Military and monarchy

25 09 2022

For those who haven’t seen it yet, avid military watcher Paul Chambers has a piece on the recent military reshuffle and what it might mean. Our earlier post on this reshuffle included important links.

Chambers reckons: “Decisions regarding reshuffles represent crucial demonstrations of power…”.He adds: “With a general election due no later than May 2023, guaranteeing palace-led political stability in Thailand’s military and police is essential to the interests of the state and of the elites. ”

From Ugly Thailand

On the role of the monarchy, Chambers includes tables that indicate palace links, and observes:

Thailand’s current king has sought to take an active role in military reshuffles, unlike his father and predecessor who opted for a more indirect role. Initiatives in this area on the part of the palace have translated into the king’s direct selection of Wongthewan faction members to serve as Army commanders, as in the cases of General Apirat Kongsompong (2018-2022) and General Narongphan Jitkaewthae (2020-2022). In 2018, King Vajiralongkorn established the Kho Daeng or Red Rim clique, whose members attend special short-term military training under royal sponsorship. Only Red Rim officers can now rise to top Army, Air Force, or Supreme Command postings.

We think Chambers direct/indirect dichotomy is misleading. The dead king certainly intervened, using his chief privy councilor Gen Prem Tinsulanonda as his hands-on military specialist. This is probably what he means by “indirect,” but this is hardly removed from direct influence, as everyone understood that Prem did the king’s work. In any case, Bhumibol was very hand-on when he supported Prem as prime minister, including against two military attempts to be rid of Prem.

Chambers sees the latest reshuffle as showing some changes to influence/power:

The data … indicate that the palace and Burapha Phayak [military faction]—the latter as dominated by [Gen] Prawit [Wongsuwan]—are engaged in a tug-of-war for control over postings at this highest level of authority. The Navy and Air Force commanders are king’s men first and foremost. Incoming Navy chief Admiral Cherngchai Chomcherngpat and Air Force commander Air Chief Marshal Alongkorn Wannarot join their classmate Army chief General Narongphan [Jitkaewtae] in acting as the bulwark of monarchical interests. Admiral Cherngchai’s royalist ties are owed to his being part of a Navy faction connected to former Navy Chief Admiral Luechai Ruddit, brother of Privy Council member General Kampnat Ruddit. For his part, Armed Forces chief General Chalermpol Srisawat must walk a tightrope, as he is close both to the palace and to Burapha Phayak, the military faction to which he belongs. Like Narongphan, Chalermpol is also a member of the king’s Red Rim faction.

The article concludes:

The 2022 military and police reshuffles reflect an attempt on the part of the monarch to enhance palace proactivity in a year that has seen differences between Prawit and Prayut grow…. [T]he palace appears to be backing new potential Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul of the military-allied Bhumjaithai Party…. [T]he king seems to have intervened in military and police reshuffles, ensuring that arch-royalists whom he trusts assume the top leadership positions…. One aspect of Thailand’s military and police reshuffles remains certain. Since 2008 … these reshuffles have remained under the control of the palace and senior security officials…”.





Who controls the armed forces

13 09 2022

It has been widely rumored that the king has taken a particular interest in military affairs. The Bangkok Post provides a hint that he may well now be in charge. The report is by longtime military watcher and favorite Wassana Nanuam. It begins:

The result of the latest annual military reshuffle shows that the power of the “three brothers in arms” has diminished as they had little say in key army appointments, according to a source….

A royal command appointing 765 officers in the annual reshuffle was published in the Royal Gazette yesterday. Of them, 300 are new major generals, 17 of whom are women. The appointments will take effect from Oct 1.

Three army generals in 2019. Clipped from the Bangkok Post

So if the top three, the coup makers, the suppressors of anti-monarchy dissent, and royalists are not influential, who is? Wassana’s source “said army chief Gen Narongphan Jitkaewthae had more authority in the appointment of personnel to key army positions…”. The report states:

The promotion of Maj Gen Phana Klaewplodthuk, 1st Army deputy commander, to commander is a case in point.

