Panic, coups and courts

9 05 2013

It is difficult to miss the increase in political panic attacks on the two main sides of the political contest in Thailand.

As PPT has already posted, the yellow-hued opponents of the elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra have had multiple panic attacks that have caused them to shout their real political views out very loud. When Yingluck speaks to a meeting on democracy, the royalists and anti-Thaksin Shinawatra coalition has its leading figures shout about treason, selling out the country and greater “crimes.” The main “crime” seems to be Yingluck’s failure to again kowtow to the old men who think they run Thailand and continue to concoct a royalist version of the country’s recent political history. A few statements by a younger woman about political reality suggest to the geriatric royalists that their presumed control of her has weakened and that she does not “know her place.”

The tried and royalist trusted method for attacking elected governments, apart from the military coup, is judicial harassment and intervention. And so it is that as the political temperature rises ever more panicked and preposterous royalists charge off to their buddies at the Constitutional Court seeking judicial interference.

At the Bangkok Post it is reported that the latest move is appointed senator  – that is, unelected senator – Paiboon Nititawan who “represents” something called “other sectors,” which really just means he’s an unelected spawn of the military junta, has begged the kangaroo court to consider Thaksin Shinawatra’s alleged “order for Pheu Thai to amend the constitution,” which the senator claims “violates Section 68 of the charter, pertaining to acts that could undermine the constitutional monarchy or grab power through unconstitutional means.”

The Post states that some yellow-shirted intellectuals think the “Constitution Court is likely to take up a complaint…”. At the same time, “Somchai Srisuthiyakorn, a political science lecturer at Sripatum University, said the allegation that Thaksin’s Skype call breached Section 68 is far-fetched.” That won’t bother the court or the royalists.

Somchai reckons that a more likely constitutional court intervention is over the “MPs and senators [who] have declared they will not accept the authority of the charter court…”. He says: “Such an announcement is bound to be a violation of the law…. Many MPs and senators may realise their action carries a risk.”

Panic has also set in on the government and red shirt side. PPT has already posted on the political foot-in-mouth calisthenics by Information and Communication Technology Minister Anudith Nakornthap. Equally panicky seems to be red shirt supporters claiming that a coup is in the offing. The clearest English-language statement of this was at New Mandala where Jim Taylor makes this claim:

The army, if a little confused about royal futures, are talking about a coup (yes, yet again) among themselves and many senior army officers (including Prayuth Chan-ocha) dropping strong hints in the media…

Several readers have emailed PPT with similar claims. We don’t doubt that the military brass around boss Prayuth Chan-ocha were shocked by Yingluck’s Mongolia speech, but we have yet to see any strong evidence of the tanks warming up. We would expect to see and hear a lot more from the top brass if they were at any serious level of plotting. That said, Yingluck’s speech and the failure of the king and queen to appear as scheduled probably mean that the military men have the coup jitters.Red shirt protest

Meanwhile, while red shirt anger over the Constitutional Court shenanigans saw a mobile protest. Reports from the protest site are mixed, with some saying the protesters preparing to leave and others reporting an expansion of the protest (both in the same newspaper on the same day….). The very same newspaper is back to its old tricks of producing material filched from yellow-shirt sites and dressing it up as an op-ed rather than concocted propaganda.

The latter report also refers to:

hundreds of yellow-shirt Thai Compatriots and Territory Protection Front members, gathering since Tuesday at Sanam Luang, are refusing to clear the site.

They say they will stay until Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra is ousted and that their presence won’t interfere with Royal Ploughing Ceremony on the grounds next Monday…. They are also demonstrating to offer moral support to the Constitutional Court judges and oppose the Preah Vihear court case.

The Bangkok Post, which says the rally is called off, has a spurious headline at its website, seems to say that the red shirt protest at the Constitutional Court was all Thaksin’s doing, when the story itself implies something else again, even suggesting that the Puea Thai bosses and Thaksin were out of sync with the protesters. Apparently the protest was called off:

after losing the backing of Pheu Thai, other red-shirt groups and, more importantly, ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra, sources say.Thaksin did it

Some ruling party MPs initially sponsored the protest by the Radio Broadcasters for Democracy movement formed by some red shirts, the Pheu Thai sources said.

