U.N. agency visits lese majeste detainees

As the attached letter indicates, the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights has visited seven lese majeste detainees.

The officers visited Darunee Charnchoensilpakul for an hour on 8 May 2013, and Somyos Prueksakasemsuk, Thanthawut Thaweewarodomkul, Wanchai Saetan, Surachai Danwattananusorn, Yuttapoom Martnork (this is the only name not appearing in PPT’s lists) and Akechai Hongkangwarn, also for an hour.

The OHCHR states that it heard from all the prisoners and will relay issues to the government and will continue to encourage the Thai government to ensure that the lese majeste law meets the country’s international human rights obligations.

The OHCHR letter to 112 Family Network dated 21 May 2013 can be downloaded here.

Regularizing restrictions on free speech

As many readers will know, the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) is a non-governmental organization with general consultative status at the U.N.’s Human Rights Council. It makes regular reports to the HRC on Thailand. Find PPT’s earlier posts on these reports here.

Below,we reproduce the latest report by the ALRC:

A written statement submitted by

THAILAND: The regularization of the crisis of freedom of expression

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

May 22, 2013

ALRC-CWS-23-05-2013

Language(s): English only

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Twenty-third session, Agenda Item 3, General Debate

1. The Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) wishes to bring the regularization of the crisis of freedom of expression in Thailand to the attention of the Human Rights Council. This statement is the sixth on this topic that the ALRC has submitted to the Council since May 2011. During the seventeenth session of the Council in May 2011, the ALRC highlighted the rise in the legal and unofficial use of Article 112 of the Criminal Code and the 2007 Computer Crimes Act (CCA) to constrict freedom of expression and intimidate citizens critical of the monarchy (A/HRC/17/NGO/27). During the nineteenth session in February 2012, the ALRC detailed some of the threats faced both by those who have expressed critical views of the monarchy, both legal and extralegal, as well as those who have expressed concern about these threats (A/HRC/19/NGO/55). During the twentieth session in June 2012, the ALRC raised concerns about the weak evidentiary basis of convictions made under Article 112 and the CCA (A/HRC/20/NGO/37) and the concerning conditions surrounding the death in prison custody of Amphon Tangnoppakul on 8 May 2012, then serving a 20-year sentence for four alleged violations of Article 112 and the CCA (A/HRC/20/NGO/38). During the twenty-second session in March 2013, the ALRC highlighted the January 2013 conviction under Article 112 of human rights defender and labour rights activist Somyot Prueksakasemsuk (A/HRC/22/NGO/44).

2. In the prior five statements, the ALRC has been concerned with the urgency of the threats posed by the constriction of freedom of expression. Particularly in the context of the 19 September 2006 coup and the violent clashes between state security forces and citizens in April-May 2010, the protection of fundamental human rights is necessary to foster the rule of law and democratization. The ALRC is again raising the issue of freedom of expression with the Council because the constriction of speech in the name of protecting the monarchy and national security has now become regularized. This is no longer an unusual breach of human rights, but one that has become constitutive of political and social life in Thailand. The entrenchment of the violation of freedom of expression threatens to normalize an additional series of human rights violations, such as the routine denial of bail to individuals awaiting trial and appeal, the provision of substandard medical care in prisons, and the use of secrecy to restrict the openness of trials and public information about ongoing cases.

3. Article 112 criminalizes criticism of the monarchy and mandates that, “Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen years.” The 2007 CCA, which was promulgated as part of Thailand’s compliance as a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, has been used to target web editors and websites identified as critical of the monarchy or dissident in other ways. The CCA provides for penalties of up to five years per count in cases which are judged to have involved the dissemination or hosting of information deemed threatening to national security, of which the institution of the monarchy is identified as a key part. While Article 112 law has been part of the Criminal Code since the last major revision in 1957, available statistics suggest that there has been a dramatic increase in the number of complaints filed since the 19 September 2006 coup; how often these complaints become formal charges and lead to prosecutions is information that the Government of Thailand has failed to provide up to this point. The CCA has often been used in combination with Article 112 in the four years since its promulgation; similar to the use of Article 112, complete usage information has not been made available by the Government of Thailand. This failure to provide information itself raises many unanswered questions about the use of both laws to diminish space for freedom of expression through the use of secrecy and creation of uncertainty.

