Delicate royals need “protection”

Of course, Thailand’s royals are, so think the ultra-royalists and several dinosaur political parties, in need of Article 112, to “protect” them.

Clipped from Bangkok Post

It seems they also have delicate eyes in need of protection from the political kaleidoscope that is election campaigning on Thailand’s streets. Despite the fact that – as several regimes have endlessly bleated, Section 2 of the 2017 constitution affirms that “Thailand adopts a democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State,” that “democratic” bit does not mean that royals can be exposed to electioneering or even see it.

Thai Newsroom reports that “Bangkok Governor Chadchart Sittipunt … posted on his Facebook page to explain that a few dozens of Pheu Thai campaign posters had been removed from the sidewalks of Aksa Road in Thawi Wattana district straddling northwestern outskirts of the capital city by officials of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration because they were not legally allowed in the royal premises.” Who knew a public road was “royal premises”?

The of the roadside signs “bewildered many people on social media … since they only advertised the Pheu Thai campaign and none was found to belong to any other contesting camps.” Even more bewildering is the fact that the so-called Thawi Wattana Palace is empty of royals.

This raises issues, again, about royal land grabs but also about rules for royals that seem to have little basis in law.

Along similar lines, Prachatai reports that the Rayong city municipality office decided to remove all election posters “because they lined the route of a royal motorcade.” That motorcade carried Princess Sirindhorn.

In this case, a municipal authority decided that the royal should not and would not see election campaign posters. Law? Nope. We suspect it is just the usual royalist nonsense. Or is it? Is the palace making these demands? Who knows? But what of the “democratic” bit in the constitution? As far aw we can tell, royals that that as nonsense and so do their minions who wish to “protect” them.

Updated: The parties and lese majeste

Yesterday we posted on Puea Thai and Article 112. Today we point readers to an article by Napon Jatusripitak, Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme at ISEAS in Singapore. His “Thailand’s Lèse-majesté Law: A Subtle Referendum in the Upcoming Elections?” is a useful account and jives with our view that 112 is on the election agenda mainly because of the valiant efforts of Tantawan “Tawan” Tuatulanon and Orawan “Bam” Phupong.

The conclusion to the paper is not really an answer to the question posed in the title but is to the point:

Will the election provide an opening for the small but growing demand for change, particularly among younger generations of Thais like Tawan and Bam? Or will it signify the political exclusion of this demand and affirm the suspension of the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and … the rule of law? Much remains to be seen, but it is clear that the lèse-majesté law has become a central issue that will shape the generational and ideological divides in political attitudes, even if its fate does not appear to be hanging in the balance.

The fate of lese majeste might not be hanging in the balance, but the fates of scores of people facing lese majeste charges are certainly left hanging.

Update: Prachatai recounts an election debate and sets out the responses to 112 by 10 participants from 10 parties. The royalist Democrat Party is listed under the majority of parties that consider “112 is problematic in terms of enforcement and its legal provisions.” Here’s the summary of party leader Jurin Laksanavisit’s comments:

Jurin expressed the view that Section 112 is still crucial, as it is designed to protect the head of state, and many other nations have a similar law.

He believes that if the enforcement is problematic, the solution lies in amending the enforcement process, rather than abolishing the law.

Lastly, he disagrees with the idea of having the Bureau of the Royal Household or the Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary act as complainants, as it is like directly pitting the monarchy against the people.

In other words, keep everything as is but fix enforcement somehow…. Last time the Democrat Party was in power it also took this position and the number of lese majeste cases increased.

Puea Thai and 112

The Shinawatra clan has always been somewhat weak when it comes to policy and rhetoric on Article 112/lese majeste. This continues with comments made to the Bangkok Post by Srettha Thavisin.

Srettha is the former president and chief executive of the Sansiri real estate empire and is now one of the three prime ministerial candidates nominated by Puea Thai. Here’s how he was reported on 112:

On amending Section 112 of the Criminal Code, or the lese majeste law, Mr Srettha said the party is looking to rectify the law to prevent it being used as a tool to incriminate opponents in politics, which is damaging to all parties and every pillar institution of the country.

A special unit might be up and running to file legal action against lese majeste offenders. It must also be considered whether the law currently metes out too harsh a punishment.

He noted the perception of how the law is being handled and enforced transcends generations. But it was important to improve the law so people, young and old, can coexist harmoniously.

None of this sounds particularly new or original. Even the junta tried a bit of this, and we can recall similar things being said by the detestable Abhisit Vejjajiva and then by Yingluck Shinawatra.

