Updated: Wikileaks and a TRT accusation of lese majeste

While it has been the Democrat Party that has most used the heinous lese majeste charge for political purposes in recent years, it should not be forgotten that in the struggle between Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party and the opposition, lese majeste was occasionally used. PPT was reminded of this when looking at some more Wikileaks cables and we came across one from U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce commenting on claims of lese majeste lodged against the Democrat Party’s Kalaya Sophonpanich.

The ambassador’s comments on this case are interesting and at times revealing. He begins with the statement that:

respected opposition Member of Parliament (MP), Khunying Kallaya Sophonpanich, has been summoned for questioning by Thai police on charges of lese majeste. Four others were questioned, including Democrat Party parliamentary candidate Thanom Onkhetpol, who lost in the February 6 general election, and three party workers. The charges are based on a complaint filed by the government Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party candidate who opposed Thanom and who reported to police in mid-January that Democrat Party (DP) campaign stickers reportedly used by Thanom illegally quoted Thailand’s revered King and Queen.

Detailing the alleged offenses, Boyce states they are:

based on campaign stickers (reportedly similar in size to a US style bumper sticker) printed and paid for by the local office of the DP in Bangkok’s Klong Toey constituency. Three quotes are used in the stickers, according to newspaper accounts. The first is an excerpt from a speech given by Queen Sirikit, “Poverty is no disgrace, while evil and fraud are disgusting and disgraceful.” The other two excerpts are from speeches given by King Bhumibol. “The richer people are, the more they cheat,” and “Anyone who cheats (or is corrupt), even just a little bit, may that person be cursed.” The complaint by MP Sita apparently alleges that the DP did not receive permission to print the quotes and that the DP is using the revered words of the monarchy for political gain. Khunying Kalaya is accused of ordering the printing and distribution of the stickers in the role of senior politician assisting the campaign of Thanom.

It is quite revealing that Boyce then states: “It’s unclear to most legal experts how this can be construed as defaming the monarch as the quotes are taken from public speeches and there is no prohibition on quoting the King or Queen in public.” Clearly, such a statement could not be made today following the remarkable political use of lese majeste and the manner in which the courts have interpreted cases with statements about the monarchy being above politics.

No charges had been laid when this cable was authored, and PPT is unaware of any case going forward, although readers may know more than us.

Boyce then notes that Kalaya “had the title of ‘Khunying’ bestowed on her over 10 years ago in part in recognition of her philanthropic works through Royally-sponsored projects for children’s’ books and encyclopedias…” and comments:

Use of this arcane but very important tenet of Thai criminal law by a government parliamentary candidate for political retribution is disturbing. This tactic, which likely had to be approved at the highest levels of TRT leadership to proceed this far, seems unnecessary and vindictive…. We are watching closely as someone clearly dedicated to Thailand’s revered monarch and to public service is drawn into a legal spectacle. Privately, many Thais have expressed to us their hope that Khunying Kalaya’s palace connections will find a way to have the charges dropped.

As far as we are aware, the case was dropped. But all of the (false) claims that the palace is never involved in these charges are but a puff of smoke when “palace connections” are invoked, and it is interesting too that Boyce takes this charge seriously and is “watching closely.” It is also telling that he uses the term “arcane” to describe a law that has come to be the most widely known in Thailand.

Update: A reader points out that the statement: “The richer people are, the more they cheat,” attributed to the king, should be linked to this post.

Updated: Wikileaks, Pansak and Surin

As mentioned in an earlier post, PPT has finally found the time to get back to Wikileaks cables and is looking through the 6,000 or so cables to see what we missed in our past viewings. We are doing this in a systematic way, trying to ensure that we don’t double-up and re-post something we’d commented on previously.  We are now working our way through the 2006 cables.

Two cables get our attention in this post. The first is from a meeting with Thaksin Shinawatra’s close adviser Pansak Vinyaratn and the second from a talk with the Democrat Party’s Surin Pitsuwan. Both cables revolve around politics and monarchy.

PPT has previously posted on comments made by Pansak. In an earlier cable, this one dated 9 March 2006, Pansak meets with Ambassador Ralph Boyce and then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Southeast Asia Eric John (who later became ambassador to Thailand). PPT thought we had covered this one previously, so if we are doubling up, we apologize.

At a time when People’s Alliance for Democracy rallies were expanding, Pansak is said to have “brimmed with fatigued confidence.” He even felt a “military coup improbable.” According to Pansak, denouncing “the ‘arrogance’ of the political opposition”,

the current political crisis is the “last hurrah of the old wealthy class,” according to Pansak. This cabal of political and economic elite who have dominated modern Thai society are “absolutely, deeply resentful” of Thaksin, who Pansak suggests is a new type of businessman and politician. Pansak said he told Thaksin, “all of these people who have lost their role in society, who have lost their shirts because of arrogance, want to come back (and defeat Thaksin.)” This “unholy alliance” of big business, the Democrat Party and “some people close to the palace” remain feckless. They have no specific programs or platforms and lack even the leadership to defeat Thaksin….

