Senate’s latest reactionary intervention

Thai PBS reports that the junta’s unelected swill in the Senate, close to the end of its term, “has voted down the nomination of the former deputy president of the Supreme Administrative Court for the position of its president.”

Wissanu Waranyoo was rejected by 158 votes to 45 in a secret ballot, after being nominated by a standing committee, which vetted his background and ethical behaviour record.”

So what caused these political dinosaurs to reject Wissanu? He was “criticised for being close to Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, mentor of Move Forward Party core members, whose views are known to be in favour of monarchy reform.” The “evidence” is that he “attended Piyabutr’s wedding and took to the stage to propose a toast to the bride and groom.”

Apparently,there was also a “digital footprint” that “showed that he once wrote on his Facebook page about a protest in front of the late former Privy Council president Gen Prem Tinsulanonda’s residence, using negative words to describe Gen Prem.”

Wissanu denied all of this in an open letter to the unelected senators but to no avail as these alleged “relationships” were unacceptable to the dolts appointed by the military junta.

Clearly, legal qualifications count for nothing when appointing senior judges. What matters is absolute loyalty to the establishment and monarchy.

All those double standards

When special deals are done in the judicial system, with high-level influence, the double standards become glaringly obvious. There’s been lots of attention to the buffalo manure piled high in the Thaksin Shinawatra deal.

We guess that one of the thoughts that Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, a Move Forward Party MP and chairman of the House committee on military affairs and Jirat Thongsuwan, another MFP MP may be to highlight double standards. As the Bangkok Post reports, Jirat is “calling for access to film Gen Prayut[h Chan-ocha]’s [taxpayer-funded, military supplied] residence to see how he is living now his time as prime minister has ended.”

The MFP had previously criticized Gen Prayuth’s use of the luxury villa in a Bangkok military compound when the general was unelected prime minister. Entitled to such pampering when army chief, he has “remained there despite leaving the premiership [to be made a privy councilor], citing security reasons.”

Wiroj’s committee is set to discuss this. But, of course, the suggestion “has drawn a backlash from critics.”

The United Thai Nation Party, created for Prayuth and soundly trounced in the election, but still a part of unelected Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s coalition, accused Jirat of “running the panel into disrepute for overstepping his mark.”

A Defense Ministry spokesperson went to the protection offered by the monarchy, and “said he was afraid it would not be appropriate to grant filming access to Gen Prayut’s residence as he now serves on the privy council and is a highly respected figure in the country.” That royal protection has been predicted.

Thanakorn Wangboonkongchana, a UTN deputy leader “insisted Gen Prayut should be left alone as he is no longer involved in politics.” Thanakorn also raised the politicized Constitutional Court’s ruling that the then “premier was rightfully occupying the house.” He says nothing about a former general, prime minister, and now privy councilor doing this.

The army continues to assert that Gen Prayuth “had complied with regulations governing the occupation of a military house.”

Is he? That seems to be the question. Reader’s will, of course, recall that Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, also a former general, prime minister, and privy councilor occupied a taxpayer-funded residence for much of his life from the 1980s. After he croaked, the military “gave” that house to the king who promptly had it demolished.

Thaksin-Prayuth

A reader sent us the following article as a reflection on recent events:

On 29 November 2023, Thailand’s Royal Gazette announced that King Vajiralongkorn had, on 21 October, signed an order appointing 2014 coup leader and prime minister Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha to his Privy Council.

In one sense, this was a reward for a military leader who had spent his career providing loyal service to the palace. Yet like Gen Prem Tinsulanonda before him, Prayuth had been more than a run-of-the-mill loyal servant. Both had been army commanders who also spent many years as prime ministers without facing the electorate.

Like Prem, as prime minister Prayuth worked assiduously to strengthen Thailand’s conservative polity, where the military and bureaucracy controlled politics under the auspices of the monarchy and where super-rich tycoons provided support for the regime. Prayuth’s military-backed regime established a constitution and numerous associated laws that codified the conservative polity – a system he referred to as “Thai-style democracy” – establishing extraordinary powers for unelected bodies that gave them “oversight” of elections and elected governments.

That system worked as expected in 2019, delivering an election victory to military-backed parties that extended Prayuth’s tenure as prime minister. Yet, as the 2023 approached, it was clear that the military-backed parties would be trounced. Voters wanted change and were drawn to opposition parties that promised an end to Prayuth’s regime and the military’s control of politics.

