Constitutional Court and international law

The International Federation for Human Rights (fidh) has issued a press release regarding the Constitutional Court and the Move Forward Party.

It is issued with its member organizations, Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) and Union for Civil Liberty (UCL). They “call on Thailand’s Constitutional Court to dismiss the petition to dissolve the Move Forward Party (MFP) to ensure compliance with the country’s obligations under international human rights law.”

The full release follows:

Thailand: Looming dissolution of main opposition party in breach of international law

Bangkok, Paris, 17 April 2024. On 3 April 2024, the Constitutional Court accepted a petition filed by the Election Commission (EC) to seek the dissolution of the opposition Move Forward Party (MFP), the political party that won the highest number of votes (14.4 millions) and parliamentary seats (151) in the 14 May 2023 general election.

The case against the MFP stemmed from the party’s submission of a bill to the Speaker of the House of Representatives in March 2021 to amend Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code (known as lèse-majesté, or royal defamation), [1] as well as its campaign to amend Article 112 during the period leading up to the general election. If dissolved, the party’s leader and executive members face a ban on holding political office for 10 years.

“Proposing laws is a legitimate and natural prerogative of legislators and should never lead to the dissolution of a political party. The looming dissolution of the Move Forward Party would disenfranchise millions of voters and breach Thailand’s obligations under international human rights law. It’s time for Thailand’s so-called ‘independent institutions’ to stop unduly interfering in democratic processes and constantly nullifying the will of the voters,” said FIDH Secretary-General Adilur Rahman Khan.

The dissolution of a political party and a ban on its leaders and executives from holding political office are inconsistent with several provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Thailand is a state party. Such provisions guarantee the right to freedom of expression (Article 19), the right to freedom of association (Article 22), and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs and to be elected (Article 25). Thailand has an obligation to fully respect, protect, and fulfill these rights.

The right to freedom of expression is “particularly necessary to ensure the functioning of political parties in a democratic society,” according to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee (CCPR), the body that monitors state parties’ compliance with the ICCPR’s provisions. [2]

The right to freedom of association includes the right to form and join associations concerned with political and public affairs, as well as the right of such associations to freely carry out their activities. The CCPR has regarded political parties as “a form of association essential to the proper functioning of democracy,” including those whose existence and operation “peacefully promote ideas not necessarily favorably received by the government or the majority of the population.” [3]

Under the ICCPR, the restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association are permissible only if they comply with the strict tests of legality, necessity, and proportionality. In particular, the ICCPR has emphasized that any restrictions on political parties must be necessary to address “a real and not only hypothetical threat to national security or democratic order” and “proportionate to the interest to be protected.” [4]

FIDH, TLHR, and UCL believe that the dissolution of the MFP simply because of its legitimate proposal to amend legislation through lawful means guaranteed by Thailand’s Constitution and international law would amount to an unnecessary and disproportionate restriction on the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of association, and, as such, is inconsistent with the ICCPR’s provisions.

In addition, the ICCPR reaffirmed that political parties and membership in parties “play a significant role in the conduct of public affairs.” [5] According to the ICCPR, the exercise of the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs by citizens can only be suspended or excluded on “objective and reasonable” grounds. [6] It further noted that the full exercise of such right requires the full enjoyment of, and respect for, the rights to freedom of expression and association, including “freedom to debate public affairs, […], to criticize and oppose, […] and to advertise political ideas.” [7]

The ban on party executives on holding political office, therefore, unreasonably deprives them of the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs.

FIDH, TLHR, and UCL note that for more than a decade, many UN human rights experts and bodies have found Article 112 of Thailand’s Criminal Code to be inconsistent with international human rights law and have called for its amendment or repeal.

FIDH, TLHR, and UCL recall that, on 12 February 2024, Thailand’s Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin stated that discussion around the Thai monarchy should be held in “appropriate venues,” including Parliament. [8]

FIDH, TLHR, and UCL also recall the remarks made by Mr. Srettha himself on 6 April 2023 that Article 112 was “problematic in its enforcement,” and that it needed to be reviewed “to prevent it from being used as a political tool.” [9] On a separate occasion, on 3 May 2023, Mr. Srettha stated that Article 112 should be amended. [10]

A history of one-sided party dissolutions

The EC’s petition was based on the Constitutional Court’s ruling on 31 January 2024 that the MFP’s proposed policy to amend Article 112 amounted to an attempt “to overthrow the democratic regime of government with the King as head of state,” stipulated in Article 49 of Thailand’s Constitution – an accusation the MFP has repeatedly denied. The Constitutional Court ordered that the MFP refrain from taking any further actions and expressing opinions that advocate for the repeal of Article 112. The ruling provided grounds for the EC to request the Constitutional Court to dissolve the MFP and ban its executives from holding political office under Article 92 of the 2017 Organic Act on Political Parties, which stipulates that the Constitutional Court can order the dissolution of political parties that commit acts to overthrow the constitutional monarchy.

