Updated: 2023 election coverage

Here are some international attempts at understanding the upcoming election:

Council on Foreign Relations, Thailand’s Parliament Has Been Dissolved: Elections Loom, But Will They Be Free?

In a free and fair election, it would be difficult for military-aligned parties to put together a winning coalition. But this could well not be a free and fair election. (2019 was not, after all.) The election commission is in the hands of Prayuth and his allies, and they can disqualify MPs who have won. The top court can even go so far as to disqualify entire parties.

Clipped from Nikkei Asia

DW, Will Thailand’s upcoming elections see a political shift?

… in recent years, Thailand has faced political unrest and economic woes, while the kingdom’s monarchy has been challenged. The prime minister’s popularity has faded.

Reuters, Thai PM Prayuth to run for re-election in May*

The military veteran has lagged rivals in opinion polls, but hopes to win over supporters with promises of looking after the wellbeing of the people and the country’s stability, and protecting the monarchy…. “The most important thing is to defend the country and protect the nation’s main institution. Please trust me as you’ve always done,” Prayuth said.

VICE, Thailand’s Election Is Filled With These Controversial Characters. Here’s What You Need to Know

Faced with pro-democracy protests, half-baked cannabis laws, and the comeback of the Shinawatra family, millions will cast their votes on the country’s leaders in May.

The Diplomat, Thai PM Dissolves Parliament, Paving Way For May Election

Thailand’s parliament has been dissolved by a government decree, setting the stage for a general election in May that will once again pit the country’s conservative establishment against an opposition led by the representatives of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

The Times of India, Explainer: What you need to know about Thailand’s elections

Youth-led protests that began in 2020 broke a longstanding taboo around questioning the role of the monarchy in Thailand, where the constitution states the king is “enthroned in a position of revered worship”.

The Move Forward party has campaigned on reforming a law that punishes royal insults with up to 15 years in jail. Activists have urged opposition parties to scrap it, but the topic remains sensitive among many Thais and most parties oppose or want to avoid talk of reform.

The Washington Post, How Military Has a Thumb on Scales in Thai Election

Paywalled in some places.

La Prensa Latina Media, Thai leader Prayut confirms re-election bid

Prayut recently joined the United Thai Nation Party having previously led a government run by the pro-military Palang Pracharath Party.

He was army chief when the military seized power in a bloodless coup in May 2014 after months of anti-government demonstrations.

Of an authoritarian and ultra-monarchical nature, the military leader silenced any dissenting voice at the head of the military junta and delayed elections several times.

In 2019 he was appointed leader of the civilian government after elections that international observers described as lacking transparency.

Between 2020 and 2021, his government used police force to stop student-led demonstrations demanding reforms in the country and the monarchy, a highly taboo subject in Thailand.

Since then, more than 200 people, including minors, have been charged with lèse majesté and sedition for their peaceful activism. Both can carry long prison terms.

South China Morning Post, As Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn readies for May 14 vote, army and youth pose major challenges

“We are ready to rescue the country,” Paetongtarn told reporters on March 21 outside the City Pillar shrine where Bangkok residents seek blessings…. “We are very ready to go on campaigning and to explain our policies in greater detail, but in the end it’s about the people; whether they choose us or not, the power is in their hands.”

Update: *A reader rightly points out that the Reuters headline is buffalo manure because Gen Prayuth was never elected, except to the unelected senators he appointed.

Out of hospital and (still) campaigning II

The Straits Times has a useful story regarding the Move Forward Party and the appearance of Tantawan Tuatulanon and Orawan Phuphong, as posted yesterday. The story, focused on Move Forward, is part of a series on Thailand’s key personalities and political parties as The Straits Times follows the campaign trail for the 2023 election.

It is a long an interesting story and PPT focuses on the part referring to lese majeste.

It was on 24 March, in Chonburi that Tawan and Bam climbed on the Move Forward campaign stage “with a sign [a ballot] asking people to vote to ‘abolish’ or ‘amend’ Thailand’s lese majeste law.”

Clipped from Bangkok Post

Party leader Pita Limjaroenrat welcomed them and allowed them to speak. “He then votes by placing a sticker in the ‘Abolish’ column on their poster. The 10 Chonburi constituency candidates behind him follow suit.”

Pita then said: “However, I must apologise, but the party must push for amendments first…”. He said that “if the amendments are still rejected, the party will push for its abolishment.” He told the crowd: “This is why the people of Chonburi must elect our candidates to step forward, so we have enough votes to solve political problems…”.

Elections and the reform protesters II

A couple of days ago we posted on some of the monarchy reform protesters and their take on the upcoming election.

