Zawacki v. Amsterdam

PPT missed the first article in this exchange in The Nation, by former Amnesty International researcher and long time opponent of adequate action on lese majeste Benjamin Zawacki. Zawacki now seems to haunt Thai politics from the International Development Law Office. We did see the response by red shirt lawyer Robert Amsterdam, and so tracked back to Zawacki’s piece in The Nation.

We can only summarize the exchange. Zawacki, long biased towards royalist and yellow shirt politics, argues that “having the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate deadly events in Thailand’s recent history, has taken an unintended if undeniable positive turn.” Indeed, we agree that the red shirt pressure to have the ICC investigate the crackdowns by the Abhisit Vejjajiva government in April and May 2010 is undeniably positive.

However, his claim that “the ICC debate in Thailand has occupied a small corner of its seven-year and ongoing political crisis, with both sides issuing ill-informed threats of the Court’s involvement to exact political revenge for electoral, judicial and extra-legal defeats,” suggests that he has been asleep at the wheel and is unable to distinguish a serious proposal to the ICC by the red shirt lawyers and the fake response by the Democrat Party. He seems to think that the current red shirt action was spurred by the Democrat Party’s fakery. Maybe he’s been on holiday between jobs or sleeping.

His aim is to dismiss the case by the red shirts, which has received ICC attention and to laud the complaint by the Democrat Party on the war on drugs, despite the fact that the Democrat Party has done none of the required legal work to process a claim at the ICC in any meaningful way.

In other words, Zawacki continues his biased and politicized interventions.

Amsterdam’s response is clear and concise, showing that “Zawacki is ill-informed on the purpose, procedure, precedent and policy of accepting ICC jurisdiction.” Going through each of these points, Amsterdam concludes:

Finally, Zawacki misconstrues the policy of accepting ICC jurisdiction. The point is not to launch a political vendetta against [former prime minister] Abhisit Vejjajiva, [former prime minister] Thaksin [S]hinawatra or anyone else. Rather the goal is to pursue justice wherever it may lead. Strong evidence has been presented to the ICC that the killing and wounding of civilian demonstrators in 2010 was systematically planned by Thai authorities. If so, they were crimes against humanity. In contrast, no such evidence concerning the 2003 anti-drug campaign has been presented to the ICC.

If Zawacki wishes to dismiss genuine investigations of the well-documented allegations of crimes against humanity in Bangkok in 2010 as a mere political ploy, then he has not heard the pleas of the families of the victims. Their tears cry out for justice. Not only justice for their loved ones, but justice so that the Thai cycle of recurrent massacres, followed by impunity, will finally be brought to an end.

One can only ponder why Zawacki does the work of the Democrat Party when that Party is so lazy and vindictive. His long silences on censorship and the use of draconian laws during that party’s time in power suggest a long connection between Zawacki and the Democrat Party royalists.

Ji on ICC and Puea Thai government

Ji Ungpakorn has circulated his take on the ICC visit to Bangkok. We reproduce it as received from a reader:

Don’t hold your breath that the Pua Thai Government will accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court

Giles Ji Ungpakorn

Millions of Red Shirts would like to see the military generals and Democrat Party politicians brought to court for ordering the shooting of un-armed pro-democracy demonstrators in 2010. But this government is unlikely to pass a simple cabinet resolution to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on this matter. This would allow the prosecution of those who committed such state crimes. The reason why it is unlikely to happen is because:

1. The Government and Taksin have made an agreement with the military from when Pua Thai won a landslide victory in the July 2011 elections. Previous to this, General Prayut, head of the army, had been extremely hostile to Pau Thai. This explains why today Pua Thai and the UDD Red Shirt leaders never again mention the role of the military in killing demonstrators. They just talk about Democrat politicians like former Prime Minister Abhisit. This fits with what Taksin has stated. He claims that the political crisis was only a confrontation between him and the Democrat Party.

2. If the Government accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the issue of state killings in 2010, the military would be investigated. Importantly, it would also open the door to future investigations by the ICC into Taksin’s role in state crimes at Takbai in 2004 and the extra-judicial killings in the War on Drugs while he was Prime Minister.

3. Taksin and the Pua Thai government need to create an image that they are “doing something” about those who shot the Red Shirts. But although this is partly because of rank and file Red Shirt pressure, it also serves the purpose of being a bargaining chip with the military in order for them to give the green light for Taksin’s return to Thailand. They are also acting out another “play” to show that they are doing something by trying to charge Abhisit at the ICC abroad, on account that he holds dual British-Thai citizenship. This only applies to Abhisit and not the army generals. It is also unlikely to succeed.

