Senate’s latest reactionary intervention

Thai PBS reports that the junta’s unelected swill in the Senate, close to the end of its term, “has voted down the nomination of the former deputy president of the Supreme Administrative Court for the position of its president.”

Wissanu Waranyoo was rejected by 158 votes to 45 in a secret ballot, after being nominated by a standing committee, which vetted his background and ethical behaviour record.”

So what caused these political dinosaurs to reject Wissanu? He was “criticised for being close to Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, mentor of Move Forward Party core members, whose views are known to be in favour of monarchy reform.” The “evidence” is that he “attended Piyabutr’s wedding and took to the stage to propose a toast to the bride and groom.”

Apparently,there was also a “digital footprint” that “showed that he once wrote on his Facebook page about a protest in front of the late former Privy Council president Gen Prem Tinsulanonda’s residence, using negative words to describe Gen Prem.”

Wissanu denied all of this in an open letter to the unelected senators but to no avail as these alleged “relationships” were unacceptable to the dolts appointed by the military junta.

Clearly, legal qualifications count for nothing when appointing senior judges. What matters is absolute loyalty to the establishment and monarchy.

With 3 updates: Needling Thaksin on 112

As Al Jazeera and the Bangkok Post report, anti-Thaksinism has not yet been squelched by the Puea Thai deal done with military parties and the higher ups.

According to the a spokesperson for the Office of the Attorney General, Thaksin Shinawatra is to face a lese majeste charge that has been hanging around since 2015. The OAG is proceeding with a case it received on 16 February 2016, from police at the Technology Crime Suppression Division, alleging Thaksin “defamed the monarchy in comments made in Seoul, South Korea, on May 21, 2015.”

Credit: Kahosod

This is a buffalo manure case as Thaksin did not refer to the monarchy, but the Privy Council (read this for more details). Nevertheless, the royalist courts can concoct a conviction from out of thin air and ignoring Article 112’s actual words, so Thaksin could be in deep trouble if his party can’t wrangle another deal.

According to and OAG spokesman “on Sept 19, 2016, then attorney-general Pongniwat Yuthapanboripan decided to indict Thaksin. At the time, Thaksin was a fugitive and the former attorney-general told police to seek an arrest warrant from the Criminal Court. The court issued the warrant.”

The police then presented the arrest warrant to the Department of Corrections and sought Thaksin’s detention in the event he was released from prison/hospital. Further, on 17 January 2024, “public prosecutors and police informed Thaksin of the lese majeste charge and a related computer crime charge.” Thaksin has repeatedly denied the charges and has “filed a written petition for fair treatment. The present attorney-general had yet to decide if Thaksin should be indicted…”.

The latter may be a way out for Thaksin and his party. But, the double standards would be huge. We can’t help wonder if Puea Thai prefers backdoor deals to a proper, legal, and parliamentary approach to reform.

Update 1: A reader suggests to us that the “deal” done for Thaksin may have been a trick by his enemies. That does not seem possible to us. Rather, we think anti-Thaksinites are seeking to rally their comrades to make the best of a deal they can’t really oppose as it is assumed to have been palace brokered. The reader is right to point out that part of the residual hatred of Thailand is because he was popular for introducing policies that actually made life better for many people.

Update 2: The deal on Thaksin’s return continues to meander along despite the opposition to him and his very special treatment. The Bangkok Post reports that the Department of Corrections, ever pliable on Thaksin but never so for other political prisoners, has reportedly listed Thaksin as eligible for special parole. If he is paroled, political temperatures will rise.

Update 3: Puea Thai has now declared its “opposition to incorporating lese majeste offences into an amnesty plan, despite the potential indictment of jailed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra for insulting the monarchy.” Looking for a back door deal? A now inglorious figure, Phumtham Wechayachai, made the outrageous claim that “Thaksin’s return from self-imposed exile in August last year serves as an indication that the ex premier is ready to enter the justice administration process.” People are rolling in the aisles guffawing, while others are rotting in jail as political prisoners. Puea Thai and its leaders have put their moral compass in the military’s back pocket.

