to the changes that had taken place quite rapidly following this deal. He lists Thaksin’s “consistent evasion of the law and misuse of authority” and drones about how Thaksin had

… manipulated all of the country’s supervisory mechanisms — the Security and Exchange Commission, the Constitutional Court, the Election Commission, the Tax Department, etc…. Even the nominally independent courts are suborned by Thaksin through bribery. In addition, Thaksin controlled the electronic media and much of the print media, Surin complained.

He seems unable or unwilling to see anything other than a dominant Thaksin:

DAS John asked how he would address critics who say that the DP is a “spoilsport” that, cognizant that the Prime Minister would win in a new election, will try to bring him down by other means. Surin responded that the political and governmental system itself has gone bad under Thaksin — constitutional controls have been undermined by the Prime Minister and electoral watchdog bodies compromised.

A politically despondent Surin seems to think that Thaksin is too popular for event the king to intervene: the king “would be reluctant to oust a populist leader elected by a large majority of the populace and still apparently enjoying great popularity outside of Bangkok and the DP’s traditional stronghold in Thailand’s south.” The Democrat Party seemed out of ideas and hoped for royal political rescue.

Update: Interestingly, our post appeared just as The Nation published a story on the end of Surin’s 5-year term as ASEAN Secretary-General. While supplicant academics praise him, PPT wonders why, after 45 years, ASEAN attracts so much attention but achieves so little.

Wikileaks: Thaksin’s Chamlong and palace problems

PPT finally has time to get back to Wikileaks cables and is trying to look through the 6,000 or so cables and see what we missed in our past searches of them. We are doing this in a systematic way, trying to ensure that we don’t double-up and re-post something we’d commented on previously.  At present, we have worked through 2005 and are now slowly getting through 2006.

In a cable dated 21 February 2006, Ambassador Ralph Boyce discusses Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s political problems, including mounting opposition from the palace. He concludes that “[t]hings are getting worse for the Prime Minister.” Boyce states that Thaksin’s options are few as “the opposition,” while “not enormous, just won’t quit.”

Boyce sees the “anti-Thaksin coalition” as boosted by “Chamlong Srimuang, a retired general and former governor of Bangkok, was a prominentpolitical figure in the 1980′s and 1990′s” and a “prominent leader of the 1992 democracy movement” joining. He says Chamlong has “star power” and adds that his “criticism of Thaksin is especially noteworthy as he was the PM’s first political mentor…”.  Chamlong’s “Dharma Army” was set to participate in an upcoming anti-Thaksin rally. Boyce says the opposition “smells blood.”

Part of the reason for this change and polls showing a decline in Thaksin’s popularity is attributed, Boyce says, to “the modest but notable shift in the media…. Papers that formerly ignored political stories or toed the government line are cautiously increasing their coverage of criticism, particularly of the Shin Corp deal.”

Boyce then refers to “a surprisingly candid comment from a Deputy Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defense…. Admiral Banawit … noted that the [anti-Thaksin] demonstration on Sunday would be big and that ‘the government would fall’ because ‘Chamlong is very effective.’ He seemed pretty cheerful about it.” PPT assumes this is Admiral Bannawit Kengrian for Boyce comments: “Banawit is an acolyte of Privy Council Chairman Prem Tinsulanonda, which makes his enthusiasm for Thaksin’s downfall doubly interesting.” This move to palace and Prem opposition is what Boyce sees as “interesting.”

Boyce also mentions a meeting with Thaksin adviser Pansak Vinyaratn where the ambassador asks “what would happen if the situation got worse and something provoked an intervention by the Palace.” Pansak is reported to have said “TRT would not allow this to happen, tacitly acknowledging that such an intervention would be inimical to Thaksin’s interests.”

While Boyce says he can’t see any “sign as yet that the King or his closest advisors want to get drawn into this kind of political role,” the simple fact that he asks Pansak and the link to Bannawit and Prem says that the palace is deeply involved in political scheming and suggests a link to the anti-Thaksin opposition.

Political nonsense and the constitutional referendum

As PPT has made clear, we think any referendum on constitutional change is unnecessary and, as the junta’s charade in 2007 showed, a referendum can be simply anti-democratic and a political nonsense. That said, the royalists, led by “Democrat” Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, suddenly changed their tune on a constitutional referendum is revealing. From a well-orchestrated symphony calling for a referendum before any changes could be made to the military junta’s constitution of 2007, the sudden discordance has resulted in a cacophony of shrieking about a referendum being just about the worst thing that could happen. This sudden change of song again reveals the royalist political on democracy.