4. At present, there are 6 persons known to be serving prison terms for alleged violations of Article 112 and/or the CCA and 1 person behind bars while awaiting trial.

a. Daranee Charnchoengsilpakul was convicted of violations of Article 112 related to 55 minutes of speech and sentenced to 18 years in prison on 28 August 2009. Following examination of her case by the Constitutional Court, her sentenced was reduced to 15 years in December 2011.

b. Wanchai Sae Tan was convicted of violations of Article 112 related to leaflets he made and distributed and sentenced to 15 years in prison on 26 February 2010.

c. Thanthawut Taweewarodomkul was convicted of violations of Article 112 and the CCA related to his work maintaining the NorPorChorUSA website and sentenced to 13 years in prison on 15 March 2011.

d. Surachai Sae Dan (Danwattananusorn) was convicted of a series of violations of Article 112 related to political speeches he made and sentenced to a total of 12.5 years in prison in a series of cases in 2012.

e. Somyot Prueksakasemsuk was convicted of violations of Article 112 related to his work in editing and publishing Voice of Taksin magazine, which was deemed to include two anti-monarchy articles (written by someone else) and sentenced to a total of 11 years in prison on 23 January 2013 (10 years on Article 112-related charges and 1 year related to a prior case).

f. Ekachai Hongkangwan was convicted of violations of Article 112 related to selling VCDs of an ABC Australia documentary and copies of WikiLeaks material and sentenced to 3 years and 4 months in prison on 28 March 2013.

g. Yutthapoom (last name withheld) has been held in the Bangkok Remand Prison since 19 September 2012 on charges of violating Article 112.

5. While there have been several other convictions in recent years, these 7 cases stand out because the individuals involved have repeatedly been denied bail, always on the grounds that their crimes are too grave a threat to national security to permit even temporary release. Although some individuals were granted bail while awaiting trial, upon conviction they were all denied bail, despite ongoing processes of appeal. This is in contravention to Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Thailand is a state party, which specifies: “Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment.” Bail is routinely granted during trials and after conviction while awaiting appeal in cases of committing violent crimes in Thailand, but routinely denied for cases involving freedom of speech.

6. As highlighted by the May 2012 death in custody of Amphon Tangnoppakul, who was then serving a 20-year sentence for allegedly sending 4 anti-monarchy SMS messages, which the ALRC commented on in a June 2012 submission to the Council (A/HRC/20/NGO/38), the prison healthcare system in Thailand falls well beneath the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. As part of the testimony provided during the April 2013 postmortem inquest hearings into Amphon’s death in custody, as reported by Prachatai, Amphon reported to fellow prisoners that when he went to seek treatment at the prison hospital, physicians made contemptuous comments about his alleged defamation of the monarchy. This goes far beyond institutional failure to meet minimum standards and indicates that physicians have become partial and may not provide an equal level of care to all prisoners.

7. Prosecutions under Article 112 and the CCA are surrounded by several different kinds of secrecy. The first is that the total number of charges and prosecutions under these two measures has not been made public by the Government of Thailand. The reason that the ALRC noted above in the list of current prisoners above that these are the known cases of individuals currently serving prison sentences or under detention while awaiting trial is that in the annual U.S. State Department Human Rights Report on Thailand, released in late April 2013, they reported that the number of persons detained or imprisoned under laws related to lèse majesté was between 7 and 18. Those 7 individuals listed above are those who are known to be behind bars, but the U.S. State Department report indicates there may be an additional 11 individuals being held. The failure of the Government of Thailand to provide precise information to the public itself raises many unanswered questions about the use of the laws to diminish space for freedom of expression through the use of secrecy. In addition, in at least two cases, those of Daranee Charnchoengsilpakul and Wanchai Sae Tan, the trials were held in camera and were closed to the public on the basis that the dissemination of the testimony may constitute a threat to national security. In a 2011 comment, the Constitutional Court argued that there was no contradiction between a secret trial and the protection of rights and liberties as provided for in the 2007 Constitution. Taken together, these two forms of secrecy create uncertainty about what consequences citizens may face for the basic exercise of human rights and makes political participation filled with possible danger.