4. Pua Thai and Taksin are part of the Thai ruling class. Two factions of this class have been in violent dispute with each other. But they are united in not wanting to improve the standards of human rights in the country and not wanting any state crimes, from 1973 to today, investigated. They are united also on not reforming lèse majesté and on the need to use the King for their own differing interests.

I would so like to be proved wrong on all this. I would love to see the state criminals brought to justice, the political prisoners released, lèse majesté repealed and myself and others would like to return to Thailand. But this dream can only be made into reality if progressive Red Shirts organise a political party independent of Pua Thai and the UDD leadership.

ICC in Bangkok II

A couple of days ago PPT posted about officers and investigators of the International Criminal Court being in Bangkok and holding meetings regarding the possibility of investigating the events of April and May 2010 . It does seem that the local media has been pretty quiet on this story.

The Bangkok Post, however, has finally mentioned the ICC visit which red shirts hope will lead to the government extending jurisdiction to the ICC.

Foreign Minister Surapong Towijakchaikul is reported to have “urged the government to accept the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction over the 2010 clashes between security forces and red-shirt protesters.”

That is a huge leap forward in seeking to end state impunity.

Surapong apparently made this statement following a meeting “with ICC chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda to discuss the steps Thailand would be required to take if it is to accept ICC jurisdiction.”

Anticipating criticism from those who oppose scrutiny, Surapong “insisted that by extending the jurisdiction to the ICC, the government would not be inviting the international tribunal to interfere in the country’s internal affairs.” He argued that an ICC investigation could “deliver justice to those who died…”.

Several red shirt parliamentarians have supported granting the ICC jurisdiction.

Democrat Party Spokesman Chavanond Intarakomalyasut indicated that he lacks even basic logic when he babbled that the 2010 Army crackdown operations in April and May “is an internal affair and it has been investigated under Thai law. The ICC can’t step in,…” before immediately blabbering that “the Thaksin Shinawatra administration’s war on drugs did” come under the ICC. His final “position” seemed to be that “the government … ratify the ICC treaty and allow it to look into all cases of ‘crimes against humanity’.”

Why? Because, and we use his quoted words because the lack of logic is breathtaking:

If we ratify the treaty, I think Thaksin will appear before the ICC before former prime minister Abhisit [Vejjajiva] and former deputy prime minister Suthep [Thaugsuban]….

Of course, the DemoPADs are hamstrung on this issue because they have taken a war on drugs case against Thaksin to the ICC, so the internal issue claim is meaningless twaddle.

The question that is paramount now is whether the red shirts can bring sufficient pressure on Yingluck Shinawatra and her timid government to push for ICC investigation.

Stories worth reading

There are a few media stories currently available that are worthy of attention. PPT doesn’t have time to put each out in separate posts, so we are listing them here with brief comments, all from the Bangkok Post:

Impeaching Suthep

The new Speaker of the Senate Nikom Wairatchapanich has put the impeachment of Democrat Party MP, former deputy prime minister and signatory to sniper letters Suthep Thaugsuban on the senate agenda for Monday, Nikom’s very first day on the job. The charge from the National Anti-Corruption Commission is relatively minor, but these rules were set in place by those attacking pro-Thaksin Shinawatra parties, not thinking that silly rules will turn and bite them. PT would far prefer to see Suthep axed for his deliberate decisions to have anti-government protesters killed.

Suthep

More state blacklists

As is well known from the War on Drugs, when the state puts together lists of “suspects,” the so-called suspects need to be very, very frightened, for the state’s tendency, through the police and military, is simply to conduct extrajudicial killings or to lock people up, often without a shred of evidence. Hence, it is very scary to learn that lists

… including politicians, school heads and local religious leaders, have been named as part of the southern insurgency network in a newly launched army handbook…. The blacklisted names are listed in two books which together are called The Order of Battle…. The second handbook identifies the names of leaders and their forces in each village, tambon and district of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and in four districts of Songkhla. The 500-page book lists 9,692 people as being involved in the insurgency network.

The Army has such a poor record, regularly killing its own citizens, that such a list of names constitutes a serious threat to each and every one of these persons.