Thaksin, Pansak claimed, “has strengthened democracy…”. By this he seems to mean that “Thaksin’s power base ‘is the people’,” with Thai Rak Thai Party “took only five years to capture the hearts and minds of the people.”Again, Pansak pans the “immature” established “elite who have dominated the country for so long have focused too much on a form of representative democracy that meets their needs and minimizes the voices of the masses.”

Boyce decides that Pansak claims are a “humorous efforts to paint Thaksin as a man of the people…”. In all of the cables we have seen, apart from being an ardent admirer of everyone in the palace, Boyce shows a congruence with the elite in usually being unable to understand Thaksin’s popular appeal.

At the same time Pansak reveals the Achilles heel of the aggressive Thaksin and an arrogant TRT: “In the past, journalists were thrown in jail…. Now, we sue them, because we believe in the custom of democracy.”

Of course, the monarchy wasn’t missing from the discussion. Pansak refers to “the King’s personal private secretary Arsa Sarasin had called Democrat Party Chief Abhisit Vejjahiva [sic.] to ask him if he would like to meet Thaksin at the palace to discuss the current crisis. Abhisit refused, saying that if the palace would like him to meet with the PM, they would have to submit a list of subjects for discussion first.” This invitation is confirmed by the ambassador and by Abhisit to the media.

Pansak made “a cryptic sentence or two that seemed to suggest a preference for a respected but politically uninvolved monarch.” He is quoted as saying:

“To revere the King in the correct manner is to allow him to be in the palace with happiness and his eunuchs only come out of the palace to go to the supermarket. So always fund beautiful roads for eunuchs to go back to the palace…the situation now is, build beautiful roads for eunuchs to go back to the palace.”

The second cable is also dated 9 March and begins with a comment on the monarchy, with the Democrat Party Deputy Leader and former Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan is headlined as having “voiced his hope that the Palace would convince Prime Minister Thaksin to step down.” As the cable has it:

When DAS John asked where he thought the situation was going, Surin said that he hoped that someone such as Privy Council Chairman General Prem Tinsulanonda would be able to weigh in with the Palace’s authority to persuade Thaksin to go for the sake of the country’s stability. He opined that otherwise Thaksin will not likely go without being pushed. If Article 7 comes into play, Surin said, the King could appoint a new Prime Minister and “fair and transparent” elections be scheduled…. The Ambassador asked if the DP had lines through to the Palace towards this eventuality. Surin said he thought not, but that the DP was “hopeful” that the Palace would decide “enough is enough” and tell Thaksin to go.

Surin’s next claim was that Thaksin and TRT were engaged in vote-buying for the 2006 election, which his party was boycotting.

Nothing much ever seems to change in the (un)Democrat(ic) Party. In a kind of bizarre failure to recognize that Thaksin and TRT had been weakened by the Shin Corp sale, Surin seems blinded to the changes that had taken place quite rapidly following this deal. He lists Thaksin’s “consistent evasion of the law and misuse of authority” and drones about how Thaksin had

… manipulated all of the country’s supervisory mechanisms — the Security and Exchange Commission, the Constitutional Court, the Election Commission, the Tax Department, etc…. Even the nominally independent courts are suborned by Thaksin through bribery. In addition, Thaksin controlled the electronic media and much of the print media, Surin complained.

He seems unable or unwilling to see anything other than a dominant Thaksin:

DAS John asked how he would address critics who say that the DP is a “spoilsport” that, cognizant that the Prime Minister would win in a new election, will try to bring him down by other means. Surin responded that the political and governmental system itself has gone bad under Thaksin — constitutional controls have been undermined by the Prime Minister and electoral watchdog bodies compromised.

A politically despondent Surin seems to think that Thaksin is too popular for event the king to intervene: the king “would be reluctant to oust a populist leader elected by a large majority of the populace and still apparently enjoying great popularity outside of Bangkok and the DP’s traditional stronghold in Thailand’s south.” The Democrat Party seemed out of ideas and hoped for royal political rescue.

Update: Interestingly, our post appeared just as The Nation published a story on the end of Surin’s 5-year term as ASEAN Secretary-General. While supplicant academics praise him, PPT wonders why, after 45 years, ASEAN attracts so much attention but achieves so little.

Wikileaks: Thaksin’s Chamlong and palace problems

PPT finally has time to get back to Wikileaks cables and is trying to look through the 6,000 or so cables and see what we missed in our past searches of them. We are doing this in a systematic way, trying to ensure that we don’t double-up and re-post something we’d commented on previously.  At present, we have worked through 2005 and are now slowly getting through 2006.