Apparently, the MPs got cold feet when the rallies turned to those close to the palace:

The MPs had also joined the protest in front of the Constitution Court on Chaeng Watthana Road in Bangkok.

But they later withdrew their support after demonstration leaders ignored their warnings and attacked Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda, threatened Constitution Court judges and used obscene words.

The MPS and Thaksin apparently worried that the rally could destabilize the government. If Thaksin is the ring master in all of this, he seems to have been unable to control the situation or to fathom the impacts of his sister’s speech or the red shirt rally against the hopeless bunch at the Court. Always murky, the arm wrestle continues.





Stashing loot

4 04 2013

We are sure readers will find this report, from the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists of interest, especially the account of Thailand’s rich stashing their loot in offshore accounts. The story is much bigger than Thailand. The Thailand account begins:moneybags 1

Nearly 600 Thais have owned offshore companies in the British Virgin Islands and other havens.

Politicians and billionaire business magnates are among the prominent Thais listed in secret documents as owners of offshore holdings in tropical tax havens.

The list includes the former wife of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a sitting senator, a former high-ranking defense ministry official, Forbes-listed tycoons, and a former government minister whose assets in the United States are frozen because of her alleged links to Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe.

Most of the report concentrates on Nalinee Taveesin and Thaksin’s former wife, Pojaman, and her brother Bhanapot Damapong, which is understandable for journalists with the anti-Thaksin bit in their teeth and wanting to demonstrate ever more political corruption, but the other 598 names are also of some interest, especially as business tycoons hide some of their wealth with gay abandon.

Nalinee is now under investigation for corruption, who we thought was briefly in Yingluck Shinawatra’s cabinet in 2012, and whose webpage hasn’t changed since then, but is still reported as a minister in some accounts, or she portrays herself as such.

Of course, this report will come as no real surprise for anyone who follows Thailand closely, for it has long been assumed that wealthy Thais stash their money in places like Singapore, Hong Kong and Taipei for decades. And, in the investigations of the Thaksin transfers over the sale of Shin Corp, overseas tax havens featured. However, this report names some names from what must be still a mine of information:

The ICIJ unearthed details of the offshore holdings through an analysis of about 2.5 million files largely associated with two offshore services providers, Singapore-based Portcullis TrustNet and British Virgin Islands-based Commonwealth Trust Limited.

Among the hundreds of other Thai names that appear in the ICIJ data is Admiral Bannawit Kengrian, “the former deputy permanent secretary of defense, who is listed as one of many shareholders in the British Virgin Islands company Vnet Capital International Co., Ltd in 1998″ with 2006 coup connections and who is described in a Wikileaks cable as an acolyte of Privy Council President General Prem Tinsulanonda.

Also listed are “members of the Chirathivat family” who own the Central Group and are the second – well, third, if the royal family is included – in the 2012, Forbes list of Thailand’s richest, the Vongkusolkit family, also amongst Thailand’s richest, and Yuenyong Opakul or Add Carabao who has business interests that include the energy drink company Carabao Tawandang.

There is plenty more at the website of the ICIJ and there must be tons more interesting detail of the networks that span Thailand’s ruling class.





Royal birthday cheer

3 04 2013

Malaysia’s national news agency reports that “Thailand celebrates Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn’s 58th birthday on April 2…”. It noted a Thai News Agency (TNA) report in claiming that this was “a most auspicious occasion to also honour and publicise her role model as an ideological leader in education, especially in the development of community-level education…”. With all of the reported worrying about succession, this birthday is of interest.

The U.S. embassy was recently sidling up to her, inviting her and a bunch of military cadets to hear about voting in the United States. Perhaps something on electoral democracy in Thailand might have been better for the trainee coupsters and their “lecturer”Sirindhorn rather than elementary school stuff on the U.S.

