The junta’s paid puppets

The Nation reports that the 250 unelected senators, the faithful stooges appointed by the military regime to protect the establishment, are now supposed to be out of their jobs. Be assured they will hang on until the new senate is selected in a junta-designed farcical process.

Those dolts had a five-year term under the junta’s undemocratic 2017 Constitution.

The report is about listing the “achievements” of this bunch.

Listed at the top is the rejection of Move Forward’s Pita Limjaroenrat as prime minister and the approval for Puea Thai Party’s Srettha Thavisin where he received only about half of the votes from the junta’s chamber. Pita only got 13 senate votes. This is listed as the senate’s great achievement as this is exactly the scenario it was designed for: seeing off anyone remotely progressive. That was pitched as being a vote for the monarchy.

Back in 2019, this senate voted for Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha, their boss and 2014’s coup maker. Not a single senator voted against him.

The senate vote for a general

Between May 22, 2019 and April 2024, constitutional amendment was resolutely opposed. And, they ensured that only establishment supporting royalists were appointed to the Constitutional Court, the Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, the Election Commission, the Ombudsman’s Office, the State Audit Commission, and one Auditor-General’s Office director.

Political harassment continues

Thai Lawyers for Human Rights reports on continuing political harassment, particularly of young activists.

Interestingly, it was found that these cases represent a continuation of the approach taken by the military-backed royalist regime of Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha. TLHR see “no significant changes occurring under the Srettha Thavisin government.”

Srettha

Looking at the period March-April 2024, TLHR found that officials were continuing to follow and question political activists – no less than 24 cases – while there were seven additional cases of obstruction – interference in activities – related to public expressions.

The most common form of harassment is to meet or inquire about information at a home or private area, while others had phone calls from officials, and some were called in for a talk at state offices.

In this two-month period, officials, and particularly the police, go after activists who have organized or participated in political rallies. In particular, they targeted those who they considered were infringing upon the royal family, especially when they were traveling.

In these cases, officials target those they consider likely to “cause trouble” during a royal visit. This involves visits, calls, and following “suspects.” The report points out that such pre-emptive harassment is now a normalized state activity.

For example, a recent propaganda/photo opportunity for the king and queen involved a bicycle ride in Pichet. Before the event, officials followed or spied on at least five activists.

Yachts, helicopters and warships

After the anti-monarchy rebellion at the beginning of the decade, the efforts of the royalist regime led by Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha, now continued by the Puea Thai-led conservative coalition, appear to have “normalized” ridiculous royalism. Of course, ridiculous royalism fleeces taxpayers.

Ridiculous royalism is not only expensive, but attributes ridiculous attributes to royals. This can be seen in a   recent report at The Nation.

In this report, King Vajiralongkorn and Queen Suthida are reported to have been ferried to the Regent Cha Am Hotel “to preside over a sailing competition across the Gulf of Thailand in celebration of the King’s upcoming 72nd birthday…”.

Clipped from The Nation

This reporting is also a part of a long campaign to link the current king and queen to the legacy of the previous king, Bhumibol. The report trawls up old claims about the dead king as a great sailor. Over the past few months, there have been a few stories extolling Queen Suthida’s sudden emergence as a “skilled” and “winning” yacht sailor.

In this report, she is said to have crewed on a “THA72 sailboat in the IRC zero class, and emerged victorious.” Of course it did.

THA 72 is reported to be “a Sailing Vessel and is sailing under the flag of United Kingdom. Her length overall (LOA) is 15 meters and her width is 4 meters.” It is reportedly a family pro-am team, based in Southeast Asia. For an idea of the limited fields and the interlinked, almost incestuous, nature of the rich persons sport, see this Bangkok Post story from 2023.

This year’s “race started at Cha Am beach in Phetchaburi province and finished at Toey Ngam Beach in Sattahip district of Chonburi province, a distance of 45 nautical miles.” There were just eight teams.

It is reported that the king boarded the “HTMS Bhumibol Adulyadej ship to witness the race along the route off the coast of Phetchaburi to Chonburi province.” That’s a whole navy ship given over to the king for a morning out.

The “race” is “organised by the Royal Thai Navy and the Yacht Racing Association of Thailand…”.

