Red shirts, courts, coup and truth

As we have been saying for several days, the political temperature in Thailand is rapidly rising. Watching courts, military and royalists becomes important.

The courts remain significant players. As the red shirts rallied against the Constitutional Court, at Prachatai there is a detailed report on red shirts who were earlier sentenced to some very long terms for allegedly burning the Ubon on 19 May 2010.

The Appeals Court in Ubon “upheld the previous court’s decision to sentence Patthama Munnin (female), Thirawat Satjasuwan, Sanong Ketsuwan, and Somsak Prasansap to 34 years in prison.” They were sentenced on “terrorism and arson” charges, and 34 years was a reduction in sentence!

The reports says that the “Appeals Court also upheld the sentences on 7 other defendants: two acquitted, one imprisoned for one year, and four imprisoned for two years.”  The report has all the details.

Interestingly, unlike yellow shirts on terrorism charges from 2008, these red shirts have been in prison without bail since they were arrested. Double standards remain and it is always interesting that these are reinforced in times of rising political crisis.

While discussing double standards, it is worth looking at a story at The Nation which reports on support for misogynist and ultra-royalist cartoonist Chai Rachawat. The cartoonist was so incensed by a speech where premier Yingluck Shinawatra finally spoke with some conviction about democracy that he engaged in a childish tantrum.

The defense of Chai is equally childish and emanates from the likes of aged yellow-shirted academic Khien Theerawit. Writing in Naew Na newspaper, Khien apparently found “13 reasons to support Chai’s comment…”.

Khien reckons that speaking about the challenges of democracy is “selling the country” by “defaming the country.” Khien has the view that “[t]ravelling on taxpayers’ money … the PM must speak for the country’s interests…”. Mentioning that “her brother’s government was brought down by a coup and his parties were dissolved by independent agencies, but without saying why” is a half-truth.

In fact, if she’d told the truth, she would have said that the coup was planned in the palace and the “independent agencies” were military junta appointed agencies that were anything but independent. If she had spoken these truths, the royalists would have been as mad as cut snakes.

Apparently, “Khien defended Chai, saying that as a Thai citizen, the cartoonist has the right to do a great service to the country by protecting the country’s name and interests.”  It seems that “defending the country” involves infantile rants.

And it is important to note that the Yingluck speech and the actions of red shirts, especially in denouncing the Constitutional Court and promoting political amnesty seems to be irritating the military.

So much so that the brass has reportedly had its tanks out on the streets. Putting its tanks out in late night Bangkok traffic is clearly a warning to the Yingluck government to get back in line with the royalists and palace.

How disoriented can an anti-Thaksin royalist become?

PPT has never quite understood why the Bangkok Post has repeatedly published the op-ed drivel by Philip J. Cunningham who has been listed as having several locations to “report” from in recent years and is now listed as “a media researcher covering Asian politics.”

So anodyne are most of his pieces that we don’t think we have ever commented on any of them.  They have usually been driven by royalist hatred of Thaksin Shinawatra. Ignoring his bile was nothing lost. However, his most recent outing, however, a brief observation of Cunningham’s most recent rant is necessary to observe how bizarre the thinking of mad royalists can be.

Cunningham seems agitated that with the “anniversary of the April-May 2010 red-shirt protests looming” that expresses a concern that there will be “colourful demonstrations and incendiary street brawls…”. In fact, the anniversary of the protest beginnings, in March 2010 – remember the Red Caravan of 20 March 2010 – has already passed. So let’s assume he means the anniversaries of the violent and bloody crackdowns against red shirts launched by the Abhisit Vejjajiva government.

Since 2010, anniversaries associated with the red shirts have been entirely peaceful.

Cunningham’s angst is heightened by his imaginary linking of red shirts, Hitler and Nazis. In this he is engaging is propaganda and expressing a line of bellicose blather from the most extreme yellow shirts. Forgetting that the royal propagandists at the palace have been the ones who “often point to numbers as a metric of success” and who think that the “bigger the crowd … the easier he found it to tap mass emotion and manipulate minds,” he accuses red shirts of this.

Given the many groups under the red shirt banner, often not aligned with each other ideologically, Cunningham he might well describe the ultra-royalists when he refers to “lockstep, groupthink” and “rhetoric [that] gets vitriolic and lies take the place of unvarnished truth, individual agency is lost and people get stepped on and crushed.” It has been this way for several decades.