The Malaysian agency reports that the usual suspects at the major malls put on displays for the “beloved princess.”

Meanwhile, the National News Bureau of Thailand reports several events, as they must. One has her releasing a new book, described as “her book” but which is actually a ” translation from a Chinese novel by a female writer in central China’s Hubei province.” The name of the real author isn’t even mentioned. The translation is said to be about “inner beauty and power of women as a mother, wife and friend, as well as the changing ways of life of Chinese people following the modernization in China.” Sirindhorn is said to have “translated the story.”

Another story has her daily schedule for the birthday bash. This began with the usual groveling required of “the Prime Minister and Cabinet members together with their spouses, the Parliament President, Members of Parliaments and their spouses, the Senate Speaker, parliamentary officials, the Supreme Court President, leaders of various other courts of law, officials of the National Anti-Corruption Commission, Election Commissioners, members of the State Audit Commission and the executive board of the Thai Red Cross Society.” It always amazes that the whole of government is dragged out for these royal events, many times each year, as if they are critical national events. Perhaps that is how they are perceived by the royalists elite?

Later on she met with the village scouts, a group of royalists that has, in the past, been mobilized to massacre in the name of the monarchy. Then a bunch of “civil servants, the military and police, various universities, schools, and associations, as well as many other groups of people” were called in to express their happiness.

The report goes on to add that “[i]n the afternoon, Her Royal Highness granted an audience to members of the Privy Council and their spouses…”. She is said to chair meetings of the Privy Council, the old men who think they should be running the country. They are said to have “presented a monetary donation,” which sounds like giving with one hand and taking with the other as they all get it from the same pot.

Still later, “executive members of the Charoen Pokphand Group (CP) also offered their warmest wishes to HRH on the same anniversary and presented a monetary donation for use in royal projects.” CP, long a big donor to things royal, is also mentioned here, in quite another light.

Another account of things royal at this juncture can be had here. Look out for Mep.





More on Akechai’s lese majeste conviction

29 03 2013

Prachatai has a longer report on the court’s decision to send Akechai Hongkangwarn to jail for lese majeste.

Akechai was sentenced to five years in prison (reduced for “cooperation”) and a fine of 100,000 baht for selling documentary CDs of an Australian Broadcasting Corporation documentary program on the monarchy and for having copies of Wikileaks documents that the court deemed were defaming to the queen and the crown prince.

Details of the “Foreign Correspondent” documentary and a link to the now well-known birthday party video are here. The Wikileaks cables are from 2008, indicating “the Queen supported the 2006 coup” and from 2010 about “opinions about royal succession from Privy Council Chair Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, Privy Council member ACM Siddhi Savetsila, and former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun.” These can be found here, here and here. The court essentially refused to allow any of these big shots to be called to give evidence.Akechai

The report states that the judges “deemed the content of the materials misleading and defamatory for the monarchy.” It is a royalist fabrication that the materials are misleading. In fact, they use material directly from the palace and from the mouths of royalist flunkies to paint an accurate picture of the monarchy. That these insider accounts may be defamatory says more about the palace than of anything else.

But the propaganda-defending courts noted that:

The country’s constitution and criminal code stipulated that His Majesty the King is the head of state and highly revered. No one shall violate or use rights and liberties for any adverse effects. The state and its people have duties to uphold the monarchy system forever….  Any defaming speech causing irritation to … His Majesty shall not be acceptable,” the judge read out the verdict.

As usual, the royalist courts manipulate the constitution’s words in order to lock up someone considered guilty of telling the truth. Akechai is reported as being “upset by the court’s decision as his intention was merely to spread neutral and objective information produced by foreign media outlet to the public.” The court’s ruling is a reminder that truth shall not be spoken.

Sulak Sivaraksa commented that “the punishment for lese majeste is too severe. The monarchy should also be for open for criticism as it is important for democracy…”.