Over the past two decades, the Constitutional Court dissolved several key anti-establishment political parties on questionable grounds, and banned their executives from holding political office for up to 10 years.

On 30 May 2007, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Thai Rak Thai party, and banned 111 executives from politics for five years for allegedly manipulating the April 2006 general election.

On 2 December 2008, the Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the then-ruling People’s Power party for electoral fraud in relation to the general election in December 2007. The Court also banned 37 party leaders and executives from politics for five years, including then-Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat.

On 7 March 2019, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Thai Raksa Chart party and banned 14 executives from politics for 10 years for nominating King Rama X’s sister, Ubolratana Mahidol, as a prime ministerial candidate ahead of the March 2019 general election. The Court considered the nomination to be “hostile to constitutional monarchy,” which it deemed to be in violation of Article 92 of the 2017 Organic Act on Political Parties.

On 21 February 2020, the Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the MFP’s predecessor Future Forward Party (FFP) for violating election laws. The Court ruled that a 191 million baht (approx. US$6 million) loan the FFP obtained from its leaders was in violation of Article 66 and 72 of the 2017 Organic Act on Political Parties, which limit legal donations from individuals at 10 million baht (approx. US$316,000), although there is no specific provision prohibiting anyone from issuing a loan to a political party. The Court also banned 16 party executives from politics for 10 years.

Footnotes
[1] Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code punishes with prison terms of three to 15 years per count anyone who is found guilty of defaming, insulting or threatening the King, Queen, Heir to the throne or Regent.
[2] UN Human Rights Committee, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 3593/2019, 15 January 2021; UN Doc. CCPR/C/130/D/3593/2019
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service (Art. 25), 12 July 1996; UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7
[6] UN Human Rights Committee, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 3593/2019, 15 January 2021; UN Doc. CCPR/C/130/D/3593/2019
[7] Ibid.
[8] Reuters, Thai PM urges royal convoy debate in ‘safe spaces’ after violence, 12 February 2024; https://shorturl.at/ixMOX
[9] Thairath TV, 6 April 2023 [in Thai]; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=81x1FFW0fKc
[10] Standard, 3 May 2023 [in Thai]; https://www.youtube.com/shorts/9yEXEBYvfIM

Updated: Move Forward’s location

In an article  at the World Socialist Web Site, Robert Campion reflects on the impending fate of Move Forward, noting that the “proceedings demonstrate the utterly anti-democratic character of the Thai parliamentary system.”

It is argued that the “party’s dissolution would represent the disenfranchisement of 38 percent of those voting in last year’s election, or 14.4 million people who voted for the MFP, more than any other party…. Millions of people no doubt backed the MFP hoping it would bring about genuine changes in government.”

The author then engages in some class analysis:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MFP_B_Final-01-1024×724.png

In reality, the MFP is not a real threat to the Thai ruling establishment, but rather functions to contain growing political opposition to the ruling class within the narrow confines of what passes for parliamentary democracy in Thailand. It is a bourgeois party, representing aspiring sections of the corporate and financial elite, that masquerades as a “progressive” opponent of the military and more right-wing sections of the Thai state.

That would seem reasonable although the description is probably more apt when applied to Puea Thai: it is a bourgeois party that once masqueraded as progressive (to win votes) and which has been (willingly) co-opted to see off change.

And it points to “MFP’s passive response to its possible dissolution,” saying that the party “is not making any attempt to mobilise workers and youth in opposition to the Thai state’s flagrant attack on democratic rights.” It adds: “The MFP is just a fearful as its political opponents of any independent movement of workers and youth and is seeking to head off any mass protests, such as those that followed the dissolution of the MFP’s predecessor, the Future Forward Party (FFP), in 2020.”