In the afternoon, in Satthahip, the king and queen “visited the Royal Thai Marine Corps Monument in Sattahip district to take photographs with members of the Vayu team and sign their names in the visitor book.” A few hours later they “attended a ceremony at Royal Thai Marine Corps headquarters to present awards to winners of the race. Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Adung Phan-iam also presented a commemorative medal to the King.”

Among royalists, the idea that the king should “bestow… a trophy, modelled after the helm of King Bhumibol’s Vega boat, to Queen Suthida, who received it on behalf of the Vayu team” is not seen as in any way silly.

They were then loaded onto a helicopter to be ferried back to Bangkok.

Not a thought for cost. Limousines, luxury hotels, helicopters, yachts, banquets, thousands of personnel, and all paid for by the long suffering and long burdened taxpayer.

Penguin’s 112 “record”

Parit Chiwarak or Penguin, who has been spending time in the monkhood, has recently “reported to police this week to answer another lese-majeste case, bringing the total number he faces to a record-setting 25…”.

If he was convicted on all charges, the total sentence would be between 75 and 375 years in prison.

According to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, this latest case stems from a complaint made by former Palang Pracharath Party MP Pareena Kraikupt over “a social media post he made in December 2021…”.

In 2022, Pareena was banned from politics by the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions, for “ethical” violations.

Penguin’s social media post was about a Constitutional Court ruling where he is “accused of offending the monarch as well as violating the computer crime law.”

Penguin “met with investigators at the Thong Lor police station on Thursday and denied both charges against him. He also refused to have his fingerprints taken and told investigators he would submit a statement of defence within 30 days. He was released after acknowledging the charges.”

Srisuwan cops a charge

Big news over the last 24 hours or so is the police trap that was set and captured serial complainer Srisuwan Janya, red shirt turncoat Yoswaris Chuklom, now with the pro-Prayuth Chano-cha United Thai Nation Party, and Pimnattha Jiraputthiphak of the same party.

Clipped from The Nation

They were charged with attempting to extort 1.5 million baht from Rice Department Director-General Natthakit Khongthip, in exchange for not exposing his alleged corruption related to the rice production cost reduction program.

On Yoswaris and Pimnattha, Deputy Prime Minister-cum-Energy Minister Pirapan Salirathavibhaga, who is their party leader, “quickly came out to say that while Yoswarit is a member of his party the police investigation results have to be first studied to determine whether he behaved inappropriately thus damaging the party’s reputation or was it a mistake.” He then tried to distance the party from the pair.

Srisuwan denied the charges, blamed political enemies, and was eventually bailed, along with the other two.

Srisuwan also denied the evidence of the police sting operation. The police took action after being informed by Rice Department Director-General Natthakit “that Srisuwan and his accomplices had demanded 3 million baht to drop a complaint about two major government projects with this reduced to 1.5 million baht after negotiation.” He claimed he earlier paid 140,000 baht, partly to gain evidence, and then yesterday put 500,000 baht in a bag and hung it on the front gate of Sriswan’s house. It was collected by Srisuwan’s wife.

Police waited “for an hour then went in, but someone in the house dashed to the rear and flung the bag with the money across to the neighbouring house. This was then retrieved from there.”

In a dodgy story, he claimed “that his wife showed it to him and as it looked suspicious they threw into their neighbour’s compound.” He must have a good neighbor policy where he dumps rubbish at his neighbor’s place….

He told others in “the media that he threw away the package, which his wife had found at the front gate of his house and found it to contain cash.” It is a developing dodgy story.

All those double standards

When special deals are done in the judicial system, with high-level influence, the double standards become glaringly obvious. There’s been lots of attention to the buffalo manure piled high in the Thaksin Shinawatra deal.

We guess that one of the thoughts that Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, a Move Forward Party MP and chairman of the House committee on military affairs and Jirat Thongsuwan, another MFP MP may be to highlight double standards. As the Bangkok Post reports, Jirat is “calling for access to film Gen Prayut[h Chan-ocha]’s [taxpayer-funded, military supplied] residence to see how he is living now his time as prime minister has ended.”