Palace involvement in coup planning (1957)

12 03 2013

Andrew MacGregor Marshall has managed to find yet another critical cable (reproduced, left and right; click on them to get a larger image) for understanding the role of the current monarchy in Thailand’s politics and especially in the planning of military coups.dhani1

Many readers will know that the palace was deeply involved in the planning of the 2006 military coup. There is no doubt that palace figures were very closely connected with the cabal of plotters who schemed to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra’s government. Likewise, Privy Council President  General Prem Tinsulanonda actively campaigned against the government. Academic Kevin Hewison summarized this planning and scheming in a set of articles from the Journal of Contemporary Asia that can be downloaded as a large PDF:

… the palace’s footprints litter the trail to the coup. Prem’s critical role has been noted, and it is impossible that he would act without palace approval. Indeed, through Prem, the palace knew of the coup well in advance: “The coup plot was known within a tight circle of people, among them Gen Prem Tinsulanonda … and his close aides…, Air Force Commander … Chalit Pukkasuk and Lt-Gen Anupong Paochinda, commander of the First Army Region” (Wassana, 2006).

Often this deep involvement is portrayed as a “slip” in the king’s constitutional role, “necessary” for returning Thailand to the conservative hands of the ruling elite, delivering it from the “populist” and “authoritarian” Thaksin.

Interestingly, what the document uncovered by Marshall shows is that the palace has been involved in earlier coups – in this case the royalist putsch by General Sarit Thanarat – that was to result in a catapulting of the monarchy back to political and economic centrality.dhani2

In Paul Handley’s The King Never Smiles, mention is made of the Sarit gaining “palace backing” by February 1957 and that “the palace aggressively undertook to undermine the prime minister” (p. 136). Later, Handley notes that the king called on Prime Minister Phibun to “resign to avoid a coup” (p. 138). Phibun refused and Sarit threw him out.

A missing link in this trail of palace politicking is the cable that details the planning of the coup. In the cable, British Ambassador Berkeley Gage writes on 17 April 1957 about a remarkable meeting the previous day in which a gaggle of royalists, including the President of the Privy Council, Prince Dhani, and the royalist agitators Seni and Kukrit Pramoj, amongst others. This was effectively a meeting of royalists and opponents of the 1932 political revolution, planning a coup, to reinstate royal power and wealth.

The presence of Prince Dhani is highly significant as this prince was the motivating political force in the palace and could not have occurred without the king’s approval or even suggestion. Clearly the palace was deeply involved. As the cable states:

Sarit

The palace’s footprints litter the trail to the coup in 1957, as they did in 2006.





Crispin on internet censorship

14 02 2013

Shawn Crispin writing for the Committee to Protect Journalists has an article on the increasing tendency for governments to want to control the internet in the Southeast Asian region. Of course, that includes comments on Thailand. His verdict is pretty much the same as the one PPT noted yesterday: almost all of Thailand’s censorship of the internet in Thailand is about the monarchy:

The authorities had already applied the law’s vague and arbitrary national security-related provisions to censor tens of thousands of anonymously posted Web pages, mostly for material deemed offensive to the monarchy.

Crispin also makes a point that scholar David Streckfuss made at the FCCT: the 2006 military-palace coup made lese majeste and the computer crimes law. In the latter, it was the junta’s administration under on-again, off-again privy councilor Surayud Chulanont that passed the flawed computer crimes law, and it is essentially that regime and the one led by Abhisit Vejjajiva, also hoisted to power by the military-palace complex, that made the law a political weapon of choice.

Part of his account is of the “legal calisthenics” that lese majeste and computer crime laws involve. For example, in the case of Chiranuch Premchaiporn’s conviction was a:

… landmark verdict [that] effectively shifted the onus of Internet censorship in Thailand from government authorities to Internet intermediaries. Judges ruled that by failing to remove the comment quickly enough–it remained on Chiranuch’s Prachatai website for more than 20 days–she had “mutually consented” to the critical posting….

On the Abhisit regime, Crispin observes:

In 2009, in the name of shielding the monarchy from criticism, the previous Abhisit Vejjajiva-led government began a controversial Internet monitoring scheme that trained civilian volunteers, including university students, to serve as “cyberscouts” assigned to comb the Internet for anti-royal material. The number of lèse majesté complaints filed under Abhisit’s tenure nearly tripled year on year from 2009 to 2010, rising from 164 to 478 cases, according to Thai court records.