Cunningham seems to only recognize “spontaneous … gatherings,” ridiculing those that “are planned and choreographed in advance.” Again, we can only point to the “planned and choreographed” monarchy events. Later he refers to “fascistic movements that … appear to be on the side of the little people, and against the old fancy-pants establishment, the loyalists, the royalists and urban snobs…”. Again, he forgets the rhetoric that spills out of the palace about the king and, say, sufficiency economy. All protected by a feudal law that is lese majeste.

Of course, for this kind of diatribe, the problem is Thaksin Shinawatra and deluded, paid or led around by the nose. No red shirt from the countryside or the factories can ever be considered to have the “agency” that Cunningham claims to value. Presumably he didn’t attend the spontaneous anniversaries at Rajaprasong where there were many groups and no leaders.

It is Thaksin “who paved the way for the nascent fascism that has intermittently gripped Thailand in recent years,” not the fascists in the military, who is to be blamed for everything that seems to make the aristocratic elite uncomfortable. It is Thaksin who engaged in a “corporatist linking of the state and big business,” not the linking of the most powerful and wealthy corporate conglomerate that is the monarchy to the Sino-Thai capitalist class in a manner that keeps profits flowing to entrench a royally-connected elite.

And  by referring to Thaksin as “Dear Leader” he skates over the real cult of personality that exists in Thailand and now embedded in the person of the current king, meaning that the monarchists are now on a black death watch worrying about succession.

That Thaksin and his political parties have been able to win every single national election since 2000 is not even considered worthy of mention. That Thaksin has the capacity to mobilize “Thais in all walks of life, especially the common folk” is discounted as Nazism when Cunningham’s real beef seems to be that somehow the rich Thaksin has been “arousing dormant class struggle.” On that one point about class, we agree. The ousting of elected governments by extra-constitutional means has been so resented by average folks that they have seen protests as an opportunity to speak to larger political and economic inequalities in Thai society. That has some shaking in their military books and Berluti shoes. Cunningham is one of them, bleating about a “false flag, a false dawn.”

The one thing that Cunningham’s propagandist diatribe demonstrates is the fear that the elites and those allied to them have of the downtrodden rising, and we guess that there are some in the current government who would worry about that just as much as Cunningham and his royalist audience.

Speculation on politics and succession

Shawn Crispin at the Asia Times Online engages in some speculation regarding the future of the Yingluck Shinawatra government and succession. It is a long and rambling essay that packs almost every political event into its musings, with very few facts and plenty of guesses; yet it still worth a read.

He begins by noting that:

While both sides have appeared committed to avoid new rounds of confrontation in the autumn of King Bhumibol’s palace-proclaimed unifying reign and in light of Yingluck’s conciliatory tack, the criminally convicted Thaksin’s persistent push for a political amnesty is still viewed by many royalists as non-negotiable, including within the top ranks of the military led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha.

He adds that “Peua Thai efforts to table assorted amnesty bills in parliament and a parallel investigation by the quasi-independent National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) into alleged irregularities in Yingluck’s personal asset declaration made upon taking office that threatens to topple her from power.” Crispin notes that the NCCC’s investigation is seen by some “as a royalist counter to Peua Thai’s amnesty and constitutional amendment initiatives…”.

Crispin puts succession front and center, just as some claimed it was when the military ran its coup for the palace in 2006. He argues that politics is all about Thaksin and the monarchy, with royalists falsely declaring that any attempt to amend the constitution is “aimed to undermine the monarchy’s position and power ahead of a delicate and increasingly uncertain royal succession.”

While “Yingluck has worked to temper royalist fears that her Thaksin-influenced government represents an existential threat to the monarchy and associated institutions,” her government seems unable to use its massive electoral mandate against the unelected elite forces.

Crispin includes considerable speculation regarding rifts in the government and between the government and red shirts, but the real story revolves around the subterranean battle between royalists-palace and Thaksin-red shirts, with the latter lacking influence over the courts:

Significantly, the MoJ lacks power over top level courts, including appointments to the Administrative, Appeals, Constitutional, and Supreme Courts. All four courts are widely viewed as royalist power centers, due in part to a series of rulings that have gone against Thaksin since the 2006 military coup that toppled his elected government. Since, Bhumibol has at royal audiences repeatedly called on freshly appointed top judges to rule with independence and righteousness.