Prayuth

The magic wand

The GT200 story just won’t go away, mainly because the fools who purchased the useless things, often at inflated prices, and who continue to defend them (an example being Army boss General Prayuth Chan-ocha) are also trying to charge the sellers. Sure, the sellers were frauds, but what about the dopes who bought the supposedly magic toys. Maybe investigators should look at the incompetence amongst the so-called security agencies.

We want it all!

The cry of the rich as they such up all the wealth, land and other resources! While PPT is not convinced that the reporting in the Bangkok Post editorial is entirely accurate, the basic point holds. We noted this: “For juristic persons, the biggest land owner has more than 2.8 million rai…”. PPT thought readers might wonder if this owner was royal. It seems that this might not be the case. The chapter on the Crown Property Bureau in the semi-official King Bhumibol Adulyadej. A Life’s Work, states that the CPB holds 41,300 rai (p. 283). Could it be the armed forces? Or one of the big farmers like CP? If readers have any ideas, let us know.

Army good, protesters bad

Who could possibly be surprised when Thawil Pliensri defends the Army’s murderous assault on red shirt protesters in 2010. After all, Thawil was secretary-general of the National Security Council at the time of the sniper orders and secretary of the Centre for the Resolution of Emergency Situations set up by the Abhisit Vejjajiva government to crush the protests by the red shirts. He says that “the operation to retake areas in Bangkok occupied by the protesters was a legitimate one.” Of course he does. He claims that “[s]ome information has been distorted and tampered with,” but seems to provide no evidence. Ultra-royalists will believe him. He, like the Army boss, declares: “state officials who risked their lives to disperse unlawful protesters deserved praise and should not be accused of killing people.” What causes Thawil to defend murder with statements that are so ludicrous as to make him look like a lying fool is his fear that he may not enjoy the impunity that he currently enjoys.

Monarchy’s twilight I

PPT said it some time ago: the monarchy is in decline. This is re-confirmed by two recent commentaries, by Thitinan Pongsudhirak and Sonia Rothwell.

Rothwell, writing at the Zurich-based International Relations and Security Network (ISN), comments on the south and red shirts, with an interesting link about rising political consciousness:

Building on the political awakening of the middle classes in the 1990s, there has been increasing political awareness both in the far south and among Thailand’s poor. Encouraged by Prime Minister Yingluck [Shinawatra]’s brother Thaksin, the politicization culminated in the so-called Red Shirt protests of 2010.

She then writes about the monarchy and while the general drift of the remarks are acceptable, some aspects deserve criticism.  The author states: “The declining health of Thailand’s long-serving King Bhumibol also threatens to seriously fracture the fragile unity of the country.” PPT isn’t sure there is much unity, but the point that the king’s death will lead to unpredictable outcomes is correct.

Rothwell asserts that the aging monarch “has been widely regarded as a unifying figure for Thailand over the past 66 years…”. On this, she is exaggerating, but many other journalists make this point from palace propaganda. The next exaggeration is a big one: “With the continuity of Thai nationhood at present largely resting on the continuity of the royal family, it is perhaps unsurprising that the country’s notoriously stringent lese majeste laws (which prohibit criticism of the royal family) continue to be tightly enforced.” The first claim about monarchy and nation is most usually heard from the yellow-shirted royalists, while the second claim neglects that lese majeste is a political crime, and that its most extravagant use corresponds with political crises.

Despite being a little mixed-up, Rothwell does identify the passing of an era.

The second commentary is by Thitinan in an article available from the Journal of Democracy, which has been outlined by Bangkok Pundit. It is an academic article that argues that the conservative elite is losing its battle to hold Thailand’s democratization back. Bangkok Pundit emphasized some parts of the article, and we’ll do that too. There are some things we think are errors (the death toll in the war on drugs was not 2,300; Yingluck’s government hasn’t been “strictly enforcing” lese majeste; Thaksin did make big bucks from state concessions; the new palace-sanctioned biography of the king is anything but “scholarly”), but much that deserves attention.

As twilight settles over the 65-year reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej (b. 1927), Thais find themselves caught in a national stalemate. Those who favor maintaining the monarchy-centered hierarchy as the ultimate source of political power are arrayed against others who want to reform the monarchy and reconcile it with a fuller and more mature form of democracy.

He adds at the end of the paper:

For Thaksin’s establishment foes, conceding to his spectacularly successful populism would have been tantamount to admitting that most people in the … have been—and have been kept—poor.