All those double standards

When special deals are done in the judicial system, with high-level influence, the double standards become glaringly obvious. There’s been lots of attention to the buffalo manure piled high in the Thaksin Shinawatra deal.

We guess that one of the thoughts that Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, a Move Forward Party MP and chairman of the House committee on military affairs and Jirat Thongsuwan, another MFP MP may be to highlight double standards. As the Bangkok Post reports, Jirat is “calling for access to film Gen Prayut[h Chan-ocha]’s [taxpayer-funded, military supplied] residence to see how he is living now his time as prime minister has ended.”

The MFP had previously criticized Gen Prayuth’s use of the luxury villa in a Bangkok military compound when the general was unelected prime minister. Entitled to such pampering when army chief, he has “remained there despite leaving the premiership [to be made a privy councilor], citing security reasons.”

Wiroj’s committee is set to discuss this. But, of course, the suggestion “has drawn a backlash from critics.”

The United Thai Nation Party, created for Prayuth and soundly trounced in the election, but still a part of unelected Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s coalition, accused Jirat of “running the panel into disrepute for overstepping his mark.”

A Defense Ministry spokesperson went to the protection offered by the monarchy, and “said he was afraid it would not be appropriate to grant filming access to Gen Prayut’s residence as he now serves on the privy council and is a highly respected figure in the country.” That royal protection has been predicted.

Thanakorn Wangboonkongchana, a UTN deputy leader “insisted Gen Prayut should be left alone as he is no longer involved in politics.” Thanakorn also raised the politicized Constitutional Court’s ruling that the then “premier was rightfully occupying the house.” He says nothing about a former general, prime minister, and now privy councilor doing this.

The army continues to assert that Gen Prayuth “had complied with regulations governing the occupation of a military house.”

Is he? That seems to be the question. Reader’s will, of course, recall that Gen Prem Tinsulanonda, also a former general, prime minister, and privy councilor occupied a taxpayer-funded residence for much of his life from the 1980s. After he croaked, the military “gave” that house to the king who promptly had it demolished.

Thaksin-Prayuth

A reader sent us the following article as a reflection on recent events:

On 29 November 2023, Thailand’s Royal Gazette announced that King Vajiralongkorn had, on 21 October, signed an order appointing 2014 coup leader and prime minister Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha to his Privy Council.

In one sense, this was a reward for a military leader who had spent his career providing loyal service to the palace. Yet like Gen Prem Tinsulanonda before him, Prayuth had been more than a run-of-the-mill loyal servant. Both had been army commanders who also spent many years as prime ministers without facing the electorate.

Like Prem, as prime minister Prayuth worked assiduously to strengthen Thailand’s conservative polity, where the military and bureaucracy controlled politics under the auspices of the monarchy and where super-rich tycoons provided support for the regime. Prayuth’s military-backed regime established a constitution and numerous associated laws that codified the conservative polity – a system he referred to as “Thai-style democracy” – establishing extraordinary powers for unelected bodies that gave them “oversight” of elections and elected governments.

That system worked as expected in 2019, delivering an election victory to military-backed parties that extended Prayuth’s tenure as prime minister. Yet, as the 2023 approached, it was clear that the military-backed parties would be trounced. Voters wanted change and were drawn to opposition parties that promised an end to Prayuth’s regime and the military’s control of politics.

Thaksin Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai Party led in many pre-election polls. However, as the campaign developed, Pheu Thai’s opposition partner the Move Forward Party also polled strongly. It looked likely that Move Forward would be a part of a post-election government.

The conservative establishment, composed of military leaders, palace officials, the wealthiest tycoons, and other royalists, was aghast and fearful that the years of Prayuth’s conservative polity would be undone by Move Forward’s “radical” and anti-monarchy reformism.

The wave of public support for Move Forward was born not just of a desire for change, but also of the dissolution of its predecessor party, Future Forward, and the exuberant monarchy reform movement that partly resulted from that dissolution. Prayuth’s government had seen off the monarchy reform movement by facing down street protests and by using the judicial system to bury articulate reformers under a barrage of legal cases. Many were charged with multiple counts of lese majeste.