8. The ALRC is very concerned about the effects of the regularization of the constriction of freedom of expression on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Thailand. The danger of this regularization is that it naturalizes violations of rights and causes them to appear normal and justified. The ALRC would like to remind the Government of Thailand that under Article 19 of the ICCPR, restrictions on the right to freedom of expression are only permissible under two circumstances: “for respect of the rights or reputations of others” and “for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.” While measure 112 is classified as a crime against national security within the Criminal Code of Thailand, and this is frequently cited by the Government of Thailand when faced with the criticism that the measure is in tension with the ICCPR, to date a clear explanation of the precise logic for categorizing the measure as such has not been provided. Without an adequate explanation being provided, the constriction of freedom of expression is arbitrary.

9. In view of the above, the Asian Legal Resource Center calls on the UN Human Rights Council to:

a. Call on the Government of Thailand to release all those convicted or facing charges under Article 112 and the 2007 Computer Crimes Act.

b. Demand that the Government of Thailand revoke Article 112 of the Criminal Code and the 2007 Computer Crimes Act.

c. Demand that the Government of Thailand provide an accounting of how they will improve the provisions for healthcare in prison and ensure that all prisoners receive the same treatment, without regard for the alleged crimes that they have committed.

d. Urge the Government of Thailand to allow and support the full exercise of freedom of expression and political freedom, consistent with the terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which it is a signatory, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which it is a state party.

e. Request the Special Rapporteur on the freedom of opinion and expression to continue ongoing monitoring and research about the brought situation of constriction of rights and individual cases in Thailand; and, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to continue to monitor and report on those cases of persons arbitrarily detained under Article 112.

Visiting lese majeste prisoners

Some time ago PPT received several emails asking us about visiting those held for lese majeste offenses. We are pleased to say  that a guide is now available in English.

For those interested in this information, and seeing and encouraging these political prisoners, visit this Facebook page.

 

 

Thaksin, law and sincerity

It is sometimes difficult for PPT to take the Abhisit Vejjajiva-dominated Democrat Party seriously. Sincerity is in short supply amongst many political leaders in Thailand, but seems in especially short supply when Abhisit is involved in justifying its use of the military to suppress political opposition in 2009 and 2010.

Abhisit’s political elasticity

On 2010,  The Nation reports that:

The ruling Pheu Thai Party yesterday demanded that opposition and Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva and Democrat MP Suthep Thaugsuban apologise to the families of those killed and injured in the 2010 red-shirt riots….

Pheu Thai Party deputy leader Anusorn Iamsa-ard said Abhisit and Suthep owed the red shirts a long-overdue apology because they had ordered security officials to use real bullets to shoot at the protesters during the crowd-control operation.

We think hell will freeze over before either man would admit any responsibility.

Indeed,  also at The Nation, it is reported that far from apologizing or admitting any missteps, Abhisit’s party blames Thaksin Shinawatra for everything! Their call is for:

… former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra … to admit to his alleged wrongdoings and respect the courts – to uphold the rule of law in Thailand.

They said Thaksin had been a major source of political conflict in recent years.

Not the Army, not the Democrat Party, not the palace’s old men scheming, not the royalist courts, not the military junta, not the dirty backroom deals, but Thaksin.