As Thitinan indicates, bereft of popular support and wanting things to be as they were “before”, the conservative elite fights on as “it has too much at stake to simply give way to the challenges that Thaksin…”. Thitinan reckons that the rift between the palace and Thaksin began after the latter’s huge 2005 election victory. That seems true enough, although criticism from the Privy Council is mentioned in a Wikileaks cable from just prior to the election, focused on the south.

At present the fight is, Thitinan claims, a stalemate, so Yingluck continues in government:

As long as the monarchy remains sacrosanct and the symbiotic relationship between it and the military remains untouched, Yingluck may be able to muddle along with a reheated populist agenda …. Should the palace begin to perceive a clear and present danger, however, the Yingluck government and anyone who actively aspires to a basic reform of the monarchy will likely face stepped-up pressure and perhaps even the specter of violence from royalist and conservative quarters.

Judicialization is a big section of the paper, and seeing this as an elite strategy, fostered by the palace, Thitinan sees it as having failed:

The monarchy is associated with the launch of the judicialization strategy, and that strategy’s failure appears to have compromised the
monarchy up to a point.

That’s a big call, especially given the Constitutional Court’s (re)positioning in political space in recent weeks. PPT thinks the judiciary remains an important elite and palace weapon against democratization.

Both articles recognize an end is near. Thitinan notes that the way forward is murky because there are so few alternatives: Thaksin and his flaws do not augur well for a broader-based democratization.

Updated: AHRC on extrajudicial killings

PPT reproduces a recent Asian Human Rights Commission statement regarding the sentencing of police officers involved in a case of extrajudicial murder from 2004. We posted on this twice a few days ago (here and here).

The AHRC statement bears on some of the concerns expressed in our second post regarding the bailing of the officers involved and the double standards at work in this act. However, a point that we missed in those earlier posts is that the link to the War on Drugs in this case is not as clear as the headlines insist (including our own). As the AHRC report indicates, this terrible killing took place in July 2004, some time after the period that most refer to as the War on Drugs. For example, a Wikileaks cable from November 2006, about an investigation into the deaths associated with the War on Drugs, states:

In February 2003, [Prime Minister] Thaksin [Shinawatra] launched a national campaign targeting drug dealers and traffickers as a threat to society and national security. Over the next several months hundreds of alleged drug offenders were killed. Estimates of the number of people killed vary. Post [i.e. Embassy] estimates the number killed as a result of this policy to be approximately 1,300. Other estimates range as high as 2,600.

Human Rights Watch states:

In February 2003, the Thai government, under then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, launched a ‘war on drugs’, purportedly aimed at the suppression of drug trafficking and the prevention of drug use. In fact, a major outcome of this policy was arbitrary killings. In the first three months of the campaign there were some 2800 extrajudicial killings [PPT: The latter figure is incorrect as it counts all murders in the period].

 The point is that the reprehensible murder of Kiettisak Thitboonkrong was linked to the War on Drugs when: “Following his death, his family launched a campaign to investigate and hold the police in Kalasin accountable for his murder and the murders of 27 other individuals by police of the same station during and following the so-called “war on drugs”.

This distinction may be a small point in processes that have seen literally thousands of people murdered by state authorities over several decades. Yet getting events in the right context seems important when trying to end the impunity enjoyed by state officials when they kill other citizens.  That said, the main issue remains that this police station had a murderous reputation for extrajudicial killings that were also a mark of the War on Drugs and deserves judicial intervention on all cases attributed to it.

THAILAND: Five police convicted of murder in landmark ruling

The Asian Human Rights Commission greets with cautious optimism the landmark ruling of the Criminal Court in Bangkok to convict five police officers for the murder of a teenager during the “war on drugs” in 2004, and hopes that it will serve as a precedent of sorts for other cases of police and state officials accused of similar crimes.

On 30 July 2012, in Black Case No. 3252/2552, 3466/2552, the Criminal Court found five out of the six police officers accused of murdering Kiettisak Thitboonkrong, age 17, in 2004. The six defendants were Pol. Snr. Sgt. Maj. Angkarn Kammoonna, Pol. Snr. Sgt. Maj. Sutthinant Noenthing, Pol. Snr. Sgt. Maj. Phansilp Uppanant, Pol. Lt. Col. Samphao Indee, Pol. Col. Montree Sriboonloue, and Pol. Lt. Col. Sumitr Nanthasathit, all officers stationed in Kalasin Province, northeast Thailand. The police had arrested Kiettisak on 16 July 2004 for allegedly stealing a motorcycle. When his family heard this news, they went to the police station and attempted to talk to him. After returning multiple times, his grandmother was allowed to witness his interrogation on 22 July 2004 and told to wait for him to be bailed out later that day. But Kiettisak never came home and several days later his mutilated body was found in a neighbouring province. Following his death, his family launched a campaign to investigate and hold the police in Kalasin accountable for his murder and the murders of 27 other individuals by police of the same station during and following the so-called “war on drugs”. After an extraordinary effort on their part to bring the killers of Kiettisak to justice, the court finally reached its verdict just over a week ago. It sentenced three police officers to death for their actions, while one it sentenced to life imprisonment, and one to seven years in prison.