The degree of royalist manipulation of truth on the proposed referendum is again illustrated in a Bangkok Post op-ed. The sudden outpouring of op-eds from the Post is revealing of a coordinated campaign, bringing together the royalist mainstream media, “Democrat” Party opposition and yellow-hued academics. This op-ed by Kamolwat Praprutitum, an assistant news editor, begins: “Tearing up a constitution is no laughing matter. Without a thorough consultative process, there is a huge risk the charter rewrite efforts will heighten colour-coded conflicts needlessly.”

As PPT has indicated in a recent post, the tearing up is almost always done by the military and royalists. It was, for example, the palace and the military that drove their tanks over the 1997 constitution, grinding it into the dust. It is they who tutored their lackeys in constitution drafting to put the 2007 constitution in place and mounted a wholly repressive and deceitful referendum campaign to put it in place. It is they who established the referendum as a wholly inappropriate procedure.

That the yellow shirted ones will oppose any rewriting of the military’s constitution is already known, and their previous support for a referendum was simply a political ruse and had nothing to do with any notion of democracy.

The op-ed points out that “[n]o sooner did it occur to the government that defying the Constitution Court ruling could spell doom for the party than the politicians in power swung toward supporting the referendum.” Well it was “advice,” but had the effect of being a “ruling” because of the threat to the ruling party and government by the royalists in the court. In efect, the current government is again kowtowing to the demands of the royalists but that is not enough for the royalists. In fact, nothing is enough for the royalists; they just want the government out and their lads back in place. Hence, questions like this one are 5-6 years late:

Will a single question be a sufficient summary of the voters’ mandate? Will a simple “yes” or “no” to the new charter reflect the majority of voters’ true understanding of the meat of the new constitution?

But the question is only relevant now because the royalists want what they want and back then they wanted a junta constitution, and now they want to keep that in place, and not allow the “disloyal” lot to change or amend it. Raising a whole bunch of legal reasons for a referendum being a problem now – finding demon-seed clauses in the junta’s constitution – shows that all the royalist calls for a referendum were simply a nonsense.

Kamolwat then embarks on a royalist call for “consultation” on the constitution because…. well, the elected politicians who campaigned on charter change and won a remarkable majority can’t be trusted and they will attack “pillar sections of the constitution” – read monarchy – and engage in “another vote-buying splurge tilting favourably toward the welfare of a single individual desperate to come home.” Kamolwat puts the “Democrat” Party position. The vote-buying claim is also a nonsense right out of the ultra-royalist playbook.

Kamolwat concludes: “Unless the referendum is free and fair, we might be better off not having it at all. We want to be asked, not bought.” This is a false claim. (Where is the criticism of 2007?) What the royalist lackeys like Kamolwat want is no change to the junta’s constitution because they think these rules, drawn up by them and enforced by them, serve them best.

CPB, land and evictions

There’s an important and long story at Bloomberg on the Crown Property Bureau that deserves considerable attention. PPT won’t summarize it; rather, we highlight some points.

The story is essentially about how the CPB is trying to boost the returns it gets from its vast land holdings in Bangkok. In doing that, it is shifting many of its long-term tenants, including the use of evictions, which is usually a sensitive issue for the CPB – probably the country’s largest landlord – and one they try to suppress as much as possible, to limit the damage to its reputation. That has been relatively easy to do when the reporting was mainly by Thailand’s tame, self-censoring and timid mainstream media.

The story’s headline must evoke collective angst at the CPB: Monarchy Fund Evicts Elderly to Boost Profit in Bangkok Renewal. The CPB self-portrayal as an altruistic outfit that keeps rents low and supports communities is smashed as it plans to build condominiums to “boost returns and regenerate Bangkok with its first commercial development project.”

The CPB’s attacks on the elderly and poor are part and parcel of its decision to “shift to build commercial properties, instead of just leasing land to private developers…”. According to the report, the CPB “earned income of at least 11.1 billion baht last year. Of that, rental income provided 2.7 billion baht…”.

This move to boost income from property is justified by apologists who keep to the CPB’s mantra of a paternalistic landlord. Others, like Chan Bulakul, CEO of The Brooker Group, say, apparently without flinching: “This is not a profit-maximization organization, but they have to survive…”. With assets of around US$41 billion, “survival” hardly seems the right term, unless succession exposes the CPB to looting or worse.

Members of the royalist elite like the Democrat Party’s former finance minister Korn Chatikavanij, is totally dismissive of the poor tenants:

All resources within the country should be put to the best social and economic use…. For property which is obviously in commercial areas, or is already being used commercially, for the crown to expect commercial returns from other people using those properties is perfectly reasonable.