Of course, for the palace, “independence and righteousness” means ruling in their interests.

Crispin ruminates on the “changed power dynamics in the palace in the wake of Queen Sirikit’s recent illness” and the king’s extended hospitalization. He refers to some who see “Thaksin as resigned to bide his time outside of the country and appeal for a royal pardon after rather than before the royal succession.” He repeats the usual speculation that “Thaksin may receive more sympathetic royal treatment under heir apparent Crown Prince Vaijralongkorn, due in part to their known past personal ties.”

However, he then speculates on succession shenanigans: “While many analysts and diplomats believe that the royal succession plan from Bhumibol to Vajiralongkorn is immutable, others have interpreted differently recent royal household signals and events.”

Sirikit, who “suffered from an ischemic stroke last July,” is out of sight and may be impaired physically and mentally. The king has been chirpier in recent times, but regularly falls back into illness and incoherence. All of this – PPT’s speculation – leads:

Some diplomats and political analysts now wonder if the long-held succession plan could be altered if the highly influential 80-year-old Sirikit, known to be her son’s top backer for the throne, were to pass ahead of Bhumibol. In line with the royal tradition known as wang na, Vajiralongkorn is renovating his Bangkok-based Amporn palace, as well as for less clear reasons facilities maintained at Don Muang airport, in advance of the anticipated transition.

Crispin then cites:

… “[p]alace insiders who spoke to Asia Times Online suggest that Vajiralongkorn’s first daughter, Princess Bajraktiyabha, could instead play a bridging role in a potential compromise scenario between royal camps vying alternately between Vajiralongkorn and Princess Sirindhorn to assume the throne. That face-saving scenario would see Bajraktiyabha take on a regency role while Vajiralongkorn’s youngest son, Prince Dipangkorn Rasmijoti, is groomed for the throne.

Frankly, these rumors have been around for several years and suggest royalist hope rather than anything more. Yet there is always the chance that succession can spin out of control, especially if the old duffers at the Privy Council get involved or the military decides to fiddle things. But as one of PPT’s unnamed sources speculated, it is expected that the king can go on for another 10 years, and the longer he does, the less royalist and middle-class opposition there may be to a shorter Vajiralongkorn reign.

Updated: The king and 1976

To conclude PPT’s “mini-series” on recent documents located by Andrew MacGregor Marshall, we now turn to some important British cables posted at Zen Journalist and which reflect on the mythology surrounding the events leading up to the bloody massacre of students at Thammasat University on 6 October. That mythology is that the king was supportive of the students who rose up against the military regime that had existed since 1958 and which had done so much to restore the monarchy.

As seen in a cable from 1963, the king, just 36 years old and close to the repressive military regime, seems to enjoy showing a “liberal” side to foreign guests. However, his comments on students are telling:

Essentially, he sees student demonstrators as trouble. He is reported as saying that he “told the Thai students he would not allow them to demonstrate here.” The king sees student demonstrators as either paid or manipulated (with echos of how the amart speak of those who vote for pro-Thaksin Shinawatra parties). Indeed, Thai students as the sons and daughters of the elite, do remain reasonably quiescent until about 1972.

Without going into detail (see this excellent documentary), by October 1973, demanding constitutional rule, a student revolution brought down the military government. The king is usually portrayed in a positive light during these events, with the recent hagiography King Bhumibol Adulyadej. A Life’s Work manages to transform the king as supporter of the military regime into a political savior and democrat. It was the opening of palace gates to students fleeing the military’s guns that made the legend of the student-supporting king. But it didn’t take the king and palace long to abandon the students, reflecting the 1963 position, considering them communists or duped by communists. Almost immediately, royalists and the palace began supporting extremist and rightist military groups as they mobilized against the “liberal” forces unleashed by the student uprising. Lese majeste accusations began to mount and trials were held. As Ben Anderson (link opens a PDF) described the mounting fear for royalists and palace as communist forces made gains in neighboring countries,

The stage was set for the 6 October massacre of students by royalist thugs and forces close to the palace such as the Border Patrol Police.