It took Kiettisak’s relatives seven years to secure this outcome. At their urging, in 2005, the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) in the Ministry of Justice began investigating the case. It spent three years. On 18 May 2009, the public prosecutor charged six police officers with premeditated murder and with concealing Kiettisak’s corpse to hide the cause of death. Because this case was investigated under the Special Investigation Act it was sent to the Criminal Court in Bangkok. The public prosecutor conducted the case and Mr. Kittisapt Thitboonkrong, father of Mr. Kiettisak, successfully sought and obtained permission from the court to act as a joint plaintiff, represented by lawyers from the Lawyers’ Council of Thailand working pro bono. The hearings took another three years. Observers for the AHRC attended many of the hearings throughout the duration of the trial.

In its verdict, the Criminal Court found Pol. Snr. Sgt. Maj. Angkarn Kammoonna, Pol. Snr. Sgt. Maj. Sutthinant Noenthing guilty of premeditated murder and hiding a corpse. It sentenced them to death. Pol. Lt. Col. Sumitr Nanthasathit it found guilty of premeditated murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Pol. Col. Montree Sriboonloue it found guilty of abusing his authority to aid in protecting his subordinates from criminal prosecution and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. The Criminal Court found Pol. Lt. Col. Samphao Indee innocent of involvement in the murder of Mr. Kiettisak.

With some reservations, the AHRC considers this ruling an important step towards ending impunity for state violence in Thailand. It is the first case of which the AHRC is aware in which police responsible for killings during the “war on drugs” under the government of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra have been held to account for their crimes. It is also the first case arising from the so-called “war” that the DSI investigated. In February 2003, Thaksin announced the beginning of the “war” with an unequivocal message to police and other state officials–that any and all necessary actions should be taken to free the country of the drug menace, including killing. Over the next three months, it became clear that the message served as a carte blanche for the use of murderous violence against citizens, rather than using the provisions of the Criminal Code to investigate and prosecute. By May 2003, an estimated number of over 2500 people had been killed. Kalasin Province was the first province in the country that the government declared had “won” the war. This ephemeral victory was achieved at the cost of many lives taken illegally, at the hands or bidding of state agents. Kiettisak was but one victim.

Rather than holding state officials who used extrajudicial violence against these citizens to account, in the worst cases, perpetrators of crimes have been rewarded. In most cases they have been tacitly and conveniently ignored. One of the long-term effects of this approach has been the further consolidation of impunity for state violence in Thailand. Therefore, this case stands out among other cases of extrajudicial killing in Thailand over the last ten years, in which courts have been unwilling to hold state officials to account, notably in the cases of the mass deaths in custody following the Tak Bai incident, and the April-May 2010 killings. Even in cases in which courts have ruled that a citizen has died while in state custody due to the actions of state officials, such as the March 2009 torture and death of Imam Yapa Kaseng, the actions of state officials have been classed as matters of official “duty” and they have been exempted from allegations of murder. This is the larger context in which Kiettisak was murdered, in which his relatives and other Kalasin residents struggled to secure justice and accountability, and against which the Criminal Court gave its ruling.

Given that this is also the first case in which a court decision has been reached, the AHRC welcomes the guilty verdict as a clear sign that the judiciary is willing to hold police to account for their use of extrajudicial violence against citizens. At the same time, the AHRC as a matter of principle opposes the death penalty under all circumstances, and calls for the sentences in this case to be reviewed, such that the convicted police officers instead receive appropriate prison terms.