On Wednesday, the Ratsadon Group “launched a fresh democracy campaign called ‘Vote for Change’ in response to the May 14 general election.”

It was Ratsadon Group leader Patsaravalee Tanakitvibulpon who announced that the

Group is calling on all eligible voters to join in the ‘Vote for Change’ campaign by seeing to it that the nationwide race to parliament will be held in free, transparent and fair fashion and that pro-democracy parties which could possibly get a majority of MPs to set up a post-election government will be practically obliged to meet the group’s resolute goals.

Clipped from Thai Newsroom

She pointed to young political activists “raising the common objectives toward which the pro-democracy parties may contribute by making ‘structural changes’ to the coup-trigger-happy military and undemocratic bureaucratism as well as reforming the monarchy.”

The Group also “called on the pro-democracy parties to steer monarchical reform beginning with the long-awaited amendment to the draconian lese majeste law, better known as Section 112 of the Criminal Code.”

They also  called for amendments to the “coup junta-designed constitution of 2017 to make it truly democratic and ultimately put an end to the ‘tyrannical elite’ regime led by caretaker prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha who rose to power via the 2014 coup.”

Another Ratsadon Group leader Arnon Nampa “suggested the people not be so concerned over apparent conflict of standpoints between the Pheu Thai and Move Forward that they might compromise the shared goals of putting an end to the ‘tyrannical elite’…”.

Elections and the reform protesters I

The Diplomat updates on the thinking and activities of monarchy reform protesters in the context of an upcoming election: “the general election will be the first since the 2020-2021 protests, leaving the door open to a hopeful democratic consolidation, or further consolidation of control by Thailand’s conservative elites.”

Yean Arunpreechawat is cited as concluding that “the monarchy as the main factor behind [Gen] Prayut[h Chan-ocha]’s lasting popularity in Thailand today: “Most people have grown tired of [Prayut’s] economic mismanagement, but will continue to vote for him so long as he gets the support from the King…”. Yean forgets the military and the tycoons in this assessment (at least as quoted), and we doubt the monarchy has this much impact on votes – Thaksin Shinawatra proved that.

From DW

We think Get Surariddhidhamrong gets closer to the mark: “Political viability relies on the monarchy, which makes it harder for political parties to seek a platform independent from monarchical approval … the people must rise up against this and drive this change so that political parties can take the next steps.”

Meanwhile, in the context of a new generation of voters, Sirabhob Attohi makes the important point about “the crucial role played by the protests in introducing Thai youths to the country’s decades-old democracy movement.” Sirabhob observes:

Many of us were too young when the Red Shirts protests started, or even during the 2010 protests. In this sense, this was our generation’s awakening, it helped us realize we can strive to demand better for our democracy and our society.

Get’s observation on the deep structural roots of royalist conservatism:

… the current political offer remains unable to address the most pressing issues facing Thailand’s fragile democracy today. “The rule of law needs to be restored before youths can trust the government again, and this can only be addressed through structural change…”.

Uprooting that is difficult when conservatives, with the military and monarchy, oppose change.

Who does the king want?

The election may still be some way off, but the issue of the palace and preferred outcome is already being pondered.

A recent article in Nikkei Asia by Marwaan Macan-Markar gets to the point, quoting an unnamed military intelligence source, who see 2023 as different from 2019: “But we should expect a twist this time…”. That has to do with Gen Prayuth Chanocha’s and Gen Prawit Wongsuwan’s “diminishing influence … over the army in recent years.”

Three army generals in 2019. Clipped from the Bangkok Post

This also saw rising palace influence: “Seasoned security analysts point to the annual promotions of the estimated 1,750 flag officers that signal this shift. Neither Prayuth nor Prawit, they say, played a significant role in the elevation of Gen. Narongphan Jitkaewthae, a palace favorite, to a three-year term as the army chief.”

Supalak Ganjanakhundee is cited as saying that Prawit “suffers” because “he is not close to the palace…”. Marwaan reckons “Bangkok-based diplomats have expressed similar sentiments during background discussions about palace favorites.”

Supalak added: “[Prawit] retired from the defense service a long time back and currently holds no ministerial posts to command the military,… [Prayuth did not] assign Prawit to take care of [any] security matters or anything related to the military.”

Prayuth remains “head of the Internal Security Operations Command, a Cold War relic that serves as the political arm of the military. Political insiders interviewed by Nikkei said that ISOC’s role will come under scrutiny — whether it will side with Prayuth’s camp over Prawit’s for the elections.”

There’s also “chatter in the barracks among conscripts, young soldiers and even captains, all under 30 years old, who favor opposition parties such as the pro-youth Move Forward and the pro-democracy Pheu Thai, according to military insiders.”