That is not to say that every leader and party in power is hopeless on Article 112. We kind of think the data tells the story. Based on some academic work we have seen and data at our website, we think there were about 4.2 lese majeste cases prosecuted per year between 1984 and 2000. Under the Thaksin government, this rate dropped to about 2.8 cases prosecuted per year between 2001 and 2005. For the period from the 2006 coup up to the end of the Yingluck government in 2013, there was an average of about 37 cases per year, but most of these were cases under the post-coup regime and under Abhisit’s regime. Then the lese majeste tsunami got big: for 2014-2016, with a military junta in power following the coup, there were more than 105 cases per year. Of course, there was the king-directed 112 hiatus, but this has been followed from late 2020 until early 2022 (when the data ends) by an average of more than 160 cases prosecuted per year under Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha.

We understand that royalists will interpret these figures as support for the generals. Indeed, the data  show that when monarchists rule, Article 112 is used with alacrity. But from a progressive position, while Puea Thai may be weak on lese majeste reform, progressives should vote these dolts out. If that happens, they should also be prepared to defend the elections and the elected government.

The past seeks re-election

A report on the upcoming election by The Nation finds its way to the Asia News Network. As ever, PPT was interested in how the military-backed parties of the past are using the monarchy.

The report begins by noting that Gen Prawit Wongsuwan has ditched efforts to be a newly-born and cuddly democrat, apparently for two reasons. First, political “moderation” had “failed to improve popularity ratings” Prawit and his Palang Pracharath Party, causing Prawit to leap “back to the conservative camp.” Second, Prawit “learned that the result of the 2019 election was a victory for the conservatives.” The alleged switch involves making “it clear that it [the military party] would not join hands with Pheu Thai and Move Forward, as the two parties have policies to amend, if not abolish, the lese majeste law, or Article 112, of the Criminal Code.”

Gen Prawit and Gen Prayuth in an earlier photo

We think this is exaggerated. For one thing, the notion that the 2019 election was a “victory” for conservatives is fudging. It was only by rigging the constitution and the election, and with last minute rule bending and breaking by the Election Commission that the “conservatives” managed to scrape together a ruling coalition. And second, Prawit is still seeking “moderate” votes. As we said recently, the plan for the 2023 election seems to be for Pirapan and Prayuth to represent the extreme right for royalist voters and maybe a few military types, banging on about monarchy. Prawit’s party represents the “cuddly” royalists, rightists, and military, appealing to a “middle” of voters, sprouting (new) words about reconciliation and democracy. The hope may be that they can get sufficient seats to form another coalition, drawing in some of the parties-for-sale.

What the royalists, rightists, and military-backed dinosaurs are doing is making the monarchy their main platform. By doing that, they are laying the ground for party disqualifications, protests, and military coup should the opposition win.

The report then assesses the conservative camp.

Prayut is firmly in the conservative camp and has clearly announced his opposition to the liberals [PPT – not really a useful term]. He has vowed to defend the monarchy and prevent any amendment to Article 112.

As a former Army chief, Prayut is imbued with a spirit of loyalty to the monarchy. He rose from the line of command in the 2nd Infantry Division, Queen’s Guard, so he has been on the forefront to protect the monarchy.

As a result, Prayut is seen as the No. 1 politician in the conservative camp and many pro-monarchy voters are expected to pour their support for his party.

Prayut’s staunch pro-monarchy stand is expected to win a lot of votes for his party, but it is yet to be seen whether the number of votes will be enough to allow him to retain his prime minister’s seat.

As we said in our linked post above, this is obvious.

The Democrat Party is looking weak, and the report says this: “Several core members of the party, candidates and party financiers are pro-monarchy elites, so the Democrat will retain its conservative stand and continue to receive sizeable support from royalists.” Because the party has splintered, several of its high-profile ultra-royalists have gone elsewhere, and former Democrat votes will likely follow.

Turning to the Bhum Jai Thai Party, the report ignores the dope party image and looks at Anutin Charnvirakul as a “defender of the monarchy. Bhumjaithai has made it clear that it does not want to see the monarchy used as a tool in political conflicts.” Except that he’s prepared to do it and so are his partners…. At least the report explains that being pro-democracy is not the party’s strong point. The report reckons that anti-democrat party built around patronage politics is still “expected to win some support from royalist voters.”

What we get from this report is that these parties of the past have little to campaign on in terms of policy or achievements and so must rely on the monarchy and the votes of royalists. Those votes look likely to be highly contested among these parties and thus are probably going to be splintered.

Fault line politics

It was only a few days ago that PPT posted that while it is the ultra-royalists who are quickest to bemoan any “politicization” of the monarch and monarchy, it is ultra-royalist parties that regularly use the monarchy as a political piece. That post was about the inaptly named United Thai Nation Party.

Earlier we had a post on the Chart Thai Pattana Party, owned by the Silpa-archa family, set one of its conditions for joining the next coalition government as a “promise not to touch the lese majesty law.”