In a cable dated 21 February 2006, Ambassador Ralph Boyce discusses Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s political problems, including mounting opposition from the palace. He concludes that “[t]hings are getting worse for the Prime Minister.” Boyce states that Thaksin’s options are few as “the opposition,” while “not enormous, just won’t quit.”

Boyce sees the “anti-Thaksin coalition” as boosted by “Chamlong Srimuang, a retired general and former governor of Bangkok, was a prominentpolitical figure in the 1980′s and 1990′s” and a “prominent leader of the 1992 democracy movement” joining. He says Chamlong has “star power” and adds that his “criticism of Thaksin is especially noteworthy as he was the PM’s first political mentor…”.  Chamlong’s “Dharma Army” was set to participate in an upcoming anti-Thaksin rally. Boyce says the opposition “smells blood.”

Part of the reason for this change and polls showing a decline in Thaksin’s popularity is attributed, Boyce says, to “the modest but notable shift in the media…. Papers that formerly ignored political stories or toed the government line are cautiously increasing their coverage of criticism, particularly of the Shin Corp deal.”

Boyce then refers to “a surprisingly candid comment from a Deputy Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defense…. Admiral Banawit … noted that the [anti-Thaksin] demonstration on Sunday would be big and that ‘the government would fall’ because ‘Chamlong is very effective.’ He seemed pretty cheerful about it.” PPT assumes this is Admiral Bannawit Kengrian for Boyce comments: “Banawit is an acolyte of Privy Council Chairman Prem Tinsulanonda, which makes his enthusiasm for Thaksin’s downfall doubly interesting.” This move to palace and Prem opposition is what Boyce sees as “interesting.”

Boyce also mentions a meeting with Thaksin adviser Pansak Vinyaratn where the ambassador asks “what would happen if the situation got worse and something provoked an intervention by the Palace.” Pansak is reported to have said “TRT would not allow this to happen, tacitly acknowledging that such an intervention would be inimical to Thaksin’s interests.”

While Boyce says he can’t see any “sign as yet that the King or his closest advisors want to get drawn into this kind of political role,” the simple fact that he asks Pansak and the link to Bannawit and Prem says that the palace is deeply involved in political scheming and suggests a link to the anti-Thaksin opposition.

Updated: Warm up the tanks!

The royalists seem to be like leopards, and completely unable to change their spots as far as their Groundhog Day political strategy is concerned. As the op-ed coaching manual at the Bangkok Post a week or so ago by Voranai Vanijaka pointed out, there are tanks, streets and judges that can all be used to bring down an elected government, sometimes in coordinated action. What he left out were the use of the mainstream media and having so-called liberal royalists shouting about the country being ruined.

PPT recently posted on how the media concoct stories in order to make the government seem immensely corrupt, pandering to notions of “policy corruption” that were spread in the past. Now, as a reader points out, the most eminent “liberal royalist” has again jumped on this corruption bandwagon, shouting of imminent doom at the hands of corrupt politicians.

Former unelected and military selected prime minister Anand Panyarachun is one of the old men who believe they should be running the country because they hate elections and have long promoted the fiction that only elected politicians, as grubby populists, are corrupt and ruining the country. Of course, all of their patrician friends in palace, military and business are, by their definition, squeaky clean.

Anand

Anand is back in the anti-Thaksin Shinawatra saddle. Back when the People’s Alliance for Democracy were on the streets and when the military were engaged in plotting with the palace to illegally overthrow the elected government in 2006, Anand was an anti-politician, anti-populist, anti-Thaksin ideologue.

Anand’s role back then is usefully summarized in a Wikileaks cable where coup supporter and then U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce stated that coup supporter Anand was considered “Thailand’s most distinguished elder statesmen.” He also notes that “Anand made waves in August [2006] when he publicly denounced Thailand’s course under Thaksin.” That was just before the coup. Immediately after the coup, Anand supported it by repeating unfounded rumors, forgetting that he himself was never elected he claimed that “Thaksin’s administration had already become undemocratic,” and added:

Thaksin had controlled the media, suppressed the free flow of information, and manipulated an uninformed electorate. He had corrupted the judiciary, to the point that court cases against him could not proceed. He had sabotaged the Constitution, manipulating political institutions that were supposed to be independent, destroying the system of checks and balances set up by the 1997 Constitution. Thaksin’s administration lacked accountability and transparency. In this environment, elections by themselves hardly ensured democracy. Thaksin blocked off all avenues for political change, leaving his opponents no option other than a coup.

It was really Thaksin who was responsible for the coup! There’s even more in the cable worth reading, such as Anand criticizing the 1997 constitution (which was partly his own work) and arguing for a less democratic form of government.