Additionally, the AHRC is gravely concerned that the convicted officers have obtained bail pending appeal. The convictions for these sentences are of such gravity that good reason exists to expect that the convicted police will attempt to evade punishment by absconding or other means. They may also seek to obtain revenge against one or more persons who testified against them. In the well-known case of disappeared human rights lawyer Somchai Neelaphaijit, the one officer convicted of an offence in connection with his disappearance himself subsequently disappeared, and is suspected to have faked his own death; he was subsequently acquitted on appeal. In the meantime, Somchai’s family received frequent threats against their own lives. The AHRC fears that in this case too the convicted police if allowed to walk free pending appeal may yet find ways and means to pervert the course of justice and undermine this hard-fought result. Consequently, it urges that the granting of bail be revoked and the five convicted officers be imprisoned while awaiting appeal outcomes.

Finally, the text of the court decision was not read in its entirety on the day the decision was announced in the Criminal Court, and the Asian Human Rights Commission is awaiting the release of the full judgment by the Criminal Court. We call on the Criminal Court to make this important decision available to the public as soon as possible. In the coming weeks, the AHRC will undertake a detailed analysis of the court decision in the case of the murder of Kiettisak Thitboonkrong with respect to the political and legal context and history of impunity for state violence in Thailand as well as the relevant international human rights standards.

Update: In addition to the above statement, the AHRC has forwarded a statement by Thailand’s Human Rights Lawyers Association, Union for Civil Liberty, Campaign Committee for Human Rights, and Peace and Human Rights Resource Center. As many of the details are similar to those above, PPT provides a link to the statement rather than copying it.

The Democrat Party: an idea-free zone

Is the Democrat Party unable to have an original idea? Are the leaders of that failed party so elitist-lazy that all they can do more than plagiarize others and come up with silly “campaigns”? This is a bit of a hotch-potch post as we attempt to catch=up with the actions of the Democrat Party.

When Abhisit Vejjajiva was hoisted to the premier’s position and his party made government in a shoddy, backroom deal that was brokered by the military, that government essentially copied the policies it had previously denigrated as “populist.” In opposition, it has pretty much PADified its policies and attacks on the government.

As PPT noted in an earlier post, Korn Chatikavanij has become an activist Democrat Party leader. The last time we saw him campaigning was when he was supporting PAD’s illegal actions in 2008. PPT has long pointed out more than once that Korn is a supporter of the People’s Alliance for Democracy. This English born, public school and Oxford educated scion of an aristocrat families who has also supported the use of draconian measures against protesters (but not his PAD buddies, of course). He was also  a quiet support for the 2006 coup.

Korn’s politics is deeply yellow-royalist and it is thus no surprise to see at The Nation that Korn has promoted the “taking back” of red as a political color. Quite a yawn, but it is just lame Facebook “activism.” Korn’s claim is that “every Thai has the right to wear red, which is one of the colours of the national flag.” Korn’s bit of royalist nationalism lacks any grounding in either the flag’s political history or the reason for the red shirts adopting the color.

If Korn’s “take back red” campaign seems lazy, childish and pathetic, another story at The Nation suggests a more significant Democrat Party activity. It is also a massive plagiarism of its opponents.

The Democrat Party has:

called on those adversely affected by the war on drugs policy implemented during the Thaksin Shinawatra administration to file a class-action lawsuit against the fugitive former premier at the court.

Notorious former Democrat Party foreign minister and PAD supporter Kasit Piromya is claimed to have:

filed a complaint at the ICC [International Criminal Court] in the Netherlands over the war on drugs, which allegedly led to the ‘silencing’ killings of thousands of drug suspects.

Loudmouth Democrat Party Spokesman Chavanond Intarakomalyasut “said those who believed they were damaged parties and had not received justice” in regard to the War on Drugs.

That is true, but PPT can’t but point out that the Democrat Party is simply following the red shirts to the ICC, demonstrating that they are unimaginative but also treating the Thai public with contempt.

We don’t say this to diminish the immensity of the deaths during the War on Drugs. Rather, we think the Democrat Party considers the public stupid. After all, it the Party was interested in this issue, why was it that it did nothing about it during its period in government from late 2008 to mid-2011? Even the military-backed government of 2006-7 didn’t take any determined action. Why the sudden interest?

We also wonder how the Democrat Party would react to an investigation of the War on Drugs that reveals these facts (and more here) for an international audience:

In a 4 December 2002 speech on the eve of his birthday, King Bhumibol noted the rise in drug use and called for a “War on Drugs.” Privy Councillor Phichit Kunlawanit called on the government to use its majority in parliament to establish a special court to deal with drug dealers, stating that “if we execute 60,000 the land will rise and our descendants will escape bad karma”….