We are not convinced that this is accurate, especially as the party is yet to be dissolved. It was after Future Forward was dissolved that people mobilized. This will be in the minds of strategists in other parties, in the courts and among military leaders, and in the palace as the Constitutional Court concocts its decision.

Update: For Puea Thai defacto leader Thaksin Shinawatra’s perspective on where the party is located, see his claim that it “is not a neo conservative party, but a reformist party, dating back to its founding as the Thai Rak Thai party…”. As to an example of the party’s “reformism,” he cited the “digital wallet” scheme, which he said was a “super new idea.” He added that “capitalism that lacks compassion will not make people happy and reaching out to the people, physically or through the media, is important.” At present, Puea Thai looks a sad reflection of the energetic Thai Rak Thai when it was in power.

Thaksin-Prayuth

A reader sent us the following article as a reflection on recent events:

On 29 November 2023, Thailand’s Royal Gazette announced that King Vajiralongkorn had, on 21 October, signed an order appointing 2014 coup leader and prime minister Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha to his Privy Council.

In one sense, this was a reward for a military leader who had spent his career providing loyal service to the palace. Yet like Gen Prem Tinsulanonda before him, Prayuth had been more than a run-of-the-mill loyal servant. Both had been army commanders who also spent many years as prime ministers without facing the electorate.

Like Prem, as prime minister Prayuth worked assiduously to strengthen Thailand’s conservative polity, where the military and bureaucracy controlled politics under the auspices of the monarchy and where super-rich tycoons provided support for the regime. Prayuth’s military-backed regime established a constitution and numerous associated laws that codified the conservative polity – a system he referred to as “Thai-style democracy” – establishing extraordinary powers for unelected bodies that gave them “oversight” of elections and elected governments.

That system worked as expected in 2019, delivering an election victory to military-backed parties that extended Prayuth’s tenure as prime minister. Yet, as the 2023 approached, it was clear that the military-backed parties would be trounced. Voters wanted change and were drawn to opposition parties that promised an end to Prayuth’s regime and the military’s control of politics.

Thaksin Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai Party led in many pre-election polls. However, as the campaign developed, Pheu Thai’s opposition partner the Move Forward Party also polled strongly. It looked likely that Move Forward would be a part of a post-election government.

The conservative establishment, composed of military leaders, palace officials, the wealthiest tycoons, and other royalists, was aghast and fearful that the years of Prayuth’s conservative polity would be undone by Move Forward’s “radical” and anti-monarchy reformism.

The wave of public support for Move Forward was born not just of a desire for change, but also of the dissolution of its predecessor party, Future Forward, and the exuberant monarchy reform movement that partly resulted from that dissolution. Prayuth’s government had seen off the monarchy reform movement by facing down street protests and by using the judicial system to bury articulate reformers under a barrage of legal cases. Many were charged with multiple counts of lese majeste.

The regime may have stifled dissent, but its heavy-handed repression made military-backed parties unelectable. To save the conservative polity, the establishment did the unthinkable. After years of casting Thaksin as an evil anti-monarchist and battling his Thai Rak Thai-People Power Party-Pheu Thai Party, it turned to Pheu Thai. Dealing with Thaksin and Pheu Thai was preferable to allowing the Move Forward Party to have a hand in a post-election government.

A week before the May 2023 election, in a secret meeting, Thaksin and palace and tycoon figures did a deal – always publicly denied – that would keep Move Forward out of a Pheu Thai Party coalition government and kept the military-backed parties in the coalition. The details of the deal will probably never be revealed. However, Thaksin soon returned from exile, served less than a day in prison, and received a royal pardon for most of his sentence. And, despite being edged in the election by Move Forward, Pheu Thai formed government.

Credit: Khaosod

In the election campaign, recognizing the electorate’s yearning for change, Pheu Thai portrayed itself as a populist agent of change, implying it would reject military-backed parties and promising a government that would bring social, economic, and political reform.

After the election, Pheu Thai spokespersons somewhat unenthusiastically participated in coalition talks with Move Forward. But these talks were soon derailed by royalist taunts that Move Forward was anti-royalist and multiple calls for it to be dissolved. Meanwhile, the Senate made it clear that the party’s leader Pita Limjaroenrat could never be approved by parliament as prime minister.