Thaksin Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai Party led in many pre-election polls. However, as the campaign developed, Pheu Thai’s opposition partner the Move Forward Party also polled strongly. It looked likely that Move Forward would be a part of a post-election government.

The conservative establishment, composed of military leaders, palace officials, the wealthiest tycoons, and other royalists, was aghast and fearful that the years of Prayuth’s conservative polity would be undone by Move Forward’s “radical” and anti-monarchy reformism.

The wave of public support for Move Forward was born not just of a desire for change, but also of the dissolution of its predecessor party, Future Forward, and the exuberant monarchy reform movement that partly resulted from that dissolution. Prayuth’s government had seen off the monarchy reform movement by facing down street protests and by using the judicial system to bury articulate reformers under a barrage of legal cases. Many were charged with multiple counts of lese majeste.

The regime may have stifled dissent, but its heavy-handed repression made military-backed parties unelectable. To save the conservative polity, the establishment did the unthinkable. After years of casting Thaksin as an evil anti-monarchist and battling his Thai Rak Thai-People Power Party-Pheu Thai Party, it turned to Pheu Thai. Dealing with Thaksin and Pheu Thai was preferable to allowing the Move Forward Party to have a hand in a post-election government.

A week before the May 2023 election, in a secret meeting, Thaksin and palace and tycoon figures did a deal – always publicly denied – that would keep Move Forward out of a Pheu Thai Party coalition government and kept the military-backed parties in the coalition. The details of the deal will probably never be revealed. However, Thaksin soon returned from exile, served less than a day in prison, and received a royal pardon for most of his sentence. And, despite being edged in the election by Move Forward, Pheu Thai formed government.

Credit: Khaosod

In the election campaign, recognizing the electorate’s yearning for change, Pheu Thai portrayed itself as a populist agent of change, implying it would reject military-backed parties and promising a government that would bring social, economic, and political reform.

After the election, Pheu Thai spokespersons somewhat unenthusiastically participated in coalition talks with Move Forward. But these talks were soon derailed by royalist taunts that Move Forward was anti-royalist and multiple calls for it to be dissolved. Meanwhile, the Senate made it clear that the party’s leader Pita Limjaroenrat could never be approved by parliament as prime minister.

The Senate, entirely made up of members appointed by Prayuth’s military junta, operated under transitory constitutional provisions that made approval of a prime minister a matter for a joint sitting of both houses of parliament. These senators duly rejected Pita. Meanwhile, agencies the Prayuth regime had populated with its supporters moved against Pita. In what some saw as a plot, the Constitutional Court suspended Pita from parliament while it considered two flimsy cases that could result in Pita’s banning from politics and the dissolution of the party.

The stymying of Move Forward gave Pheu Thai an opportunity to form a coalition government and nominate real estate tycoon and establishment scion Srettha Thavisin as prime minister. Srettha promptly received the overwhelming support of both houses in parliament. In coalition building, Pheu Thai rejected Move Forward while Srettha’s 34-member cabinet includes 16 ministers drawn from the parties from the previous government.

The first months of Srettha’s government have been marked by its unwillingness to do anything new. The circumstances of its rise and the determination to keep Thaksin from jail mean that it has to  abandon campaign promises and slow signature policies to a snail’s pace, including its 10,000 baht digital wallet, meant to stimulate a listless economy. Yet the conservative polity has been maintained.

We may never know if Prayuth’s Privy Council appointment was a part of the historic deal to overturn Move Forward’s electoral success and preserve the conservative polity. Yet that appointment fittingly bookends the successful effort to maintain Prayuth’s political legacy. Conveniently, being appointed to the Privy Council shields Prayuth from political criticism and any legal repercussions from his coup leadership and his actions as the establishment’s prime minister.

Back to the future

Quite a while ago PPT posted here and there about the 2014 military junta’s plans for Thailand’s politics.

In summarizing some of these thoughts, back in 2014 we had a post that commented on an article at The Nation by Supalak Ganjanakhundee. His view and ours was that the “quasi-democratic regime under General Prem Tinsulanonda between 1980 and 1988” was the military’s and royalist elite’s preferred “model that would be suitable for Thailand forever.”

Of Premocracy, Supalak stated:

The Prem regime is the role model for many elite political architects. He is a former Army commander who was “invited” by political parties and elected politicians to take the premiership after elections during the 1980s. To that extent, political parties and politicians were only minor parts of the arrangement. They were furniture, rather than the structure of the country’s administration.