Of course, critics of the CPB are hampered by the lese majeste law and the fact that it is never required to be transparent. Academic Kevin Hewison says: “Because it is opaque, we know little about how its profits support the monarchy and the royal family.” If the CPB is opaque, the Privy Purse Bureau is an impenetrable secret space.  An insider states: “The extent of the Privy Purse’s landholdings and revenue are unknown … because they aren’t disclosed…”.

The king’s personal holdings are said to:

include shares valued at $63 million in companies including Minor International Pcl (MINT), Thailand’s biggest hotel operator, which runs local franchises for Burger King Worldwide Inc., according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Privately held land includes the sites of Siam Paragon and Siam Center malls in central Bangkok.

The report also notes that the royal family rakes in taxpayer funds, with the government having:

allocated 7.4 billion baht in tax money to fund travel, security, development projects and agencies related to the palace in the fiscal year ended Sept. 30, a 10 percent increase from a year earlier, according to the budget.

Royalists dismiss calls for transparency. In doing so, they make some bizarre claims: “You cannot go into the bedroom of the king…. This is unlike in the U.K. — you can take the picture of the naked someone in the palace. That’s not our culture.”

In fact, naked pictures have been taken in a palace and circulated, more than once. Another culturalist apology crashes and burns….

Apparently related to this very fact of naked picture related issues, the challenge for the CPB, apart from simply filling bigger bags of cash,  is that “operations would change under a different monarch.” This seems to amount to “unforeseen events.”

“Bizarre, slightly surreal, and somewhat Kafkaesque”

Lennox Samuels at The Daily Beast has his take on the charging of former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and his former deputy Suthep Thaugsuban. His essential position is the most common amongst the commentariat in Bangkok at present, yet there is much in the article that is worth considering.

It is at once bizarre, slightly surreal, and somewhat Kafkaesque: The most recent ex-prime minister of Thailand, Abhisit Vejjajiva, and one of his former deputy premiers, Suthep Thaugsuban, charged with the killing of a taxi driver during the political unrest that rocked the country more than two years ago. The charges were announced the day after the 85th birthday of the nation’s beloved King Bhumibol Adulyadej.

Part of the bizarre is the response from Abhisit, Suthep and the Democrat Party. Samuels talked to academic-for-hire and former Abhisit spokesman Panitan Wattanayagorn who sees the “charges as politically driven.” PPT wonders what he says about the “charges against 295 red shirts.” No, we don’t ponder this, for we know that Panitan deals in double standards and would dismiss these red shirts as “terrorists.” Panitan does make one good point: “It’s unprecedented to charge two top policymakers, including the former prime minister, like this.” That’s true and deserves to be applauded, not denigrated as when Panitan “likened the situation to charging President Obama with crimes in connection with his lawful execution of his role as commander-in-chief.” Of course, in Thailand, the king is commander-in-chief, so the comparison is flawed.* Other Democrat Party members, like The Economist, argue that the driving force behind the charges revolve around Thaksin: “Thaksin wants to come home and he’s getting desperate as his surrogates in government gain their own power and become more independent…”.

Samuels recalls Thailand’s “long-running political tug-of-war … marked by coups, deadly protests, and the ouster of prime ministers for absurdist reasons like hosting a cooking show on television. And inevitably, a bogeyman lurks in the background—or foreground, depending on who’s telling the story.” The bogeyman is not Privy Council president General Prem Tinsulanonda, the king, queen, old military duffers or someone in the military brass. Of course, it is “Thaksin Shinawatra, the populist billionaire premier ejected in a 2006 coup who has lived in comfortable exile ever since.”

We agree with Samuel that:

In essence, Thailand is divided between reformist democracy activists who want a more open process, and traditionalists who are content with the centuries-long structure dominated by elites that regard the one-man-one-vote ideal as at best premature. The elites, personified for many by Abhisit and the Democrats, have resisted “reconciliation” efforts, loath to agree to anything that would dilute the status quo.

We also agree with a diplomat cited by Samuel who declares that: “The fact is, Thaksin has been convicted of a conflict of interest,” the Western diplomat said. “Barely a misdemeanor. There are several prime ministers in the past who have committed far more egregious offenses. Frankly, it is unsustainable in the long run that the de facto prime minister be barred from his country.”

Abhisit takes a different view and in announcing his impending martyrdom, declares (at The Nation):

I hereby affirm that I will not negotiate for anybody’s interest. I insist that wrongdoers must be brought to justice and will fight the case based on facts. I will not join the process to absolve people who cheated the country. I’ll accept my fate even if the judicial process lands me in jail or gets me executed, but I will not whitewash the wrongdoings of cheaters….