The Senate, entirely made up of members appointed by Prayuth’s military junta, operated under transitory constitutional provisions that made approval of a prime minister a matter for a joint sitting of both houses of parliament. These senators duly rejected Pita. Meanwhile, agencies the Prayuth regime had populated with its supporters moved against Pita. In what some saw as a plot, the Constitutional Court suspended Pita from parliament while it considered two flimsy cases that could result in Pita’s banning from politics and the dissolution of the party.

The stymying of Move Forward gave Pheu Thai an opportunity to form a coalition government and nominate real estate tycoon and establishment scion Srettha Thavisin as prime minister. Srettha promptly received the overwhelming support of both houses in parliament. In coalition building, Pheu Thai rejected Move Forward while Srettha’s 34-member cabinet includes 16 ministers drawn from the parties from the previous government.

The first months of Srettha’s government have been marked by its unwillingness to do anything new. The circumstances of its rise and the determination to keep Thaksin from jail mean that it has to  abandon campaign promises and slow signature policies to a snail’s pace, including its 10,000 baht digital wallet, meant to stimulate a listless economy. Yet the conservative polity has been maintained.

We may never know if Prayuth’s Privy Council appointment was a part of the historic deal to overturn Move Forward’s electoral success and preserve the conservative polity. Yet that appointment fittingly bookends the successful effort to maintain Prayuth’s political legacy. Conveniently, being appointed to the Privy Council shields Prayuth from political criticism and any legal repercussions from his coup leadership and his actions as the establishment’s prime minister.

Watch the wallet

We at PPT have a sense of deja vu watching the Puea Thai coalition as the lead party seeks to implement its signature policy, the digital wallet scheme, where 10,000-baht digital wallets will be provided to all Thais aged 16 and over. There’s a ton of opposition, but much public support.

Clipped from The Nation

We well recall the claims of “populism” heaped on Thaksin Shinawatra back in 2001, when his Thai Rak Thai government was implementing its signature policies. Back then, the initial scorn for a popular government came from academics. Today, some of the leading opponents are also academics.

Back then, that initial opposition was gradually ramped up, royalized, and led to the 2006 military coup. “Populist” policies came to be “policy corruption,” and was equated with vote-buying and, hence accounted for Thaksin’s supposedly false popularity.

We have a feeling that this path is being cleared again. It may not be exactly the same path, and the opposition to the digital wallet may be replaced with other complaints, but we just have that deja vu feeling.

The police swamp II

Rotten to the core

It was only in June that we posted on the fact that barely a day passes without another corruption story on the police force.

So we can’t let the huge story of dark influences, police, “corrections officers,” and murder go past without a comment.

We recall that one of things that the economic crisis of the late 1990s and the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra and Thai Rak Thai did was reduce the power of dark influences, gangsters, and godfathers. It is now clear that the years of military rule have restored the dark influences who have long connections to military and police.

The police have been especially grasping and thoroughly corrupt since the military “de-Thaksinified” the force. That said, it cannot be denied that the police have long been a well-organized corruption machine – some would say Thailand’s largest criminal enterprise.

We won’t go into the details of the current case, except to note that there were 25 relatively senior police officers and several other senior officials at a “party” organized by Praween Chankhlai, a former kamnan or subdistrict head in Nakhon Pathom, known as Kamnan Nok. Of course, kamnans and their “association” have been courted and promoted by the military-backed regime from 2014 to 2023.

Praween ordered a policeman executed in front of his colleagues:

At around 9 p.m. after the suspect [Praween] had quarreled with the deceased policeman [Pol. Maj. Siwakorn Saibua] he had ordered his subordinate, Mr. Thananchai Manmak, or Nong Thapha, 45, to use a 9mm semi-automatic pistol to kill the policeman right there and then.

Thananchai fired several shots at Pol. Maj. Siwakorn killing him on the spot with one shot accidently hitting Pol. Lt. Col. Wasin. He was himself shot dead in Kanchanaburi yesterday in an exchange of gunfire with police who were trying to arrest him.

Turns out the gun used in the murder was a police weapon. CCTV evidence was destroyed and a Corrections Department official took the CCTV’s hard drive and disposed of it in a canal.

As is common in such cases, not only has the so-called kamnan denied everything, but the man he ordered to kill was himself killed by police in another province.

This is a startling set of events but the traits displayed are common.

With the destruction of evidence and the shooter, we would not be surprised to see the case go on for a considerable time and the boss to get off. Again, that’s a pattern.