Thailand was then mostly run by military officers and bureaucrats. The prime minister had no accountability to the people. His power was supported by the military. Prem faced challenges from young officers and two coup attempts, rather than lawmakers in the House of Representatives. He never gave a damn about the politicians in Parliament. They would create no trouble for his government as long as they were allowed to join the Cabinet.

The 2014 coup, then, was to be yet another effort to embed the preferred political model.

But the junta’s plan owed much to the palace’s man in 1976, Thanin Kraivixien. He was catapulted into the prime ministership in 1976 following a massacre of students and a military coup. The king wanted the right-wing Thanin as premier. He presided over a period of fascist-like repression that was so extreme that even made some in the military leadership wonder if Thanin was damaging the military-monarchy brand.

After the 2014 coup, Thanin provided “advice” to the Prayuth Chan-ocha dictatorship. Indeed, the junta’s 20-year “roadmap” to “democracy” is modeled on Thanin’s 16-year plan for “democracy.” There are other similarities and comparisons that can be made. Among them, the junta’s draft constitution drew inspiration from the Thanin era, with Meechai Ruchupan having served Thanin as well. And, like Prayuth’s regime, Thanin’s dictatorship made excessive use of the lese majeste law to repress political opponents.

Rotten to the core

More significantly, as in the Prem period, we see a regime in decay. Some might say that this also reflects the 1990s, and that’s not wrong as Prem’s regime set the pattern. Parties forming and self-destructing as they bid for ministerial seats and the huge flow of illicit funds that underpinned a decrepit system of vote-buying and provincial gangsterism. Politicians selling themselves to the highest bidder. Politicians, military, and gangsters in cahoots, feeding at the trough of state funds. The state budget became a fund for military aggrandizement and private wealth accumulation by well-connected capitalists. Those capitalists and the military groveling before an ever more powerful monarchy.

All of this is the manner of the current corrupt regime. Did we mention Chinese gangsters? That, at least seems like an “innovation.”

Allowing Gen Prayuth/Prawit to continue in their alliances with gangsters – some of them MPs and many of them police and military brass – guarantees (perhaps) a shaky palace and keeps funds flowing, but it screws the other 65 million Thais.

 

Moving Prayuth

The Bangkok Post reports on a recent media event where the red-yellow anti-government group, Samakkhi Prachachon, came together again to demand that Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha “resign for poor governance over the past seven years.”

The group, led by Adul Khiewboriboon and Jatuporn Prompan handed over a letter that “accused Gen Prayut of failing to fulfil his promises, adding he failed to achieve reforms and reconciliation, while political conflicts have worsened and corruption has increased.” Of course, from the day of the 2014 military coup, these were false promises.

Observing that “Gen Prayut had claimed he remained in power to protect the royal institution,” they claimed his use of Article 112 was “to destroy his political opponents.” Of course, the link between military and monarchy has become almost unbreakable and defines political power and action.

Interestingly, Jatuporn “called on Gen Prayut to follow in the footsteps of the late Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, who turned down a request to remain as prime minister after holding office for eight years.” He kind of mishmashes history. Prem was essentially brought down in a campaign for an elected prime minister and by wavering support in the military.

In fact, though, for all of his failings, those who supported the coup got exactly what they wanted. Gen Prayuth remains in power, though unelected, through the support of unelected, junta-appointed senators, put in place by a constitution that rigged the political system and election laws and a politicized and biased Election Commission that rigged the 2019 election outcome. That rigged system is supported by a Constitutional Court that is remarkably biased to the extent that it appears to fall in line with the regime as if it is an arm of government.

In such a system, moving Prayuth requires splits in the regime or a major political crisis that shatters the military-monarchy-bureaucracy alliance.

The Prasit affair

Readers may recall our recent post about the fraudsters who bore remarkable similarities to the massive Mae Chamoy scam of the 1970s and 1980s. The similarities were royal and military.

Prasit displaying loyalty

Following the negotiated surrender and arrest of fraudster-in-chief Prasit Jeawkok, the Bangkok Post had a recent editorial calling for the military to reveal its links with Prasit. As ever, self-censorship, fear and misplaced loyalty prevents the Post asking about palace links.

A couple of days ago, Thai PBS provided some background on Prasit. For those who can read Thai, we suggest going to the source of much in this report – the grifter’s own website. All of our photos are clipped from that website, where there are plenty more.