This is all a long background to the most recent work of this patrician ideologue for the royalist elite. At PhuketWan, Anand fumes: ”This government is taking the country to hell. ” Yet another elected government with a substantial popular mandate is attacked by a man never elected to any public office. He claims that there is “hardly an area of society where the effect of corruption is not being felt.” This is not an accident, he asserts, for “[c]orruption was growing more organised and networks of greed were spreading through every aspect of Thai society…”. Anand says: ”It shouldn’t be like this, but the power of money is now the ultimate authority.” He says corruption is worse than it has ever been under this government which is “taking the country to hell.”

We assume that one old man’s feelings – well, more than one, we are sure – about this government amounts to yet another call for his buddies in the military brass to warm up their tanks.

Update: On the alleged corruption of the current regime, which seems to be partly driven by the new Transparency International rankings, and which Anand should know about, being a card carrying member of TI, almost all mainstream newspapers have now reported that Thailand’s ranking has dropped and so looks worse than the year before. So the current government is harangued as “more corrupt” than the previous one. The problem is, as pointed out days ago by Bangkok Pundit, that no such comparison is even possible. Here is the screenshot from what TI states, very clearly:

Did any editor, sub-editor or reporter even look at the word “cannot”? Yet when political bias is the aim, most in the media don’t let facts get in the way. And nor do the old men of the royalist elite.

Asa out, Grit in

At The Nation it is reported that Asa Sarasin has retired as secretary-general of the Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary. He was in the position for 12 years and reportedly asked to stand down some time ago. In the context of the ancient old men hanging around the palace so they may bath in the reflected glory, that seems a little odd as Asa is listed by The Nation as only 64. In fact, he was born in 1936, so he is 76 years old. Deserving of a rest perhaps, but a spring chicken when compared with Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda who soldiers on in his 90s.

Asa Sarasin

Asa will be “succeeded by one of the deputies, Grit Kanchanakunchorn, making him the sixth person in that post during His Majesty’s reign. The promotion takes effect on Monday.” Grit was once Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and before that was Ambassador to the United States. We have been having trouble finding information on Grit, so if readers can help us out, we’d gladly post more.

Back to Asa, who The Nation says is “known for being good at his job and serving His Majesty in an exemplary manner.”Back in in 2008, one report had Asa as exceptionally busy:

With Bhumibol’s advanced age and declining health, and with one palace insider saying his private principal secretary, Asa Sarasin, handles most of the monarch’s day-to-day affairs, diplomats and others speculate that the military now marches mainly to the beat of the royal advisory Privy Council. Both institutions would likely see their powers legally diminished in a post-Bhumibol era were a pro-Thaksin administration allowed to rule and amend laws without the resistance of a PAD-like protest movement.

Asa has been an important contact for the U.S. Embassy, although not always trusted by the Embassy (see here) and was manipulative of the public through bent stories from the palace (see here). It was Asa that Ambassador Ralph Boyce went to when handing over an advance copy of Paul Handley’s The King Never Smiles and waiting expectantly for Thaksin Shinawatra to fall from power. A Wikileaks cable described Asa’s account of palace political interventions prior to the 2006 election.

His tenure saw the Office earn something said to be “good governance status.” PPT can’t imagine that it could be anything else. Imagine the king’s office having a governance system based on charisma, personal relationships, favoritism and favor, and nepotism.

In addition to all of that political activity, as a royal flunkey, he was also engaged in a lot of business for himself and the palace. One sources states:

Mr. Arsa Sarasin serves as an Advisor to the Board of Directors of Bangkok Bank Public Company. Mr. Sarasin served as the Chief Executive Officer of Padaeng Industry Public Company Limited and the President, Padaeng Industry Co., Ltd…. Mr. Sarasin serves as Chairman of Thai Asia Pacific Brewery Company Limited. He serves as Chairman of Board of Governors of Pacific City Club Ltd. He serves as Honorary Chairman of The Foundation for International Human Resources Development, Toa Paint (Thailand) Co., Ltd. and the Chairman, TOA Group of Companies. He serves as Chairman of the Board of Polymer Solution Co., Ltd. He serves as the Chairman of Amata City Co. Ltd., a subsidiary of Amata Corp. Public Co. Ltd. He serves as Chairman of Padaeng Industry Public Co. Ltd. He serves as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Maesod Clean Energy Company Limited. He has been Chairman and Independent Director of Siam Makro plc since 2007. He serves as Co-Chairman of Thai-Lao Association. Mr. Sarasin serves as an Independent Director of Charoen Pokphand Foods Public Co. Ltd. He serves as Director of Siam Cement Public Co. Ltd. and is a Member of its Governance and Nomination Committee. He serves as a Director of Thai Pure Drinks Ltd. and Thai Prime Fund. He is also a Director of Thai Tapioca Development Institute. He served as a Director of Vinythai Public Company Limited. He serves as a Member of Thailand Business Council for Sustainable Development.

Politics, royalty and business do mix.