Punishment and pleasure

Ever since the 2006 military coup, various rightist regimes have sought to lock up Thai Rak Thai/Puea Thai politician Watana Muangsook. Several failed attempts have accompanied numerous charges and several short stints in prison, a police cell or a re-education camp.

A couple of days ago the Bangkok Post reported that the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions has now “found him guilty over his role in irregularities in a low-cost housing project.” He was found guilty on “11 counts of corruption, which carry up to 99 years in prison.” In Thailand, that means 50 years as it is the legally maximum jail time.

Watana and Yingluck

The article is pretty opaque on exactly what he did that the court considered illegal, but “abusing power and demanding kickbacks” are mentioned for the time Watana was minister. “Abusing power” seems to mean anything the court wants it to mean. Demanding kickbacks is clearer, but no details are provided.

Several others considered close to Thaksin Shinawatra were also sentenced to jail time and fines. Anti-Thaksinism would seem to be a motivating factor as the original investigation after the 2006 coup, “initiated by the now-defunct Assets Scrutiny Committee…”. That seems to have gone nowhere for some time. It was later taken up by the post-2014 coup “National Anti-Corruption Commission which forwarded its findings to the Office of the Attorney-General in Nov 2016 after deciding to implicate [prosecute?] Watana for alleged violations of the Criminal Code.”

Watana made bail and he can appeal.

At about the same time, the Bangkok Post editorialized that the junta’s Election Commission (EC) decision “to clear 31 political parties of illegal borrowings could cause further confusion regarding the organic law on political parties.” It pointed out the double standards involved when compared to the Constitutional Court’s dissolution of the Future Forward Party on similar charges.

The editorial says the “logic for this [decision] appears fuzzy when looked into in detail.” But “fuzzy” is the EC’s usual mode of operation and any notion of law and logic goes out the window.  The Post reckons the whole deal smells of rotting fish. The editorial has more, and the EC has responded, also reported by the Bangkok Post but it doesn’t satisfy the logic test.

As far as we can see, the vendetta continues, even if the Thaksin clan seems to be engaging in considerable royal posterior polishing as it seeks more control over Puea Thai.

The king and his antics II

Thailand’s king and his antics in Europe have attracted plenty of unfavorable comment, The most recent is from The Statesman. While we think that most of PPT’s readers will know all of the facts and antics recounted, we consider the article by Francis Pike, with our added illustrations, worth reproducing in full:

The depraved rule of Thailand’s Caligula king
Protestors are risking it all to take on the monarchy

Fu Fu

The Roman emperor Caligula was renowned for his extravagance, capricious cruelty, sexual deviancy and temper bordering on insanity. Most famously, before he was assassinated, he planned to appoint his favourite horse as a consul. This is probably a legend. But King Maha Vajiralongkorn, who ascended the Thai throne in 2016, adopted Caligula’s playbook for real. In 2009 the then crown prince promoted his pet miniature poodle Foo Foo to the post of air chief marshal, in which capacity he served until his death in 2015, aged 17. Foo Foo’s cremation was preceded by four days of formal Buddhist mourning.

The poodle first came to the attention of the general public when a video was released showing him eating cake from the hand of Vajiralongkorn’s third wife, Princess Srirasmi, while she cavorted in a G-string at the dog’s lavish birthday party. At a 2009 gala dinner in honour of Vajiralongkorn, Foo Foo was kitted out head to paw in black-tie dress and, according to a WikiLeaks-revealed account by US ambassador, Ralph Boyce, ‘jumped onto the head table and began lapping from the guests’ water glasses, including my own’.

When on parade the new king wears crisp, snowy-white, gold-braided, Ruritanian military uniforms or elaborate Thai regalia that make him look like a Buddhist temple in human form. In downtime his dress code can at best be described as kinky: trainers and low-hung jeans paired with the skimpiest of crop tops. His back and arms are festooned with possibly fake tattoos.

Vajiralongkorn is famously lecherous. Indeed, in his youth, Thai aristocrats would pack off their daughters to Europe to get them out of his clutches. Happily for Bangkok’s elite, the crown prince’s tastes, after his divorce from his first wife, an aristocratic relative of his mother, were consistently low-rent. His second wife was an aspiring actress, albeit of the soft-porn variety.