The report observes that the “wealthy businessman” was once considered “a saint and a model of success” by the yellow-shirted brigade. He is now outed as a fraudster who may have nicked more than a billion baht. As seen in the Mae Chamoy scam, such fraudsters usually share with influential people in military, police, and even palace.

As can be seen at his website, Prasit made much of his links to the palace and its activities and displayed the loyalty expected of  “good people.”

Prasit claims he is a “reformed gangster” who abandoned his criminal past to establish a “billion-baht business empire” from which he now “gives back” to society. He claims a rags to riches story.

Like so many of his ilk, he’s made many influential connections.

Prasit has also “given back” as a royalist and as a supporter of the military and its ruling regime.

He’s “been linked to the Thai military’s so-called ‘information operations’ (IO), which critics say target the government’s opponents and propagandize for the powers-that-be.” Opposition politician Pannika Wanich of the Progressive Movement accuses “Prasit of being instrumental in the Army’s IO by allowing free use of computer servers under his control.”

Prasit admits “”to owning phone applications and servers used by the military but said his goal was to combat fake news by spreading facts about His Majesty the King’s kindness.”

Like many rogues, Prasit promotes “his royalist credentials. Appearing on a talk show in early December, he unbuttoned his shirt to reveal the words “Long Live the King” tattooed on his chest.”

Prasit also makes much of his relationship with the late Privy Council president Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, Prime Minister Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha, former Cabinet members and, of course, senior military leaders.

Further updated: Crooks, fraudsters, and palace

The story of four high-profile suspects arrested in connection with a fraudulent investment ring estimated to have made off with at least 1 billion baht reminded us of an earlier hi-so fraud.

In the recent case, police detained “Lt Col Dr Amraporn Visetsuk, chairwoman of the Tiao Puea Chart (Travel for the Country) project, and three others, on charges of public fraud and collaborating in fraudulent public borrowing. All of them denied the charges.” The one who got away was “suspected ringleader Prasit Jeawkok, chairman of the Kuen Khun Pandin (Paying Back the Land) project…”.

The story gets more interesting:

Last year, Pannika Wanich, spokeswoman for the Progressive Movement, accused Mr Prasit of being behind the army’s now-discredited “information operation” (IO) and allowing the army to use the servers under his control for free.

Prasit himself has “boasted of his royalist credentials and unbuttoned his shirt to show a ‘Long Live the King’ tattoo on his chest. Even if he supported IO, he declared, it was a ‘good IO’.”

Prasit has been praised by the wealthy Yuenyong Opakul or Add Carabao who is also a mad monarchist, writing “the song ‘Prasit the Giver,’ praising his good deeds under the Kuen Khun Pandin project in July 2019.”

All of this is vaguely familiar to anyone old enough to remember the fantastic Mae Chamoy fraud case in the mid-1980s that saw Chamoy Thipyaso and seven others found guilty of corporate fraud and on 27 July 1989, sentenced her to 141,078 years in prison. She only served 8 years.

It was her connections with the military, and especially the Royal Thai Air Force and also with the Petroleum Authority of Thailand, saw her chit fund scheme go on for almost 20 years, providing huge returns to some at the top of the pyramid scheme.

As the linked report states:

Among her clients there were prominent members from the military and the Royal Household, which prompted calls for the Thai government to bail out the banks and chit funds. Discussions of an unknown nature were made with King Bhumibol Adulyadej, following which the chit fund was wound up and Thipyaso arrested. She was [d]etained secretly by the Air Force for a few days.

Thipyaso’s trial only commenced after the losses of the victims from the military and royal staff were recovered….

Paul Handley’s The King Never Smiles (pp. 308-9) has more on the scheme:

Chit funds were pyramid schemes that had blossomed over several years without intervention from the government, in part because many had strong government connections. One especially, the Mae (Mother) Chamoy Fund, was estimated at $300 million and involved large numbers of investors from the military and, it soon became apparent, the royal household, including probably Sirikit, Vajiralongkorn, Ubolrat, and Chulabhorn. With such prominent and politically significant people likely to lose massively in the Mae Chamoy collapse, [Gen] Arthit [Kamlang-ek] stepped in again. He threatened a coup if the government did not rescind the [recent baht] devaluation and bail out the banks and chit funds.

