The corrupt are loyal

According to Prachatai, Lampang Deputy Governor Chamlak Kanpetch, who has been investigated for alleged disloyalty to the monarchy, has declared that “he is a true royalist, and willing to die for His Majesty.” More fool him, but you get the picture regarding the ridiculousness and buffalo manure demanded by the rightist-royalist regime (which is still in place and deeply embedded).

He was investigated by a panel of six for clicking the like button on the Facebook page of Yan Marchal, known for his political parodies of Thailand’s monarchy and junta. The deputy gov claims he was “framed” by someone disgruntled about a land deal. We wonder if the deal should be investigated.

This would be silly if it were not reflective of the old regime’s efforts to stymie the popular vote and engineer a more “royalist” regime than any that would include Move Forward. It is remarkable that mad monarchism now means that a pro-Thaksin party is more reliable than Move Forward. Just a month ago the royalists feared a Puea Thai coalition government and still hates Thaksin Shinawatara. Now the tune has changed as the old men and women of the entrenched ruling class seek to see off Move Forward as dangerous anti-monarchists and to prevent mildly progressive change in the country.

Even the caretaker prime minister, never elected but aligned to a party that was crushed in the election, has decided that he’s still the boss and can order folks around.

The Nation agrees that Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha “appears to be having a hard time moving on from his crushing election loss.” Yet there he is, warning “the party that won the most seats in May 14 vote – Move Forward – against amending Article 112 of the Criminal Code, also known as the lese majeste law.”

When the defeated general was asked if he was against amending Article 112, he replied: “Of course.” He added: “It has to be that way. It is in the heart of soldiers, police, civil servants, and many people…. They don’t agree and they wonder why [Move Forward would amend it.]”

Who support Article 112, meaning the monarchy? He says, “many people,” but we can never know for sure. But we do know that more than 60% of the people who voted threw in their lot with parties that want reform or had expressed concern about 112.

He says the military. Some of the election results show that many of the rank-and-file voted for progressive change and against military-backed parties. We also know that the military is a bloated and corrupt organization led by hundreds of more or less inactive generals who, like Prayuth, live high on the hog.

He says the police. Here he refers to a vast and corrupt mafia-like organization, where a new scandal involving billions emerges almost every day.

In other words, protecting Article 112-cum-crown is an exercise in protecting the corrupt.

Puea Thai and 112

The Shinawatra clan has always been somewhat weak when it comes to policy and rhetoric on Article 112/lese majeste. This continues with comments made to the Bangkok Post by Srettha Thavisin.

Srettha is the former president and chief executive of the Sansiri real estate empire and is now one of the three prime ministerial candidates nominated by Puea Thai. Here’s how he was reported on 112:

On amending Section 112 of the Criminal Code, or the lese majeste law, Mr Srettha said the party is looking to rectify the law to prevent it being used as a tool to incriminate opponents in politics, which is damaging to all parties and every pillar institution of the country.

A special unit might be up and running to file legal action against lese majeste offenders. It must also be considered whether the law currently metes out too harsh a punishment.

He noted the perception of how the law is being handled and enforced transcends generations. But it was important to improve the law so people, young and old, can coexist harmoniously.

None of this sounds particularly new or original. Even the junta tried a bit of this, and we can recall similar things being said by the detestable Abhisit Vejjajiva and then by Yingluck Shinawatra.

That is not to say that every leader and party in power is hopeless on Article 112. We kind of think the data tells the story. Based on some academic work we have seen and data at our website, we think there were about 4.2 lese majeste cases prosecuted per year between 1984 and 2000. Under the Thaksin government, this rate dropped to about 2.8 cases prosecuted per year between 2001 and 2005. For the period from the 2006 coup up to the end of the Yingluck government in 2013, there was an average of about 37 cases per year, but most of these were cases under the post-coup regime and under Abhisit’s regime. Then the lese majeste tsunami got big: for 2014-2016, with a military junta in power following the coup, there were more than 105 cases per year. Of course, there was the king-directed 112 hiatus, but this has been followed from late 2020 until early 2022 (when the data ends) by an average of more than 160 cases prosecuted per year under Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha.