Frankly, the martyrs are those protesters murdered by the state in 2010, and in 1973, 1976, 1992, at Kru Se and Tak Bai and(to mention just a few instances) where no one has been held accountable.

The problem the autocrats have is that Thaksin is electorally popular but, as Samuels explains, “the former premier is anathema to establishment Thais, who regard his populist rhetoric and policies as threats to the societal order…”. They fear and hate Thaksin so the concoct conspiracies that see anyone who is not on their side as a mortal enemy and where proposed constitutional amendments amount to “a process they allege would result in the entire political system being jettisoned, including the monarchy.” That is bizarre.

The outcome is described in the article this way:

In the short term, the political gridlock is likely to continue, as neither side has the leverage to effect change—or the will to compromise. “A lot of people are in a prolonged conflict,” said one prominent political figure. “There’s more and more hatred and anger, and things get more complicated. So it is not possible for them to say, all of a sudden, we want to reconcile.” He added that both sides are “about even,” with Red Shirts having the government on their side while the Yellow Shirts can claim the military, judiciary, and “people in the palace.” … “Reconciliation basically has a better chance when one side dominates,” he said. If so, Thailand’s in for a long slog.

Interestingly, the government also has the majority of the people on its side, but then the autocrats simply can’t accept elections or their results (unless they were to somehow conjure a win). This is one reason why Abhisit always speaks of the rule of law and seldom about issues of democracy.

______

*While there are U.S. politicians who should be held responsible for atrocious acts internationally – think drones and Indochina bombing – we can’t think of a case of post-Civil War mass state killings in the U.S. that haven’t gone to the courts. The Kent State killings come to mind as a case that did go to courts, but maybe readers can remind us of others as we know little about U.S. history.

Abhisit’s continuing mendaciousness

Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva has long been short on truthfulness. His latest foray into his parallel world of twisted words and actions is revealing of habitual conjuring of propagandized unreality.

The Bangkok Post cites Abhisit’s latest conjuring. To most observers the Democrat Party is deeply embedded within the dinosaur movement Pitak Siam. By their own words and deeds the Democrat Party has shown its continuing reliance on anti-democratic political movements, just as it has relied on the anti-democrats in the palace, military and ultra-royalists in the past.

So when Abhisit is “demanding the government take responsibility if violence erupts at the Pitak Siam anti-government rally this Saturday,” it becomes clear that Abhisit and his party are hoping for violence and the catalyst of a 2008-like movement against the elected government, again.

Abhisit’s mendacious statements were legendary when he was premier, and nothing has changed. When the Puea Thai “government claimed it knew of some parties who planned to create untoward incidents during the protest,” Abhisit sprang to the defense of his “party,”  daring the government to crack down “to prevent violence.” Of course, he relishes the idea that ultra-royalists will become violent so that his party can benefit.

The tendentiousness of Abhisit’s claims are immediately indicated by Democrat Party spokesman Chavanond Intarakomalyasut’s claim that “the government of trying to block people from joining the Pitak Siam rally.” Clearly, Abhisit’s blaming of the government is seen as nothing by Democrat Party for undemocratic politics.

Meanwhile, the government and red shirt qualms regarding the plans by the dinosaur movement were well-expressed by “Deputy Commerce Minister and red-shirt leader Nattawut Saikuar said yesterday the anti-government rally would not be able to overthrow the government in one day without a ‘special situation’.” He observed that such a situation was possible “with support from the party that had overthrown the past governments of Thaksin [Shinawatra], Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat.”

What party might that be? The Democrat Party can be excluded for they are followers, not movers and shakers. We suspect he points to the military-palace coalition.

Somsak to be prosecuted!

Prachatai has reported a dismal story that first started with a Facebook notification a couple of days ago: police have, after more than a year of “consideration,” decided to send to prosecution a lese majeste charge against Thammasat University historian Somsak Jeamteerasakul. The complaint was made by the Army.

Somsak has been told “to report to the public prosecutor on 20 Nov.” He had earlier reported to the police in May 2011. The Army’s charges against him apparently relate to two articles he wrote “in response to Princess Chulabhorn’s interview and which had been published on several websites in late March and April that year.”

He has denied the offenses.

PPT thinks that this process is one that has been pushed in order to silence a critic and to tell academics that the monarchy is also off limits for their consideration. Readers might recall that various friends of the palace, including Abhisit Vejjajiva have said that academic criticism is permitted. We have a feeling that this is a charge the second generation in the palace wants to prosecute.