The 1st Army is known to be a key unit, controlling troops in 26 provinces in the Central Plains Region, East and West, with its HQ in Bangkok.

The promotion of Maj Gen Phana is unexpected, given that Lt Gen Tharapong Malakham, the army’s 1st Corps commander, was most favoured for the job, but shunted to the post of an army special adviser, the source said.

Lt Gen Tharapong came from the Burapha Phayak (Tigers of the East) group — a nickname given to a military clique attached to the 2nd Infantry Division, the Queen’s Guard. Gen Prayut, Gen Prawit and Gen Anupong are members of this clique.

Despite this, Lt Gen Tharapong was still passed over for a promotion, showing the power of the trio has diminished, the source said.

Now the interesting bit:

The 1st Army commander must concurrently serve as the chief of staff at a special task force under Royal Guard 904, of which army chief Gen Narongphan is commander.

Before his promotion, Maj Gen Phana finished special training to become a royal guard last month.

Moreover, he and the army chief once served in the 31st Infantry Regiment, the King’s Guard, in Lop Buri.

We are guessing that the top decision maker is now the king. That is not good, even if the army top brass, past and present are thugs.





Military-monarchy alliance

21 08 2022

Two articles worth reading:

NikkeiAsia: “Thailand king’s elite ‘Red Rim’ officers enter the spotlight.” The story begins by noting the King’s control and influence over the upper ranks of the military:

Clipped from Khaosod

As Thailand’s military officers await their fate in annual promotions, the fortunes of the elite “Red Rim” corps within the armed forces, the country’s most powerful political institution, appear secure.

Military insiders expect prominent officers among this new corps, a 2017 innovation by King … Vajiralongkorn, will have influential slots in the top-heavy military, which has an estimated 1,750 generals, admirals and air marshals commanding 335,000 active military personnel. The U.S. military, by contrast, has just over 880 flag officers.

The Diplomat: “How Lese Majeste Laws Are Eroding Free Speech in Southeast Asia.” That story begins:

Across Southeast Asia, increasingly authoritarian governments are systematically corroding freedom of expression as their tolerance for dissent and criticism deteriorates. States continue to harass, sue, and imprison activists and human rights defenders at alarming rates, as documented by ARTICLE 19’s Global Expression Report 2022. Repressive governments in the region are weaponizing a range of laws to silence criticism and preserve their corrupt regimes. Of these, archaic lese majeste laws are arguably the most problematic of them all.

 





Wither the (in)justice system

27 01 2022

Over several years, the (in)justice system has been crafted to ensure that “good” people are protected from the law. That protected species is made up of criminal masterminds, the well-connected, murderous generals, coup-makers, police, army, the wealthy, and more.

In the never-ending saga, dating back to 2012, of getting the wealthy Vorayuth “Boss” Yoovidhya off all charges associated with his murder of a lowly policeman, The Nation reports that. as expected, the “cocaine use charge against … [the fugitive is] nearing the end of its statute of limitations.”

An AFP photo clipped from ChannelNews Asia

The office on Wednesday released a statement on the results of the year 2021 and the direction of proactive action in 2022.

That will leave one charge: “rash driving causing the death of another person…”.

The only question now is how the corrupt (in)justice system can make that one go away. In the meantime, there’s stalling, delays and so on that mean justice is dead and those responsible for that death have probably become wealthier.

Meanwhile, to add emphasis to the death of justice, the Bangkok Post reports that an Appeals Court “upheld a Civil Court ruling dismissing a lawsuit filed against the army for compensation over the death of Lahu human rights activist Chaiyaphum Pasae, who was shot dead at a checkpoint in Chiang Mai province in 2017.”

The “court ruled to dismiss the lawsuit and said the army has no need to pay compensation to Chaiyaphum’s family. The court considered the M16 rifle that a soldier shot Chaiyaphum with was used in self-defence and out of necessity.”

