Knowing the obvious on the military

At The Nation there’s a story that seems all too obvious to PPT and probably to anyone else who watches Thailand’s politics: the military is politicized, runs coups and rejects any modern notion of civilian control.

It seems that when an academic recites these truths, it is newsworthy, especially when a foreign academic, Professor Aurel Croissant, is making these points.

That “Thailand remains among those countries that have failed to institutionalise civilian control over the military,” is clear, despite efforts by  premiers as diverse  as Chuan Leekpai and Thaksin Shinawatra.

The professor says that “Thailand ranks fifth the world in terms of having the most number of military coups,” with 18 “successful” coups since 1932.

Nicholas Farrelly at New Mandala some time ago pointed out that counting coups is difficult:

Here on New Mandala we recently hosted a discussion about Thailand’s coup history where I suggested that counting the number of coups (attempted and successful) is a complicated business. Often, when somebody asks “how many coups have there been in Thailand?”, the final number that is cited is 18 but I fear that this may be a product of force of habit rather than hard number crunching.

He adds:

As it stands I have 11 “successful” and 9 “unsuccessful” coup efforts in the 20th century [sic. he adds 2006 in] for a total of 20.

The army’s real task: coups and repression

Readers at that thread add several more.

Croissant tells us that “the risk of a putsch remains high,”another point widely discussed, even in the past few days.

Sadly, but not unexpectedly, “Croissant predicted it will be a long time before Thailand can achieve genuine civilian control over the military.”

Oddly, though, in the way he is reported, the professor seems to blame civilians for the problem.

It [civilian control] will depend on not just the military refraining from getting involved in politics but also on strong civilian support and consensus that civilians should have oversight of the military.

“There’s no consensus on that they will not pull the military into political conflicts,” said Croissant, who jointly conducted research on the topic over four years in which more than 180 people in the Kingdom were interviewed.

We guess it depends a bit on who you interview….

Croissant adds:

… the military’s power can be exerted not just through the staging of coups d’etat but also through influence over the government’s decision-making processes. The lack of coups doesn’t automatically mean that civilian oversight exists, he said. “The military can exercise control over policy because democracy is weak.”

And who do we blame for that?Certainly the military, but we will come back to this point below.

On the brighter side, the academic “sees the September 19, 2006 coup as a sign of the army’s ‘eroding military control’ over Thai politics and society.”

What is missing in this account -and, yes,we know it is only a news report – is any discussion of the forces that have institutionalized the military’s coup  mentality.

From 1932, the military became a “protector” of the state. By the late 1950s, the military was transformed – with considerable U.S. funding and advice – into a “protector” of the state with the monarchy as the central defining element. This latter role has demanded a military that was pretty much hopeless in terms of usual ideas about  warfare and was trained and armed for domestic warfare. This meant fighting communists, insurgents,and as required, civilian protesters, who have been murdered by the military in very large numbers.

Protecting the monarchy and state also meant support for and from the Sino-Thai tycoons who expanded their economic and,later, political power through this period. The military was rewarded, with awards, decorations and loot (especially in border zones and in “commissions”).

Of course, the Abhisit Vejjajiva regime represented a complete alliance of military power and civilian weakness. Abhisit was anointed by military and monarchy and was beholden to them.

The alliance of capitalists, monarchy and military is strongly in favor of military interventionism  to protect their interests, political and economic. Some saw Thaksin’s rise as a weakening of this alliance and 2006 was a way to put things right. Some predict this alliance will weaken again at succession.

Speculation on politics and succession

Shawn Crispin at the Asia Times Online engages in some speculation regarding the future of the Yingluck Shinawatra government and succession. It is a long and rambling essay that packs almost every political event into its musings, with very few facts and plenty of guesses; yet it still worth a read.

He begins by noting that:

While both sides have appeared committed to avoid new rounds of confrontation in the autumn of King Bhumibol’s palace-proclaimed unifying reign and in light of Yingluck’s conciliatory tack, the criminally convicted Thaksin’s persistent push for a political amnesty is still viewed by many royalists as non-negotiable, including within the top ranks of the military led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha.

He adds that “Peua Thai efforts to table assorted amnesty bills in parliament and a parallel investigation by the quasi-independent National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) into alleged irregularities in Yingluck’s personal asset declaration made upon taking office that threatens to topple her from power.” Crispin notes that the NCCC’s investigation is seen by some “as a royalist counter to Peua Thai’s amnesty and constitutional amendment initiatives…”.