The MFP had previously criticized Gen Prayuth’s use of the luxury villa in a Bangkok military compound when the general was unelected prime minister. Entitled to such pampering when army chief, he has “remained there despite leaving the premiership [to be made a privy councilor], citing security reasons.”

Wiroj’s committee is set to discuss this. But, of course, the suggestion “has drawn a backlash from critics.”

The United Thai Nation Party, created for Prayuth and soundly trounced in the election, but still a part of unelected Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s coalition, accused Jirat of “running the panel into disrepute for overstepping his mark.”

A Defense Ministry spokesperson went to the protection offered by the monarchy, and “said he was afraid it would not be appropriate to grant filming access to Gen Prayut’s residence as he now serves on the privy council and is a highly respected figure in the country.” That royal protection has been predicted.

Thanakorn Wangboonkongchana, a UTN deputy leader “insisted Gen Prayut should be left alone as he is no longer involved in politics.” Thanakorn also raised the politicized Constitutional Court’s ruling that the then “premier was rightfully occupying the house.” He says nothing about a former general, prime minister, and now privy councilor doing this.

The army continues to assert that Gen Prayuth “had complied with regulations governing the occupation of a military house.”

Is he? That seems to be the question. Reader’s will, of course, recall that Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, also a former general, prime minister, and privy councilor occupied a taxpayer-funded residence for much of his life from the 1980s. After he croaked, the military “gave” that house to the king who promptly had it demolished.

Release the political prisoners!

Without the conscience that was the red shirts of yore, the Puea Thai Party is morally rudderless and now attached at the hip to the conservatives who have stifled political progress for decades. Take, for example, the mooted delivery of “aid” to Myanmar. For all of the effort to portray this as “humanitarian,” it is the military’s and regime’s effort to support fellow conservatives. This is the kind of intervention that might have been expected from Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha’s regime.

A domestic example is the failure of the “new” government to address the plight of political prisoners and those facing legal cases that derive from political expression.

The call for change continues. As reported by Prachatai, a few days ago, “protesters stood for 1 hour and 12 minutes along the road passing Tha Phae gate, a tourist landmark in Chiang Mai’s old town, to demand the release of political prisoners and to show support for [lese majeste prisoner] Anon [Nampa], who was attending a witness examination hearing at the Chiang Mai Provincial Court.”

One protester observed: “My feeling is that it’s unjust for intellectual fighters, and I want to tell Anon to keep fighting. Those of us who are outside will also fight. Time is moving forward every second. Something has to change. Nothing lasts forever…”.

Increasingly, protesters are critical of royalist courts and their double standards.

According to the report, “24 people remain in detention pending trial or appeal on charges relating to participation in pro-democracy protests. Of this number, 15 are detained pending trial or appeal on [Article 112] charges, including Anon, who has been detained since 26 September 2023.”

Thaksin-Prayuth

A reader sent us the following article as a reflection on recent events:

On 29 November 2023, Thailand’s Royal Gazette announced that King Vajiralongkorn had, on 21 October, signed an order appointing 2014 coup leader and prime minister Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha to his Privy Council.

In one sense, this was a reward for a military leader who had spent his career providing loyal service to the palace. Yet like Gen Prem Tinsulanonda before him, Prayuth had been more than a run-of-the-mill loyal servant. Both had been army commanders who also spent many years as prime ministers without facing the electorate.

Like Prem, as prime minister Prayuth worked assiduously to strengthen Thailand’s conservative polity, where the military and bureaucracy controlled politics under the auspices of the monarchy and where super-rich tycoons provided support for the regime. Prayuth’s military-backed regime established a constitution and numerous associated laws that codified the conservative polity – a system he referred to as “Thai-style democracy” – establishing extraordinary powers for unelected bodies that gave them “oversight” of elections and elected governments.

That system worked as expected in 2019, delivering an election victory to military-backed parties that extended Prayuth’s tenure as prime minister. Yet, as the 2023 approached, it was clear that the military-backed parties would be trounced. Voters wanted change and were drawn to opposition parties that promised an end to Prayuth’s regime and the military’s control of politics.