This relates to a case where “officers claimed they found drugs in Chaiyaphum’s car and had to shoot him because he resisted their search and tried to throw a grenade at them.” Of course, witnesses had a different story, saying “Chaiyaphum was dragged out of the car, beaten and shot.” And, the CCTV footage of the military’s actions was taken away by Army bosses and never provided to any court. That’s because the military is more powerful than the courts, enjoys almost complete impunity for its crimes, and has the power to murder civilians as it sees fit.

Of course, occasionally a court does its work properly, but these occasions are surprises rather than the norm. Wither the justice system.





Monarchy propaganda as fake news

25 01 2022

The Bangkok Post has published palace propaganda. We know they have little choice in the matter, but we also guess the tycoons who run the paper also love this kind of fake news.

As we write this post, the story has become inaccessible. It remains a searchable story at the Post, and might come back, but there’s also an excerpt here.

With King Vajiralongkorn turning 70 later this year, the military is busy not just crushing opposition to the monarch and regime, but is promoting him and link between monarchy and military.

Reminiscent of elements of then Army commander Gen Apirat Kongsompong’s royalist rant in 2019, the Post article promotes the martial monarch.

It reports that the Royal Thai Army “will upgrade Ban Mak Khaeng Thed Phrakiat Park in Loei,” building a “sculpture of the King, and open[ing] a museum to portray the historical moment when the King, who was Crown Prince at the time, fought alongside troops against communist rebels in Ban Mak Khaeng…”.

Such a propaganda effort promotes monarch, monarchy, military and the bond between monarch and military.

The park was first constructed “by the Internal Security Operations Command (Isoc) of Loei to mark the battlefield in which [Vajiralongkorn]… joined soldiers in fighting Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) insurgents in tambon Kok Sathon of Dan Sai district” in 1976.

As the Post story notes, the “1970s was the height of the Cold War, when communist revolutions toppled governments and monarchies in Laos and Cambodia and when relations between the Thai monarchy and military were reshaped by dramatic and rapid shifts in domestic politics.” The best example of that relationship was the royalist massacre of students on 6 October 1976.

Vajiralongkorn had hurriedly returned from counterinsurgency training in Australia to be there for the massacre and he took up arms with the military to fight the battle against those identified as opponents of the military and monarchy.

The Post reports that: “On Nov 5, 1976, King Rama X, who was [a] … captain at that time, received a direct order from … King Bhumibol Adulyadej … to contain the situation [the anti-CPT fight in Loei].”

A myth in training

Lt Gen Chanvit Attatheerapong, director of the Army Tourism Promotion Agency – who knew there was such a thing – declared: “As a soldier, when the king had fought alongside army troops, it was a moment of incomparable rejoicing for us soldiers. And he [the king] is courageous…”.

It is important to both king and military to create stories of the king-as-soldier in a period when the ruling elite is reliant on  the military-backed regime.

The propaganda is myth-making as “villagers, police and soldiers who witnessed the events tell the magnificent story of the bravery of … the King.” From a soldier taking part in a fire fight, the then crown prince is re-made as a hero:

Pol Lt Suvin Viriyawat, a 69-year-old retired police officer, said the CTP insurgents had nearly managed to surround and cut off a police stronghold….

However, they never thought His Majesty the King would arrive to support his troops. Due to the mountainous area, the chopper could not land, so His Majesty the King suddenly hopped down with his seven royal guards onto the heated battlefield. “His Majesty the King said he was just a soldier, no need to be formal, just carry out our duties. He was so kind to us and ate alongside us too,” said Pol Lt Suvin.

“If His Majesty didn’t show up, around 20 survivors of the 48 might not be alive as we were surrounded with limited supplies for eight days. It was like we were drowning and His Majesty pulled us up. We survived because of him,” he said.

With such embellished stories, ISOC and the Army want to display the martial king, the brave soldiers and the people as one. Such propaganda is believed to be critical for the maintenance of the ruling elite. And, it blots out the critical role played by royals and royalists in the murder of civilians.