Crispin puts succession front and center, just as some claimed it was when the military ran its coup for the palace in 2006. He argues that politics is all about Thaksin and the monarchy, with royalists falsely declaring that any attempt to amend the constitution is “aimed to undermine the monarchy’s position and power ahead of a delicate and increasingly uncertain royal succession.”

While “Yingluck has worked to temper royalist fears that her Thaksin-influenced government represents an existential threat to the monarchy and associated institutions,” her government seems unable to use its massive electoral mandate against the unelected elite forces.

Crispin includes considerable speculation regarding rifts in the government and between the government and red shirts, but the real story revolves around the subterranean battle between royalists-palace and Thaksin-red shirts, with the latter lacking influence over the courts:

Significantly, the MoJ lacks power over top level courts, including appointments to the Administrative, Appeals, Constitutional, and Supreme Courts. All four courts are widely viewed as royalist power centers, due in part to a series of rulings that have gone against Thaksin since the 2006 military coup that toppled his elected government. Since, Bhumibol has at royal audiences repeatedly called on freshly appointed top judges to rule with independence and righteousness.

Of course, for the palace, “independence and righteousness” means ruling in their interests.

Crispin ruminates on the “changed power dynamics in the palace in the wake of Queen Sirikit’s recent illness” and the king’s extended hospitalization. He refers to some who see “Thaksin as resigned to bide his time outside of the country and appeal for a royal pardon after rather than before the royal succession.” He repeats the usual speculation that “Thaksin may receive more sympathetic royal treatment under heir apparent Crown Prince Vaijralongkorn, due in part to their known past personal ties.”

However, he then speculates on succession shenanigans: “While many analysts and diplomats believe that the royal succession plan from Bhumibol to Vajiralongkorn is immutable, others have interpreted differently recent royal household signals and events.”

Sirikit, who “suffered from an ischemic stroke last July,” is out of sight and may be impaired physically and mentally. The king has been chirpier in recent times, but regularly falls back into illness and incoherence. All of this – PPT’s speculation – leads:

Some diplomats and political analysts now wonder if the long-held succession plan could be altered if the highly influential 80-year-old Sirikit, known to be her son’s top backer for the throne, were to pass ahead of Bhumibol. In line with the royal tradition known as wang na, Vajiralongkorn is renovating his Bangkok-based Amporn palace, as well as for less clear reasons facilities maintained at Don Muang airport, in advance of the anticipated transition.

Crispin then cites:

… “[p]alace insiders who spoke to Asia Times Online suggest that Vajiralongkorn’s first daughter, Princess Bajraktiyabha, could instead play a bridging role in a potential compromise scenario between royal camps vying alternately between Vajiralongkorn and Princess Sirindhorn to assume the throne. That face-saving scenario would see Bajraktiyabha take on a regency role while Vajiralongkorn’s youngest son, Prince Dipangkorn Rasmijoti, is groomed for the throne.

Frankly, these rumors have been around for several years and suggest royalist hope rather than anything more. Yet there is always the chance that succession can spin out of control, especially if the old duffers at the Privy Council get involved or the military decides to fiddle things. But as one of PPT’s unnamed sources speculated, it is expected that the king can go on for another 10 years, and the longer he does, the less royalist and middle-class opposition there may be to a shorter Vajiralongkorn reign.

Abortive Abhisit

Back in 2007, as the military promoted its referendum on the constitution designed to rollback reforms hard won following the bloody events of 1992, Democrat Party leader and, at the time, premier presumptive, Abhisit Vejjajiva was all for it (“Abhisit says Democrats [sic] will clean up politics,” Bangkok Post, 22 July 2007).

Bowling over democracy (a Nation photo)

He was strongly supportive of a process that academic Pasuk Phongpaichit (“Pasuk takes aim at the perils of draft charter,” Bangkok Post, 27 July 2007) said would lead to “the country will be controlled by soldiers, the elite and officials, she warned. Thailand will have a ‘managed democracy,’ where soldiers and the elite rule the country.”

It may not have worked out exactly like that, but the elite continues to need this undemocratic constitution that legitimized the 2006 coup. For an accounting of the military and elite efforts to prevent a no vote in 2007, Asia Sentinel is a good place to begin.