It is from this point that the British cables of 1976 become interesting and enlightening. The first of these is from 9 October 1976 (the link downloads a PDF) when the smell of blood and burned bodies had barely cleared at Thammasat, and British diplomat Malcolm Macdonald met the king and the Embassy reports on the meeting. It is clear that Anderson’s assessment of the king as a rightist is vindicated. He says the students were politicized and intent on overthrow the government and “the establishment.” We read this as a reference to the ruling class and the monarchy. He claimed they were influenced from “outside” and he feared the links the students had developed with unions and this challenge saw him state that he preferred a military government. The result was that, for some time, he had formed the view that a military government “was inevitable.” He explains that he knew of the coup in advance and had not objected. Thereafter he sets out the path of politics that was to be exactly as his chosen Prime Minister Thanin Kraivixien later expressed it:

The next cable is from 13 October 1976, by British Ambassador David Cole. This file is so large that we are unable to load it so the originals will need to be viewed at Zen Journalist, which is often blocked in Thailand (Update: A version is available here).

The cable defends the military. Ambassador Cole makes the claim that the coup was not “premeditated by the military” is contradicted by the king’s statement cited above and by a later claim citing Kukrit Pramoj. His claims that the right-wing groups like the Red Gaur, Village Scouts and Navapol had nothing to do with the military brass appears contrived. However, the prediction that a far right government would be “disastrous for Thailand” seems reasonable. Interestingly, lese majeste is at the heart of the coup justifications, both in repeating the bogus claim that a student looking like the crown prince was theatrically hung by students. Lese majeste is also mentioned in military thinking:

Cole then turns to the role of the king and states: Indeed, from the cable of the 9th, we know that the king did more than acquiesce. Then Cole turns more directly to the palace and its involvement: As in 2006, when the role of the palace was clear, the king and the coup leaders tried to cover his tracks and those of other royals, even when they were obvious. While Cole predicts that the monarchy will be the biggest loser from the coup, this was be but a short-term setback as the king and his propagandists set about rewriting the history of this event.

The third cable is from about a month after the coup. On 5 November 1976, Cole writes about the current political situation. Again, this cable, reporting the Danish Ambassador, shows clear palace involvement, with the king planning for post-coup political arrangements well in advance of the coup: In short, nothing changed all that much for the palace in deciding events in 1976 and in 2006. They were involved and were enthusiastic about being involved.

Yingluck on lese majeste

Yingluck Shinawatra gained office with the support of red shirts. They expected her to do something to distinguish her government from that of Abhisit Vejjajiva which had essentially imprisoned, censored and attacked its opposition. Yingluck at the head of a Puea Thai Party government was expected to change this, and she has. Thailand’s politics has cooled quite substantially.

She was also expected to do something to stop the use of lese majeste as a royalist political tool to bludgeon opponents and to lock up the outspoken. PPT acknowledges that  fewer cases have been prosecuted under Yingluck’s government and the investigations seem to have been reduced (with a significant exception noted earlier today). However, the blocking of internet-based material is continuing, with PPT blocked again in recent days, probably due to this post. It seems that royalists hate the truth. Other sites are also being blocked for content that challenges the usual royalist treacle on the monarchy.

While it may be political reality, it is nonetheless disappointing to see reports that show Yingluck mouthing royalist platitudes that make her sound like Abhisit. So it is that Yingluck spoke at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand with an Abhisit tone when asked about:

… whether the government would do something about the controversial lese majeste law and the Computer Crimes Act (CCA), which are seen by many here and abroad as limiting freedom of expression. She replied that freedom of speech in Thailand had to be “in line with the constitution”…. “The lese majeste law is intended to uphold the monarchy as the pillar of stability,” the premier stressed.

As PPT has shown, recently making good use of Zen Journalist materials from archives, nothing could be further from the truth. The palace has been involved in almost every political coup since 1947. The law was instituted to protect absolute monarchs and has been enhanced by royalist military and extreme rightist governments to protect the status quo that has the monarchy at its core. Those regimes have been all too ready to murder opponents in the name of the monarchy, and the monarchy has been generally satisfied with this state of affairs, growing immensely wealthy and bloated by its power and propaganda.