Prince, and kids in earlier times

The marriage did not last. After Vajiralongkorn put posters all over the palace accusing her of adultery, she fled to London and later to the US with her children — apart from a daughter who was kidnapped and brought back to Bangkok. The daughter was elevated to the rank of princess, but her mother and brothers had their diplomatic passports and royal titles revoked by the crown prince. The Thai public was left horrified by his treatment of his family.

Another marriage followed in 2001, to the aforementioned Srirasmi, though it was not publicly announced until 2005 when the crown prince, by then in his early fifties, declared it was time to settle down. How-ever, in 2014 he stripped his wife of her royal titles because of her relatives’ corruption. Srirasmi’s parents were jailed for two and a half years each for lèse-majesté.

Sineenat

Five years later, on 1 May last year, and just three days before his official coronation, Vajiralongkorn married for the fourth time, to Suthida Tidjai, a former Thai Airways hostess, giving her the title of Queen Consort. The Thai people were dumbfounded when just two months later, the new king named his mistress, Major General Sineenat Wongvajira-pakdi, as his Royal Noble Consort; it was the first time this form of address had been used for more than 100 years. The new relationship lasted three months. On 21 October, Sineenat was stripped of all her titles and disappeared from public view, supposedly for being disrespectful to the queen.

The king’s extravagance is no less remarkable than his private life. A monarchy that was impoverished in the postwar period had, by some estimates, increased its wealth to between $40 billion and $60 billion by last year. Most of the wealth resides in land; ownership of some four square miles of central Bangkok makes the Thai monarchy the world’s wealthiest by a large margin. Overseas holdings include a major stake in the Kempinski hotel group.* Indeed, for years Vajiralongkorn has spent months on end at the Munich Kempinski with his harem and servants. In addition, he owns a mansion on Lake Starnberg to the southwest of Munich. In spite of his huge allowances as crown prince, affording him ownership of two Boeing 737s, it is thought that he had to resort to begging funds from the then prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra to cover his gambling debts.

Why do King Vajiralongkorn’s private shenanigans matter? Royal families throughout Europe have long weathered sexual and financial scandals. Juan Carlos may have had to step down as king and go into exile, but the Spanish monarchy has survived. So too has the Belgian monarchy after the former King Albert II admitted to a love child. There is no suggestion that Prince Andrew, cherubic by comparison with King Vajiralongkorn, will bring down the British royals because of the Epstein imbroglio. But the key difference is that, unlike Thailand, all those are constitutional monarchies.

Bhumibol and Ananda

In Thailand the monarchy is integral to the country’s real power structures. This was a 70-year legacy of Vajiralongkorn’s father, King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Bhumibol’s reign started under a cloud following the killing of his 20-year-old predecessor, King Ananda Mahidol, by a single shot to the head with a Colt .45 pistol. After a questionable trial two servants were executed for the murder, though it is widely suspected that the king was accidently shot by Bhumibol, his brother. For the first decade of his rule King Bhumibol was entirely powerless and lived under the rule of the quasi-dictator Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram, who, during the second world war, had allied Thailand with the Axis powers.

Bhumibol, Sirikit, Prem

But gradually, as Thailand inched towards a democracy, Bhumibol won the adoration of the Thai people thanks to his moderating influence and good works, such as paying for medical facilities for the poor. His political power increased. In 1952 he bravely refused to preside over ceremonies for Phibunsongkhram’s new militaristic constitution.** However, Bhumibol’s finest moment came in 1981 when he faced down the ‘April Fools’ Day’ coup d’état by fleeing Bangkok and raising the Thai royal standard at the military base at Khorat, where General Prem emerged as the new military strongman. There followed what is now known as the ‘Network Monarchy’ era, a coalition of military interests and those of the financial and industrial elite based in Bangkok. As a former American deputy-president at Thailand’s Bank of Asia noted: ‘Thai politics has been about dividing up the pie among the elite.’ At the centre of the web stood the Thai monarchy. Elected democratic institutions remained largely an adornment to this oligarchic structure.

In 2001 a business chancer and mobile phone billionaire, Thaksin Shinawatra, later the owner of Manchester City FC, swept to power with his Thai Rak Thai party promising a populist agenda including reform of health and education. Much to the chagrin of the ‘Network Monarchy’, Thaksin won a sweeping electoral victory again in 2005. Bhumibol, who loathed Thaksin, gave tacit support to the coup that first removed him and then sent him into exile two years later. Until his death in 2016, Bhumibol thwarted, either by military or judicial coup, the democratic will of the Thai people, who since 2001 have consistently voted into power Thaksin-backed parties and their proxy leaders. Bhumibol’s historic reputation, albeit tarnished by his thwarting of the democratic will, became an important pillar of resistance to Thaksin’s outsiders. After Bhumibol’s death in 2016, the critical power of the monarchy was left in the hands of his dissolute playboy son.