This has become the refrain of military-backed and a gaggle of splinter parties seeking to benefit from elections while backing the incarceration of children for lese majeste.

In recent days, Thailand’s so-called health minister and prime ganja promoter Anutin Charnvirakul of Newin Chidchob’s Bhum Jai Thai Party has declared he is “open to working with any party and would be prepared to be prime minister if the opportunity arose.” But this claim of willingness to be sucked into any coalition turns out to be an untruth. He reportedly “explained” that as a “staunch monarchist [he] draws the line at any suggestion of amending a lese majeste law.” Apparently, “for Anutin the monarchy is sacrosanct” and this includes Article 112. He solemnly declared: “Protecting the monarchy is an inspiration for the party…”.

So Anutin is either prepared to only work with rightists – a good fit for himself and his party – or he thinks he can get Puea Thai to leave Article 112 untouched.

Likewise, Palang Pracharath leader Gen Prawit Wongsuwan has also been talking about allies after an election where his party is looking like failing. He said his military party “could form a government with any other party, including Pheu Thai, provided they share similar policies, in particular being opposed to amending the lese majeste law.”

This is recognition of Puea Thai’s likely election and the losers are drawing a line in the coalition sand. Clearly, the lese majeste ball is now in Puea Thai’s court. Can they be clear on 112??

Out of hospital and (still) campaigning I

Tantawan Tuatulanon and Orawan Phuphong were only discharged from Thammasat University Hospital on Thursday. It had taken 12 days for medicos to nurse them back to health after their 52-day fast.

Yet, as the Bangkok Post reports,

Within hours they were in Ayutthaya, attending a Pheu Thai Party campaign event for the May 14 general election. Carrying a large placard, they began to circulate through the crowd, asking party faithful to mark down whether they favoured repealing Section 112 of the Criminal Code, the royal defamation law. A second question asked whether freedom and economic prosperity were possible at the same time.

Clipped from Bangkok Post

The two women approached the party’s campaign stage, and were “eventually allowed onstage. Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the face of the party and presumptive prime ministerial candidate, made some general remarks about freedom of expression and the moment passed without incident.”

The Post gleefully writes: “Like most parties campaigning for the May 14 poll, Pheu Thai does not want to make lese-majeste an issue, or even mention it at all, beyond saying that is open to discussing possible amendments.”

It then seems to want to attack Move Forward:

On Friday evening, Ms Tantawan and Ms Orawan — Tawan and Bam to their supporters — took their campaign to a Move Forward rally in Chon Buri, where they found an enthusiastic reception. Party leader Pita Limjaroenrat even invited them onstage and expressed support for their efforts.

It adds:

Only Move Forward has an explicit policy proposal to reform the law to reduce the current harsh punishments. The party also says that only the Bureau of the Royal Household should be allowed to file criminal complaints. Currently, anyone can file a lese-majeste complaint against anybody else and the police are obliged to investigate it.

Tantawan and Orawan have said they will “visit all the parties, even the ‘dictatorial’ ones, on the campaign trail to find out where their leaders and supporters stand on the lese-majeste issue.”

The Post suggests potential violence if they show up at the United Thai Nation (Ruam Thai Sang Chart) party “fronted by the acting prime minister, Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, the reception might be less than warm. One of the big names who joined the party this week is Dr Rienthong Nanna, a ultra-royalist vigilante infamous for inciting supporters to go after reformist activists.”

This reporting is lop-sided, but at least the report includes available data on lese majeste cases long-missing from the Post’s reporting. We can probably thank Tawan and Bam for that!

Elections and the reform protesters II

A couple of days ago we posted on some of the monarchy reform protesters and their take on the upcoming election.

On Wednesday, the Ratsadon Group “launched a fresh democracy campaign called ‘Vote for Change’ in response to the May 14 general election.”

It was Ratsadon Group leader Patsaravalee Tanakitvibulpon who announced that the

Group is calling on all eligible voters to join in the ‘Vote for Change’ campaign by seeing to it that the nationwide race to parliament will be held in free, transparent and fair fashion and that pro-democracy parties which could possibly get a majority of MPs to set up a post-election government will be practically obliged to meet the group’s resolute goals.

Clipped from Thai Newsroom

She pointed to young political activists “raising the common objectives toward which the pro-democracy parties may contribute by making ‘structural changes’ to the coup-trigger-happy military and undemocratic bureaucratism as well as reforming the monarchy.”

The Group also “called on the pro-democracy parties to steer monarchical reform beginning with the long-awaited amendment to the draconian lese majeste law, better known as Section 112 of the Criminal Code.”