Wikileaks: Thaksin’s relations with the palace before the fall

In this Wikileaks cable dated 7 December 2005, U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce recounts a lunch meeting with Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, where the latter expounds on his view that he has a good relationship with the king and queen. It is an interesting account, especially as in later cables Thaksin is highly critical of the monarchy.

The cable states that “Prime Minister Thaksin came to the [ambassador's official] residence on December 7 flush from what he considered a boost from the King’s birthday speech several days earlier.” This speech is the well-known onewhere the king speaks about criticism in a meandering and barely logical discourse. That speech is reflective, Thaksin reportedly says, is related to “the King’s chief motivation these days [which] is the preservation of the status of the monarchy.”

Thaksin is reported as saying that “there were no unpleasant surprises in the speech and noted that the King had previewed the speech to him on November 21.” Apparently, at that meeting, the monarch “counseled him [Thaksin] not to be hot headed in response to his critics.”

Thaksin seems to have wanted to give the impression that he and the king were on excellent terms. Thaksin stated that “the King’s frequent anecdotes during the December 4 speech referring to the Prime Minister had the quality of inside jokes that he and Thaksin shared.”

Whether or not he was drawing on the king’s advice to be nicer to critics, “Thaksin noted that he had dropped his lawsuits against fervent critic Sondhi Limthongkul.” Thaksin reckoned that this had “taken the wind out of Sondhi’s sails,” adding that “the Bangkok elite may be easily duped by a ‘crook’ like Sondhi, but ‘not for long’.”

Back to his relationship with the palace and the impact of his huge 2005 election victory:

Thaksin expressed satisfaction over what he termed a uniformly good relationship with the Palace. He related to me that when he called on the King following his massive 377 seat win last February, he intimated that it would be his last term. “What, you will leave me alone?” Thaksin said the King replied.

Thaksin also explained that the queen had “urged that Thaksin see the King regularly, citing his ability to cheer up His Majesty.”

Talking of the role of the queen and Thaksin’s claim that the king told him “he was lucky to have a Khun Potjaman to candidly advise him as well as encourage him,” Boyce asks “if the Queen was His Majesty’s ‘Khun Potjaman,’ he said emphatically no.” Boyce seems to add this: “The Palace clearly has two camps, with fundamentally different DNA in each.”

Boyce concludes the cable with a comment that:

Thaksin was boosted by the King’s speech and his apparent outmaneuvering of Sondhi. He was confident of his close ties to the Palace and feels that he and the King enjoy a close relationship.”

Wikileaks, April 2009 and challenging the monarchy

A Wikileaks cable dated 29 April 2009 has U.S. Embassy political officers commenting on speeches by Thaksin Shinawatra at the time of red shirt rallies that saw an ASEAN meeting cancelled in Pattaya as blue shirts from the Abhisit Vejjajiva government battled red shirts. This resulted in red shirt actions in Bangkok, shutting down parts of the city. The Army was sent out to clear the streets.

Interestingly, this cable is highly critical of both Thaksin and of the red shirts, using language that would suit the most critical of yellow shirts. Ralph Boyce may have departed as Ambassador in 2007 and yet the decidedly pro-yellow shirt sentiments continued on.

The Embassy refers to Thaksin’s “incendiary rhetoric” as having “reinforced many Thais’ perception that Thaksin aims to marginalize if not overthrow the monarchy.” That is quite a remarkable claim from the Embassy and probably reflects the views of its royalist and yellow-shirted interlocutors. The cable states:

On April 9, according to a translation by English-language daily The Nation [PPT: using this newspaper is always hit-and-miss, and it has been highly biased, even making things up], Thaksin called for “the last revolution of the country to root out all the elite members who are behind the coup of 2006,” and he stated: “The power of the people is paramount. There must be no other power beyond the power of the people any more.”

As several academic commentators have noted, the cable notes that Thaksin’s policies “contributed significantly to the development of political awareness…”. Yet the Embassy sees Thaksin as concerned about his loot rather than his constituency:

Ironically, Thaksin’s most dramatic calls for political change now come even as we hear that he is more concerned with his personal financial benefits than with the transformation of Thai society….

Even then there were questions raised about the relationship between the red shirt movement and “its erstwhile sponsor…”.

Noting the Democrat Party government’s attacks on Thaksin, the Embassy observes: “Any foreign government that appears sympathetic to Thaksin likely imperils its interests vis-a-vis Thailand’s current administration, as well as the monarchy and military.” The U.S. Embassy was likely very worried about this given that its long-term relationships were anchored in the monarchy and military.

The Embassy seems stunned that “Thaksin publicly denounced Privy Councilors Prem Tinsulanonda and Surayud Chulanont as instigators of the 2006 coup.” Not long after that, Thaksin made it ckear that the king “was informed in advance of the coup.”

The cable immediately comments of Embassy “beliefs:

[there is] uncertainty whether the King knew in advance of the coup. We are skeptical of both Thaksin’s and Pallop’s veracity, and we continue to believe it possible that the King did not have advance knowledge of the coup. Palace staff continue to insist he did not.