Arms trading

7 11 2021

Reports of arms trading from within the military are reasonably common but so little is done about it that a cynic might think that it is just another corrupt way for officers to acquire unexplained wealth.

A recent Bangkok Post report is about a “Crime Victims Assistance Club” that “filed a complaint with the House committee on military affairs, asking it to look into a case involving a soldier who allegedly sold army weapons to an illegal arms trafficking gang in a neighbouring country.”

Club chairman Atchariya Ruangrattanapong “said he previously filed a complaint with the army over the matter, and Col Sirichan Ngathong, deputy army spokeswoman, later said the culprit was sacked from the army and now faces legal action and the weapons have been retrieved.”

Nothing to see here (as usual).

Picture from The Nation

However, the army’s “action” seemed to have prevented a full investigation. Atchariya stated that “he believes some senior army officers may have been involved.” What a surprise!

According to Col Sirichan, Atchariya complaint “accused the 9th Infantry Division of dereliction of duty by turning a blind eye to the theft and smuggling of weapons and cars across the border for sale in Myanmar.”

Sounds normal to us, at least by the standards of the military.

Col Sirichan insisted that “anyone found guilty of the crime will face disciplinary punishment and legal action.”

Whoopee! Any charges? Nope, not yet.

But the army seems keen to bury the story. Wonder why?





Regime vs. students

20 10 2021

Over the past 18 months, political conflict has revolved around students opposing the regime and its royalist supporters. The student challenge has waned, in part because of the virus, but also because of the regime’s repression strategy, which has included virus emergency provisions used mostly for political purposes.

Much of the repression has been delegated to the purged police. Of course, the military has also been involved and continues to provide its backing for the regime and monarchy.

Political repression has extended from the streets to universities and to the judicial system. The latter has made heavy use of laws on lese majeste, sedition, computer crimes, public health mandates, and some charges dredged from a feudal Thailand.  For example, in a case from a year ago, several protesters were accused of violating Article 110 of the Criminal Code, which has to do with attempts an act of violence against the queen or the royal heir.  Those charged face 16-20 years’ imprisonment, making this an even more serious crime than lese majeste.

Of course, not one of those charged attempted any violence. But the repression of using the law hangs on, as one of them, Bunkueanun Paothong, explained in a recent op-ed.

In universities, administered by royalists doing the bidding of the regime, struggles continue. Prachatai reports on the royalists at Chiang Mai University where students from the Media Arts and Design Department in the Faculty of Fine Arts have been prevented from showing their final arts projects allegedly because “some pieces deal with social and political themes.” The censorious and fearful royalist Faculty administrators even locked students out of buildings. Some students and their parents are worried that the kids will not be allowed to graduate.

Such actions are common at universities across the country. Thasnai Sethaseree, an artist and Faculty of Fine Arts lecturer observed:

What happened during the past week is a common occurrence in Chiang Mai University, but the people who are affected have never spoken out…. Things like this happen in Chiang Mai University every day. This case like a volcano that will make the lava in other places erupt….

Back in Bangkok, where working class kids are facing off against police, Talugas protesters continue to be pushed into prisons. Thalugas, is causing a royalist stir:

Soldiers will step in to handle political protests only when the situation is considered a rebellion or a riot, Defence Forces chief Gen Chalermpol Srisawat said on Tuesday.

He said the announcement by the Thalu Gas group, now renamed the People’s Revolutionary Alliance (PRA), about aiming to overthrow the constitutional monarchy was a lawful expression of the group’s opinion.

The responsibility of the police is to ensure law and order, he said. So if the group were to act in any way that threatens Thailand’s sovereignty, it would then be time for the military to take action, he said.

While the statement that issuing an anti-monarchist statement is legal might bring some relief, the military defines the monarchy as a matter of “national security,” suggesting that the general’s statement is really a threat. Indeed, the police are already “investigating” a “Facebook page operated by the Thalu Gas group over content related to the monarchy…”.