They also  called for amendments to the “coup junta-designed constitution of 2017 to make it truly democratic and ultimately put an end to the ‘tyrannical elite’ regime led by caretaker prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha who rose to power via the 2014 coup.”

Another Ratsadon Group leader Arnon Nampa “suggested the people not be so concerned over apparent conflict of standpoints between the Pheu Thai and Move Forward that they might compromise the shared goals of putting an end to the ‘tyrannical elite’…”.

Who does the king want?

The election may still be some way off, but the issue of the palace and preferred outcome is already being pondered.

A recent article in Nikkei Asia by Marwaan Macan-Markar gets to the point, quoting an unnamed military intelligence source, who see 2023 as different from 2019: “But we should expect a twist this time…”. That has to do with Gen Prayuth Chanocha’s and Gen Prawit Wongsuwan’s “diminishing influence … over the army in recent years.”

Three army generals in 2019. Clipped from the Bangkok Post

This also saw rising palace influence: “Seasoned security analysts point to the annual promotions of the estimated 1,750 flag officers that signal this shift. Neither Prayuth nor Prawit, they say, played a significant role in the elevation of Gen. Narongphan Jitkaewthae, a palace favorite, to a three-year term as the army chief.”

Supalak Ganjanakhundee is cited as saying that Prawit “suffers” because “he is not close to the palace…”. Marwaan reckons “Bangkok-based diplomats have expressed similar sentiments during background discussions about palace favorites.”

Supalak added: “[Prawit] retired from the defense service a long time back and currently holds no ministerial posts to command the military,… [Prayuth did not] assign Prawit to take care of [any] security matters or anything related to the military.”

Prayuth remains “head of the Internal Security Operations Command, a Cold War relic that serves as the political arm of the military. Political insiders interviewed by Nikkei said that ISOC’s role will come under scrutiny — whether it will side with Prayuth’s camp over Prawit’s for the elections.”

There’s also “chatter in the barracks among conscripts, young soldiers and even captains, all under 30 years old, who favor opposition parties such as the pro-youth Move Forward and the pro-democracy Pheu Thai, according to military insiders.”

Of course, the palace abhors Move Forward and worries about Puea Thai and Thaksin Shinawatra.

Rigging it again II

Rigging the election campaign is just a little more complicated this time than it was in 2019; even then it was a close call for the royalist-military parties and their allies. Part of the complication has to do with the convolutions of the former military bosses organizing their own political futures, together or separately. Gen Prawit Wongsuwan is even trying to pretend he’s now a democrat.

Meanwhile, tons of state money – taxpayer funds – are been lashed about by the regime, giving those officials who influence electoral outcomes locally large pay rises.

But royalists are gunning for Puea Thai, fearing that the party is likely to do very well.

Sonthiya Sawasdee, a former adviser to the House committee on law, justice and human rights, has petitioned the Election Commission seeking the dissolution of Puea Thai “based on an allegation that it has broken election rules.” The claim is that the party has violated the law by allowing a figure banned from politics – Nattawut Saikua – participating in party campaign events.

Given bias in the EC and in the courts, this petition is not frivolous. Even if dismissed, such cases eat up energy and resources. Of course, a complaint has also be made against the Move Forward Party.

 

Puea Thai and lese majeste

Reuters reports that activists have been pressuring the Puea Thai Party to develop a spine on Article 112.

The report notes how draconian the law is and notes that it “has long been a taboo topic in Thailand…”. Depending on how “long” is defined, that is not entirely accurate, at least according to historians of lese majeste.. Reuters is correct that “calls for it [112] to be reformed have also led to arrests.” That may seem absurd, but in royalist Thailand it is “normal.”

The eight activists who met “with the Pheu Thai party … said scrapping Article 112 must be a priority.”

Activist Somyos Prueksakasemsuk said he believed that revoking 112 is an electoral asset.

Naturally enough, “[a]ll 17 ruling coalition parties have vowed not to touch the law, while the ultra royalist Thai Pakdee party has started a petition to make it even stricter.”

Following the meeting, it was stated that “Pheu Thai gave no firm answer on abolishing article 112.” Party secretary-general, Prasert Jantararuangtong, however, “encouraged public discussion on the way it was being enforced as a means of addressing problems in the short term.” He warned: “There are many opinions and polarised views in society on the amendment of this law, which could lead to more conflict…”.

And, while the military remains resolutely royalist, Puea Thai knows that there always the threat of the royalist coup. No doubt they also know that the palace has learned that the law is necessary to maintain the luxury, taxpayer supported lifestyles of royals. They also know that the king covets the political power he has accrued in recent constitutional and administrative changes.

The fact remains, that without pressure from activists (and political parties), royalist feudalism will continue to dominate and smother modern Thailand.