King Bhumibol, in a 2003 birthday speech, praised Thaksin and criticized those who counted only dead drug dealers while ignoring deaths caused by drugs.

“ไอ้การชัยชนะของการปราบไอ้ยาเสพติดนี่ ดีที่ปราบ แล้วก็ที่เขาตำหนิบอกว่า เอ้ย คนตาย ตั้ง ๒,๕๐๐ คน อะไรนั่น เรื่องเล็ก ๒,๕๐๐ คน ถ้านายกฯ ไม่ได้ทำ นายกฯ ไม่ได้ทำ ทุกปี ๆ จดไว้นะ มีมากกว่า ๒,๕๐๐ คนที่ตาย” “Victory in the War on Drugs is good. They may blame the crackdown for more than 2,500 deaths, but this is a small price to pay. If the prime minister failed to curb [the drug trade], over the years the number of deaths would easily surpass this toll.”

Bhumibol also asked the commander of the police to investigate the killings. Police Commander Sant Sarutanond reopened investigations into the deaths, and again claimed that few of the deaths were at the hands of the police.

PPT thinks this set of murders deserves real and serious investigation and prosecution. However, we don’t think the Democrat Party is in any way serious: they did nothing when in power and they are unlikely to have thought through the full implications of the War on Drugs.  Any threat to the impunity enjoyed by state officials also threatens the patrician royalist party and its supporters.

Updated: Double standards and impunity still at work

A few short days ago, PPT posted on the sentencing of police on murder charges associated with the Thaksin Shinawatra government’s War on Drugs, which was, in part, motivated by calls from the palace for a crackdown on drug dealing. In that post, it was reported that a court sentenced three (of five) police officers to death for killing a teenager and disposing of his body back in 2003.

At the Bangkok Post it is reported that the three officers have received bail and the witnesses in the murder trial are frightened and have said they will ask the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) and human rights groups for protection. The protection of the witnesses ended when the policemen were sentenced. Now that they are bailed, the witnesses fear intimidation or even death, which are too common in cases like this in Thailand.

Meanwhile, Sukunya Prueksakasemsuk, “a core member of the Network of People Affected by Article 112, pointed out that no lese majeste prisoners received bail, while the three police officers with death sentences did.” Sukunya is the wife of Somyos Prueksakasemsuk, currently on trial for lese majeste offenses. She’s not entirely correct as some lese majeste victims have had bail – see our Pending Cases – but her general point is a good one:

“The bail for police officers with the death penalty might raise eyebrows among people over whether double standards are being applied for these officers,” said Mrs Sukunya, whose husband Somyot, a lese majeste suspect, was denied bail several times.

The notion that Somyos (and several others charged or sentenced under Article 112) are more threatening and likely to break the law when on bail than these notorious policemen convicted of murder is ludicrous. The impunity of state officials and the double standards at work within the judicial system are again exposed.

Update: A reader reminds us that we neglected another accused of murder who has been bailed: Democrat Party MP Khanchit Thapsuwan who was “indicted in the Samut Sakhon Court on Thursday on a charge of murdering Udon Kraiwatnussorn, former president of the provincial administration organisation, on Dec 26 last year.” He used his status as an MP to get bail. It becomes clear that a challenge to the monarchy is far, far more serious for the royalist elite than the murder of political opponents.

Updated: War on drugs trial

A Press Release from the Human Rights Lawyers Association, Thailand forwarded by the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC):

THAILAND: Please attend court to hear order on War on Drugs killing

For immediate release on 27 July 2012

The death in custody of Mr. Kiattisak Thitboonkhrong as a result of police’s detention at Muang Kalasin Police Station

30 July 2012, 09.00 am, at Courtroom no. 913, Bangkok Criminal Court

On 30 July 2012, 09.00 am, at Courtroom no. 913, Bangkok Criminal Court on Ratchadapisek Rd., the Court shall issue an order in the Black Case no. O3252/2552 between the public prosecutor v. Pol. Sen. Sgt. Maj. Angkhan Khammoonna, defendant no. 1 and other five defendants. The defendants in this case have been accused of committing premeditated murder and moving the body to conceal the cause of death. They were also accused of being competent officers in criminal investigation who have abused their power to help prevent another person from being brought to justice. The case stems from the death of Mr. Kiattisak Thitboonkhrong, 17 years, a student from Kalasin province, who was found dead by hanging in a makeshift in a paddy rice field in Roi Et province. Prior to that, he had just been released from the Muang Kalasin Police Station on 22 July 2004. Please attend the court session on the date announced above.

