Prachatai, using data from Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, reports that the “denial of bail for Anon Nampa and Weeraphap Wongsaman has brought the number of people detained on a royal defamation charge in Thailand to 13. Of this number, 3 are detained following a final verdict or after a decision not to appeal, while 10 are detained pending trial or appeal.” It goes on to list the brief details of all of those TLHR know are detained.
Prachatai also reports that “33 student organisations and activists groups filed an open letter with the President of the Supreme Court today (3 October) to demand the release of political prisoners detained pending trial or appeal and to call for an end to the prosecution of citizens under the royal defamation law [Article 112].”
This group was able to name 25 detainees, although there may be more.
The demand for the release of political prisoners and an end to Article 112 charges is said to have been originally made by activist Sopon Surariddhidhamrong, who is currently detained pending an appeal made after he was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months in prison on lese majeste. Sopon “declared that he rejects the authority of the court, would withdraw his legal representation and would not participate in any additional legal proceedings against him.”
In this context, PPT came across an article by Will Jackson, who is a digital producer with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Asia Pacific Newsroom. It begins by noting that “the conviction and sentencing of a human rights lawyer and activist [Arnon] last week under Thailand’s lese-majeste law — the first since the country’s new government took office — has left those pushing for reform of the law dismayed.”
In fact, Arnon was not the first, but the fourth to be convicted of lese majeste under the government led by Srettha Thavisin, which was sworn in on 5 September. The others were Phimchanok Jaihong, Weeraphap Wongsaman, and Thirawat Yotsing. Dismay over Article 112 can thus be multiplied.
In his article, Jackson cites academic Patrick Jory, who gets excited about Vacharaesorn Vivacharawongse’s short visit to Thailand and his comments on the 112 exhibition in New York. Jory reckons this shows that the former prince is “on the liberal side of Thai politics” and that he “would be an ideal candidate for the throne for the ‘pro-democracy forces’…”. Frankly, we are baffled by such statements, and they are a kind of a throwback to the language once used to describe Princess Sirindhorn when she was alleged to have been in competition with Vajiralongkorn for the top royal position. Nothing came of that, and Sirindhorn has not shown any liberal leanings. Her “qualification,” apart from blood, was that she was supposedly more intelligent than her brother and more affable. Neither “quality” seemed valued when succession eventuated. Further, we are bemused by the notion that anyone who is truly “pro-democracy” would want another king.
For the dismayed, Jackson points out that the Puea Thai-military parties coalition is likely to mean they can be even more glum: “the lese-majeste law did not even get a mention in new Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s policy statement delivered last month.” Thai Lawyers for Human Rights spokesperson Akarachai Chaimaneekarakate said “since late 2020, almost 2,000 people had been charged or prosecuted for criticising the government and monarchy, including at least 279 cases under the lese-majesty law.”
But then there is hope, so we quote in full:
Experts spoken to by the ABC are more upbeat about the long-term prospects of law reform.
Adam Simpson, a senior lecturer in international studies at the University of South Australia, said those who voted for Pheu Thai believing they would reform Section 112 would punish the party at the next election for their “rehabilitation” of the military-backed parties.
“MFP may well win the next election more comprehensively, particularly if [former MFP leader] Pita [Limjaroenrat] is back as leader by then,” he said.
“In any case, I think the days of Section 112 as it currently stands are numbered after the next election, if not before.
“It is already an archaic relic of an earlier period and the more it is used to prosecute criticism of the monarchy, the more it will push Thailand’s increasingly liberal electorate into the hands of the MFP.”
Dr Jory said the election had demonstrated a fundamental shift in Thai politics, with the progressive MFP winning 32 out of the 33 seats in the capital Bangkok — the main seat of economic and political power in Thailand — while also doing well in major centres like Phuket and Chiang Mai.
“The affluent, urbanised, better-educated regions, they’re all going Move Forward,” he said.
He said many of those in the middle and upper classes who used to be conservative “yellow shirts” had gone “orange”, the colour of the MFP.
“I’m quite optimistic in the medium to longer term.”
We tend to think the battle over 112 is likely to be much messier than these two academics think, but we are optimistic about further efforts to change. But what they miss is that there are scores and scores of 2020-21 activists still facing charges and that their cases will grind down optimism.
But we’d also be more optimistic than Jory about Move Forward. It was not just the “affluent, urbanised, better-educated regions” that voted for the party. Look at the party list result and look at the votes where Move Forward didn’t win but came close. That’s reason for optimism.
But, just to bring readers down again, we should recall that the establishment and its instruments are still likely to want to obliterate Move Forward using “legalities.”
Political Prisoners in Thailand 