The northeast and politics

At  the Huffington Post an op-ed by Stanley Weiss who “is founding chairman of Business Executives for National Security (a non-partisan organization of senior executives who contribute their expertise in the best practices of business to strengthening national security),” blah, blah, blah, who refers to the role played by Pansak Vinyaratn in linking Thaksin and his sister, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra:

Pansak (from Wikipedia Commons)

Dubbed “Thaksin’s Oracle” in U.S. diplomatic dispatches revealed by the website “Wikileaks,” Pansak served as chief political advisor to Thaksin and serves as chief policy advisor to Yingluck. He has been at the heart of a strategy that has transformed rural [North] East Thailand into an economic powerhouse….

PPT readers will know about Pansak from a bunch of Wikileaks cables. Where the story gets interesting is in explaining Thaksin’s political success that Pansak makes some comments that interested PPT:

“A famous Cornell professor once lived in Northeast Thailand and came up with a term to describe the people there: cosmopolitan villagers,” Pansak tells me. “When the Thai party first started 11 years or so with Thaksin, we researched the northeast and found a net positive income — not from rice, but from other activities. Thai people in the northeast have more passports than Bangkok Chinese. They work in Gulf States and are cosmopolitan. We found that info and no one else cared.”

In fact, it wasn’t a Cornell professor, but Charles Keyes of the University of Washington in Seattle, and his “discovery” was long after Thaksin had come to power and been ditched by the palace-military coup. The “discovery,” if it was made back when Thaksin came to power and is not Pansak explaining in hindsight, is remarkable for the period in 2000-2001, when no other political party cared a fig for the Northeast:

The great innovation of Thaksin and Pansak (along with U.S.-trained academic Somkid Jatusripitak) was “the increased role of government in the allocation of credit,” as Chulalongkorn University Professor Pasuk Phongpaichit writes. But not just anywhere: “Thaksinomics” focused the government’s attention on the poor and rural areas of Thailand. Arguing that “a country is a company and a company is a country,” the self-described “CEO Prime Minister” approached the national economy like a business, looking for ways, as Pasuk explains, to “mobilize any dormant or unexploited assets including unused natural resources and neglected human resources.”

At the same time, the focus on farmers in these poor rural areas reflected Pansak’s earlier experience and ideas from the period when he worked with Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, back in the late 1980s.The rest of the political story is well-known and Thaksin’s remarkable political longevity amongst people in the Northeast owes everything to his “populist” policy innovations.

Today Pansak says:

“The northeast keeps developing…. They have a more independent structure and exports are going straight to airfields. And VAT (tax) collection there has gone up by double digits. It’s a huge success story.”

“But,” he adds, “The Thai elite refuse to admit this success.”

Of course they don’t. They still imagine that the people of the Northeast are just cheap barbers, laborers, entertainers and waiters and waitresses who can be shoved around and exploited politically and economically. As the article explains:

Now that the poor and rural populations have awakened, there may be no turning back. “Thaksin let the genie out of the bottle,” a senior Western official tells me. “The northeast is tapped in and now awakened.”

Updated: Wikileaks and a TRT accusation of lese majeste

While it has been the Democrat Party that has most used the heinous lese majeste charge for political purposes in recent years, it should not be forgotten that in the struggle between Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party and the opposition, lese majeste was occasionally used. PPT was reminded of this when looking at some more Wikileaks cables and we came across one from U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce commenting on claims of lese majeste lodged against the Democrat Party’s Kalaya Sophonpanich.

The ambassador’s comments on this case are interesting and at times revealing. He begins with the statement that:

respected opposition Member of Parliament (MP), Khunying Kallaya Sophonpanich, has been summoned for questioning by Thai police on charges of lese majeste. Four others were questioned, including Democrat Party parliamentary candidate Thanom Onkhetpol, who lost in the February 6 general election, and three party workers. The charges are based on a complaint filed by the government Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party candidate who opposed Thanom and who reported to police in mid-January that Democrat Party (DP) campaign stickers reportedly used by Thanom illegally quoted Thailand’s revered King and Queen.