Crispin then moves to the Yingluck Shinawatra government, where the comments become less fact-based, claiming that the government’s Internet surveillance capabilities were expanded “in 2011 through a US$13 million investment in an undisclosed ‘interception’ system, according to local news reports.” It would be good to know if there has been more surveillance rather than simply reports. It is correct that in 2011″cabinet approved a directive that allowed the national police Department of Special Investigations to collect evidence, including through the intercept of Internet-based communications, without a court order in Computer Crime Act-related investigations.” It remains unclear how this power is being used.

On lese majeste, Crispin reports that:

Yingluck also established a 22-member committee dedicated specifically to suppressing lèse majesté content online. By mid-2012, MICT authorities claimed to have blocked 90,000 Facebook pages because of anti-monarchy content. That censorship followed on a late-2011 warning by MICT Minister Anudith Nakornthap that Internet users could be charged under the Computer Crime Act for “liking” online comments critical of the royal family.

While the latter is true, the claim to blocking a large number of Facebook pages has not been confirmed. One thing is clear: the number of allegations and charges of lese majeste has declined precipitously.

If any readers have better data on blocking by the current government, we’d be pleased to post it. Blocking of PPT is far less rigorous than it was under the Abhisit regime, but we continue to see some blocking by ISPs.





“Reforming” lese majeste to save the regime

29 01 2013

The Bangkok Post is a conservative newspaper. It has been the preferred newspaper of the English-reading Thai elite and tends to reflect their interests. In recent years it has demonstrated the royalism of that elite, hoping that the relatives and friends in military- and palace-backed governments (under on-again-off-again Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont and elite scion of the royalist elite, Abhisit Vejjajiva) could get royalist rule back on track.

So it is significant that the recent lese majeste conviction of Somyos Prueksakasemsuk has caused the Bangkok Post to issue a call for “reform” of this draconian, medieval law. We assume that this call represents one thread of discussion within the higher echelons of the royalist elite who now see lese majeste as a problem for royalist rule.

We make this assumption because the Post editorial begins by observing that the “trial and conviction of Somyot Prueksakasemsuk has once again put Thailand in an uncomfortable spotlight.” We can imagine that the fact that “Thailand is increasingly criticised as a nation where authorities trample on the media and on freedom of expression” bothers the elite. We guess that some of them are tired of having to defend Thailand and its “protection” of a fabulously wealthy and privileged monarchy as somehow “culturally unique.” They probably get prickly at having to defend the sentencing of chained and caged journalists, aged men and political activists as being “culturally appropriate.” The idea that two men are sentenced for things they didn’t say and articles they didn’t write is probably causing them to squirm in their bespoke suits and Thai silk designer dresses.

Hence, the editorial demands action be taken to address the discomfort felt by some of the royalist upper crust about the lese majeste law (the editorial also briefly mentions the Computer Crimes Act). To be sure, Article 112 is defined by the Post as “a special law about the most special high institution,” and it makes no political or class mistake by demanding that the law is required, necessary and foundational:

The purpose of a lese majeste law must be to protect the monarchy and the royal family. They are otherwise defenceless against libel, slander, defamation, and against attacks on the system of democracy under a constitutional monarchy.

So the Post’s argument is that the lese majeste law might be reformed in ways that maintain the status quo and continue to “protect” the monarchy and the system of elite rule that it underpins. [Of course, "defenceless" is a bizarre term when referring to a body that wields huge political and economic power, but the monarchy continues to fear a situation where normal law might be applied to it and its privileges.]

The Post appears to be calling for a thinking person’s royalist “reform” of lese majeste as the “ultra-nationalists” are too hardline [read this as meaning: ultra-royalists are a nasty lot only good for street demonstration at needed times to protect our ruling class] and “advocates of legal change too often play into the hands…” of the yellow-shirted “knee-jerk” protection-of-the-monarchy lot. Hence, the “key to any reasonable amendment of the Criminal Code cannot proceed rationally from simple opposition to a law. The question is what the country needs, and what best serves the nation and all its institutions.”