The police admit they cannot eliminate anti-monarchism. The plan seems to be to silence it with thousands of legal charges and the jailing of hundreds.

The struggle continues.





Military media

11 10 2021

A chilling report at Prachatai suggests that in October 2021 the military’s media is revamping itself for ultra-royalist, extreme rightist agitation, much as it did in 1975-76.

The military’s TV Channel 5 is hiring “four ultra-royalist hosts from Top News … [to] host 7 hours a day … from 3 January 2022.”

The hosts, Kanok Ratwongsakul, Teera Tanyapaibul, Santisuk Marongsri, and Sathaporn Kuasakul, claim they will be “delivering impartial and accurate reports.” That seems unlikely.

Channel 5 or the Royal Thai Army Radio and Television Station is a free-to-air television network owned by the Royal Thai Army, and was launched on 25 January 1958. It is not a particularly popular broadcaster, ranking about 18th in ratings, and one motivation for this rightist move is to increase the broadcaster’s popularity. Becoming bellicosely ultra-royalist is seen as a way to do this.

Lt Gen Rangsi Kitiyanasap, Managing Director of Channel 5, says that the new programming “will provide information that will end the public division and help Thailand out of the economic and health crisis caused by the spread of Covid-19…”. That is code for supporting regime and monarchy.

Lt Gen Rangsi babbled, channeling Fox News:

The goal of presenting news on Channel 5 will emphasize news which is the truth in all aspects, with in-depth detail, and importantly, which does not create division in society, and does not add fuel, but pulls firewood out of the fire. We will be a mainstream media outlet which will not judge who is wrong or right, but presents comprehensive information and lets the people decide….

The general claimed the new contract was with “GMC, with Chaiwat Techapaitoon as Chair of the Executive Board, [and] was a different legal entity from Top News Digital Media Co Ltd, which has Sonthiyan Chuenruthainaitham as its founder.” As Prachatai explains: “Sonthiyan was a right-wing activist and a media entrepreneur whose support helped lead to the killing of red shirt protesters in 2010, the military coup in 2014, and the violent crackdowns on pro-democracy protesters in 2020-2021.”

Military and military-backed media were notorious in the 1970s for their agitation against students and democracy advocates. Sound familiar? Back then, that media promoted the forces who assassinated activists and massacred students at Thammasat University.





Military godfathers and the corruption of parties and politics

26 09 2021

Thai PBS reports on continuing ructions in the Palang Pracharat Party that has Gen Prawit Wongsuwan’s underlings pitted against Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha. It turns out that the failed plot to unseat Gen Prayuth during the recent censure debate was only round 1 of this fight.

The start of the second round came when plotter and convicted heroin trafficker and “influential person” Thammanat Prompao retained his Party post. It is presumed that General Prawit was behind this. Prawit then doubled-down, appointing “a former Army rival of the PM” as the Party’s new chief strategist. Gen Vitch Devahasdin Na Ayudhya took this “powerful post previously held by the current party leader, Deputy Premier General Prawit…”.

Previously, in 2010, Gen Vitch was assistant Army chief and “was appointed to the Centre for Resolution of Emergency Situation, which was tasked with handling the red-shirt protests against Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government.”

In that year, Gen Vitch was competing with Gen Prayuth to “succeed outgoing Army chief Gen Anupong Paochinda. However, the post was eventually handed to Gen Prayut instead.” This despite Gen Vitch’s long connection with Gen Prawit.

Readers can read the whole story for the details or plow through the most recent post at Secret Siam, which posits a deep and long struggle, including speculation regarding parts played by none other than Thaksin Shinawatra.

One thing is clear: that the rise and rise of the unsavory Thammanat demonstrates how “a powerful political broker” with a criminal past (who knows about the present?) can float to the top through links built through equally unsavory characters in the military (and higher).

The story of Thammanat’s rise is like a Thai version of “The Godfather,” but most of the protagonists are military mafia.