No probability there. Just belief (and hope). Thaksin appears to have flummoxed the Americans:

According to Thai constitutions (including the present one), the King “shall be enthroned in a position of revered worship and shall not be violated.” Despite repeated professions of loyalty to the King, Thaksin’s recent statements appeared bold and taboo-breaking, outside the usual boundaries of Thai political discourse. On earlier occasions, Thaksin has arguably acted, through both words and symbolic actions, in ways designed to erode the status of the King, or at least to reveal that Thaksin lacked the respect for the monarchy that most mainstream politicians profess.

While the Embassy is seemingly astounded that anyone would speak out, especially one from the elite. Interestingly, the Embassy observes that only “some Thais appear to feel that Thaksin and his supporters went too far.”

Kasit’s hatred of Thaksin

A report in The Nation is one that is suggestive of complete loss of perspective and any remaining good sense amongst the leadership of the Democrat Party.

When the already odd debacle over the NASA request to use Utapao was rejected, there was a claim from the seemingly desperate Democrat Party that the request was somehow tied to a visa request for Thaksin Shinawatra. PPT ignored this bit of that debate mainly because it seemed nonsensical and irrelevant except to the mad yellow-shirted extremists. After all, these were the same lot who were alleging that all of the political conflict of recent years was being engineered by the United States in a conspiracy to bring down the monarchy. Later they argued that the NASA request was part of a grand plan to use climate as a weapon of war.

It seems that the more extreme, not to say demented, elements of this conspiracy wing of the yellow shirts are now significant in and for the Democrat Party. This seems, in part, due to the blind hatred the leadership of the party has for Thaksin.

So it is that former foreign minister, (former?) member of the  People’s Alliance for Democracy, former airport occupier and now Democrat Party party list member of parliament Kasit Piromya has suggested a severing of links between Thailand and the United States  because Thaksin has been said to have been issued a visa. (As a footnote, we do not recall this same angst when the U.K. government stated that Thaksin could enter several months ago.)

Kasit has demanded that the “Foreign Ministry and the United States … clarify a claim … that ex-PM Thaksin Shinawatra was given a visa to enter the US a few months ago.”

Kasit made the claim that:

the US always says that it is a world leader that respects the law and human rights under democratic principles. When the US asked Thailand to extradite alleged Russian weapons trader Viktor Bout to face trial in the US, the Thai government led by the Democrat Party adhered to the request….

 PPT will later look through the Wikileaks posts on the Bout case to see what it says about Kasit, but let’s look at the “human rights” angle. Yes, the U.S. does sometimes make these claims but has never matched the claims with much positive action. In the Thailand case, the U.S. has long supported and funded all kinds of right-wing military regimes. Most recently, Wikileaks releases clearly showed how then Ambassador Ralph Boyce was essentially cheering for the coup and then welcomed it and the military junta.

The United States has never released a truthful report on human rights in Thailand because it worries that the identification of political prisoners in Thailand will be unacceptable to the royalist elite that has long run Thailand. More recently, as the Abhisit Vejjajiva government, of which Kasit was a prominent member, was having the Army slaughter red shirts and was arresting and imprisoning political opponents, there was barely a U.S. word of criticism of these actions. The U.S. always seems to protect allies, no matter how gruesome their governments.

Ignoring all of this and the long relationship between allies, Kasit gets hung up on his personal hatred of Thaksin and declares: “If the claim is true, it means the US does not respect Thailand’s justice system but insults the country’s law and integrity…”.

Of course, respecting a justice system that makes a mockery of  the law and the constitution is hard to do, but that’s not Kasit’s point. Rather, Kasit is coming back to what was his major activity for a while when he was minister for foreign affairs-cum-chief Thaksin hunter:

If the US does not cooperate with us [and extradite Thaksin], we must condemn and all Thais must sever ties with the US….

Such a demand is reflective of Kasit’s personal hatred of Thaksin. How else could a former foreign minister and ambassador to the U.S. manage such a seemingly demented demand? But this is reflective of the whole leadership of the Democrat Party where hatred of Thaksin drives almost all of their political actions. It causes them to ally with loonies, fix the courts, kill, repress, lie, imprison, and more.They hate the people who vote for pro-Thaksin parties because it thinks they are all deluded, ignorant or paid. The personal hatred causes the Democrat Party to covet a coup. Hating Thaksin means all logic is thrown out the window in a demented hate-him-or-you-are-an-enemy scream.