This time, King Bhumibol himself rescued [Gen] Prem [Tinsulanonda], without saying anything. Prem went to stay at the Phuphan Palace for nine days, and each day the media ran pictures of Prem with the king, queen, and crown prince. Making the message clear, when Prem returned to Bangkok he was escorted by Prince Vajiralongkorn and Chulabhorn’s consort Captain Virayuth. When Arthit then flew to the Phuphan Palace, Prem turned around and went back. What was said in their discussions with the king was not made public, but the episode ended with Prem still in power and Arthit unpunished for his series of mutinous acts. The devaluation stood and the Mae Chamoy Fund was shut down, but only after more backhall dealings managed by Prem. Fund manager Chamoy was arrested and held in secret by the air force until, it is believed, the losses of palace and military personnel and other high officials were recovered. Only afterward was she tried and sent to prison. Her hearing was held in camera and the records were sealed, presumably to protect the palace. Meanwhile thousands, possibly tens of thousands, of people who didn’t have special protectors lost their savings.

Are we completely mad to wonder if there aren’t some coincidences of news now and news then?

Update 1: Adding to the mystery and protection of fraudsters, it is reported that Prasit Jeawkok has done a deal with police to surrender to them on 17 May. It is common for influential people to arrange this kind of deal and arrive to meet police with influential figures and lawyers. At the same time, we are told that “the Second Army pledged the suspect, Lt Col Amaraphon, who is attached with the Second Army’s Support Command, will face punishment if she is found guilty.” That’s a familiar refrain, seldom ever carried out.

Update 2: Thai Enquirer has two op-eds on this case, here and here. Is anyone surprised that Lt Col Amaraphon already has bail? Scams like this produce huge cash flows for big shots.

Thailand and Myanmar’s generals

Oren Samet has a useful article at The Diplomat. “The Myanmar Public Fights Not to End Up Like Thailand” makes some points that need attention. It begins:

A week after overthrowing Myanmar’s elected civilian government on February 1, coup leader [Gen] Min Aung Hlaing sent a letter to Thai Prime Minister [Gen] Prayut Chan-o-cha asking – with no hint of irony – for his help in supporting “democracy” in Myanmar. The letter was revealing not for what it said, but for who it was addressed to. Prayut is, himself, a former general, who overthrew Thailand’s elected government in 2014 and has been in charge ever since. When it comes to coups, Thailand’s generals know what they’re doing.

As we know, and despite initial silence and opacity, in recent days, representative’s of Myanmar’s military junta have been meeting with Thai counterparts – most of whom were a part or associated with Thailand’s own military junta in 2014-19.

As far as we know, this is the first overseas visit by a Myanmar government representative since its hugely popular and elected government was thrown out by the coup.

According to Samet, the Myanmar generals are following a Thai script:

When Min Aung Hlaing made his first televised statement since taking power, he repeatedly emphasized that government policies would remain unchanged and welcomed continued foreign investment. Despite the disastrous consequences of previous military takeovers in Myanmar, he promised that this coup would be different.

He might as well have said, “this time we’re doing it Thai style.”

Samet rightly points out that Gen Min Aung Hlaing:

has close connections to the Thai military. He received multiple high-level honors from the Thai authorities, even after orchestrating the Rohingya genocide in 2017. Prem Tinsulanonda, a previous Thai general turned prime minister, considered Min Aung Hlaing his “adopted son.”

Thailand’s royalist military and the interfering Gen Prem has, from the ashes, helped in bringing authoritarianism back to Myanmar.

But, as the world knows, the Myanmar generals are facing stiff opposition. This is not, as Samet claims, being unable to follow the Thai example, but different circumstances. In 2014, the Thai generals didn’t face widespread opposition because they had eliminated, through repression and jailings, the red shirt opposition and its leaders. At the same time, like Thailand’s yellow shirts who hated Thaksin Shinawatra, in Myanmar, several public intellectuals with civil society links have gone over to the generals and express an intense hatred of Aung San Suu Kyi and her alleged arrogance.

The other thing that the Thai military might have shown their buddies across the border is that it is possible to wait out civil opposition while picking off some of that oppositions leadership. The men with guns know that peaceful protest can often be waited out.

Monarchy, politics and partisanship

Remember all the bleating about the king being above politics?

We all know that this is buffalo manure, demonstrated by the king himself in recent days.

Interestingly, there’s more evidence of the palace being directly involved in politics that emerges on an almost daily basis.

