The events that began in 2020, where mostly young people took to the streets to demand not just democratic reform but reform to the monarchy under King Vajiralongkorn, were a major challenge for the crown and for the ruling class.
For some time before these events, Vajiralongkorn had been behaving in ways that suggested to many Thais that he was erratic, self-centered and more. He spent much of his time overseas, mainly in Germany with a harem of concubines, and burning through wads of taxpayer money. Also concerning for many was his preparation for taking the throne, involving seemingly cruel treatment of a wife he discarded, throwing many of her relatives in prison, and “cleaning out” his entourage of those he considered insufficiently loyal. In addition, with the support of the military-backed regime, he demanded and received legal and constitutional changes that bolstered his position as king. Taking personal control of the crown’s vast wealth seemed to confirm feelings that this was a grasping and self-indulgent monarch.
The rebellion that began in 2020 was not just about Vajiralongkorn, but his actions and the regime-supported excision of things related to the People’s Party revolution of 1932, suggested a Thailand that was moving rapidly backwards while most of the population seemed to want a more progressive country.
That rebellion was snuffed out by the military regime, on the streets, and most especially through a persistent use of the law to repress. Police, prosecutors and judges proceeded to eliminate anyone considered anti-monarchy by entangling them in the courts and by the use of the lese majeste law, jailing scores of people seen as leaders or influencers of the rebellion. That legal action continues today.
Part of the palace response was for Vajiralongkorn to return to Thailand and to be seen publicly. He and several of his family became engaged in promoting shows of royalism and in promoting ultra-royalist fervor.
As far as we know, the king remained in Thailand. It seemed he recognized that he needed to be in-country to see off the reformists.
That war against reform extended into politics, as the military-monarchy alliance and the establishment worked to see of reformist political parties that were considered to also harbor anti-monarchists. 2026 marked the electoral victory of that anti-reformist agenda.
The monarchy was saved and the king now appears to have decided that he can again travel. Recent trips to Bhutan, China, Laos, and Sweden suggest that he thinks he’s back on top, having seen off the rebellion.
That confidence is justified. He’s got his loot, his government is a trusty conservative-royalist cabal of gangsters, thugs and wealth, he has a strengthened constitutional position, his womanizing is not the same butt of derision it once was, and his opponents are greatly weakened and being weakened further.
Like a spoiled child, he seems to have finally grasped all that he wants. But perhaps there is more that he craves. Taxpayers beware.
Political Prisoners in Thailand 
[…] The article gets into a little culturalist musing about Article 112, which would be better framed as a ruling class narrative, for how else can calls for the law’s abolition or reform be understood? But that aside, the article notes how the case is framed to silence critics and rub out reformers. The idea is to frighten to silence. In addition to this case, there have been scores of other 112 cases, punishing reformers and strengthening the ruling class. […]
[…] palace appears to feel safe again through this very “useful” law. So too are the ultra-royalist vigilantes who are primed […]