The regime may have stifled dissent, but its heavy-handed repression made military-backed parties unelectable. To save the conservative polity, the establishment did the unthinkable. After years of casting Thaksin as an evil anti-monarchist and battling his Thai Rak Thai-People Power Party-Pheu Thai Party, it turned to Pheu Thai. Dealing with Thaksin and Pheu Thai was preferable to allowing the Move Forward Party to have a hand in a post-election government.

A week before the May 2023 election, in a secret meeting, Thaksin and palace and tycoon figures did a deal – always publicly denied – that would keep Move Forward out of a Pheu Thai Party coalition government and kept the military-backed parties in the coalition. The details of the deal will probably never be revealed. However, Thaksin soon returned from exile, served less than a day in prison, and received a royal pardon for most of his sentence. And, despite being edged in the election by Move Forward, Pheu Thai formed government.

Credit: Khaosod

In the election campaign, recognizing the electorate’s yearning for change, Pheu Thai portrayed itself as a populist agent of change, implying it would reject military-backed parties and promising a government that would bring social, economic, and political reform.

After the election, Pheu Thai spokespersons somewhat unenthusiastically participated in coalition talks with Move Forward. But these talks were soon derailed by royalist taunts that Move Forward was anti-royalist and multiple calls for it to be dissolved. Meanwhile, the Senate made it clear that the party’s leader Pita Limjaroenrat could never be approved by parliament as prime minister.

The Senate, entirely made up of members appointed by Prayuth’s military junta, operated under transitory constitutional provisions that made approval of a prime minister a matter for a joint sitting of both houses of parliament. These senators duly rejected Pita. Meanwhile, agencies the Prayuth regime had populated with its supporters moved against Pita. In what some saw as a plot, the Constitutional Court suspended Pita from parliament while it considered two flimsy cases that could result in Pita’s banning from politics and the dissolution of the party.

The stymying of Move Forward gave Pheu Thai an opportunity to form a coalition government and nominate real estate tycoon and establishment scion Srettha Thavisin as prime minister. Srettha promptly received the overwhelming support of both houses in parliament. In coalition building, Pheu Thai rejected Move Forward while Srettha’s 34-member cabinet includes 16 ministers drawn from the parties from the previous government.

The first months of Srettha’s government have been marked by its unwillingness to do anything new. The circumstances of its rise and the determination to keep Thaksin from jail mean that it has to  abandon campaign promises and slow signature policies to a snail’s pace, including its 10,000 baht digital wallet, meant to stimulate a listless economy. Yet the conservative polity has been maintained.

We may never know if Prayuth’s Privy Council appointment was a part of the historic deal to overturn Move Forward’s electoral success and preserve the conservative polity. Yet that appointment fittingly bookends the successful effort to maintain Prayuth’s political legacy. Conveniently, being appointed to the Privy Council shields Prayuth from political criticism and any legal repercussions from his coup leadership and his actions as the establishment’s prime minister.

The Privy Council and the bourgeoisie

The social media distaste expressed for the king’s appointment of royalist posterior polisher, coup maker, constitution smasher, and commander of murderous military units, Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha, to the Privy Council has prompted yet another effort to veneer the obvious.

The Nation has been prompted/ordered to publish something it headlines “Some facts about the Privy Council of Thailand.”

The article is pretty straight up and down, reading the official screed.  However, as it notes that “[privy] councilors cannot be partisan…”, and refers to official positions, it says nothing about the fact that every privy councilor is partisan in political terms. That’s why there are so many former military and police officers appointed. It is but a committee for the palace and the royalist ruling class.

The only statement in the account that might be considered mildly controversial is the observation that “Privy councillors are not … prohibited from sitting on the boards of influential companies.” As we said, it is but a committee for the palace and the royalist ruling class.

Privy councilors get on well with their betters in the Sino-Thai bourgeoisie, and have often made family fortunes by skimming when in official positions.  In the Privy Council, the relationship is cemented, as is the relations ship between bourgeoisie and palace.