Hence it is no surprise that Abhisit is now campaigning against a proposed referendum to change the undemocratic charter. More than that, he and his (un)Democrat(ic) Party are encouraging voters to avoid and abort the referendum. One Party legal adviser says:

eligible voters who oppose the government’s move to rewrite the charter have the right to stage “civil disobedience” by not going to vote, as well as simply voting against it. He said that unlike a general election, when eligible voters have a duty to vote, people have the right to choose whether to vote in a referendum.

Because Abhisit’s abort call may be illegal, he now says: “I did not mean the referendum should be blocked…”. The basic point of Abhisit’s undemocratic position has been clear since 2006: accept coup, repression, military in order to establish elite rule. He has been consistent.

Misreading lese majeste

At the Asia-Pacific Memo that comes out of the Institute of Asian Research at Canada’s University of British Columbia there is a post by Kieran Bergmann who is said to be “the Google Policy Fellow at the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. She previously worked at the Canadian Embassy to Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos.”

Bergmann’s post is on lese majeste. Unfortunately, the post misrepresents the current situation in Thailand. This misrepresentation is little different from similar misrepresentations by the likes of Human Rights Watch.

Bergmann has much in the post that is accurate, “a surge in prosecution of these ‘lèse-majesté’ cases – some estimated as high as 1,500 per cent.” The data is pretty much correct:

In 2006, only 30 such charges were filed. In 2007, the year the Computer Crimes Act was adopted, 126 charges were filed. In 2010, a whopping 478 charges were filed. I found that the lack of clarity surrounding these laws and the very real threat of prosecution prompts many Thai commentators and editors to exercise self censorship.

The misrepresentation relates to the period after the July 2011 election. Bergmann states: “When the current prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was elected in July 2011, there was hope that the number of such charges would drop…. But the government has ramped up its efforts.”

The fact is that charges, prosecutions, and jailings have declined. It is true that the government talked up its commitment to the monarchy and its “protection,” a point PPT has made. However, it is incorrect to equate this government’s actions in any way with the remarkably frenzied use of lese majeste and related laws against political opponents by the Abhisit Vejjajiva regime and the military following the 2006 military coup.

Put simply, the evidence for “ramping up” on lese majeste under the Yingluck Shinawatra government is non-existent. While PPT would like the government to do more to free those held on political charges and to get rid of this feudal law, this isn’t the anything like a claim that the present government is “ramping up.”

Obama and lese majeste

The Network of Family Members and People Affected by the Article 112 has released an open letter to U.S. President Barack Obama on lese majeste, prior to his visit to Thailand. PPT reproduces it below:

16 November 2012

Subject: Your support to raise our concern to Thai government to release all Thai political prisoners

Dear President Obama,

On behalf of The Network of Family Members and People Affected by the Article 112 (called the 112 Family Network) and other joint organizations, I would like to welcome you to Thailand and would like to hand this letter to you and allow us to express comments as well as to support us to raise our concerns to Thai government. I have hereby attached a letter in Thai to you and have summarized the key points as follows:

1. There are many Thai citizens charged, arrested and detained in prisons from the coup on 19 Sep 2006. Some were arrested and detained because of gathering in the public, speech, publishing the articles which interpreted as insulting the king or royal families. There were many of them charged under the article 112 (Lese Majeste Law) for example: Mr.Somyot Prueksakasemsuk, Dr.Somsak Jiamtherasakul, Mr.Thanthawut Thaweewarodomkul, Lt. commander Chanin Klayklaeng.

2. The article 112 has been widely used to charge Thais because its definition of “insulting’ or defaming” is unclear and ambiguous. This has limited the right to express opinion and suppress Thai under fearfulness and have to self-censor.

3. Thai government ignored the UPR and responded that the charges of Thais under this law are nothing related to Thai politics.

4. At the moment, there are 7 persons charged and detained or imprisoned under the article 112 and computer crime act and about 30 persons detained under the emergency decree. All of them should be considered political prisoners. In addition, they have not received the bails despite several application submissions to the court.

5. Therefore, I would like to pass our following recommendations to you to raise to Thai government :

5.1 Release all political prisoners that were charged under the article 112, computer crime act and all charges related to the emergency decree as well as public gathering to express political opinions.

5.2 Grant bail to all prisoners undergoing the trials

5.3 Thai government compensate to the former prisoners who were charges and end trial with acquittance.

Respectfully your,

Sukanya Prueksakasemsuk, Representative of the 112 Family Network

Dr.Niran Phitakwatchara, National Human Right Commission

Mr.Sarawut Patoomraj, Human Rights Advocate/Educator Institute for the Rule of Law and Human Rights

Suda Rangkupan, Representative of the Declaration of street justice

 

Remembering the 6 October royalist massacre

As we have pointed out several times in recent weeks, the royalist state is “protected” by the military and ultra-royalists. This task requires that these groups – most especially the military – repress and kill citizens seen as dissidents or an opposition.