Thaksin Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai Party led in many pre-election polls. However, as the campaign developed, Pheu Thai’s opposition partner the Move Forward Party also polled strongly. It looked likely that Move Forward would be a part of a post-election government.

The conservative establishment, composed of military leaders, palace officials, the wealthiest tycoons, and other royalists, was aghast and fearful that the years of Prayuth’s conservative polity would be undone by Move Forward’s “radical” and anti-monarchy reformism.

The wave of public support for Move Forward was born not just of a desire for change, but also of the dissolution of its predecessor party, Future Forward, and the exuberant monarchy reform movement that partly resulted from that dissolution. Prayuth’s government had seen off the monarchy reform movement by facing down street protests and by using the judicial system to bury articulate reformers under a barrage of legal cases. Many were charged with multiple counts of lese majeste.

The regime may have stifled dissent, but its heavy-handed repression made military-backed parties unelectable. To save the conservative polity, the establishment did the unthinkable. After years of casting Thaksin as an evil anti-monarchist and battling his Thai Rak Thai-People Power Party-Pheu Thai Party, it turned to Pheu Thai. Dealing with Thaksin and Pheu Thai was preferable to allowing the Move Forward Party to have a hand in a post-election government.

A week before the May 2023 election, in a secret meeting, Thaksin and palace and tycoon figures did a deal – always publicly denied – that would keep Move Forward out of a Pheu Thai Party coalition government and kept the military-backed parties in the coalition. The details of the deal will probably never be revealed. However, Thaksin soon returned from exile, served less than a day in prison, and received a royal pardon for most of his sentence. And, despite being edged in the election by Move Forward, Pheu Thai formed government.

Credit: Khaosod

In the election campaign, recognizing the electorate’s yearning for change, Pheu Thai portrayed itself as a populist agent of change, implying it would reject military-backed parties and promising a government that would bring social, economic, and political reform.

After the election, Pheu Thai spokespersons somewhat unenthusiastically participated in coalition talks with Move Forward. But these talks were soon derailed by royalist taunts that Move Forward was anti-royalist and multiple calls for it to be dissolved. Meanwhile, the Senate made it clear that the party’s leader Pita Limjaroenrat could never be approved by parliament as prime minister.

The Senate, entirely made up of members appointed by Prayuth’s military junta, operated under transitory constitutional provisions that made approval of a prime minister a matter for a joint sitting of both houses of parliament. These senators duly rejected Pita. Meanwhile, agencies the Prayuth regime had populated with its supporters moved against Pita. In what some saw as a plot, the Constitutional Court suspended Pita from parliament while it considered two flimsy cases that could result in Pita’s banning from politics and the dissolution of the party.

The stymying of Move Forward gave Pheu Thai an opportunity to form a coalition government and nominate real estate tycoon and establishment scion Srettha Thavisin as prime minister. Srettha promptly received the overwhelming support of both houses in parliament. In coalition building, Pheu Thai rejected Move Forward while Srettha’s 34-member cabinet includes 16 ministers drawn from the parties from the previous government.

The first months of Srettha’s government have been marked by its unwillingness to do anything new. The circumstances of its rise and the determination to keep Thaksin from jail mean that it has to  abandon campaign promises and slow signature policies to a snail’s pace, including its 10,000 baht digital wallet, meant to stimulate a listless economy. Yet the conservative polity has been maintained.

We may never know if Prayuth’s Privy Council appointment was a part of the historic deal to overturn Move Forward’s electoral success and preserve the conservative polity. Yet that appointment fittingly bookends the successful effort to maintain Prayuth’s political legacy. Conveniently, being appointed to the Privy Council shields Prayuth from political criticism and any legal repercussions from his coup leadership and his actions as the establishment’s prime minister.

112 update I

During the break we took over the past few weeks, there have been several developments related to Article 112. As a matter of record, we list these stories and sources, in rough chronological order, over two posts.

The Bangkok Post reported on the amnesty bill proposed by the Move Forward Party by pointing to the significant opposition to the bill. As expected, this opposition comes from the royalist parties of the current Srettha Thavisin government.