One example is in The Nation, where Parliament president Chuan Leekpai has stated that “he had consulted Privy Councillor [Gen] Surayud Chulanont … about plans for a national reconciliation committee to resolve rising political conflict.” Chuan added “that Surayud, a former Army chief and post-2016 coup PM, declined to express an opinion on the topic.” Sort of: “he asked all sides to consider the community at large…”.

What’s wrong with that? After all, the old meddler, Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, was interfering all the time. But that was wrong. Like the king, the Privy Council is supposed to be above politics, and under the constitution, providing advice to the king, not to leaders of the legislature.

A second example is about other bodies that claim to be “neutral.” The Office of the Chularatchamontri claims that it and all “Islamic organisations at all levels maintain political neutrality.” This didn’t stop them staging “a mass gathering for Muslim residents who stand united in wanting to protect the country’s three pillar institutions.” The report adds:

The event called Ruam Palang Muslim Pokpong Sathaban Chart Sat Kasat (Uniting Muslim Power to Protect the Nation, Religion and the Royal Institution), was presided over by Aziz Pitukkumpol, the Chularatchamontri.

The event took place at the National Administration Centre for Islamic Affairs Chalerm Phrakiat in Bangkok’s Nong Chok district. It was attended by a large crowd of Muslim residents who wore yellow and waved the national and royal flags.

We understand that the Office is a bureaucratic and state organization, and probably was ordered to mobilize, and that the Chularatchamontri is appointed by the king, but why babble about “neutrality” and then act in highly partisan manner?

No one is above politics, and the right continues to use offices of the state for political purposes. The king will be pleased.

Challenging monarchism I

Pro-democracy protesters have dramatically changed Thailand’s political and cultural landscape.

One of the best examples is in newspaper reporting. Some outlets have gone full-on mad monarchist, but all are reporting on the monarchy as never before. It was only a few weeks ago that Thais relying on the mainstream media might easily have thought that the king and queen were living in Thailand. Almost no outlet ever mentioned much about the royals spending all their time in Germany and Switzerland.

That’s all changed.

These outlets have to report on events such as last evening’s march to the German Embassy in Bangkok. In reporting such events, the media find that they must say something about them. Sure, they still self-censor on the most radical statements and the students poking fun at the monarch and even purloining his recent statements to ultra-royalists as anti-monarchy memes. For example, when Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha ignored the demand that he go, the Khana Ratsadon 2563 named the 26 October march to the German Embassy “Very Brave, Very Good,” with the note: “Because we can’t talk sense with the dog, we shall talk to the dog’s owner.” A huge banner read: “Reform the Monarchy.”

While not mainstream, like many other outlets, Thisrupt explained why the protesters were going to the German Embassy: “Today, Khana Ratsadon will march from Samyan Intersection to the German Embassy on Sathorn Road. Germany has been the residence of … King Rama 10 for many years. ”

The Nation reports: “Pro-democracy demonstrators submitted a letter to the German embassy in Bangkok on Monday asking its government to investigate whether HM the King is ruling from German soil.” The protesters stated; “The request is aimed at reinstating … the King to Thailand so the Palace is placed under the Constitution and Thailand can return to being a genuine constitutional monarchy…”.

A Thai PBS photo

Thai PBS reports: “Thousands of protesters ended their rally in front of the German Embassy on South Sathorn Road after submitting a letter addressed to the German government stressing their call for Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha to resign and demanding a probe into … the King’s frequent visits to Germany.”

Can anyone imagine such a reporting even a month ago?

Even anti-democrat ultra-royalists have had to acknowledge that the king they claim to revere prefers to spend his time living the high life in Germany. Their tiny rally at the German Embassy before the thousands of pro-democracy protesters showed up, begged the German government to ignore the “false information” about their usually absent king.

We don’t think the monarchy can recover from this. Of course, after its involvement in the 1976 massacre at Thammasat University, the monarchy took years to recover its ideological hegemony, mainly through military-backed government led by unelected premier and groveling royalist Gen Prem Tinsulanonda. In parliament, ultra-royalists like the reprehensible Paiboon Nititawan, an MP for the junta’s Palang Pracharath Party, continue to wind the clock backwards, “accusing protesters of trying to overthrow the monarchy.”

Military supporters like Paiboon may want the extreme repression and bloodshed they’ll need to push the anti-royalist genie back into the bottle. We think the bottle is also broken.