Detailing the alleged offenses, Boyce states they are:

based on campaign stickers (reportedly similar in size to a US style bumper sticker) printed and paid for by the local office of the DP in Bangkok’s Klong Toey constituency. Three quotes are used in the stickers, according to newspaper accounts. The first is an excerpt from a speech given by Queen Sirikit, “Poverty is no disgrace, while evil and fraud are disgusting and disgraceful.” The other two excerpts are from speeches given by King Bhumibol. “The richer people are, the more they cheat,” and “Anyone who cheats (or is corrupt), even just a little bit, may that person be cursed.” The complaint by MP Sita apparently alleges that the DP did not receive permission to print the quotes and that the DP is using the revered words of the monarchy for political gain. Khunying Kalaya is accused of ordering the printing and distribution of the stickers in the role of senior politician assisting the campaign of Thanom.

It is quite revealing that Boyce then states: “It’s unclear to most legal experts how this can be construed as defaming the monarch as the quotes are taken from public speeches and there is no prohibition on quoting the King or Queen in public.” Clearly, such a statement could not be made today following the remarkable political use of lese majeste and the manner in which the courts have interpreted cases with statements about the monarchy being above politics.

No charges had been laid when this cable was authored, and PPT is unaware of any case going forward, although readers may know more than us.

Boyce then notes that Kalaya “had the title of ‘Khunying’ bestowed on her over 10 years ago in part in recognition of her philanthropic works through Royally-sponsored projects for children’s’ books and encyclopedias…” and comments:

Use of this arcane but very important tenet of Thai criminal law by a government parliamentary candidate for political retribution is disturbing. This tactic, which likely had to be approved at the highest levels of TRT leadership to proceed this far, seems unnecessary and vindictive…. We are watching closely as someone clearly dedicated to Thailand’s revered monarch and to public service is drawn into a legal spectacle. Privately, many Thais have expressed to us their hope that Khunying Kalaya’s palace connections will find a way to have the charges dropped.

As far as we are aware, the case was dropped. But all of the (false) claims that the palace is never involved in these charges are but a puff of smoke when “palace connections” are invoked, and it is interesting too that Boyce takes this charge seriously and is “watching closely.” It is also telling that he uses the term “arcane” to describe a law that has come to be the most widely known in Thailand.

Update: A reader points out that the statement: “The richer people are, the more they cheat,” attributed to the king, should be linked to this post.

Waiting for a death

Chulalongkorn University’s Thitinan Pongsudhirak has a kind of a Chinese New Year summary of the political situation in an op-ed at the Bangkok Post. Like many other commentators, he looks at the Yingluck Shinawatra government’s uneasy relationship with the palace. “Uneasy” might be the wrong word, for Yingluck appears to have a better relationship than her elder brother, even if it remains frosty.

It seems that for an elected government to stay in power in Thailand, it must agree that “the monarchy must be protected and upheld at all costs.” Part of the cost is all the money the government has to throw at the rich royals in order to “protect” them. Thitinan observes that:

the quintessential Thai tension is rooted in the twin transitions of the times and the individual. Electoral democracy in the early 21st century has outgrown the monarchy-centred hierarchical political order from the Cold War. The chasm between democracy- and monarchy-centred outcomes has manifested in crisis and turmoil.

It is a pity he doesn’t ask how it came to this, but he is right to note that “[t]o stay in office, Ms Yingluck, her brother and their team must let these two transitions take their own course without rushing or subverting them.”

For Thitinan, this is Thailand’s long 20th century that is “not to be interrupted by dissenting voices” from the 21st century: “The government must pay due reverence and go with the flow on all monarchy-related matters.” But the king’s autumn is likely to lead to a very hot summer once he passes, with no political outcome guaranteed. So far the 21st century wait for the end of the 20th century wait has cost one coup, three elected government, a pile of treasure, many political prisoners, people killed in political violence and more.

Crispin on internet censorship

Shawn Crispin writing for the Committee to Protect Journalists has an article on the increasing tendency for governments to want to control the internet in the Southeast Asian region. Of course, that includes comments on Thailand. His verdict is pretty much the same as the one PPT noted yesterday: almost all of Thailand’s censorship of the internet in Thailand is about the monarchy:

The authorities had already applied the law’s vague and arbitrary national security-related provisions to censor tens of thousands of anonymously posted Web pages, mostly for material deemed offensive to the monarchy.