In other words, how do “we” keep the law, “protect” the monarchy which “we” maintain as foundational to our class rule and not have to be “uncomfortable” and seen as knuckle-draggers locally and internationally.

Reflecting this ruling elite position, the editorial then claims to speak for all Thais:

… there is no disagreement among Thais. All citizens want to protect the national institutions. Protection of the monarchy, in particular His Majesty the King, is the aim of all citizens. No rational person or group has called for abolishing laws which protect His Majesty and the royal family. So any discussion of legal change can start on level ground:

This is pompous upper class nonsense. Of course there is disagreement! Clearly, there are rational Thais who do wish to abolish the law. Others, for reasons of political limitations, powerful threats and extant fears of attack, demand thoroughgoing reform rather than going the extra step.

The Post is right to observe that “[r]easonable people also can agree that Section 112 of the Criminal Code is out of date and deserves careful and factual study.” It observes that “it is obvious that the law is sometimes used by unscrupulous people in a political manner to harass those with whom they disagree.” This charge must include Abhisit, Suthep Thaugsuban and a gaggle of Democrat Party politicians, pretty much everyone in the leadership of the People’s Alliance for Democracy, Tul Sitthisomwong, Army boss General Prayuth Chan-ocha, several high officials in the Interior ministry, a number of politicians associated with pro-Thaksin Shinawatra political parties, amongst many others.

Tacitly acknowledging that many of the charges currently going through the courts were politicized charges brought by the Abhisit regime, the Post calls for an “amended Section 112 [that] would cause lese majeste charges to be brought only in cases where legal experts were certain that the offence was indeed against the monarchy _ not against a political ideology.” The editorial advocates “… change to make it relevant to the current situation.”

Without acknowledging that  lese majeste charges have declined very significantly under the the Yingluck Shinawatra government, the Post blames politicians for being tardy on lese majeste reform and its abuse. Yingluck’s timidity on lese majeste is based on a fear that “an amendment to Section 112 could be political suicide.” To then compare her political reticence with “silence” by her predecessors is disingenuous. Surayud and Abhsit weren’t “silent” on lese majeste; they used it again and again to repress political opponents and to demonstrate loyalty and their royalist credentials. They were deafening in their use of this political weapon. They spawned hundreds of other knuckle-draggers on monarchy and lese majeste through their collaboration with those who considered the monarchy and monarchy’s state under threat from republicans.

The ruling class is trying to save the royalist state it has constructed.





Targeting Surachai

27 01 2013
Surachai

Part of the 1985 cover of the UCL Newsleter

Many readers will know that Surachai Danwattananusorn has been incarcerated on several lese majeste charges since 22 February 2011. On 28 February 2012, the then 71 year-old Surachai was sentenced to 15 years in jail for speeches made in late 2010. This was halved for his guilty plea.  On 27 April 2012, Surachai was sentenced to a further 5 years in jail. The court halved this sentence because of his guilty plea on the previous charges.  On 17 May 2012, he was hospitalized and scheduled for a prostrate operation. He came out of jail and hospital to be sentenced on yet one more charge on 28 May 2012. He received a further 5 years, reduced by half, for a speech on 15 December 2008. That’s a total of 12.5 years in jail. Surachai filed for a royal pardon on 20 August 2012.

At New Mandala, which has been surprisingly quiet on recent lese majeste cases and sentences, academic Jim Taylor has a brief interview with Surachai. PPT won’t repeat the details here, but we do want to add to the story from a document we recently came across from the mid-1980s. That was an appeal from the Union of Civil Liberty for Surachai, who had been tried in a kangaroo/military court under the administration of unelected Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda, now Privy Council president. He was eventually released after an international and local campaign.