In 1976, this protection of the monarchy saw murders in the monarchy’s name. The most dramatic and horrible event was the royalist-inspired attack on people – mostly students – damned as “disloyal.” This massacre at Thammasat University, probably killed more people than the dark events of April and May 2010, yet there has never been any state investigation nor anyone sent to trial. Impunity was the rule because the state’s troops and rightist gangs were doing the work of the royalist state. The main perpetrators of the massacre are claimed to be the Border Patrol Police who trained many of the rightist gangs in the name of the monarchy and with considerable U.S. funding. The BPP was and remains close to the royal family.

The regime that was put in place following the massacre and a coup was, like 2006, headed by a palace favorite. Thanin Kraivixien remains a Privy Counselor even today, considered “respected” because of that. Yet the fact is that his administration was one of the most right-wing, repressive and brutal regimes. Mercifully, after just a year, he was thrown out by another coup, led by General Kriangsak Chomanan, who was never forgiven by the palace for throwing out the its prime minister. Of course, this led to Kriangsak’s ouster, arranged to replace him with General Prem Tinsulanond, another palace favorite, who remains president of the Privy Council today. Just days after the bloodshed, the crown prince distributed awards to paramilitary personnel involved.

In other words, the massacre at Thammasat University was intimately linked to palace political machinations. Neither the palace nor the military has been far from the politics of the period since, and the massacres of Bangkok protesters seen in 1992 and 2010.

A major event was organized to remember this 1976 event. It is in Thai and can be found here. Prachatati released new pictures from the period last year, and the BBC has a 10-minute documentary worth accessing. So is Puey Ungpakorn’s account of the events around 6 October.

Political voice

It is kind of interesting to see rice farmers protesting against Bangkok-based academics. And, we think it is reflective of the way that politics has changed since the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra and especially since the 2006 coup.

Most readers will be aware that there has been quite a campaign waged against the Yingluck Shinawatra rice pledging scheme. PPT has no resident economists who can pontificate on the rice growing in fields they have never seen except in postcards, but the National Institute of Development Administration has no shortage of them. A few days ago urban-bound Veera Prateepchaikul at the Bangkok Post stated emphatically that he cheered:

Dr Adis Israngkura na Ayudhaya, dean of the Economic Development Faculty of the National Institute Development Administration (Nida), and 145 academics and students who co-signed a petition to the Constitution Court challenging the effectiveness of the government’s rice-pledging scheme and the sanity of continuing this badly-flawed and corruption-riddled populist policy.

Of course, to date there is no outstanding evidence of corruption riddling the scheme. Although such schemes have been plagued by corruption for all governments in the past, Veera is making great leaps and unsubstantiated claims. It is interesting that another report breaks down the numbers: 50 Nida lecturers, 27 Thammasat University academics, and 42 other people who were either students or members of the public who disagreed with the scheme. Sounds like a political attack rather than one based in sound economic analysis. As well, we know from past campaigning, that NIDA’s academics and students have a deep yellow-hue. And they have been joined by others who are broadly anti-Thaksin/anti-populist (whatever the latter term means), including the usual lot of appointed senators. The argument seems to be that rice and other crop pledging is anti-capitalist and unaffordable.

Readers may find Philip Bowring’s op-ed of interest in that it deals with the political economy of the schemes.

Whatever the economics, the politics are significant. A Bangkok Post report details some of this. It refers to rice farmers “threatening to step up protests against academics…”. These elite academics are used to the farmers being seen and not heard, as they first labored through decades of rice taxes that made farmers bear the burden of cheap urban prices and kept farmers poor and then have struggled to get an fair share of their price for crops that are always controlled by middlemen and women and millers.

Some 3,000 rice farmers gathered at NIDA to protest and “lambasted the academics for their move and accused them of being manipulated as a political tool against the government.” Protest leaders “said the pledging scheme helped free farmers from massive debts and improve their lives.” Another “5,000 rice farmers from Suphan Buri, Ang Thong, Pathum Thani, Ayutthaya and Chai Nat rallied at the provincial hall of Suphan Buri” and “200 rice farmers from Chiang Mai and Lamphun staged a similar protest at the Chiang Mai provincial hall…”.