Thai PBS says “Vitch has been close to Gen Prawit since their early years in the Royal Thai Army three decades ago, and reportedly introduced Thammanat to Prawit.” It goes on to say that it was Thammanat who “helped Vitch to get into the ruling party.”

Gen Vitch is open regarding his links to “dark influences,” saying:

he has known Thammanat since the latter worked for his long-time friend Gen Trairong Intarathat. Also known as “Seh Ice”, Trairong once served as an adviser to then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and was described as an influential figure.

So mafia-connected military figures have swirled through various governments for several years. For those who don’t know Seh Ice, his brief obituary says this:

Gen Trairong was born on Sept 1, 1949, the fourth of the four sons of Maj Phone Intarathat, a former director of the Thailand Tobacco Monopoly, and ML Kanyaka Suthat.

He was a Class 10 student of the Armed Forces Academy Preparatory School and Class 21 cadet of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy in the cavalry division.

His classmates at the Armed Forces Academy Preparatory School included Thaksin, Gen Anupong Paojinda, the current interior minister, ACM Sukumpol Suwanathat, a former defence minister, and Gen Prin Suwanathat, a former transport minister.

He held several important positions in military service, including specialist attached to the Supreme Command, chief of the Office of the Permanent Secretary for Defence, an army specialist, and chief of staff officers for the defence minister (Gen Thammarak Issarangura Na Ayutthaya).

Not long before he died in 2016, he was identified, along with Thammanat, Seh Ice was identified in a military report as an influential mafia boss:

Two of four people reportedly named as “influential criminal figures” on a military document deny any wrongdoing, saying there is not a shred of truth to the allegation.

“That’s ridiculous, and I’m wondering which [security] people think like that,” former army specialist Gen Trairong Intaratat, better known as Seh Ice, said yesterday….

The three others named in the document are Karun Hosakul, a former Pheu Thai Party MP for Bangkok’s Don Muang district; Capt Thammanat Prompao, a former close aide to Gen Trairong and said to be involved in several enterprises including lottery ticket distribution; and Chaisit Ngamsap, who is alleged to be connected to illegal activities in the Mor Chit area of Bangkok.

Capt Thammanat, a former military officer, said he had contacted 1st Division commander, Maj Gen Narong Jitkaew, to ask him about the document and was told the information came from an intelligence report and there were no plans to summon him.

And, here’s an AFP report from 1998, with Thammanat playing a lead role:

BANGKOK, Sept 9 (AFP) – Eighteen middle-ranking Thai military officers are being investigated for links to an international heroin trafficking operation, the supreme commander of Thailand’s armed forces said Wednesday.

General Mongkol Ampornpisit said the officers had been re-admitted into the military in the past two years and the scandal, the latest in a series to rock the Thai military, had prompted him to order that all recently re-admitted officers have their backgrounds checked.

“I have submitted the names of all re-admitted officers for the last two years to have their criminal backgrounds checked with the police,” General Mongkol told reporters, without elaborating on the heroin trafficking allegations.

He said he hoped the move to vet officers would help contain one of the biggest scandals to hit the Thai military establishment in many years.

The revelation of the heroin investigation follows another scandal involving an army captain at the centre of a murder probe, who had previously served a jail term in Australia for drug trafficking.

Mongkol conceded the military had been lax when re-admitting Captain Patchara [Thammanat] Prompao into the armed forces after he was fired twice and convicted of narcotics trafficking.

Patchara is now in detention awaiting trial in a civilian court after he surrendered to police on Monday to face charges that he raped and then beat a male academic to death.

In June, amid a drive was to make the armed forces more accountable, the government demanded the military disclose the contents of secret bank accounts they had been allowed to keep.

Earlier this year the armed forces were accused by opposition politicians of involvement in vast illegal logging operations in northern Thailand.

So many connections, so many charges – none of which have held up in the Thailand. That’s what a mafia system is about and this is how it works. More tellingly, the military continues to reward crooks who slither to the top.