Undoubtedly Surachai has been a confrontational political activist. That is why the royalist state and the Prem and Abhisit Vejjajiva governments targeted him. It seems that the leaders of the royalist cabal, miffed that they couldn’t halt his activities in the 1980s have long memories and came after him again as he led Red Siam. As there has been not a peep from above regarding his amnesty, it seems he has a second “death” sentence at the hands of essentially the same cabal.





HRW on Somyos lese majeste conviction

23 01 2013

Human Rights Watch has a news release on the conviction and harsh sentencing of Somyos Prueksakasemsuk for lese majeste. Amongst other things, it states: “The conviction of a prominent Thai magazine editor and his harsh 11-year sentence for ‘insulting the monarchy’ will further chill freedom of expression in Thailand.” It adds:Jit

The courts seem to have adopted the role of chief protector of the monarchy at the expense of free expression rights…. The court’s ruling appears to be more about Somyot’s strong support for amending the lese majeste law than about any harm incurred by the monarchy.

It makes this point in noting that Somyos “was arrested five days after launching a campaign to collect 10,000 signatures calling for the amendment of article 112.”

Remarkably, HRW notes that Somyos was convicted despite the fact that “Thailand’s Printing Act protects editors from being held accountable for the content of others.”

HRW also makes a point PPT has expressed many times:

Human Rights Watch said that Thai authorities used Somyot’s pretrial detention as a means to punish him for his views. Somyot was denied bail eight times during the course of his 20-month pretrial detention [other sources say 12 times]. He was compelled to appear in shackles in hearings in four different provinces for the same alleged offense, even though all the witnesses resided in Bangkok.

HRW also adds some well-known context:

From 1990 to 2005, the Thai court system received only about four or five lese majesty cases per year. In the period from January 2006 to May 2011, however, there was a surge when more than 400 cases were brought to trial. While the prosecutions for lese majeste have declined since Yingluck Shinawatra took office in 2011, Thai authorities continue to use draconian statutes in the Penal Code and the Computer Crime Act to restrict freedom of expression, including on the internet. Thousands of websites have been blocked as “offensive to the monarchy.”

However, the claim that: “Neither the king nor any member of the royal family has ever personally filed any lese majeste charges” is neither here nor there as they are unable to do this. That said, while usually hushed up, it is known that the Royal Household and Privy Council participate in some legal actions on lese majeste.





Further updated: Red shirt leader Yoswaris Chuklom sentenced on lese majeste

17 01 2013
Jeng Dokchik

Jeng

Bloomberg reports that Yoswaris Chuklom, currently an adviser to the government, a comedian and red shirt leader who was prominent in the 2010 protests, has been sentenced to two years in prison on a lese majeste charge based on comments made in a speech during a red-shirt rally at the Phan Fa stage on 29 March 2010.

Also known as , he “received the sentence for comments made in a speech to protesters that implied King Bhumibol Adulyadej influenced [then Prime Minister] Abhisit [Vejjajiva]’s decision not to dissolve the parliament, according to a court statement. The court said it freed him on bail while he appeals the sentence because he showed no intention to flee.”

The court stated: “His statement falsely accused the king of political interference and opposing the defendant and his group…. His statement that his speech didn’t mean he was referring to the king is groundless.”

Yes, that’s right, the court concluded that there was an implied “threat to the monarchy” by associated a political decision with the king, who all politicians are meant to listen to and heed his advice, no matter how bland or loopy, in royalist Thailand.

Yoswaris is alleged to have “told Red Shirt protesters that Abhisit refused to dissolve parliament in 2010 on the orders of an unidentified person with more power than both him and Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda, the king’s top adviser, according to the court. The [court concluded that the] speech apparently made people believe that Yossawaris was referring to the king…”.

This startling, almost unbelievable, case is one of a raft of lese majeste cases brought against red shirt leaders. Politicized courts continue to “punish” those seen to attack the royalist state where it now seems that even an “implied” statement about a body the court might conclude is the king, queen or heir apparent is sufficient to lock an opponent up. Jeng is punished for being an outspoken critic of the royalist state.

Update: Other reports on the sentencing are at the Bangkok Post and The Telegraph.








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