We understand that royalists will interpret these figures as support for the generals. Indeed, the data  show that when monarchists rule, Article 112 is used with alacrity. But from a progressive position, while Puea Thai may be weak on lese majeste reform, progressives should vote these dolts out. If that happens, they should also be prepared to defend the elections and the elected government.

The ultra-royalist fear

We are pretty sure that the recent uptick in reports of ultra-royalist activity and threats is related to two things. First, they fear another Shinwatra party election victory. And, related, they are preparing the ground for activism to unseat such a regime should it gain power.

There are three stories on this that are worth considering.

First, at Prachatai, ultra-royalist threats of violence. The thug doing the threatening is Anon Klinkaew, self-appointed leader of the ultra-royalist vigilante group the so-called People’s Centre to Protect the Monarchy. He was the person responsible for the police complaint under Article 112 that resulted in the arrest and later detention of Thanalop (last name withheld), also known as Yok. He has now threatened to kill the now 15-year-old “because she refused to take part in the judicial process: associated with the 112 charge.

By some counts, the People’s Centre to Protect the Monarchy is responsible for at least 16 lese majeste complaints. The few who claim allegiance to it are thugs and bullies, apparently feeling threatened by children and free speech.

To get a feeling for Anon’s mental disarray, read about his rant against a child:

In a 10 April live broadcast on his Facebook page, Anon said he will continue to file charges against critics of the monarchy, including 15-year-old activist Thanalop. He also said he was told that Thanalop and an activist known as “Comrade Sleepless” is the same person, and that he will kill her if this is true.

“Don’t you fucking hope that I’ll stop. I won’t stop no matter what happens,” Anon said. “That fucker Yok or Comrade Sleepless, if they’re the same person, they’re dead. Just wait and see.”

Anon also threatened to beat up Thanalop and kill her if she doesn’t agree to participate in the judicial process. “I will fucking kill you. Don’t tell the police, then,” he said on the broadcast. “I will beat you up, don’t you fucking complain.”

Second, also at Prachatai, the very same “Centre” has gone ballistic over a foreigner in France: “ultra-royalist group People’s Centre to Protect the Monarchy has filed a royal defamation complaint against French TikToker Yan Marchal over his latest online video.” This relates to the video clip at his Facebook page posted on 12 April. It is also at Facebook:

The third story is at the Bangkok Post and refers to the wealthy “songs for life” hypocrite Ad Carabao and his new song “Prachathipatung” which “revives the myth of vote-buying and ignorance in rural society.” It is an article well worth reading as it is reprising this claim just in time for the 2023 election, allowing an opposition victory to be denigrated and opposed.

As we said, there’s a fear sweeping the conservatives. It will deepen and the efforts to swing voters will become increasingly fiendish.

Updated: Military party ultra-royalism

A couple of weeks ago we posted on hick party royalism. Today we post on one of the military parties and its ultra-royalism.

Recall that it is the ultra-royalists who are quickest to bemoan any “politicization” of the monarch and monarchy. Yet their military-backed parties regularly use the monarchy as a political piece. This is because for decades the royalists have been promoting and “protecting” the monarchy as a national shibboleth and the keystone of the conservative ruling class.

Pirapan. Clipped from https://fetcherx.com/

In their latest use of the monarchy for political advantage, in its electoral campaigning, the leader of the inaptly named United Thai Nation Party, Pirapan Salirathavibhaga has “vowed to take action against ‘nation haters’ if his party forms the next government, saying Thailand is a land for patriots and those who don’t like it can live somewhere else.”