Crispin also makes a point that scholar David Streckfuss made at the FCCT: the 2006 military-palace coup made lese majeste and the computer crimes law. In the latter, it was the junta’s administration under on-again, off-again privy councilor Surayud Chulanont that passed the flawed computer crimes law, and it is essentially that regime and the one led by Abhisit Vejjajiva, also hoisted to power by the military-palace complex, that made the law a political weapon of choice.

Part of his account is of the “legal calisthenics” that lese majeste and computer crime laws involve. For example, in the case of Chiranuch Premchaiporn’s conviction was a:

… landmark verdict [that] effectively shifted the onus of Internet censorship in Thailand from government authorities to Internet intermediaries. Judges ruled that by failing to remove the comment quickly enough–it remained on Chiranuch’s Prachatai website for more than 20 days–she had “mutually consented” to the critical posting….

On the Abhisit regime, Crispin observes:

In 2009, in the name of shielding the monarchy from criticism, the previous Abhisit Vejjajiva-led government began a controversial Internet monitoring scheme that trained civilian volunteers, including university students, to serve as “cyberscouts” assigned to comb the Internet for anti-royal material. The number of lèse majesté complaints filed under Abhisit’s tenure nearly tripled year on year from 2009 to 2010, rising from 164 to 478 cases, according to Thai court records.

Crispin then moves to the Yingluck Shinawatra government, where the comments become less fact-based, claiming that the government’s Internet surveillance capabilities were expanded “in 2011 through a US$13 million investment in an undisclosed ‘interception’ system, according to local news reports.” It would be good to know if there has been more surveillance rather than simply reports. It is correct that in 2011″cabinet approved a directive that allowed the national police Department of Special Investigations to collect evidence, including through the intercept of Internet-based communications, without a court order in Computer Crime Act-related investigations.” It remains unclear how this power is being used.

On lese majeste, Crispin reports that:

Yingluck also established a 22-member committee dedicated specifically to suppressing lèse majesté content online. By mid-2012, MICT authorities claimed to have blocked 90,000 Facebook pages because of anti-monarchy content. That censorship followed on a late-2011 warning by MICT Minister Anudith Nakornthap that Internet users could be charged under the Computer Crime Act for “liking” online comments critical of the royal family.

While the latter is true, the claim to blocking a large number of Facebook pages has not been confirmed. One thing is clear: the number of allegations and charges of lese majeste has declined precipitously.

If any readers have better data on blocking by the current government, we’d be pleased to post it. Blocking of PPT is far less rigorous than it was under the Abhisit regime, but we continue to see some blocking by ISPs.

Further updated: Somyos, amnesty and lese majeste

The cruel 11-year sentence meted out to Somyos Prueksakasemsuk – 10 years for lese majeste and an extra years for insulting a autolatric, coup-making general – has caused plenty of reaction. Some of that has been the usual yellow-shirted and monarchist gloating that the monarchy has been “saved” once more by locking up a red shirt. Most of the reaction has been shock and outrage. In this post PPT looks at some of the reaction.

Some have asked if this case means that the monarchy is an impediment to democratisation in Thailand (a question asked 17-18 years ago in one academic article, well before there was any red shirt movement and when lese majeste was not used so eagerly).  Others have used words like “chilling” and “detrimental” when talking of freedom of expression.

When the EU condemned the verdict, the required ultra-royalist reaction was to protest, with a group of 50 or so royalist xenophobes calling themselves the Monarchy Protection Network or Volunteers ranting that Europeans with constitutional monarchies might better understand “the importance of the monarchy to Thailand.” They grumbled about the king being some kind of military leader and about him having “done a lot for the country” and demanded that anyone being nasty towards their idol be punished. They also drew comparisons with Europe and lese majeste laws there. Of course, their observations on Europe are uninformed, as even a quick look at Wikipedia shows that even the rare uses of the laws usually result in small fines, whereas Thailand’s use of these laws is more in line with feudal Europe.

The more positive reaction has been for the mobilization of protests demanding amnesty and for Article 112 to be abolished or reformed. Even some usually critical of anything considered to have a whiff of Thaksin Shinawatra like ” consumer protection rights advocates and FTA Watch activists are behind the letters to be sent Friday to Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Parliament Speaker Somsak Kiatsuranand, and Supreme Court president Phairoj Vayuparb, as well as the chair of the National Human Rights Commission, to seek basic rights for Somyot who has been denied bail 12 times…”.