Their opposition hinges on lese majeste, as did the narratives used following the election to sideline Move Forward, on Article 112. Puea Thai’s Deputy Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai has mentioned this as what will be the regime’s response. Puea Thai is gleeful and slimy when manipulating Thaksin’s personal “amnesty,” but seems uninterested in political prisoners and former prisoners.

Royalist posterior polisher and Chartthaipattana Party leader Varawut Silpa-archa said “his party is against granting amnesty to people charged with or convicted of lese majeste or of serious offences causing damage to the nation.” Meanwhile, Nikorn Chamnong, also of Chartthaipattana said “he agrees with the government proposing its own amnesty bill but emphasized that any proposal must exclude lese majeste and serious crimes.” In other words, the regime will manipulate a partial amnesty bill but will steer clear of free speech, monarchy-related “crimes.”

Of course, lese majeste offenses skyrocketed under the previous regime as a means to defeat monarchy reformers. This has left hundreds of people charged, convicted, or awaiting trials, most bailed but a dozen or so still in prison.

While estimates of numbers are often provided, we assume that there are some that never get attention. For example, Prachatai recently reported that a 51 year-old man, identified as Yong (first and last name withheld) “has recently been found detained in Bangkok Remand Prison since 2020 after being found guilty” of lese majeste.

Yong was previously a taxi driver. He said “ he had previously participated in the 2010 Red Shirt protests. He also witnessed the shooting in the head of Red Shirt military chief Maj Gen Khattiya ‘Seh Daeng’ Sawasdipol at the Saladaeng intersection.”

Yong stated that he has been detained for three years. His case stemmed from a comment he made on a Facebook post “that contained an image of the royal family and interacted with others on the post.”

He was arrested by officials from the military, including the Internal Security Operation Command and taken to the 11th Infantry Regiment and detained for 3-4 days, during which time his mobile phone was confiscated. This detention by the military was common under the military junta led by Gen Prayuth.

After he was transferred to the police and informed of the 112 and computer crimes charges, Yong was detained for 19 days before filing a bail application. He was later released on bail. However, after being released, “he decided to plead guilty on 1 December 2020. Yong was sentenced to 12 years in prison, but due to his guilty plea, the sentence was reduced to 6 years.”

Yong also “added that he had received two pardons on special occasions which reduced his sentence. His remaining sentence is approximately 7 months and he expects to be released on 15 June 2024.”

Of course, some get it easier than others.

Clipped from Prachatai

The Bangkok Post reported that a “former co-leader of pro-democracy demonstrations who later switched to support a party linked to former prime minister [Gen] Prayut[h] Chan-o-cha has received a suspended sentence for royal defamation in connection with a rally staged in February 2002.”

Shinawat “Bright” Chankrachang is described as “a former co-leader of the Rasadon group, which staged street protests against the military-backed government led by Gen Prayut.”  He later turned to “helping candidates of the Prayut-linked United Thai Nation Party,” a group of military-supported royalists, in the May election.

Turncoats are a common feature of Thailand’s politics. Shinawat claims that his turning got him special treatment.

… the court notified me that I have turned over a new leaf and carried out community work to benefit society…. The court then suspended my jail term for two years and ordered me to report to probation officials.

Shinawat claims he was previously “misguided.”

The Privy Council and the bourgeoisie

The social media distaste expressed for the king’s appointment of royalist posterior polisher, coup maker, constitution smasher, and commander of murderous military units, Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha, to the Privy Council has prompted yet another effort to veneer the obvious.

The Nation has been prompted/ordered to publish something it headlines “Some facts about the Privy Council of Thailand.”

The article is pretty straight up and down, reading the official screed.  However, as it notes that “[privy] councilors cannot be partisan…”, and refers to official positions, it says nothing about the fact that every privy councilor is partisan in political terms. That’s why there are so many former military and police officers appointed. It is but a committee for the palace and the royalist ruling class.

The only statement in the account that might be considered mildly controversial is the observation that “Privy councillors are not … prohibited from sitting on the boards of influential companies.” As we said, it is but a committee for the palace and the royalist ruling class.

Privy councilors get on well with their betters in the Sino-Thai bourgeoisie, and have often made family fortunes by skimming when in official positions.  In the Privy Council, the relationship is cemented, as is the relations ship between bourgeoisie and palace.