Predictably, “nation haters” are defined by Pirapan as anti-monarchists: “Thailand is a land for patriots and the land is holy with the monarchy serving as the pillar of the country.” He babbled on:

“If you don’t like it, you have no right to change it because the entire nation wants it,” he added.

“If you don’t like it, please go to another place. No one is stopping you. Go now. Any country you like, you can go and stay there. But Thailand will be like this forever.”

“Under the Ruam Thai Sang Chart (the Thai name of UTN), we will not change,” he said. “If the UTN is a core party that forms the next government, we will get tough against chang chart (nation haters) and those who want to overthrow the institution.”

Apparently Pirapan sees no contradiction in the “United Thai Nation” excluding those who do not subscribe to mad monarchism. But he wouldn’t, because the very wealthy like him tend to defend their pile.

And, of course, as a former judge, Pirapan reflects the judicial bias against those who do not bow to ultra-monarchism. As a mad monarchist, he has defended the king’s extraordinary powers, hunted down lese majeste suspects and blocked thousands of websites when minister, claiming that “Offences against the King, the Queen, the Heir-Apparent or the Regent are considered offences relating to the security of the Kingdom…”. Unsurprisingly, Pirapan was an extreme opponent of Thaksin Shinawatra and the red shirts.

Added to all of this, while Pirapan spouts loyalty when it comes to the monarchy, he has had little loyalty to the various parties he’s joined. Of course, his lack of party loyalty is not unusual among royalists. Back in 2021, when was in the ruling, military-backed Palang Pracharath Party, he was an “advisor to powerful party leader Gen Prawit Wongsuwan.” Now he’s touted as number 2 to Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha in the new UTN and Prayuth reckons he should be prime minister after Prayuth’s ludicrous extended term is over.

When Pirapan sprouted his hate declaration it was “during the party’s first major campaign rally at Benjakitti forest park in Klong Toey district…”. Supporting his extremist monarchism were a gaggle of rightists: Gen Prayuth, ML Chayotid Kridakon, ultra-royalist Rienthong Nan-nah, who is now “chairman of the party’s committee on quality of life improvement,” and party secretary-general Akanat Promphan, stepson of Suthep Thaugsuban, who “paved the way for the military coup led by Gen Prayut” in 2014.

Pirapan said the UTN “will live forever under the policies of Uncle Tu (Gen Prayut’s nickname) and the heart of the party is the nation, the monarchy and people…”.

But there seems more going on within what Thai PBS called an “old boy network.”

Gen Prawit, who is also deputy prime minister, revealed recently that he has maintained close ties with Pirapan since the time they served together in Abhisit Vejjajiva’s Cabinet from 2008 to 2011. Prawit served as defense minister and Pirapan as justice minister.

However, their relationship actually began long before they entered politics.

Apirat back then. Clipped from Khaosod

Both studied at the all-boys Saint Gabriel’s College. Though Prawit was Pirapan’s senior by many years, both were part of an alumni network that also included former Army chief Gen Apirat Kongsompong, who is now a deputy to the Lord Chamberlain of the Royal Household Bureau, which oversees day-to-day operations of the Palace.

Rumors have it that Apirat helped get fellow alumnus Pirapan his advisory job at Government House after the latter left the Democrat Party in 2019.

The plan for the 2023 election seems to be for Pirapan and Prayuth to represent the extreme right for royalist voters and maybe a few military types, banging on about monarchy. Prawit’s party represents the “cuddly” royalists, rightists, and military, appealing to a “middle” of voters, sprouting (new) words about reconciliation and democracy. The hope may be that they can get sufficient seats to form another coalition, drawing in some of the parties-for-sale.

Update: According to the Bangkok Post, Rangsiman Rome of the Move Forward Party has responded to the ultra-royalist Pirapan’s hate speech.

Updated: 2023 election coverage

Here are some international attempts at understanding the upcoming election:

Council on Foreign Relations, Thailand’s Parliament Has Been Dissolved: Elections Loom, But Will They Be Free?