Wikileaks: Utapao

PPT hasn’t got much to say about the debate over Utapao and the U.S. desire to extend its access to a base that was once one of its most important. Hence, we thought readers might find this Wikileaks cable from 2005 might be of some interest. We reproduce it in full minus the alphabet soup that begins each cable,and with bits of our emphasis:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002280

SUBJECT: UTAPAO NAVAL AIR STATION – OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVED FACILITIES Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (d)

¶1. (C) The Royal Thai Naval Air Station at Utapao represents the most strategically significant location in Thailand, and one of considerable importance regionally. In the past several years Utapao has been used to support OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and various smaller contingencies. Most recently, while serving as the regional hub for the U.S. led OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE (OUA), the value of our nearly unfettered access to the facility was once again clearly demonstrated.

¶2. (C) In addition to supporting contingency operations, approximately 30 U.S. military aircraft routinely transit Utapao monthly, and the base is central in supporting an average of 40 joint and combined exercises conducted between United States and Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) annually. There are also commercial pressures on Utapao that will likely grow in the future, including booming business in the nearby Eastern-Seaboard industrial zone, international charter flights, the base’s use as a commercial aircraft diversion airfield, and civilian competition for control of airfield operations.

¶3. (C) Although successive Thai governments have been responsive to U.S. requests to use Utapao, we cannot take for granted the access we have enjoyed to date. Despite the high tempo of U.S. activity in Utapao, we have offered very little in the way of lasting facility improvements or maintenance that would provide mutual benefits and be supportive of our strategic objectives regarding expanded access and influence.

¶4. (C) The aftermath of OUA and increased interest in further development of Utapao as a Cooperative Security Location (CSL) requires careful consideration of how to best advance our own interests while fully acknowledging legitimate partner nation sovereignty and commercialization issues. In this effort, it is critical that all U.S. military initiatives that would in any way alter the current status quo first receive thorough review, vetting and approval of Commander, USPACOM, and that they be considered in the context of any other “competing” or complementary programs. Those programs approved by Commander, USPACOM should then be reviewed by the U.S. Country Team in Thailand to provide a perspective on what is achievable given existing political realities and conditions, thereby resulting in a cooperatively developed product which will have examined all equities. The Joint United States Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI) will serve as the in-country focal point for all U.S. military initiatives potentially affecting Utapao, to include construction projects, renovations, facility expansion and all interaction with applicable RTARF representatives.

¶5. (C) Although the Royal Thai Government (RTG) is aware of the general U.S. interest in the CSL concept globally, it is important to note that there are no formal agreements with any level of the RTG regarding the establishment of CSLs in Thailand. The access that we currently enjoy is solely the result of our traditional alliance and military-to-military partnership that has been sustained over many years. The past practice of disparate offices from various organizations surveying Utapao based on stove-piped coordination and objectives inadvertently jeopardizes our current level of access through potential Thai misperception of USG intent. It is important now, and will become increasingly important in the years ahead, that we concentrate efforts to develop a single plan, endorsed by USPACOM and the U.S. Country Team, that promotes Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) and Mission Performance Plan (MPP) objectives, but is tempered by a realistic analysis of RTG concerns and sensitivities.

¶6. (C) The U.S. Country Team’s preferred approach would be a plan that is implemented in phases addressing near-, mid- and long-term objectives, and that contains elements directly benefiting both U.S. and RTG goals. This approach would seek to front-load improvements that would be perceived as most beneficial from the Thai perspective in order to both serve as tangible evidence of our appreciation for the access we have been granted over many years, as well as offset the potential impression that follow-on improvements might be seen to have greater benefit to the U.S. Specifically: A. Near Term: Provide equipment and services addressing immediate needs in improving airport safety and upgrading air traffic control capability. These are areas that have long been neglected and represent fundamental, required airport capabilities supporting U.S. military, Thai military, and commercial aircraft. Examples of improvements in the near term would include: 1) Area Surveillance Radar (ASR-10); 2) VOR/DME capability; 3) UHF/VHF integrated communications package; 4) Improved fire-fighting and crash and rescue capability; 5) Airfield Grounding System B. Mid Term: Develop the largely unused portion of Utapao east of the main runway for use as a U.S. lodgment point supporting small deployments of U.S. personnel and equipment, such as might be expected during an exercise. The significant advantages associated with moving U.S. operations to the east side include: 1) Reduced visibility of U.S. forces; 2) Reduced interference between military and commercial traffic; 3) A self-contained capability to receive and process U.S. military personnel, cargo and equipment separate from primary flightline Thai military and foreign commercial operations and facilities C. Long Term: Expand development of the east side, to include exploring the possibility of leasing existing warehouse structures in order to support larger contingency deployments of U.S. TDY personnel, and to formalize U.S. presence on a long-term basis. Consideration should be given to the placement of mobile equipment to support greater logistics capacity, to include: 1) Fuel trucks; 2) MHE (10K forklift, 10K rough terrain forklift, 25K Loader (NGSL), ground power unit (GPU), air start unit (ASU), aircraft maintenance stands, runway sweeper)