As the Bangkok Post reports, the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School has recognized Thammanat as and outstanding alumnus:

The controversial soldier-turned-politician was nominated for the award this year, but due to the Covid-19 outbreak, the usual annual ceremony to present the award to him and other outstanding Afaps alumni has been postponed until next year….

It is said Thammanat has declined the award, but the “honoring” of one of its most corrupt alumni is a telling indictment of a corrupt organization. The military (and police) cannot tell right from wrong, and instills this “value” in its new officer cadets.





With 3 updates: Students vs. the rotten system

13 09 2021

In recent posts, here and here, PPT has mentioned the increasingly aggressive tactics adopted by the regime’s police in confronting mostly young protesters. The police now face determined protesters.

The South China Morning Post reports that police face thousands of protesters – “young, angry and desperate for radical change – [who] come out to oppose a state they have lost all faith in.” Some are as young as 12. These protests are now daily and have a degree of predictability:

Protesters, some armed with paint bombs – the more hardcore among them, sling-shots and glass bottles – retreated then returned, a daily dance on Bangkok’s streets which is now threatening to spill out of control.

Protests now almost inevitably end in tear gas, broken bottles and rubber bullets.

The protesters speak to power and call for change: “No one in power has heard us, no one listens to us, they only intimidate and suppress…. So we will keep coming back.”

Their targets are not just the regime, but the rotten system: “… deepening inequality in a country where a tight-knit establishment of tycoons, military and monarchy dominate the economy and politics.” The quoted protester – aged 16 – says: “Inequality comes from these structural issues, everything is tied up here by monopolies of business and power…”. Her observation is testament to the alienation felt by many in the young generation.

Academic Kanokrat Lertchoosakul observes that:

This generation are a totally different species of political, active citizens that we have never seen before in Thailand…. They are a generation with mass awareness of their political rights and have superior analytical skills to their elders.

Prachatai provides another example of youth activism, reporting on the Bad Student activist group that has “launched a strike campaign to protest against the continuous use of online classes during outbreaks of Covid-19, which has been detrimental to students’ mental health and deprived many of an education.”

They are “demanding that the government provide students, education professionals, and members of the public with high efficacy vaccines as soon as possible so that the education system and the economy can continue.” They also want the Ministry of Education to “reduce tuition fees or impose a tuition fee moratorium, and provide whatever welfare is needed by students and their parents to keep young people in school.”

The group encouraged students “to stop attending [online] classes between 6 – 10 September 2021…” and the brief boycott was quite successful.

Bad Students have also joined the ongoing demonstrations and were there almost from the very beginning, saying: “We don’t want this rotten education system. We don’t want this stinking Minister. But we want our future back, and even better, is an education system that truly improves us…”.

Meanwhile, Thai PBS reports on students and other protesters still held without bail, including “seven core leaders of the anti-government Ratsadon group, who have been held on remand for about a month.” These detainees include Parit Chiwarak, Arnon Nampa, Panupong Jadnok, and Jatuphat Boonpattararaksa.

As the SCMP says, “Thailand is on a precipice … its politics once more a tinderbox of anger.”

Update 1: Sorry, we should have noted that the SCMP article was from August whereas the photos are more recent.

Update 2: Three stories at the Bangkok Post add to the analysis of the present moment in protest. In one story, police have said they will bring numerous criminal charges protesters. A second story says that police data is that 509 protesters have been arrested and a further 250 are being sought since the rallies began in July. That story also carries an important quote from Thalugas, welcoming the United Front of Thammasat and Demonstration and the Thalufah group as rally “witnesses at the rally by young demonstrators in Din Daeng that evening.” Thalugas “said they should not be left to fight alone.” A third story is about a member of the older generation of protesters, Sombat Boonngamanong. He says: “We are at a crucial moment in democracy development…. This is a time when the ruling authoritarian establishment is trying to suppress the young, democratic generation.” His view is that “the nature of social movements has changed — because more people, especially younger generations, respect democratic values…. They do not tolerate authori­tarianism.”

Update 3: Prachatai reports on arrests in recent clashes. It has also produced a video on Bad Students:








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