Wikileaks, monarchy, Article 7 and political intervention

Continuing PPT’s series commenting on Wikileaks cables, Ambassador Ralph “Skip” Boyce reports in one cable on his discussions with palace officials – the king’s Principal Private Secretary Asa Sarasin and his assistant Tej Bunnag – on thoughts about a political intervention in March 2006. It is, we think, revealing of palace meddling, Privy Council activism and various levels of ineptitude.

A good place to begin on this cable is with Boyce’s initial summary and his final comment:

In his summary, he notes that “The Palace is trying to undo the furor caused by the broadcast Sunday night of the King’s intervention following the violence that resulted from the 1992 democracy protests.”

In his comments, he says: “7. (C) … We were struck by the relative ease with which these two people close to the King entertained the idea of a royal intervention under Article 7, something the Palace has been most reticent about discussing previously. We came away with the impression that, if the elections were unsuccessful due to the inability of enough candidates to meet the 20 percent threshold (ref B) or some other reason, then this might be an acceptable opening for the King to use his constitutional authority to resolve the crisis…. A royal intervention could happen, but not at this time.”

Some other comments:

On a cover-up: “Arsa admitted that the Sunday evening broadcast of the iconic film of the King’s intervention following the 1992 pro-democracy demonstrations had provoked a wave of conspiracy theorizing (ref A). Arsa claimed that the King himself had wanted the film broadcast to emphasize the need for peace and reconciliation.” So the king suggested it and wanted it. “Arsa … had scrambled to issue a press statement to distance the Palace from all of this. First, they issued a statement saying that the Palace had had nothing to do with the Sunday evening broadcast.” He lied to the media and to the public in attempting a cover-up. Realizing that this would be obvious, Arsa then “followed up with a second statement almost immediately. That statement noted that as film was ‘public information’ the media could re-broadcast it on their own, providing they did so responsibly. Thus Arsa had tried to extricate the Palace from the political storm.” He lied twice.

On requested intervention: “Arsa described both sides as ‘implacable.’ Both were trying to force the King to come down into the political arena. Arsa said that the King was just not ready to do this — yet…. Arsa said that if the PM and his cabinet cannot conduct the business of government, then there might be an argument for the King to ‘intervene’ under Constitution Article 7 to resolve a deadlock.”

On the king and Thaksin: The “relationship between the King and Thaksin is ‘correct.’ The PM gets an audience with the King whenever he wants one. Lately, however, the King ‘only listens,’ he doesn’t say anything because ‘he’s afraid that Thaksin will quote him.” He adds that “Thaksin is disrespectful generally to anyone else who disagrees with him.”

On the Privy Council: Tej Bunnag “pointed out that the press was also carrying reports of yesterday’s Privy Council meeting. ‘One of them’ had leaked the news that the Privy Council had discussed the current situation, leading to more speculation that the Palace was considering intervening. Tej emphasized that this had been a regularly-scheduled meeting and did not signify any change in the Palace’s position.” When Boyce asked “how an intervention by the King would actually be perceived by the public. Tej agreed that, despite Thaksin’s popularity in the countryside, if the King did somehow remove him, this would be accepted by the population.”

Clearly, the king’s intervention in the political conflict of the time was an option that was on the table and actively considered. And, of course, it was used a month later.