During 2001-2006, the government implemented a policy to suppress drug trafficking causing more than 2,500 deaths as a result of extrajudicial killings. A number of people in Kalasin province have lost have lives and gone disappeared. One of the deceased was Mr. Kiattisak Thitboonkhrong. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has conducted an inquiry into the case and reported its findings on human rights abuse in 2006. One NHRC’s recommendations was for the government to provide the surviving family of Mr. Kiattisak Thitboonkhrong remedies as he had died in custody of police officers from the Muang Kalasin Police Station.

In 2005, the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) accepted to admit the case of Mr. Kiattisak Thitboonkhrong’s death as a special case and on 9 September2009, the public prosecutor of the Office of Special Litigation 1 decided to prosecute Pol. Sen. Sgt. Maj. Angkhan Khammoonna, as defendant no. 1, Pol. Sen. Sgt. Maj. Sutthinan Nonthing, defendant no. 2, Pol. Sen. Sgt. Maj. Phansin Uppanan, defendant no. 3, Pol. Sen. Sgt. Maj. Samphao Indee, defendant no. 4, Pol. Col. Montri Boonlue, defendant no. 5 and Pol. Lt. Col. Sumit Nunsathit, as defendant no. 6. It took more than eight years to compile all evidence and prove the facts in the court hearings before the delivery of the verdict soon.

For more information, please contact:

Human Rights Lawyers Association (HRLA) (66) 2-6930682

Mr. Manu Manuratsada, Attorney (66) 81-4394938

Ms. Waraporn Uthairangsi, Attorney (66) 84-8091997

………………………………………………..

Human rights Lawyers Association (HRLA)

email : hrla2008@gmail.com tel/fax : 02-6930682

http://www.naksit.org

Update: The Huffington Post reports that:

A Thai court Monday sentenced three police officers to death for killing a teenager during a much-criticized drug crackdown by the [Thaksin Shinawatra] government eight years ago.

The officers were found guilty Monday of killing a 17-year-old student in Kalasin province in the northeast in 2004 and moving his body to conceal the cause of death.

Who is at risk of state murder in Thailand?

The Justice for Peace Foundation (JPF) has called for the Government of Thailand to ratify and comply with the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The Asian Human Rights Commission has circulated it in English.

To most reasonable people, that might seem a very reasonable call. Indeed, a question might be asked as to why Thailand hasn’t already signed up. The answer is deeply depressing. The government – any Thai government – refuses to sign because, not unlike the abolition of the lese majeste law, such an innovation scares the pants off the elite. They fear that removing the impunity they have of using the Army and police to murder and massacre would bring their whole political and economic monopoly crashing down. Of course, it wouldn’t, but this lot won’t allow concessions to be made to the lesser beings they lord it over.

The JPF report details the enforced disappearance of 59 people from across Thailand. JPF President Angkhana Neelapaijit, whose husband Somchai was disappeared, states:

JPF has found that enforced disappearances take place within a broader context of state violence which is used to silence dissenting views and to eliminate suspected criminals, outside of the rule of law….

JPF found that two government policies contributed to enforced disappearances: “the highly militarized counter-insurgency approach adopted in southern Thailand by various governments and the War on Narcotic Drugs beginning in 2003.”

JPF also found that particular categories of people were most vulnerable to enforced disappearances:

(i) people with close relationships with officials and /or come into conflict with officials; (ii) activists engaged in human rights, political or corruption activism; (iii) witnesses of crimes or human rights violations; and (iv) migrants.

The report also points out that enforced disappearance is not a new problem, and notes cases since 1952.

How are people disappeared? Apparently there are three patterns:

The first, and most common, involves officials taking the victim from the street by forcing them into a vehicle and driving away. Secondly, the disappearance begins with the victim being arrested from his home or place frequently used by him. Thirdly, the victim is invited to meet an official at a specific location and then disappears. The detention of the individual is consistently denied when families seek information about their missing relative.

All of this will be depressingly familiar to anyone with some knowledge of Thailand and the activities and impunity of its police and Army. All of this is supported by the judiciary, which is biased, corrupt and compromised.

Angkhana is absolutely correct when she states that:

Decades of impunity have created a context in which administrative and security officials know that their illegal actions are condoned by the state and that the likelihood of legal action against them is extremely low….

JPF has made several recommendations, including ratification of the International Convention.