In a free and fair election, it would be difficult for military-aligned parties to put together a winning coalition. But this could well not be a free and fair election. (2019 was not, after all.) The election commission is in the hands of Prayuth and his allies, and they can disqualify MPs who have won. The top court can even go so far as to disqualify entire parties.

Clipped from Nikkei Asia

DW, Will Thailand’s upcoming elections see a political shift?

… in recent years, Thailand has faced political unrest and economic woes, while the kingdom’s monarchy has been challenged. The prime minister’s popularity has faded.

Reuters, Thai PM Prayuth to run for re-election in May*

The military veteran has lagged rivals in opinion polls, but hopes to win over supporters with promises of looking after the wellbeing of the people and the country’s stability, and protecting the monarchy…. “The most important thing is to defend the country and protect the nation’s main institution. Please trust me as you’ve always done,” Prayuth said.

VICE, Thailand’s Election Is Filled With These Controversial Characters. Here’s What You Need to Know

Faced with pro-democracy protests, half-baked cannabis laws, and the comeback of the Shinawatra family, millions will cast their votes on the country’s leaders in May.

The Diplomat, Thai PM Dissolves Parliament, Paving Way For May Election

Thailand’s parliament has been dissolved by a government decree, setting the stage for a general election in May that will once again pit the country’s conservative establishment against an opposition led by the representatives of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

The Times of India, Explainer: What you need to know about Thailand’s elections

Youth-led protests that began in 2020 broke a longstanding taboo around questioning the role of the monarchy in Thailand, where the constitution states the king is “enthroned in a position of revered worship”.

The Move Forward party has campaigned on reforming a law that punishes royal insults with up to 15 years in jail. Activists have urged opposition parties to scrap it, but the topic remains sensitive among many Thais and most parties oppose or want to avoid talk of reform.

The Washington Post, How Military Has a Thumb on Scales in Thai Election

Paywalled in some places.

La Prensa Latina Media, Thai leader Prayut confirms re-election bid

Prayut recently joined the United Thai Nation Party having previously led a government run by the pro-military Palang Pracharath Party.

He was army chief when the military seized power in a bloodless coup in May 2014 after months of anti-government demonstrations.

Of an authoritarian and ultra-monarchical nature, the military leader silenced any dissenting voice at the head of the military junta and delayed elections several times.

In 2019 he was appointed leader of the civilian government after elections that international observers described as lacking transparency.

Between 2020 and 2021, his government used police force to stop student-led demonstrations demanding reforms in the country and the monarchy, a highly taboo subject in Thailand.

Since then, more than 200 people, including minors, have been charged with lèse majesté and sedition for their peaceful activism. Both can carry long prison terms.

South China Morning Post, As Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn readies for May 14 vote, army and youth pose major challenges

“We are ready to rescue the country,” Paetongtarn told reporters on March 21 outside the City Pillar shrine where Bangkok residents seek blessings…. “We are very ready to go on campaigning and to explain our policies in greater detail, but in the end it’s about the people; whether they choose us or not, the power is in their hands.”

Update: *A reader rightly points out that the Reuters headline is buffalo manure because Gen Prayuth was never elected, except to the unelected senators he appointed.

Elections and the reform protesters I

The Diplomat updates on the thinking and activities of monarchy reform protesters in the context of an upcoming election: “the general election will be the first since the 2020-2021 protests, leaving the door open to a hopeful democratic consolidation, or further consolidation of control by Thailand’s conservative elites.”

Yean Arunpreechawat is cited as concluding that “the monarchy as the main factor behind [Gen] Prayut[h Chan-ocha]’s lasting popularity in Thailand today: “Most people have grown tired of [Prayut’s] economic mismanagement, but will continue to vote for him so long as he gets the support from the King…”. Yean forgets the military and the tycoons in this assessment (at least as quoted), and we doubt the monarchy has this much impact on votes – Thaksin Shinawatra proved that.