Of course, the palace abhors Move Forward and worries about Puea Thai and Thaksin Shinawatra.

Rigging it again II

Rigging the election campaign is just a little more complicated this time than it was in 2019; even then it was a close call for the royalist-military parties and their allies. Part of the complication has to do with the convolutions of the former military bosses organizing their own political futures, together or separately. Gen Prawit Wongsuwan is even trying to pretend he’s now a democrat.

Meanwhile, tons of state money – taxpayer funds – are been lashed about by the regime, giving those officials who influence electoral outcomes locally large pay rises.

But royalists are gunning for Puea Thai, fearing that the party is likely to do very well.

Sonthiya Sawasdee, a former adviser to the House committee on law, justice and human rights, has petitioned the Election Commission seeking the dissolution of Puea Thai “based on an allegation that it has broken election rules.” The claim is that the party has violated the law by allowing a figure banned from politics – Nattawut Saikua – participating in party campaign events.

Given bias in the EC and in the courts, this petition is not frivolous. Even if dismissed, such cases eat up energy and resources. Of course, a complaint has also be made against the Move Forward Party.

 

Rigging it again I

In a post a couple of weeks ago, we noted that The Economist, on 24 March 2019, said the 2019 election was “a rigged vote.”

In an article at the South China Morning Post, Zachary Abuza argues that “Thai politics remains a rigged system with little chance of reforms.”

In summary, Abuza writes that “Thai politics remains a dangerous mix of a very unpopular leader, from an unpopular party, who is likely to hold onto power, with insufficient pressure for the royalist-military establishment to make any meaningful reforms.”

That’s true, but his discussion of election rigging is, we think, mostly confused and confusing. But readers can decide for themselves.

He is right to note the outside influence of the junta selected and appointed senate. This is a means to rig who gets to be prime minister. But with election campaigning already underway, it is necessary to look at other kinds of rigging.

First, there’s the way the regime has controlled the bureaucracy, rooting out all those who aren’t royalists and sycophants. The Ministry of Interior controls the provinces. It will work for the preferred right-wing parties.

Second, and related, the regime has control of the Election Commission, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, and the judiciary. That swings the election to the right. And, the specter of dissolved parties looms over the opposition.

Third, the military is onside. It gave birth to the regime and has done very well from it. A recent report states that “Thailand’s acquisition of defense … imports soared 1,039 percent last year, an equivalent of $3.84 billion, leaving many ordinary Thais baffled.” The military has a mirror administration and controls ISOC, which surveils, coaxes and coerces down to the village level.

Fourth, the regime is shoveling out billions of baht to the electorate in what used to be described as vote-buying by policy corruption.

That’s just the beginning. This is 1980s-1990s style electioneering. The corruption cases that have cascaded over the country in recent months is a pointer to the money politics that buys MPs, parties, and voters.

Succession and elections

Singapore’s Mothership reports on a talk by Chulalongkorn University’s Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang who (bravely) asserted:

One of the biggest concerns for the country would be the matter of succession. Princess Bajrakitiyabha Narendira Debyavati, the eldest daughter of Thai King Maha Vajiralongkorn, was hospitalised [PPT: she’s dead] and eventually put on life support after she collapsed while training her pet dog on Dec. 14 last year.”

He explained:

While the Thai palace has never declared Bajrakitiyabha as the successor to the throne, she has been widely assumed to be next in line for succession.

“She studied law, she’s intelligible, approachable, and well-loved by many of the elite community,” Khemtong said, while “Prince Dipangkorn, the only male heir of [King] Vajiralongkorn, is said to be mentally challenged,” though Khemtong also stressed that as a “Thai person, [he] can neither confirm [nor] repudiate that accusation.”

We think that’s reasonably accurate, although Dipangkorn’s brief recent visit to Thailand suggested that there may have been some quick rethinking. In any case, dopey princes have previously become kings. It’s blood that matters.

His point is about the election:

“Now the king is in some kind of crisis. So the question is whether this crisis [will cast a] political shadow. Will we still have the election in May 2023?” Khemthong asked.

According to Khemthong, Thailand’s 2023 election is supposedly the biggest event of the year. It was expected to occur in May, but many believe the election might happen much earlier.

On the election:

Khemthong sounded pessimistic about the election, as he said, “The election will not be a transition. Actually, the election will help normalise this very unfree and unfair political arrangement of Thai politics.”

On linking palace and election:

But big questions remain. Given the Thai princess’s condition, how will the palace crisis affect this year’s election?

“The main question is that in times of crisis, will the palace resort to some extra-constitutional convention?” Khemthong asked. “At the very least, if there’s a state funeral, will it delay [the] election and for how long? And that’s the question that we don’t know the answer yet.”