While Thai journalists continue to be worse than hopeless, the International Federation of Journalists has stated:

“The reactions to the ruling reflect the strength of feeling against the court’s decision which has the potential to damage severely the country’s standing,” said IFJ president Jim Boumelha. “The sentence handed down by the court speaks more to curtailing critical reporting in Thailand than to protecting the monarch.”

The Nation says that the amnesty calls “started with the proposal of the Nitirat group … who called for a charter amendment to make a new provision on amnesty.”

Nitirat proposed that only the demonstrators should be absolved. Their leaders would also benefit from the amnesty if they proved they led the protests because of political conflict, not because they were hired. Of course, those who were jailed under the lese majeste law would also receive the benefit.

But under Nitirat’s proposal, no government officials would be absolved irrespective of whether they were officials carrying out the crackdown orders or they were the officials who gave the orders….

… Nitirat also linked the amnesty to the campaign for amendment of Article 112 on lese majeste, so the government could not comply with it.

Therein lies the rub for the timid Yingluck Shinawatra government that has refused to touch lese majeste, fearful of the wrath of the palace and its supporters. The more official red shirts want an amnesty via an executive decree, believing that this would not tread so heavily on any royalist or palace toes.

One way or another, the Yingluck government is now seemingly being cornered by its supporters.

Meanwhile, the Bangkok Post’s Voranai Vanijaka decides that all of this tells us there are real red shirts and fake red shirts. PPT isn’t sure how he would know apart from the fact that he recently spoke with a taxi driver who claimed to be a red shirt. As with most royalists, his focus is Thaksin. He also makes a point about the government’s timidity on lese majeste:

should the government be cowed by the fear of possibly losing power into sacrificing promises of justice, democracy and human rights; or – at the very least – should it have the courage to take some sort of a public stand, starting with the lese majeste law, to simply say something.

Readers might scoff at Voranai, an opponent of red shirts when they have been on the streets and a booster for the Democrat Party, suggesting that his question is a kind of yellow shirt provocation, hoping that the government will do something on amnesty and lese majeste in order that the “tanks and protesters on the streets and judges on the Constitution Court bench” can get into action again. Yet the question for the government is apt: “But to take some sort of a stance, to say a word or two against the abuse and exploitation of the lese majeste law should not be beyond the courage and conviction of the Pheu Thai government.”

Of course, Voranai doesn’t make any comparisons. It cannot be denied that this government’s track record on lese majeste charges is far superior to that of the Abhisit Vejjajiva government, when lese majeste was just one of its tools in filling jails with opponents and censoring opposition media. So at least Voranai can ask about “promises of justice, democracy and human rights” for this government; under Abhisit such questions simply didn’t arise.

Update 1: Asia Provocateur posts on questions raised in the UK parliament regarding the lese majeste sentencing of Somyos. We found the answers interesting, where it was twice stated that the “Government frequently raises human rights concerns with Thailand, both at ministerial and official level.” In addition, the British say:

Following the verdict, the European Union issued a statement expressing deep concern at the decision to sentence Somyot to 10 years imprisonment. The statement noted that the verdict seriously undermined the right to freedom of expression and press freedom. Our ambassador has also raised the issue with the Thai authorities.

Update 2: With respect to the European experience, The Nation has a useful report from an EU-sponsored workshop in Bangkok.

Former Dutch Ambassador to Thailand Tjaco Van Den Hout declared that “diversity, tolerance and broadmindedness are fundamental aspects of human rights in Europe. He stressed that high tolerance for criticism of public figures, including that of politicians and head of state and monarchy, is necessary for a democratic society.”

Lese majeste scholar David Streckfuss pointed out that the “minimum mandatory punishment under Thai lese majeste law, which is three years imprisonment term, is as high as the maximum sentences stipulated in Jordan, Morocco and Belgium.” He added that Thailand, “is unique in the world when it comes to the severity of the law and the frequency of its use.”

Peter Mork Thomsen, a judge from Denmark who handled lese majeste cases said “Danish lese majeste law had no mandatory minimum punishment…”.