Another military thug appointed privy councilor

As PPT expected, King Vajiralongkorn has expressed his gratitude to yet another military thug and appointed 2014 coup leader Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha to the Privy Council.

We say “gratitude” because Gen Prayuth managed succession and then willingly collaborate in handing the king a range of powers that increased Vajiralongkorn’s personal control of palace, police, and military. Just as significant was Gen Prayuth’s role in fighting off the most significant challenge to the monarchy since the 1970s.

Many of those who opposed the enhanced powers of the monarchy handed to Vajiralongkorn and resented the palace’s huge take from the public purse are in jail or awaiting trial, many on lese majeste charges. The political repression of recent years has been deep and continues under the Puea Thai-led regime.

While the Privy Council’s role has been downgraded under this king, and privy councilors now spend a lot of time representing the king at official events royals once did, the position only goes to those the king trusts and appreciate. Many of the councilors are from military and police backgrounds.

The Royal Gazette announced Gen Prayuth’s appointment on Wednesday, saying that the king “decided that there should be another privy councillor.”

Thaksin and 112

Back when Thaksin Shinawatra first returned from exile, and spent a few hours somewhere in the prison system before being taken to a hospital, some ultra-royalist anti-Thaksinists wanted one lese majeste case against Thaksin processed. Those involved included the electorally unpopular Thai Pakdee Party. The party mentioned an army-instigated 112 case that was said to have been accepted by the Criminal Court in 2015, with an arrest warrant issued.

In fact, Thaksin has accumulated a long list of lese majeste cases over the years, with the earliest being when police recommending an indictment for comments in 2009. The 2015 case the ultra-royalists pushed was from an interview in South Korea on which PPT has a full report. Thaksin had commented on the links between military and Privy Council in orchestrating the 2014 military coup. He stated:

Gen Udomdej

The military listened to the Privy Councilors…. When they didn’t want us to stay anymore, they made Suthep [Thaugsuban, leader of anti-government protests] come out, and then had the military help him. Some people from the palace circle also provided help, which made us powerless.

The result was that Thaksin’s passport was revoked and a lese majeste investigation began. On 29 May 2015, Army chief General Udomdej Sitabutr filed a lese majeste charge.

Those complaining ultra-royalists went quiet when the king pardoned for most of his 8 year sentence. They had to accept the king’s action, even if they hated it.

It is therefore a little surprising that the case has come up again – perhaps hatred of Thaksin trumps subservience to the king.

It is reported that Praphrut Chatprapachai, described as “a legal expert and former Democrat MP candidate,” urged called on the government to take legal action against Thaksin on his 2015 lese majeste case. Praphrut “urged Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin to instruct the police to take legal action against Thaksin” on this case.

Pressuring a privy pivot point

It was recently reported that Thammasat University’s Sociology & Anthropology professor Anusorn Unno has submitted a letter of petition endorsed by 91 university lecturers, university students and others to Privy Council President Gen said Surayud Chulanontseeking his/palace intervention to save lese majeste political prisoners Tantawan Tuatulanond and Orawan Pupong.

He was “petitioned to immediately help put an end to a life-and-death crisis involving a couple of young women on a severe hunger strike.”

The act is said to be “unprecedented.”

Separate petitions including one endorsed with signatures of some 5,000 people have already been lodged in support of calls of human rights groups for reform of the judicial process and abolition of the lese majeste law in addition to the immediate, unconditional release of those political detainees.

It may seem odd to seek intervention from the very institution that is opposed by the hunger strikers. We guess that the idea is to point to the palace as the pivotal point in Article 112.

More taxpayer funds for royals

PPT was (not) staggered to learn from a story in The Nation that reports that even more bags of taxpayer money is being poured into pampering the wealthy royals.

The story states that the regime “has approved an 8.78-billion-baht budget to procure new aircraft for VIPs including royals, privy counsellors, prime ministers, ministers and royal guests.”

Oddly, the report does not say what kind of aircraft is being purchased.

The Prime Minister’s Secretariat proposed the purchase as the “Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) needs to replace the old Airbus A340-500 procured from Thai Airways International (THAI) for VIP travel.”