¶7. (SBU) Each of these phases offers the partner nation significant benefits and contributes to infrastructure improvement necessary to better support routine and contingency U.S. deployments. The option to develop the east side creates an ability to expand or contract the U.S. footprint, using temporary structures and mobile equipment tailored to mission requirements, while avoiding unwanted conflicts with ongoing airport operations, particularly on the commercial side. This option does not envision the construction of large, permanent structures that would advertise the U.S. presence. It would, however, address anticipated RTG/RTARF concerns. ARVIZU

Wikileaks: All in the family

PPT has finished a first cull of the Wikileaks cables, and we have posted commentary on those that seemed of interest. We are now going back through the Cablegate database more systematically, and again we will gradually post comments on those that strike us as revealing. Apologies if we sometimes post on a cable we have had up before; there are a lot of them.

Given all of the material belching from the international media on England’s jubilee and the post on the Ananda Mahidol idolatry, a cable from 2 February 2005 seems worth some commentary. In it, Ambassador Ralph Boyce writes almost breathlessly about the then “latest news” on the royal family. The Embassy and State Department were eagerly royal-watching. If readers find tabloid-like “revelations” distasteful, read no further, for it is of that style.

Boyce reports on a 27 January 2005 ceremony with the king and Princess Sirindhorn leading to “a private audience” for Boyce and a couple of others.

The first big news item is that “the King showed great interest in all exchanges.” The second item is that a discussion of “mental health and family stability” animated him. Boyce says: “These issues are obviously near and dear to the heart of the King, and while involved in this free-flowing conversation, he made several notable remarks.”

On family stability, Boyce states that the king commented:

I understand how important it is to have both a mother and a father in a family unit. I lost my father at a very early age, and was raised by my mother. While she did a wonderful job of raising her children, she could not, alone, replace the role of a father.

Some might read into this the his own search for a father-figure, first amongst the old and senior princes who fought against the 1932 Revolution, followed by his adulation for General Sarit Thanarat, who reciprocated and overturned much that had been done post-1932 to reduce royal power.

On his kids, he is reported as stating:

I have four children. But she (Sirindhorn) is the only one who ‘sits on the ground with the people.’ She never married, but she has millions of children.

Not really anything new or startling in this reporting, but Boyce then turns to a conversation when he “called on Dr. Chirayu Isarangkul na Ayuthaya, Director-General of the Crown Property, on February 1, 2005.”

First, and, Boyce says “most significantly,”  Chirayu “said that the Crown Prince’s wife … is pregnant.” PPT isn’t sure why this is significant for he also says that this was widely known. Perhaps the significance is in the unstated hope for a boy that would allow the dynasty a line. Otherwise, the only boys were from the disowned Yuvadhida Polpraserth, who lives in exile in the U.S., with her 4 sons, having been thrown out of Thailand by the prince several years ago.

Chirayu mentions “the Crown Prince’s former consort, Mom Yuvathida (aka Mom Benz),” saying that:

Prince, Yuvadhida and kids in earlier times

on the Queen’s last visit to the United States she had agreed to an audience with Mom Benz and her children, but that Mom Benz had not made contact with the royal traveling party. Subsequently, Ambassador Sakthip was asked to travel to Florida to meet with Mom Benz and her children, but Mom Benz declined the meeting. Apparently, there is an issue of medical expenses for Mom Benz’s third son; the Crown Prince reportedly has made it clear that he will cover these expenses and that he does not want his mother or father to be burdened with the issue of his former family.

On the family itself and the favorite Sirindhorn,

Chirayu noted that it said as much about the failings of the King’s other three children as his fondness and respect for Princess Sirindhorn. The other three had tried to carryout their royal responsibilities, but clearly were not as capable or interested as Princess Sirindhorn.

On the king’s eldest daughter, Chirayu said that:

he had had to undertake much of the bitter legal mediation between Princess Ubolratana and Peter Jensen. He noted that their separation and divorce had been quite nasty and that Mr. Jensen had not come to Thailand to attend his son’s funeral. Chirayu said that he fended off queries as to where Mr. Jensen was by joking that he was afraid to come to Thailand because the Crown Prince would beat him up.

Ubolratana

This is an interesting comment, for at the time there were rumors that Jensen had arrived in Thailand but had been turned away and the comment about the prince was widely circulated. It seems the palace knows how to score advantages from the rumor mill.

Remarkably, in a diplomatic cable, Boyce then adds his own re-statement of a rumor:

We have heard that Mr. Jensen borrowed money from several Thais and Thai banks prior to his divorce from Princess Ubolratana and that these funds have never been repaid.

The rumors usually have it that Ubolratana was a keen borrower.

It is sometimes commented that the royal family is dysfunctional. However, as the above rather odd diplomatic cable seems to indicate, while there are spats and disappointments, it seems to indicate that accommodations are made and the meatier things of conspicuous consumption and political and economic life probably hold sway over the squabbles.