Will King Vajiralongkorn redeem his dire youthful reputation and do a ‘Prince Hal’, moving to the path of royal righteousness? The signs so far are not good. Just over a week ago, the Royal Noble Consort Sineenat suddenly re-emerged with no information other than an inventive Royal Gazette announcement that ‘It will be regarded that she was never stripped of the royal consort title, military ranks and royal decorations’.

More important than this saga of extra-judicial fiat, the king intervened in the drafting of a new constitution by the military junta in 2017 to grant himself new powers over the appointment of regents. In addition, the new constitution asserted the king’s rights to ‘manage’ during any constitutional crisis. Given that Thailand has had 17 military coups since 1932, this is not trivial. Two crack regiments have also been put under his direct control. As the political exile and professor at Kyoto University Pavin Chachavalpongpun has noted, the king ‘is basically running the country now, though he’s not doing that like his father did through moral authority. He’s using fear to solidify his position and to take command.’

It is therefore interesting that in the past month, demonstrations of up to 10,000 people have called for the powers of the king to be curtailed. Protestors have defied Thailand’s draconian lèse-majesté laws — which can incur up to 15 years’ imprisonment — to chant ‘Down with feudalism’. It remains to be seen whether the protests are a straw in the wind of future political instability. The new king’s attempt to transition from a monarch with influence within the ‘Network Monarchy’ to a monarch who rules is fraught with danger. But at least Vajiralongkorn is unlikely to come to Caligula’s sticky end; the king has a ready-made home for an exile in his beloved Bavaria.

*For discussions that reflect changes in ownership, see here and here.

**The refusal to attend was a fit of pique and self-interest.

Royalty and rewards

Being a loyal minion of the palace brings rewards and for some rather grand rewards. At the top of the pile of slithering posterior polishers are privy councilors. Under the previous king, the old princes he initially appointed, their task was to build the monarchy politically and economically. Later, and especially when dedicated crawling former prime minister Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, the major task was ensuring that all that the government did had royal approval. This was seen in Prem’s control of military promotion for decades.

The now dead King Bhumibol was especially keen to develop links and clients in the judiciary. He appointed several legal experts and former judges to the Privy Council, some of who, in the 1970s, he managed to hoist into positions as unelected prime ministers.

The solidly royalist judiciary has been especially useful for the monarchy and the military as it battled Thaksin Shinawatra and his successor who dominated electoral politics. The judiciary has been politically biased, bringing case after case against parties and people seen as enemies of the ruling class.

Now Bhumibol’s son seems to be following in his father’s footsteps. He has issued orders that have essentially told the Constitutional Court how it should operate. And, no doubt, he has smiled on the dissolution of parties he (and the military leadership) sees as anti-monarchy.

This is a long introduction to Vajiralongkorn’s appointment of former President of the Constitutional Court Nurak Mapraneet to the Privy Council.

According to the Bangkok Post, Nurak “previously held many important positions in the judiciary including presiding judge of the Chaiya Provincial Court, presiding judge of the Phuket Provincial Court, deputy chief of the Office of Chief Justices Region 6, chief justice of the Court of Appeal Region 8 and chief of the youth and family cases section at the Court of Appeal Region 7.” As a reliable ally of the military, “[a]fter the Sept 19, 2006 coup, … Nurak was made a member of the Constitutional Drafting Council and later appointed to the Constitutional Court.” He became president of the Constitutional Court on 21 May 2014 and retired on 31 March 2020.

Most recently, Nurak completed his assigned task and as president of the court, oversaw the dissolution of the Future Forward Party and banned its executive from politics for a decade.

As the first linked report has it:

During his tenure as president, Nurak was responsible for dissolving six political parties, including the Future Forward Party in February, the Thai Rak Thai party and the Thai Raksachat Party…. He also voted to remove two prime ministers (Samak Sonntorawej and Yingluck Shinawatra)….

The rewards for royal groveling are now going to flow, so long as Nurak doesn’t annoy the erratic king.