Their comments were prompted by Thaksin’s remarks on the “post-coup Assets Examination Committee (AEC)’s investigation against him were unfair.” There is nodoubt that they were contrived and unfair. This isn’t to say that Thaksin is squeaky clean; he isn’t. But the assets case was a fix and the cases where Thaksin should have been pursued were dropped or ignored for reasons that implicate those on the royalist side.

Abhisit is reported as stating that “he was saddened by the fact Thaksin could not admit his wrongdoings.”

Abhisit also claimed that Thaksin “should declare that he does not support a draft amnesty law proposed by Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung.”

On this latter point, Abhisit must have prepared his statement in advance for the the Bangkok Post reports that:

Deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra appeared to beat a tactical retreat on Sunday night when he told his red-shirt followers he favours an amnesty bill that excludes not only protest leaders and those responsible for the crackdowns, but also himself.

The report adds:

Thaksin’s announcement ran counter to a proposal by Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yubamrung in a bill he plans to file with the House of Representatives tomorrow.

The amnesty issue is certainly not finished, but Thaksin seems to have again demonstrated Abhisit’s failures.

All Abhisit can do is accuse Thaksin and the red-shirt leaders of telling lies.

Adding to the remarkable ingenuousness  demonstrated by the Democrat Party when they demand Thaksin accept laws, another report at The Nation has this eye-opener:

Democrat heavyweights have threatened to sue Department of Special Investigation director-general Tarit Pengdith if he refuses to review his agency’s decision to press charges against Democrats over donations to the party.

Laws for Thaksin seem acceptable for the Democrat Party but not for them.

Red shirts remember

An AFP report says there were some “12,000 Red Shirt protesters” on Sunday marking the third anniversary of a crackdown in May 2010.

Other reports are of 26,000 with some of up to 40,000 red shirts.

Roads were blocked for the red shirts as Thaksin Shinawatra phoned in and commented that “the government’s amnesty efforts must focus on absolving red shirts facing legal action in connection with the 2010 political violence rather than protest leaders or even himself.”

Police said the protest was peaceful.

Remembering 2010

As another anniversary of the Abhisit Vejjajiva regime’s army-led crackdown on red shirts is upon us, it is worth recalling that it is only a year or so ago that the Department of Special Investigation reported its investigations of the deaths.

DSI stated back then that state authorities “may be responsible for the deaths of at least 25 people…”.

Since then, while the DSI under the Yingluck Shinawatra has made some moves towards having Abhisit and Suthep Thaugsuban held responsible, it seems the army brass is again sitting in the world of unconscionable impunity (more on this below).

A series of recent reports reflect on the tragic events of 2010 and on the events since.

At the Red Shirts blog, it is reported that on 12 May 2013, a hearing finally:

took place at the Bangkok Criminal Court on the investigation and autopsy reports concerning 6 corpses found inside the Pathumwan Temple grounds. These victims were shot dead during the government suppression of the UDD protest on May 19, 2010.

Police investigators found bullet holes and:

reported that many more bullet holes could be found all over the temple grounds. Bullet holes were found on a metal sign in front of the temple, on the wall of the temple, on the advertisement sign under the BTS sky train, on the sky walk connecting the sky train stations, on the overpass and many more on the concrete platforms of the sky train.

Soldiers denied investigators access to the sky train tracks and the sky walk area.

Police ballistic analysis showed “23 bullet holes found on the temple grounds and Rama 1 Road …indicated that these shots had been fired from a higher angle and definitely not from a horizontal line of fire.” There was no evidence reported of shots from inside the temple.

At the Bangkok Post it is reported that the “parents of a boy who was killed as security forces moved in to clear the Ratchaprasong area … claim …  not enough is being done to find the people responsible for their son’s death.”

Pansak Srithep, was the father of 17-year-old Samapan, his only son. Samapan was killed on Ratchaprarop Road, where several people were shot dead. Pansak said “it has been draining for him and other families of those killed during the unrest to struggle to find witnesses willing to appear in court.”

Pansak “wants the government … to do more to help, and said investigators could do more to help with the court cases.” He claimed the Yingluck government “lacked the will to help…”.