Whether the scheme is flawed is a different debate as we see farmers standing up (once again) to elites and the privileged. Things have changed politically.

 

Remembering the 2006 military-palace coup

It is six years since the yellow-tagged military rolled its tanks into Bangkok’s streets to oust Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party government. Thaksin had many faults and made many mistakes. Paramount amongst them was his development as a popular leader – in February 2005 his party had won the biggest ever landslide in Thailand’s electoral history – and the threat this apparently posed to Thailand’s royalist elite.

Behind government administrations lurked the real power holders in the military brass, the palace and the upper echelons of the bureaucracy who together comprised the royalist state. Thaksin’s reliance on votes and the fact that he accumulated them as never before was an existential threat to the powers that be. Their final response after destabilizing the elected government was to get the military to chuck it out.

Six years later, with Thaksin’s youngest sister in the prime minister’s chair, the political struggle continues. PPT felt that our best way of observing the anniversary of the military-palace power grab is to re-link to the Wikileaks cables that reflect most directly on that coup. Here they are:

• Prem Tinsulanonda prepares the ground for the coup
• The king’s relaxed and laughing attitude to the coup
• Samak Sundaravej’s comments on the queen and her political position on the coup
• The junta as the Council for Democratic Reform Under the Monarchy
• Prem relaxed, confident, and very pleased with the course of events
• Abhisit Vejjajiva welcomes the coup
• Human Rights Watch’s Sunai Phasuk on the coup of last option
• U.S. Ambassador on the coup as good news
• Anand Panyarachun on supporting the coup
• Bowornsak Uwanno as a messenger for the junta

There are more cables on the figures circling around the coup and the events immediately before and after the coup, giving a pretty good picture of how the royalist elite behaved and what they wanted the embassy to know.

Updated: Red shirts rally

The Bangkok Post reports that a “large number of red-shirt supporters of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) began a rally on Saturday at Democracy Monument in Bangkok.” This rally, which will hear numerous speakers including Army boss Prayuth Chan-ocha’s legal nemesis Robert Amsterdam, was described by UDD chairperson Thida Tawornsate Tojirakarn as being to “mark the sixth anniversary of the Sept 19, 2006 coup that overthrew Thaksin Shinawatra…”.

Thida also “said the UDD would also use the event to collect signatures for a petition seeking the impeachment of the Constitution Court judges and in support of charter amendments.”

PPT will have other posts to mark the anniversary of the palace-military coup.

Update: Video of the rally is now coming out. A reader send us a link to Amsterdam’s speech:

 

A lese majeste update

The Human Rights Brief is a student-run publication at American University Washington College of Law that has operated since 1994 out of the school’s Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. The Brief has about 4,000 subscribers in over 130 countries. Last week, it commented on Thailand and the lese majeste law, featuring on its front page this week.

PPT won’t post it all as this academic site is unlikely to be blocked in Thailand, yet some aspects deserve highlighting.

The article begins by noting that Joe Gordon, Ampol Tangnopakul and Darunee Charnchoensilpakul were each sentenced in late 2011. For those who forget these things, those sentences all came after the Yingluck Shinawatra government had been elected to office, although all cases began under earlier administrations. The report notes that these “three cases in particular have triggered international expressions of concern and much domestic debate and activism in a struggle for the future of freedom of expression in Thailand in 2012.”

The report argues that: “Before 2006, Article 112 had been used most frequently by political elites to attack each other’s devotion to the monarchy, which became a proxy for targeting enemies with dissenting political views.” Following the 2006 military coup, the monarchy and the law have been highly politicized.

It is noted that Thailand is:

a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 1996, Article 19 of which obligates the country to protect the rights of individuals who seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds. Nevertheless, supporters of Thailand’s constitutional monarchy deny the law’s harsh effect on freedom of expression. Instead, they cite the need to protect the monarchy as an institution to justify continued enforcement of Article 112.

Further to this, the report reminds us that:

Thailand underwent its Universal Periodic Review in early October 2011, where 14 member states recommended amending or repealing Article 112. A few days later, UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Frank la Rue issued a statement calling for amendments to both Article 112 and the CCA. According to the Special Rapporteur, the laws are overly broad and impose harsh criminal sanctions unnecessary to preserve Thailand’s monarchy or national security.

Finally, the report points out that the Yingluck administration has caved in on lese majeste in an effort to appease political opponents in the royalist and palace camps. Hence, it is argues that international pressure and domestic debate about Article 112 must continue.