Recalling the 2006 military coup

The army’s task: coups and repression

19 September was the anniversary of the 2006 military coup. This was the coup that set the path for Thailand’s decline into military-dominated authoritarianism based in ultra-royalist ideology.

Over the past couple of days we didn’t notice a lot of memorializing of the event that illegally removed then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party, with tanks on the streets and soldiers decked out in royal yellow.

The military soon hoisted Privy Councilor Gen Surayud Chulanont into the prime ministership.

Anointing the 2006 coup

As we know, the coup did not succeed in its self-assigned task of rooting out the “Thaksin regime,” with Thaksin’s parties having been the most successful over the years that have followed and when the military permitted elections. This is why the 2014 coup was aimed at “putting things right,” through a more thorough political repression and a rigging of the political system for the ruling class. It also unleashed a rabid use of lese majeste to destroy that class’s political opponents.

One effort to recall the 2006 coup was by Ji Ungpakorn. He observes the:

forces behind the 19^th September coup were anti-democratic groups in the military and civilian elite, disgruntled business leaders and neo-liberal intellectuals and politicians. The coup was also supported by the monarchy….

2006 coup

And adds:

Most NGOs and large sections of the middle classes also supported the coup. What all these groups had in common was contempt or hatred for the poor. For them, “too much democracy” gave “too much” power to the poor electorate and encouraged governments to “over-spend” on welfare. For them, Thailand is still divided between the “enlightened middle-classes who understand democracy” and the “ignorant rural and urban poor”. In fact, the reverse is the case. It is the poor who understand and are committed to democracy while the so-called middle classes are determined to hang on to their privileges by any means possible.

For a flavor of the times, see reports of the coup by the BBC and The Guardian. For early efforts to understand the 2006 coup, consider Ji’s A Coup for the Rich, Thailand Since the Coup, and Thailand and the “good coup.”

It’s been downhill since 2006: repression, military political domination and ultra-royalism, leading to a form of neo-feudalism in contemporary Thailand.

Anti-democrat doziness

Soonruth Bunyamanee is editor of the Bangkok Post and he has an op-ed that is a commentary on the fact that an election ain’t changin’ nothin. Not for the junta.

He seems somewhat surprised by this, complaining that the appearance of change for Thai politics is “in fact, just follow[ing] its familiar pattern of putting old wine in new bottles.”

The stimulus for this seems to be the massive party jumping of the past week:

The spotlight has shone on the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP), which is said to be a vehicle for the military regime to bring back Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha to be prime minister for the second time after the election. Many politicians have switched camp to the PPRP which, by favourable constitutional conditions set by the coup-installed charter drafters, is expected to win a ticket to form a coalition government after the election.

As Soonruth observes, these “defections are obviously driven by a desire to be part of the next government.”

Somewhat disappointed and showing why he’s the editor of the Post, he reckons that The Dictator once offered “hope of change for the better under his and the military regime’s guidance.” Hope for diehard anti-democrats.

Soonruth’s disappointment is that:

the PPRP, as a machine to return Gen Prayut to power, has delivered something we didn’t hope for. Most politicians defecting to the PPRP are “the old faces” and many of them seem to be from the group Gen Prayut called “bad politicians”.

PPRP executives say the party will make changes to the country. I wonder how they can do it with the same old politicians. What they could do is contest the election in the old ways — by campaigning through canvassers appealing to political bases.

Has Soonruth been asleep for more than four years? Did he miss the bit about the junta coming to power to destroy the Thaksin Shinawatra party/parties? Did he doze off when the junta’s constitution wound the political clock back?

He’s in anti-democrat shock:

The PPRP’s political model is not new. It is the same model adopted 20 years ago by the now-dissolved Thai Rak Thai Party, the political establishment from which Pheu Thai was spawned….

He’s wrong. The model is pre-TRT, and that is what the military junta intended from the beginning. Its all about hoovering up all and sundry provincial toughs and thugs and having multi-party coalitions and weak government.

The 1997 constitution changed that and Thaksin grabbed that opportunity and had strong government and much more party discipline. That’s what the constitution gave and what the ‘good people” thought they wanted at the time. Thaksin turned out to be their horror movie and turned them back to the fascist military.

We know Soonruth has been dozing when he claims the “upcoming election should be a time when Thai politics is changed by voters.” He seems not to have been watching what the junta has been doing.