From DW

We think Get Surariddhidhamrong gets closer to the mark: “Political viability relies on the monarchy, which makes it harder for political parties to seek a platform independent from monarchical approval … the people must rise up against this and drive this change so that political parties can take the next steps.”

Meanwhile, in the context of a new generation of voters, Sirabhob Attohi makes the important point about “the crucial role played by the protests in introducing Thai youths to the country’s decades-old democracy movement.” Sirabhob observes:

Many of us were too young when the Red Shirts protests started, or even during the 2010 protests. In this sense, this was our generation’s awakening, it helped us realize we can strive to demand better for our democracy and our society.

Get’s observation on the deep structural roots of royalist conservatism:

… the current political offer remains unable to address the most pressing issues facing Thailand’s fragile democracy today. “The rule of law needs to be restored before youths can trust the government again, and this can only be addressed through structural change…”.

Uprooting that is difficult when conservatives, with the military and monarchy, oppose change.

Who does the king want?

The election may still be some way off, but the issue of the palace and preferred outcome is already being pondered.

A recent article in Nikkei Asia by Marwaan Macan-Markar gets to the point, quoting an unnamed military intelligence source, who see 2023 as different from 2019: “But we should expect a twist this time…”. That has to do with Gen Prayuth Chanocha’s and Gen Prawit Wongsuwan’s “diminishing influence … over the army in recent years.”

Three army generals in 2019. Clipped from the Bangkok Post

This also saw rising palace influence: “Seasoned security analysts point to the annual promotions of the estimated 1,750 flag officers that signal this shift. Neither Prayuth nor Prawit, they say, played a significant role in the elevation of Gen. Narongphan Jitkaewthae, a palace favorite, to a three-year term as the army chief.”

Supalak Ganjanakhundee is cited as saying that Prawit “suffers” because “he is not close to the palace…”. Marwaan reckons “Bangkok-based diplomats have expressed similar sentiments during background discussions about palace favorites.”

Supalak added: “[Prawit] retired from the defense service a long time back and currently holds no ministerial posts to command the military,… [Prayuth did not] assign Prawit to take care of [any] security matters or anything related to the military.”

Prayuth remains “head of the Internal Security Operations Command, a Cold War relic that serves as the political arm of the military. Political insiders interviewed by Nikkei said that ISOC’s role will come under scrutiny — whether it will side with Prayuth’s camp over Prawit’s for the elections.”

There’s also “chatter in the barracks among conscripts, young soldiers and even captains, all under 30 years old, who favor opposition parties such as the pro-youth Move Forward and the pro-democracy Pheu Thai, according to military insiders.”

Of course, the palace abhors Move Forward and worries about Puea Thai and Thaksin Shinawatra.

The NACC’s contortions

The National Anti-Corruption Commission is well known for its capacity to support the regime that came to power following the 2014 coup. It has contorted itself, its rules, and laws to ensure that no serious charge sticks to those at the top of the regime. Among many cases, we recall Gen Prawit Wongsuwan’s “borrowed” watches, Thammanat Prompao’s nepotism, heroin smuggling, and unusual wealth, and Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha’s relations.

Here’s another fine display of contortion. The NACC “has found no evidence implicating Industry Minister Suriya Jungrungreangkit in a dereliction of duty case. It was referring to a case linked to the purchase of 10 ultra-long-range aircraft between 2002 and 2004….”.

Revealing is the fact that the NACC “Mr Suriya was not involved in THAI’s purchase of the 10 aircraft…”. At the time, Suriya was Minister for Transport.

The very same NACC decided in December 2022 “to press charges of dereliction of duty against ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, former deputy transport minister Phichet Sathirachawal, former THAI board chairman Thanong Bidaya and former THAI president Kanok Abhiradee…”.

According to Isra News, Suriya submitted the purchase proposal to cabinet.