The Bangkok Post states that there are currently “37 cases are at the initial inquest stage,” while “[a]nother 15 cases, including the death of Japanese cameraman Hiroyuki Muramoto and six deaths at Wat Pathum Wanaram, are at a stage where authorities are still determining if the security forces were responsible.” Another four cases “are awaiting a decision from prosecutors as to whether they will proceed,” and five others, “including that of Maj Gen Khattiya Sawatdiphol, known as Seh Daeng,” are at initial stages of police investigation.

The family of Kamolkate Akkahad, a medic shot at Wat Pathum Wanaram, are “also dismayed by the slow progress…”. They “will not join the main [official red shirt] stage during the event on Sunday.”

At Prachatai it is reported that on 29 April, “the Criminal Court began an inquest into the deaths of Mana Saenprasoetsi and Phonsawan Nakhachai who were shot at Bon Kai on Rama IV Rd on 15 May 2010…”. They were two of 16 killed at this location, where video evidence shows army operations, including snipers.

Mana “was fatally shot in the back of the head near the mouth of Soi Ngam Duplee … while he was trying to help people who had been shot there.” Phonsawan, who was assisted by Mana later succumbed to his stomach gunshot wound.

Mana’s  mother Naree stated he was shot “while holding a red-cross flag in his hand”and helping two others who had been shot.

Soon after his death, the authorities (mis)used photos of Mana to justify actions that took place some distance from where he was shot.

Another story at the Bangkok Post directs attention to red shirt dissent the Puea Thai government’s amnesty push:

Some red shirts see the proposal championed by Deputy Premier Chalerm Yubamrung as a betrayal because it would cover senior Democrat Party figures who were in government when the military crackdown on the Bangkok rally took place three years ago Sunday.

Of course, the anti-Thaksin Shinawatra lot oppose amnesty as a move to bring the man home. Thaksin is due to address supporters via videolink this weekend.

As PPT has stated several times, a blanket amnesty “would simply perpetuate the culture of impunity in Thailand, where senior figures rarely take responsibility for anything…”. The report adds:

Prominent scholars have been criticising the Pheu Thai flip-flop in social media forums. They include Nitirat Group core member Piyabutr Saengkanokkul; Thammasat University scholars Kasian Tejapira and Somsak Jeamteerasakul. Hard-core red-shirt activists Nithiwat Wannasiri, Jittra Kotchadet and Suda Rungkuphan also oppose the Chalerm plan.

 They say the party is betraying the red-shirt rank and file, as if a hundred deaths and a thousand injuries were simply the price to pay for the party’s compromise with the old establishment for the sake of its own survival.

PPT reiterates that those responsible for the murder of civilians must be brought to justice as an important step to rooting out the culture of impunity that state officials and the military has when murdering civilians.

Challenging Yingluck

In our last post, PPT commented that the royalist reactionaries were again agitating for anti-Thaksin Shinawatra activists to come together to oppose the elected government. In that post we mentioned the rather dull attempt to equate neo-fascist royalism with a democracy movement.

For a reason that still eludes PPT, the yellow lot think the motivation for a mass uprising is premier Yingluck Shinawatra speaking out on democracy and opposing the 2006 military coup.

Along with the limp web-based attack, as reported at The Nation, the People’s Alliance for Democracy’s proxy, the Thai Patriotic Front, called for 50,000 people toshow up at their rather bedraggled “rally at Sanam Luang … to demand the Pheu Thai-led government resign.”

Led by PAD stalwart Chaiwat Sinsuwong, the rally was said to be set to “continue until the government agreed to step down.” Chaiwat seeks to support the Constitutional Court, a major element of the royalist attacks on the elected government.

Already the subject of  “an order by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) to move to another rally site,” Chaiwat knows that staying at Sanam Luang is important for political impact.

As the royalist reactionaries come together one more time, Chaiwat and his group provide one possible focus if the movement draws more support than Pitak Siam a few months ago.