This Airbus appears to be the same VIP plane that the generous generals shoveled money into for the Royal Thai Air Force for a magnificent loo for royal poop and pee at a cost to taxpayers in excess of 54 million baht.

At that time, it was also reported that the air force had awarded Thai Airways a 750 million baht contract to renovate the interior of a Boeing 777-800 royal aircraft that was said to be under direct command of King Vajiralongkorn’s Deachochai 3 Royal Flight Unit.

Adding salt to the deep wounds on the taxpayers’ collective back, in 2020 it was reported that a new Airbus was procured for royal travel, complete with a VIP conversion at Lufthansa Technik. At a cost of probably well north of US$100 million, the plane joined a VIP fleet that then included two Boeing 737s, three Airbus 319/320/340s, three ATR 72s, 3 Sukhoi Superjet 100s, one Super King Air, and four Saab 340s.

Obviously, the rather small royal family doesn’t feel sufficiently pampered. More taxpayer money probably helps makes them feel better about themselves.

Military and monarchy I

For those who haven’t seen it yet, avid military watcher Paul Chambers has a piece on the recent military reshuffle and what it might mean. Our earlier post on this reshuffle included important links.

Chambers reckons: “Decisions regarding reshuffles represent crucial demonstrations of power…”.He adds: “With a general election due no later than May 2023, guaranteeing palace-led political stability in Thailand’s military and police is essential to the interests of the state and of the elites. ”

From Ugly Thailand

On the role of the monarchy, Chambers includes tables that indicate palace links, and observes:

Thailand’s current king has sought to take an active role in military reshuffles, unlike his father and predecessor who opted for a more indirect role. Initiatives in this area on the part of the palace have translated into the king’s direct selection of Wongthewan faction members to serve as Army commanders, as in the cases of General Apirat Kongsompong (2018-2022) and General Narongphan Jitkaewthae (2020-2022). In 2018, King Vajiralongkorn established the Kho Daeng or Red Rim clique, whose members attend special short-term military training under royal sponsorship. Only Red Rim officers can now rise to top Army, Air Force, or Supreme Command postings.

We think Chambers direct/indirect dichotomy is misleading. The dead king certainly intervened, using his chief privy councilor Gen Prem Tinsulanonda as his hands-on military specialist. This is probably what he means by “indirect,” but this is hardly removed from direct influence, as everyone understood that Prem did the king’s work. In any case, Bhumibol was very hand-on when he supported Prem as prime minister, including against two military attempts to be rid of Prem.

Chambers sees the latest reshuffle as showing some changes to influence/power:

The data … indicate that the palace and Burapha Phayak [military faction]—the latter as dominated by [Gen] Prawit [Wongsuwan]—are engaged in a tug-of-war for control over postings at this highest level of authority. The Navy and Air Force commanders are king’s men first and foremost. Incoming Navy chief Admiral Cherngchai Chomcherngpat and Air Force commander Air Chief Marshal Alongkorn Wannarot join their classmate Army chief General Narongphan [Jitkaewtae] in acting as the bulwark of monarchical interests. Admiral Cherngchai’s royalist ties are owed to his being part of a Navy faction connected to former Navy Chief Admiral Luechai Ruddit, brother of Privy Council member General Kampnat Ruddit. For his part, Armed Forces chief General Chalermpol Srisawat must walk a tightrope, as he is close both to the palace and to Burapha Phayak, the military faction to which he belongs. Like Narongphan, Chalermpol is also a member of the king’s Red Rim faction.

The article concludes:

The 2022 military and police reshuffles reflect an attempt on the part of the monarch to enhance palace proactivity in a year that has seen differences between Prawit and Prayut grow…. [T]he palace appears to be backing new potential Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul of the military-allied Bhumjaithai Party…. [T]he king seems to have intervened in military and police reshuffles, ensuring that arch-royalists whom he trusts assume the top leadership positions…. One aspect of Thailand’s military and police reshuffles remains certain. Since 2008 … these reshuffles have remained under the control of the palace and senior security officials…”.