But, no charge. Of course, it is because Suriya jumped the Thaksin ship and washed up with the junta. Double standards? You bet.

Jumpol dead

Prachatai and the Bangkok Post report on the death of Jumpol Manmai, a former favorite of Prince/King Vajiralongkorn, who was disgraced by the palace. Read the two reports together and see how spineless the Post is whenever royals are concerned.

The one useful sentence in the Post story is the claim that his death due to a lung infection came after his years in jail and had “been treated for his illnesses after having been discharged from prison before passing away.”

Did he die from health problems that were due to his incarceration?

Of course, as the Prachatai story intimates, Jumpol was severely punished by the palace. Which other land encroacher has been paraded with shaved head and in chains? Which other land snaffler has disappeared on arrest, reportedly to Vajiralongkorn’s personal prison, refused to apply for bail and been convicted in a matter of days?

The cruel and vindictive Vajiralongkorn angrily dismissed Jumpol “for misconduct [that was] described by the palace as ‘extremely evil’. He abused his post for personal gain and his political interests threatened national security, it said.”

Jumpol had quite a history. For one thing, after being sidelined as a Thaksinite following the 2006 military coup, he was back by 2009. This is what Khaosod said earlier about Jumpol’s career:

A policeman by trade, Jumpol is better known as a well-connected political player with links to both former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra….

While he served as deputy police commissioner, Jumpol was considered for the top job at the police force in 2009, but did not make the final cut.

He’s considered by many political analysts to be a rare figure who can serve as a liaison between the Shinawatra clan and the palace circle.

After retiring from the force in 2010, Jumpol came back to the limelight in September when he was appointed deputy director of the Royal Household Bureau, a title also known as the Grand Chamberlain.

The job appeared to be tailor-made for him; the title of deputy director in the royal household did not exist prior to Jumpol’s appointment.

There’s more than this. Jumpol was rumored to be the then prince’s “candidate” for police chief back in 2009, which saw a major standoff with then premier Abhisit Vejjajiva. One result of this crisis was the resignation of secretary-general to PM Abhisit, Nipon Promphan, related by marriage to Suthep Thaugsuban.

Wikileaks has several cables that tell various elements of the police chief saga and the rumors of links between Jumpol and Thaksin: 21 Sept 2009, 24 Sept 2009, 28 Sept 2009, 6 Oct 2009.

Monarchism and Foreign Affairs

We seem to have missed this free article from the the Journal of Contemporary Asia. From JCA’s blog:

“On His Majesty’s Service: Why is the Thai Foreign Ministry Royalist?” (DOI: 10.1080/00472336. 2022.2081930) is a new article by Pavin Chachavalpongpun of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University in Japan.

This article is now available for free download. This offer expires soon.

The abstract for the article states:

In the final decade of the King Bhumibol Adulyadej reign, various state agencies lined up to defend the monarchy against political opponents. Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of those state agencies expressing its disdain for elected governments dominated by Thaksin Shinawatra whose popularity was perceived to threaten royal power and prerogative and, hence, the stability of the throne. Beginning in 2006, Thai diplomats, serving and retired, joined anti-Thaksin movements calling for his resignation, which culminated in the 2006 military coup. The research question for this study is: Why is the Thai Foreign Ministry royalist? It is argued that the Foreign Ministry’s contempt of Thaksin was, at one level, due to its obligation to reinforce royal hegemony. At another level, the Foreign Ministry sought to protect itself in the face of Thaksin’s drastic bureaucratic reforms. This study traces the source of royalism among Thai diplomats. It explores the impact of the bureaucratic modernisation in the late nineteenth century, which further deepened ties between the Foreign Ministry and the palace. It also examines the characteristics of Thai diplomats as a privileged political caste whose status is sustained by its dependence on the monarchy. In the final part, the study discusses Thaksin’s control of foreign affairs, inevitably instigating a clash with the Foreign Ministry.